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Abstract 
Living under the Rubber Boom:  
Market Integration and Agrarian Transformations in the Lao Uplands 
This thesis investigates market integration and agrarian transformations in the uplands of 
the Lao PDR through the lens of the rubber ’boom’. The study addresses the processes and 
consequences of rubber expansion on upland spaces and populations. The thesis draws on 
fieldwork undertaken in four upland communities in Luang Namtha province in the north-
western Lao PDR. The chosen study settlements are different in the levels of market and 
spatial integration as well as in the form that rubber investment takes. Through employing 
a mixed-method approach (household surveys and in-depth interviews), the study shows 
how various actors (market forces and market actors, the transnational and domestic 
states, state personnel, and uplanders themselves) and conditions (the histories of village 
settlement and agricultural land access, levels of market and geographical connections, and 
relations between uplanders and the state and state personnel) have influenced the ways 
in which rubber has expanded into these upland communities. The study, while recording 
some particularities of agrarian transformations among the four settlements, also highlights 
some commonalities. These similarities include: i) changes to the upland economy and land 
use from semi-subsistence to market-oriented production, ii) transformation of land rights 
and control from collective to private and quasi-private systems, and iii) increasing risks to 
the sustainability of upland livelihoods, especially for those who were formerly highly 
reliant on shifting agriculture. The findings of this study contribute to the existing literature 
and debates about agrarian transformations in Southeast Asia, the nature of global land 
grabs, the roles of different actors in shaping agrarian processes, and the evolving place of 
the state in a time of globalisation. Taken together, the thesis provides a better 
understanding on the processes of market integration in the frontiers of the ‘reforming’ Lao 
PDR. 
 
  
iii 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract............................................................................................................................ii 
Table of Contents.............................................................................................................iii 
List of Tables....................................................................................................................vii 
List of Figures...................................................................................................................ix 
List of Maps.......................................................................................................................x 
List of Pictures...................................................................................................................x 
List of Boxes......................................................................................................................x 
List of Acronyms………………...............................................................................................xi 
List of Lao Terms…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….xii 
Declaration.....................................................................................................................xiii 
Statement of Copyright...................................................................................................xiv 
Acknowledgement...........................................................................................................xv 
Chapter One Introduction................................................................................................17 
1.1 Introduction: the significance of the rubber boom for agrarian studies...................17 
1.1.1 Agrarian transformations in Southeast Asia.................................................19 
1.1.2 Understanding global land grabs..................................................................20 
1.1.3 Researching actors in agrarian processes....................................................22 
1.1.4 Researching the state in the agrarian processes..........................................24 
1.2 Research and objectives............................................................................................25 
1.2.1 At an empirical level.....................................................................................25 
1.2.2 At a conceptual level....................................................................................26 
1.3 Sites and research methods......................................................................................27 
1.4 Structure of the thesis...............................................................................................30 
Chapter Two Literature review: agrarian transformations, peasants, market, and the 
state in an era of globalisation............................................................................32 
2.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................32 
2.2 Agrarian transformations..........................................................................................35 
 2.2.1 The paths of agrarian transition...................................................................35 
 2.2.2 Rural transformations and de-agrarianisation.............................................39 
 2.2.3 Agrarian transformations in the frontiers....................................................42 
2.3 Global land grabs for farmland investment...............................................................45 
2.4 The state and agrarian processes..............................................................................48 
  
iv 
 
 2.4.1 The state’s role in a national framework.....................................................49 
 2.4.2 The state’s role in a globalisation framework..............................................53 
2.5 Peasants, small farmers and the market...................................................................55 
2.6 Summary...................................................................................................................61 
Chapter Three Research methodology: principles and practices of doing research in the 
Lao uplands.........................................................................................................62 
3.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................62 
3.2 Research framework…………………………………………………………………………………..………..62 
3.3 Doing fieldwork in the Lao PDR.................................................................................69 
3.4 Research sites: justification and practices.................................................................71 
3.5 Research methodologies: plan and reality................................................................78 
 3.5.1 A questionnaire survey – how did it work in the Lao uplands?....................79 
 3.5.2 In-depth interviews......................................................................................83 
3.6 Data analysis..............................................................................................................92 
3.7 Positionality and ethical issues..................................................................................93 
3.8 Summary..................................................................................................................99 
Chapter Four The Lao PDR and its agricultural context..................................................100 
4.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................100 
4.2 The socialist Lao PDR: independence and development challenges 
(1975-1986).............................................................................................................102 
 4.2.1 The socialist Lao PDR: new dependencies in  
the independence period...........................................................................102 
 4.2.2 Lao agriculture: an uncompleted  
socialist transformation.............................................................................106 
4.3 The Lao PDR: a country in transition  
(1986-present).........................................................................................................108 
 4.3.1 The Lao PDR: hope and reality in the era of  
market integration..................................................................................................108 
 4.3.2 Lao agriculture in transition.......................................................................122 
4.4 Summary.................................................................................................................130 
Chapter Five Research Communities.............................................................................132 
5.1 Introduction............................................................................................................132 
  
v 
 
5.2 Luang Namtha Province..........................................................................................136 
5.2.1 Rubber in Luang Namtha............................................................................142 
5.3 Research communities............................................................................................144 
 5.3.1 Overview of the research communities: people and places......................144 
 5.3.2 The state and the upland communities......................................................149 
 5.3.3 The market in the uplands.........................................................................156 
 5.3.4 Livelihoods of the village............................................................................159 
5.4 Summary.................................................................................................................162 
Chapter Six Rubber expansion in the frontiers of the Lao PDR........................................163 
6.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………….......163 
6.2 Rubber expansion from ‘above’: the state-orchestrated rubber boom…….........…164
 6.2.1 Rubber expansion and the ‘will to improve’…............................................164 
 6.2.2 A brutal path of rubber expansion…………………………............................……168 
6.3 Rubber expansion from ‘below’: uplanders’ orchestrated rubber boom…....………177 
6.4 Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………………......….186 
Chapter Seven Transforming the uplands in the age of the rubber boom.......................188 
7.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………….…………............................…188 
7.2  Transformations of the upland economy and land use………………………………....……188 
7.3  Transformations of land use rights and access ……………………………........................194 
7.3.1 State land rights…………………………………………..………………….................…..…198 
 7.3.2 Communal land rights………………………………………….…................………………198 
 7.3.3 Private land rights………………………………………………………….……....................199 
7.4 Emergence of new rural classes………………………………………………………………………….205 
 7.4.1 The emergence of a rural entrepreneurial class in the Lao uplands……….206 
 7.4.2 The emergence of a semi-proletariat class…………………………………….....….207 
7.5 Upland livelihoods: current situation and portents for the future………………..…...209 
 7.5.1 The rubber boom and the erosion of former livelihoods….....……….……….210 
 7.5.2 Emergence of new livelihoods…………………………………………………………..…..215 
 7.5.3 Assessment of the past, looking to the future…………………………………...…..218 
7.6 Summary…………………………………………………………………….…………...............…………....226 
Chapter Eight Rethinking agrarian transformations: linking the Lao experiences to the 
literature...........................................................................................................228 
  
vi 
 
8.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………..…………………………….............228 
8.2 Agrarian transformations in the Lao uplands………………………………………………………229 
 8.2.1 The paths of agrarian transition in the Lao uplands……………….………….……229 
 8.2.2 The role of agriculture on rural livelihoods……………………………….…...………233 
8.3 Rethinking land grabs and land deals…………………………………………………….….…..……240 
 8.3.1 Forms and strategies of land control and deals in upland Lao PDR……...…242 
 8.3.2 Actors in land grabs and land deals…………………………………………………….....245 
8.4 Actors in the agrarian processes…………………………………………………………………….……247 
8.5 Rethinking the links between smallholders and the market ………….............….….…250 
 8.5.1 Do smallholders always oppose the market? …………………………........………250 
 8.5.2 Market and differentiation…………………………………….……….………..........……251 
8.6 Rethinking the state and market in economic globalisation…….………….......…………259 
 8.6.1 Decline of the state……………………………………………......................………..……261 
 8.6.2 Continuity of the state………………………………………………………….........………..261 
8.7 Summary…………………………………………….…………………………………............…………….….264 
Chapter Nine Conclusion…………………..................................................................……..….266 
9.1 Introduction……………………………………………………..………….…..............................…….266 
9.2 Key research findings………………………………………………………………..…………………….….266 
 9.2.1 Actors of the rubber expansion in the uplands of the Lao PDR…………..….266 
 9.2.2 Impacts of the rubber boom……………………………………….……………………...….272 
9.3 Contribution of the thesis…………………………………………………………….……………..………276 
 9.3.1 Conceptual implications………………………………………………………………………..276 
 9.3.2 Policy implications………………………………………………………………………………….281 
9.4 Summary.................................................................................................................282 
Appendices………………………………………………………………………………..………………………………284 
Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages………………………………..…………285 
Appendix 2 Summary missing data………………………………………………………..…….300 
Appendix 3 A list of the 'elite' interviewees and informal meetings,  
2009-2010…..................................................................................302 
Appendix 4 An overview of Long, Nalae, and Sing districts. …………………….….305 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….312 
 
  
vii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1 Degrees of integration and dominant forms of rubber involvement  
in the study villages, 2009………………………………………………………...................29 
Table 2.1 Links between the literature and research objectives……………............….....33 
Table 2.2  Generalised typology of agrarian transitions in Southeast Asia…..........……38 
Table 2.3  The character, direction, and orientation of land use change……..........……46 
Table 2.4  Summary of agrarian processes in relation to the role of the state and 
globalisation…………………………………………………………………..…..…...................50 
Table 3.1 Relations between research aims and objectives and sets of empirical 
data………………………………………………………………………………………………………….65 
Table 3.2 Summary of households surveyed and socio-economic status in  
the study villages, 2009…………………………………………….………….......……….……82 
Table 3.3  Summary of interviewees from the study villages………………...............…..…84 
Table 3.4 Summary of data collected by in-depth interviews, 2009-2010………………..85 
Table 4.1 The Lao PDR: an overview………………………………………………........………..….…101 
Table 4.2 Lao landmarks of transition, 1980s-2011…………………………….……….…………110 
Table 4.3 Overview of the economic conditions of the GMS members at  
the onset of Cooperation,1992-1995…………………………….……………….…......111 
Table 5.1 Main ethnic groups in Luang Namtha, 2005….………………………………………..138 
Table 5.2 Areas of paddy, upland rice and major cash crops planted in the  
district of Long, Nalae, and Sing (2008/2009)…………………...................……141 
Table 5.3 Status of rubber plantations in Luang Namtha, 2009………………..........……143 
Table 5.4  Summary of the study villages……………………………………….........………...…….145 
Table 5.5 Year of settlement in the study villages………………………..............………..…..150 
Table 5.6 Forestland classified by the LUP/LA programme in the study villages….…154 
Table 7.1 The economy and land use changes in the study sites, 
 late 1990s–2010........................................................................................191 
Table 7.2 Areas of rubber land under private rights and full control, 2009..............202 
Table 7.3 The current situation of shifting cultivation, 2009…………………....………...…211 
Table 7.4  Amount of Non-timber forest products exported from Nalae district  
  (2001-2008)…………………………………………………………………................…...……212 
Table 7.5  Surveyed households’ average number of cattle (early 2000s-2009)….....214 
  
viii 
 
Table 7.6  Average household annual income from wage labouring in each village, 
2009…………………............……………………………………………………..……………......216 
Table 7.7 Possible future scenarios of transforamtions in the study communities…221 
Table 8.1  Percentage of surveyed households involved in each livelihood  
activity, 2009……............................................................................………..…235 
Table 8.2  A brief summary of the research’s contribution to debates  
on agrarian transformations in Southeast Asia..........................................239 
Table 8.3  A brief summary of the research’s contribution to the  
   understandings of land grabs and land deals………………………………….….....241 
Table 8.4 A brief summary of the research’s contribution to debates on  
the links between small farmers and the market……………………………………259 
Table 8.5 A brief summary of the research’s contribution to debates over  
state and market relations.........................................................................260 
  
  
ix 
 
List of Figures 
Figures 1.1 Rubber planted areas in the Lao PDR, 1990-2020……………………………….…...19 
Figures 4.1  Lao economic performances, 1985-2010………………………………............…...118 
Figures 4.2 Share of accrual FDI in the Lao PDR by country, as of August 2009…………119 
Figures 4.3 Actual FDI by sectors (US$ millions), 2006-2014………………………..........……120 
Figures 4.4 Exports by sectors, 2007-2012………………………….………………………….......…..120 
Figures 4.5 Shares of public domestic expenditure (percentage), 2000-2005……………125 
Figures 5.1 Rice production areas in Luang Namtha, 1985–2010………………………………140 
Figures 5.2 Luang Namtha’s rubber planted areas, 1994–2009…………………........………143 
Figures 5.3 Percentage of surveyed households’ engagement in each  
livelihood activity, 2009……………………………………………………………………......160 
Figures 5.4  Average annual income of surveyed households generated  
from each activity, 2009……………………………………………………………......…..…161 
Figures 7.1  Transformations of land rights and control, late 1990s-2010…………………197 
Figures 7.2  Rice surpluses and shortages in the study communities,  
  early 2000s-2009……………………………………………………..…………………………….218 
Figures 8.1 Average income of surveyed households by  
livelihood activities, 2009…………………………………………………...............………235 
Figure 9.1 Key actors in rubber expansion in the Lao uplands…………………………………267 
  
  
x 
 
List of Maps 
Map 1.1 Luang Namtha province, the Lao PDR ……………………………………….…………….28 
Map 4.1  The Greater Mekong Economic Corridors…………..………………………….……...113 
Map 5.1 Luang Namtha province and the study sites…….………………………......….…..137 
 
List of Pictures 
Picture 5.1  Luang Namtha’s provincial centre……………………………………………………….…139 
Picture 5.2  Baan Kaem Khong, 2010……………………………………………………………….………..146 
Picture 5.3 Baan Pha Lad, 2010……………………………………………….……………………...…..…..147 
Picture 5.4  Baan Houay Luang Mai, 2009……………………………………..………………….….…..148 
Picture 5.5 Baan Don Tha, 2009……………………………………………………..…………………….....149 
Picture 5.6 An example of a LUP/LA map in a village in Sing district, 2010…………......154 
Picture 6.1 Rubber intercropped with upland rice, 2010……………….…………….............182 
Picture 6.2  Going to have more rubber, 2010…………………………………………….....…….....182 
Picture 7.1  A combination of upland rice fields and forest, Nalae, 2010……...............193 
Picture 7.2  Today’s typical landscape dominated by rubber trees, Nalae, 2010……...193 
Picture 8.1  Houses of villagers of different economic status, 2009-2010………………….252 
 
List of Boxes 
Box 6.1  Uncle Long Ma’s story……………………………………………..……….......………………179 
Box 6.2  The story of Uncle Lene……………………………………………………………….......……180 
Box 6.3  The story of Uncle Ponu………………………………………………………….................181 
Box 7.1  Claiming land: stories from Houay Luang Mai and Don Tha villages…......199 
Box 7.2  Mr Pae and the conflicts over land access…………………………………..…......…204 
Box 8.1  The market and differentiation: stories from Baan Houay Luang Mai…...256 
 
  
  
xi 
 
List of Acronyms 
ACF   Action Contre la Faim  
ADB  The Asian Development Bank 
AoA  Agreement on Agriculture 
CPI  Committee for Planning and Investment 
CYN  Chinese currency unit (Chinese Yuan) 
DAFO  District Agricultural and Forestry Office 
EU  The European Union 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FUF  Friends of Upland Farmers Company 
GATT  The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product  
GBP  Great Britain Pound 
GMS  The Greater Mekong Sub-region 
GNP  Gross National Product 
GoL  The government of the Lao PDR  
GTZ  A German Technical Cooperation 
LAK  Lao Kip (Lao currency unit) 
LPRP  The Lao People's Revolutionary Party 
LUP/LA  Land Use Planning and Land Allocation Programme  
MAF  Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
NAFRI  National Agriculture and Forestry Research Institute 
NEM  New Economic Mechanism 
NLMA  National Land Management Authority 
NTFPs  Non-Timber Forest Products 
NUOL  National University of Laos 
PAFO  Provincial Agricultural and Forestry Office 
RLG  The Royal Lao Government 
THB  Thai Baht (Thai currency unit) 
UNWFP  United Nations World Food Programme (also called WFP) 
WTO  The World Trade Organisation 
  
  
xii 
 
List of Lao Terms 
Baan  a village 
Hai  an upland rice-field 
Muang  a district  
  
xiii 
 
Declaration 
I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and effort and where other sources of 
information have been used, they have been acknowledged. No portion of the work 
referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree 
or qualification of this or any other learning institutes. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
xiv 
 
Statement of Copyright 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published 
without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
xv 
 
Acknowledgement 
It has taken me four years, with lots of ups and downs – a typical life of PhD student, to 
complete this dissertation which could not be possible without support, patience, and trust 
of both individual people and institutions. My first thanks go to Thammasat University for 
providing me the funding to pursue a PhD study. My PhD study could not have been 
possible without consistently exceptional support, guidance, and a lot of patience from my 
supervisors. I am obligated to everything they have done in configuring and shaping my 
research ideas and ensuring that my research could be possible. I owe much to Jonathan 
Rigg, my lead supervisor, for his great interest and enthusiasm in supporting my research 
project. I appreciate him for not only time and effort he put on this research but also his 
open-mindedness in encouraging me to challenge his work more critically; I have not been 
successful in this, though. I am fortunate to have Ann Le Mare as part of the supervision 
team. I am grateful to her for many unexpected questions she asked which urged me to 
think carefully about the points that I had overlooked. Her points make me realise the 
importance of communicating the research to people who are beyond the areas of my 
research. I also thank Kathrin Horschelmann for introducing the literature on post-socialist 
transformation. It has been such a great learning experience being their student. 
This thesis would not have been completed without the fieldwork in the Lao PDR. My 
sincere thanks go to the Faculty of Agriculture, at National University of Laos for agreeing to 
be my host organisation during my field research. I would like to thanks Assoc. Prof Dr. 
Oudom Phonekhampheng, Assoc Prof Inthong Somphou, Ajarn Phoukeo Saokhamkeo and 
Ajarn Phouvin Phousavanh for their help in a number of ways and on a variety of different 
occasions. Special thanks go to Ajarn Saythong Vilayvong who introduced me to various 
state organisations and provided me with guidance on understanding unwritten Lao 
cultural codes. I also cherish his sincere and open-minded friendship. I am grateful to 
Charlotte Hicks, Peter Dutton, and Sarayoot Jailak for providing me with an overview of 
rubber expansion and upland development. Thanks also go to Chanthone Phasy who 
allowed and assisted me to access materials from the GTZ’s library. 
In Luang Namtha, I appreciate the assistance provided by the Luang Namtha PAFO, with 
special thanks to Mr Khammouan Lorkamchuer. My research could not have been possible 
without assistance from DAFO’s staff members from Long, Nalae, and Sing districts. I would 
  
xvi 
 
like to thank Mr Asoun Phoulakham (Long DAFO), Mr Sotvisay Phoulavong (Nalae DAFO), 
and Mr Sommee Phomphanya (Sing DAFO) in particular for their assistance and guidance to 
me. Also special thanks for Anongsack Chanthavong and his family for not only helping to 
make my research in Long district possible but also for our friendship we have developed. 
My heartfelt thanks go to villagers from all of the villages I visited who, with their kindness 
and patience, allowed me to ask many questions.  
In Thailand, I thank Ajarn Yos Santasombat and Ajarn Chusak Wittayapak from Chiang Mai 
University for their constant moral support. I am particularly grateful for the friendship 
from Ajarm Jamaree Chiengthong, sharing joyful and difficult aspects of life. Thanks also to 
all of my friends for their friendship, attention and support.  
Back to Durham, I would like to thank Thai friends at Durham University and friends from 
the Geography Department, especially Jitsuda Limkriengkrai, Sasiwimol Nawawitphisit, 
Jiajie Zhang, Hosna Shewly, Md Nadiruzzaman and Clare Collingwood Esland, who made my 
life in Durham colourful. Special thanks go to Yingluk Kanchanaroek from Leeds University 
for sharing both joyful and dull moments of PhD life. Thanks also to Spencer Munn for 
being such a wonderful housemate and for his patience in explaining to me both English 
grammar and culture. 
Last but definitely not least, my parents deserve my very special thanks for all the love, 
support, encouragement they have given to me. Without being convinced why their 
daughter would like to do a PhD in Geography, they have never hesitated to provide me 
support in whatever ways they can. I dedicate this PhD to them. 
 
 
  
17 
 
Chapter One  
       Introduction 
1.1  Introduction: the significance of the rubber boom for 
agrarian studies 
 “The most dramatic change of the second half of this century, and the one 
which cuts us off forever from the world of the past, is the death of the 
peasantry1.” 
Eric Hobsbawm (1994: 289) 
The status of the peasantry has long been of interest to scholars in agrarian and rural 
studies. Scholars of many persuasions, from Marxist to populist and neo-liberal, have 
commented on the disappearance of the peasantry along with the process of capitalist 
development (Bernstein 2003: 4). Large parts of the world have become predominantly 
capitalist and urban in societal terms. The number of megacities with more than 10 million 
inhabitants increased from only two in 1970 (New York and Tokyo) to 21 in 2011 (United 
Nations 2012: 5-6). The number of urban residents has more than doubled from 1,352 
million in 1970 to 3,632 million in 2011, with a projected figure of over 4,500 million in 
2025 (United Nations 2012: 9). Rural populations, while their numbers are still high, 
                                                          
1
Tracing back to the classical work of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx, Bryceson (2000) 
notes that these theorists share similarities in their views of peasants as a non-capitalist agricultural 
producer class who usually use 'backward' or traditional technologies to produce only to meet the 
consumption needs of the family's members. These classic theorists conceptualise a peasant society 
as a closed, 'backward', non-capitalist, undifferentiated community in the countryside which is 
distinctive in its form from industrial society. This fixed view of the peasantry is increasingly being 
challenged (Kearney 1996; Bernstein 2000). In this research, I use peasantries as a broad term to 
denote those people whose livelihoods are founded on agriculture and have links to rural spaces. In 
order to catch up with the transformations taking place in the research sites, I use the production 
aim as one of the important criteria to classify agriculturalists into three categories: i) peasants 
whose aim of production is dominated mainly by subsistence purposes, ii) semi-peasants or small 
farmers who, while they still produce for their own consumption, are involved in producing for (and 
increasingly reliant on) the market, and iii) professional farmers who produce mainly for the market 
and whose production involves a high level of investment. I am aware that these categories are 
problematic and there is an overlap of the boundaries between them. I thus use the categories as a 
methodological tool for capturing change rather than as a political statement. By contrast to some 
classic theorists, I do not consider peasants as more ‘backward’ than semi-peasants (small farmers) 
or professional farmers. 
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particularly in the World Bank’s categories of agriculture-based and transforming countries2 
(World Bank 2007a: 5), are in decline in many parts of the world. In East and Southeast Asia 
this dates from 1995, while for South and Central Asia decline is projected to occur from 
2025, and in Sub-Saharan Africa from 2045 (IFAD 2010: figure 1). It is not just, however, 
that the proportion of the urban population is growing relative to the rural populace, but 
for rural inhabitants even when they are still involved in agriculture, farming is no longer 
their only occupation. From the late 1980s to the early 2000s, the share of non-agricultural 
income in total rural household income in many countries significantly increased. In some 
countries, such as China, Mexico and Indonesia, non-agricultural income has grown to 
exceed agricultural income (IFAD 2010: figure 6). Do these trends confirm the ‘disappearing 
peasantries’ thesis?  
History shows that a large number of peasants and small farmers are still alive under the 
capitalist economy and, even though they may encounter hardship, are likely to continue to 
survive into the future (Brookfield and Parsons 2007). The ‘surprising’ survival of peasants 
and small farmers raises issues not about the ‘failure’ of the agrarian transition, but rather 
about the multiple trajectories of transition which may not follow the paths that have been 
previously predicted. Studies have shown different pathways of agrarian and rural 
transitions from rural urbanisation (Guldin 1997), de-agriculturalisation (Guldin 2001; 
Guang and Zheng 2005), and de-agrarianisation (Bryceson 1996; Bryceson and Jamal 1997; 
Rigg and Nattapoolwat 2001), to re-peasantization (Ploeg 2009) or re-agrarianisation 
(Vandergeest 2012). This research aims to make a contribution to the advancement of 
understanding of these multiple trajectories of agrarian transformation by looking at 
agrarian change in the Lao PDR - a country which we still know little about. Due to the 
recent, rapid increase in the area planted to rubber in the country (see Figure 1.1), the 
research uses the rubber ‘boom’ as the empirical lens to capture a picture of transition. 
Researching the Lao rubber boom also provides insights into a number of other overlapping 
areas of debate, namely global land grabs, actors in agrarian processes, and the role of the 
state in the context of marketization and globalisation (or regionalisation). 
                                                          
2
 The World Bank’s World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (World Bank 
2007a) classifies countries into three categories based on the role of agriculture in economic growth 
and poverty reduction: i) agriculture-based countries, which use agriculture as the basis for 
economic growth; ii) transforming countries, where agriculture is no longer a major source of 
growth, and where there are rising rural-urban income disparities and poverty remains high in rural 
areas; and iii) urbanised countries, where agriculture makes only a very small contribution to 
economic growth (less than five per cent).  
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Figure 1.1 Rubber planted areas in the Lao PDR, 1990-2020. 
 
Sources: Manivong and Cramb (2008: 115), Hicks et al (2009), and NAFRI et al (2009) 
Note: Data for 2010 and 2020 are projections based on government planning documents 
1.1.1 Agrarian transformations in Southeast Asia 
A key debate within agrarian studies is how to understand the transformations of rural 
spaces. In Southeast Asia, several studies point to quite profound changes in rural 
landscapes, livelihoods and social relations stimulated by state interventions in rural areas 
(Hart 1988; Hirsch 1989; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; White 1999), market integration (Li 
2002a; Rigg 2005a; Agergaard et al. 2009), rural industrialisation and rural-urban 
interaction (Rigg 1998; 2001; 2003; Thompson 2004), and transnational processes (McKay 
2003; McKay and Brady 2005). These studies provide obvious links between the 
transformations taking place in rural areas and the wider context. 
One of the shared insights of agrarian research in Southeast Asia today is the diversification 
of the household economy and the increasing significance of non-farm activities for rural 
household livelihoods (Rigg 2001; 2003; Potter and Badcock 2004; Thompson 2004), 
sometimes viewed as a processes of ‘de-agrarainisation’ (Rigg 2001; 2003; Rigg and 
Nattapoolwat 2001), in which the role of agriculture as a major source of household 
livelihoods has declined. Rural households may survive but only on the basis of economic 
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activities beyond agriculture and even beyond rural spaces3. While the bulk of scholarship 
on Southeast Asia’s agrarian transformations has been conducted in non-socialist areas 
where the processes of spatial and economic integration have long taken place, thus 
providing a coherent picture of agrarian situations, studies in previously communist 
countries (Vietnam and the Lao PDR) by non-communist researchers have only generally 
been possible since the 1990s when the countries were first integrated into global 
capitalism. Thus there is a need for more work on these former socialist countries. Data 
from such latecomer countries provide additional insights into agrarian transformations, 
the lived experiences and livelihoods of people on the margins where a socialist state is 
involved (Forsyth and Michaud 2010: 3-4). Researching rubber expansion in the Lao PDR 
adds to our understanding of rural transformations in Southeast Asia by providing an 
alternative insight, one that is located at the margins of Asia’s miracle where market 
integration is nascent, where new forms and structures of social and economic relations are 
emerging, and where livelihoods are in flux. 
1.1.2 Understanding global land grabs  
“More than 200 million hectares of land in poor nations was sold by 
governments in land-grabbing deals with industry and investors between 2000 
and 2010.” 
(Gilbert 2011) 
“We give land because we cannot produce on that land. Because of lack of 
capital and technology, that’s why. They open a big opportunity for 
employment and of course generation of taxes and other financial gain.”  
(Ethiopia's Agriculture Minister cited in Rugman 2012) 
Recent rising demand for land in the global South has encouraged both scholars and policy 
researchers to investigate the emergence of a new wave of land deals. Deininger and his 
colleagues (Deininger et al. 2011: 51), drawing on data from press reports, estimate that 
around 56 million hectares of land globally were acquired by foreign investors in a period of 
less than a year. Land in African countries accounted for around two-thirds of the global 
demand. This level of demand is extremely high in comparison to previous land use 
                                                          
3
 Thus rural spaces and urban spaces are now much more closely connected than previously. 
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expansion. In Africa, “demand in 2009 alone was equivalent to more than 20 years of 
previous land expansion” (Deininger 2011: 218). A considerable amount of literature has 
explored the processes, causes and impacts of this rush for land control. The demand for 
farmland to secure food and biofuel supplies for investing countries is pointed to as a main 
driver for large-scale land acquisitions in the South (Cotula et al. 2008; Cotula et al. 2009; 
FIAN 2010; Mann and Smaller 2010; Hall 2011). The media often characterise this land rush 
in the global South as a result of increasing pressures on farmland in the North (Chen 2011; 
McVeigh 2011). Though actors from the North are still key in spurring the rush for land in 
the South, several studies (GRAIN 2008; Friis and Reenberg 2010; Mann and Smaller 2010; 
Cotula 2011b) show that some non-Western countries, namely the oil-rich Gulf countries, 
and highly-populated countries, have also emerged as important actors in this process. 
Empirical studies have identified some common characteristics of such land grabs. For 
instance, transferred land is usually land which was previously under an informal customary 
arrangement without legal recognition by the state’s authorities (Spieldoch and Murphy 
2009: 47; Deininger et al. 2011: 99-100). Some allocated land was defined as ‘waste’ land 
and was claimed on the basis that there was no pre-existing land user (Cotula et al. 2009: 
62). These findings have led to policy recommendations to protect smallholders from losing 
their land by securing people’s land rights.  
As African countries are the major targets of land acquisitions, most literature on land grabs 
is drawn from the African experience. While many non–African countries are also 
experiencing a rush for land, their land grab situations have received less attention (Visser 
and Spoor 2011). Focusing only on the African experience may be problematic, as Borras 
and Franco (2011: 14) remark: 
“This leads to both strengths and weaknesses in analysis of the issue. Among 
the strengths is the ability to demonstrate that large-scale land investments 
tend to result in negative outcomes for domestic populations, even in land-
abundant countries such as those in Africa. Yet focusing solely on Africa risks 
missing important specificities and dynamics of land-grabbing in other 
regions.” 
This research, then, wishes to draw attention to the experiences of land grabs and deals in 
the Lao PDR, a country which is one of the targets in the rush for farmland investment 
(GRAIN 2008: 4). Researching the rubber boom offers an alternative view of global land 
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grabs, which may resonate with land grabs in other regions, or may reveal distinct elements 
that deliver alternative ‘lessons’. 
1.1.3 Researching actors in agrarian processes4 
Rob Cramb (Cramb 2009) observes how oil palm, mostly cultivated in the form of private 
estates, has become a dominant crop in Sarawak, a Malaysian state on the island of Borneo. 
He records the role of the state and private companies in Sarawak’s recent upland 
transformation: 
 “In most cases,..., provisional leases have been issued directly to private 
plantation companies… These purely private estates accounted for 359,000 ha 
or 62 per cent of total oil palm area… In theory, the provisional lease requires 
the lessee to identify any customary claims and negotiate acceptable 
arrangements with the claimants before the lease can be confirmed. In 
practice, capital has been raised and land clearing commenced on the 
assumption that the provisional lease gave the company clear title to all the 
land falling within the perimeter of the lease area. Hence longhouse 
communities who claimed customary rights to part or all of the land allocated 
for a private oil palm estate often know nothing of the granting of a provisional 
lease until bulldozers arrived to clear the area for planting. When they 
protested they were mostly ignored, given notice to leave the area or, in the 
worst cases, subjected to violence.” (Cramb 2009: 24) 
The expansion of oil palm plantations in Sarawak provides a picture of how a new boom 
crop, oil palm, has expanded into the frontiers. Cramb points to the role of external forces 
and actors - the state and oil palm companies - in transforming the frontier landscape. He 
shows how relations between market actors and people in the frontiers have developed to 
the detriment of the latter. Longhouse communities have become the victims of market 
expansion: their land has been taken by the oil palm companies. 
The story of oil palm expansion in Sarawak reflects one of the key questions in the literature 
on agrarian studies - who and/or what are the agents of changes? Literature influenced by 
                                                          
4
 Actors used in this thesis include both human actors (such as small farmers, investors, and state 
officials) and non-human actors (such as market forces and the state). 
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the political economy approach tends to consider agrarian transformations at the ‘local’ 
level as the outcome of external and powerful actors, in particular the state, the market, 
and global forces. Some literature (Nevins and Peluso 2008) records the application of 
violence in the marketization of the frontiers. Small farmers, who are now more connected 
to the market, are likely to be seen as the victims of external forces, leading to their 
displacement from the means of subsistence and production (Araghi 2009), or their semi-
proletarianisation (Akram-Lodhi 2007b; Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010). This perspective on 
transformations in the frontiers conveys the sense that people in the frontiers have to 
‘resist’ the market and transformations imposed from ‘outside’. This, however, is not the 
only frontier story that can be told. 
From the early 1990s to 2000, the Central Highlands of Vietnam were transformed as coffee 
plantations, operated mostly by smallholders, rapidly expanded. Stan Tan (2000) observes 
how this frontier landscape was changed not by outsiders, but by small farmers: 
“… the precipitate peasants manifested both determination and initiative to 
the ‘self-enrol’ into the coffee network when they carved out the plots of land 
from existing forests and laid claims to the land, outside State auspices. They 
then sourced their own seeds, found their own ways of cultivating the coffee 
trees, and ‘walked’ their way into the coffee marketing networks of the 
traders. Knowledge of cultivation and commodity value are extended more 
through inter-personal networks reflected in the phrase ‘nguoi di sau hoc hoi 
nguoi di truoc’ (ask and observe those who came earlier), and individual 
innovation of cultivation techniques ‘moi  nguoi moi cach’ (each has his own 
way); more, that is, than via some meticulous State plan.” (Tan 2000: 60) 
The story of the coffee boom in Vietnam shows that transformations in the frontiers are 
not solely induced from outside. Smallholders in the Central Highlands played a significant 
role in transforming the frontier landscape and connecting the frontier space to the global 
market. While the experience of Sarawak’s uplands shows victimhood and, possibly, the 
resistance of people in the frontiers to market expansion, the story of the coffee boom in 
Vietnam’s Central Highlands highlights how far the market and capitalism are ‘welcomed’ 
by populations in the frontiers. The binary opposition of small farmers, either as victims or 
agents of changes, is now considered problematic due to the fact that it overlooks the 
complexities of agrarian processes in the frontiers, and relations between the frontiers and 
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the wider context. A study which “does not rely on an assumed relation between an ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’” (Tan and Walker 2008: 123) indeed could provide rich data to build a better 
understanding of the processes of change taking place at the frontier. Researching the 
rubber boom in the uplands of the Lao PDR provides just such an opportunity. 
1.1.4 Researching the state in the agrarian processes 
The collapse of the USSR and former socialist countries has led to significant changes across 
the former socialist world. The state is now, arguably, no longer the dominant actor in 
controlling or determining a country’s socio-economic development, even in putative one-
party states such as the Lao PDR, China and Vietnam. Andrew Walker (1996) notes that 
there is a tendency to distinguish between the ‘power of the state’ and the ‘power of the 
market’. In the context of the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and economic 
liberalisation in the transition countries, it is assumed that the power of the state has 
declined giving way to the rise of market power. Apart from the transition in the former 
socialist countries, the roles and status of the state are challenged by globalisation and neo-
liberalism. The world is now intensely connected and economic activities in almost every 
corner of the world are linked to global capitalism.  
There is debate among scholars about the role and status of the state in an increasingly 
interconnected world. This ranges from “the end of the nation-state” (Ohmae 1995), or 
“the erosion of the state” (Strange 1997), to “the myth of the powerless state” (Weiss 
1997; 1998). These two extreme positions are quite problematic; the state is neither 
disappearing nor being unaffected by global processes. The state, though it may play a less 
crucial role in the global era than it did previously, is nonetheless still a vital actor in 
economic processes (Raynolds 1994; McMichael 1997; Gainsborough 2007). Jones and 
Jones (2004: 410 ), while recognising that the state is inevitably affected by globalisation, 
propose that “geographers need to focus on the ways in which the nation state continues 
to act, albeit in a modified manner, within the era of globalisation” (italics in original). 
Empirical research on the role of the state in economic processes and development, 
particularly in a transition country such as the Lao PDR, can provide a better understanding 
of the status of the state enabling us better to address the question: “to what extent is the 
nation state being transformed, to what extent is it declining — or even perhaps still 
growing?” (Mann 1997 cited in Jones and Jones 2004: 421).  
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While the Lao PDR is moving towards economic liberalisation, its market system is still 
‘imperfect’ and the economy is considered as ‘frontier capitalism’ (Laungaramsri 2012). It 
remains, moreover, a one party state governed by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party 
(LPRP). The Lao PDR provides an insight into how relations between global and regional 
forces, and transition, may take different forms from those evident in other countries. 
Questions addressed include whether the state is still the key actor in agrarian processes 
and rural transformations or if it has lost its previously dominant status to various non-state 
actors, and how relations between the state and non-state actors have evolved in the 
context of spatial and economic integration. 
1.2 Research aims and objectives 
This research aims to understand rubber expansion in the uplands of the Lao PDR in the 
context of on-going regional (spatial) and market (economic) integration, against a 
backdrop of (apparent) political continuity. The research aims to use the rubber boom as a 
lens to reflect and link a number of overlapping strands of literature, namely agrarian 
transformations in Southeast Asia, global land grabs, actors in agrarian processes, and the 
state in the context of increasingly global market transactions. In doing so, the research sets 
out a series of research objectives and questions, at two levels: empirical and conceptual. 
1.2.1 At an empirical level: 
 1. To understand the processes of rubber expansion into the frontiers 
 1.1 Who and/or what are the key actors in the recent rapid expansion of rubber in 
the Lao uplands?  
 1.2 How have these actors shaped and re-shaped agrarian relations in the uplands? 
 2. To understand the impacts of current rapid expansion of rubber on upland 
spaces and peoples 
 2.1 To what extent has rubber expansion shaped and re-shaped the upland 
landscape? 
 2.2 To what extent, and how, has rubber expansion affected the lives and 
livelihoods of uplanders? 
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1.2.2 At a conceptual level: 
 1. To contribute to the (re)conceptualisation of agrarian transformations in 
Southeast Asia: 
 1.1 Can notions of agrarian transformations in Southeast Asia, namely the paths of 
transition and de-agrarianisation, which have been derived from research in the non-
socialist countries be applied to the experience of agrarian change in the Lao uplands? 
 1.2 Do the experiences of agrarian transformation in the Lao PDR offer us an 
alternative insight into the notion of ‘actors’ in agrarian processes? How do the empirical 
data from the Lao uplands contribute to the understanding of relations between small 
farmers, the market, and the state(s) as well as to the notion of agency in agrarian 
processes5? 
 2. To contribute to the (re)conceptualisation of global land grabs: 
 2.1 To what extent can the notion of ‘global land grabs’, mostly derived from the 
African experience, be applied to the current situation in the transitional Lao PDR? 
2.2 How do agrarian transitions in the Lao uplands provide us with an alternative 
insight into global land grabs and land deals? 
 3. To contribute to the (re)conceptualisation of the state in the globalisation 
process 
 3.1 To what extent is the state-market dualism applicable to the current situation in 
the Lao PDR, and how does the experience of the Lao PDR contribute to furthering this 
debate? 
 
                                                          
5
 In this research, agency is termed as individual capacity to “construct their own life course through 
the choices and actions they take within the opportunities and constraints of history and social 
circumstances” (Elder and Johnson 2002: 61). People’s agency is not about individuals’ free decision 
making or action without any influence of society. Rather, agency is developed and exercised within 
socially constructed opportunities. The agency of smallholders in this research thus is considered as 
‘constrained agency’ (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011). 
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1.3 Sites and research methods 
The thesis provides a comparative study of four upland communities in Luang Namtha 
province6 – a province in the north-western region of the Lao PDR (Map 1.1) which has the 
highest planted area of rubber in the country (see section 3.3 for details on the justification 
for and practicalities of choosing the research sites). The four communities have different 
degrees of market integration and have been dominated by different patterns of rubber 
investment (see Table 1.1) which provide an interesting comparison on how levels of 
integration influence the ways that peasants and small farmers have responded to the 
rubber boom. Different dominant patterns of rubber plantations in the four villages also 
provide valuable data to reflect on the capacity of each individual village and different 
groups of households to deal with the rubber boom. 
The study is based on fieldwork which was carried out in the Lao PDR between September 
2009 and September 2010. As the thesis aims to understand changes at a local level, it 
relies mainly on primary data collected at the village level. Primary data were also collected 
through interviews with local officials, investors, NGOs, and scholars. These primary data 
were complemented by secondary data collected from government organisations, NGOs 
and reports from newspapers (the fieldwork is discussed in detail in Chapter 3). 
It is important to note that while social and cultural change was one of the issues that this 
research intended to investigate, socio-cultural dimensions were presented lightly in the 
thesis. The research draws heavily on economic and production perspectives. This was due 
to two main reasons. Firstly, it was clear that at the time the fieldwork was carried out, 
economic and production aspects were a central concern of both villagers and state 
officials. People were interested to talk more about livelihoods and issues related to the 
upland economy than they were about various social aspects of rubber expansion. As I will 
discuss in Chapter 3, the response of the research subjects partly shaped the direction that 
the research took. Secondly, the research was conducted at an early stage in people’s 
engagement with rubber. While transformations are definitely a continuous and continuing 
process, the ‘outcome’ of rubber engagement on the lives of people in terms of income 
                                                          
6
 I use Luang Namtha to refer to the whole province while Luangnamtha is the town and provincial 
capital. Namtha is used when I refer to Namtha district of which Luangnamtha is the main town. 
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generation could not be observed because it was too early in the rubber cycle. While it was 
possible to observe and even forecast the economic and production aspects of the rubber 
boom on people, various socio-cultural implications of the boom (such as social 
differentiation, impacts on social cohesion and social norms, and so forth) that will result 
from the boom could not be observed. Under these conditions, the socio-cultural 
implications of transformation were less present and obvious than the economic 
dimensions, and the thesis reflects this fact. 
Map 1.1 Luang Namtha province, the Lao PDR 
 
 
  
29 
 
Table 1.1 Degrees of integration and dominant forms of rubber involvement in the study villages, 2009 
 Don Tha village 
(Nalae district) 
Houay Luang Mai  
(Sing district) 
Kaem Khong  
(Long district) 
Pha Lad 
(Long district) 
Distance to the nearest Lao-
Chinese border (kilometres) 
120 5 103 65 
Travel time from the village to 
the nearest Chinese border 
2.5 hours 5 minutes 2.5 hours 1.5 hours 
Dominant pattern of rubber 
investment 
1). 2+3 contract farming 
system with a Chinese 
rubber company7 
1).Smallholder investment 1). Large-scale concession 
plantations of a Chinese 
rubber company 
2). Informal deal between 
local investors and 
villagers (local investors 
provide seedlings in 
exchange for land from 
villagers) 
1). 1+4 contract farming 
with a Chinese rubber 
company8 
2).Smallholder investment 
Degrees of market engagement Low High Low Average 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009-2010
                                                          
7
 2+3 contract farming is a system where villagers contribute land and labour inputs while an investor is responsible for the capital, knowledge and technology, and marketing. 
Don Tha’s villagers get 65 per cent of the profits for their contribution of land and labour. Their contract lasts 45 years.  
8
 1+4 contract system is a system where villagers provide only land while an investor is responsible for capital, knowledge and technology, marketing, and labour. Pha Lad’s 
villagers get 30 per cent of the trees when the rubber is three year-old, as recompense for their contribution of land.  
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organised into nine chapters, including this one. Following this chapter, 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on agrarian transformations (highlighting the debates over 
the paths of agrarian transition, rural transformation and de-agrarianisation, and agrarian 
transformations in the frontiers), global land grabs, the relations between small farmers 
and the market, and the state in agrarian processes. This provides the conceptual 
background that will frame the empirical material. This literature is returned to in Chapter 
8, when the empirical data is interrogated against the comparative literature and vice 
versa. 
Chapter 3 provides a summary of the methodology employed to generate the data 
necessary to address the research aims and questions. The chapter provides the 
justification of the selection of the research sites and subjects. It discusses the range of 
methods employed, namely household surveys, interviews, and observation, and identifies 
any limitations. The principles, practicalities, ethics as well as the positionality of a Thai 
female researcher undertaking research in the uplands of the Lao PDR are also explored in 
this chapter. 
Chapter 4 gives an overview of the Lao PDR and discusses the status and development of 
the communist Lao PDR as an aid-reliant country since independence in 1975. The chapter 
explores the attempt and failure of the socialist Lao PDR to transform itself to socialism 
and, later, the necessity to integrate the country into the global and regional economies 
and to embrace economic reform. The role of agriculture is also discussed in relation to the 
country’s wider economic development. 
The study sites are introduced in Chapter 5, beginning with the broader context of Luang 
Namtha province before providing a summary of the four upland study communities and 
providing an overview of spatial and economic relations between the study sites and the 
broader context. 
Chapter 6 focuses on how rubber has expanded into the upland study communities. It 
provides empirical data and analyses two broad paths of rubber expansion into the 
uplands: a path from ‘above’ and a path from ‘below’. Using rubber expansion as a means 
to reflect on wider processes, this chapter illuminates how various actors at different scales 
have been involved in the processes of change taking places in the frontiers of the Lao PDR. 
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Changes in upland areas brought about by the rubber boom are traced in Chapter 7. The 
chapter discusses the transformation of the upland economy and land use from a semi-
subsistence to a market-oriented system. The chapter also highlights the transformation of 
land rights and access from a collective system to diverse forms of land rights and control 
associated with differences in the ways that rubber has arrived in each village and power 
relations between villagers and external actors have subsequently evolved. The chapter 
considers the emergence of two new rural classes: a rural entrepreneurial class and a semi-
proletariat class. The chapter also explores how the livelihoods of the uplanders have been 
affected by the rubber boom. It thus gives an overview of the decline of some former 
livelihood activities and the emergence of new livelihood activities brought about by the 
rubber boom.  
Chapter 8 links the empirical data recounted in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 back to the 
existing literature to consider the extent to which these data either support or challenge 
debates on agrarian transformations, global land grabs, actors in agrarian processes, 
relations between small farmers and the market, and the state and market in globalisation. 
The final chapter, Chapter 9, returns to the research objectives listed in Chapter 1. It 
provides a summary of the research findings and highlights the research’s contribution to 
the advancement of the understanding of agrarian transformations, global land grabs, 
actors in agrarian processes, and the state in a globalisation context. This chapter also 
discusses the policy contributions of the research regarding agricultural development and 
poverty alleviation in the uplands of the Lao PDR. The chapter also discusses some 
limitations of the research and makes recommendations for further studies. 
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Chapter Two  
Literature Review: Agrarian Transformations, Peasants, 
Market, and the State in an Era of Globalisation 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews literature related to agrarian transformations and small farmers, 
focusing on the actors, processes and impacts of agrarian processes. The intention is that 
this chapter will provide the conceptual backdrop to the thesis and the empirical chapters 
that follow. The literature reviewed is brought to bear in three different, but interlinked, 
ways. Firstly, it is used to frame the approach taken in the study. Literature on peasants, 
small farmers and the market is used to consider the agency of uplanders while literature 
on the state and agrarian processes is applied to reflect on upland transformations from a 
structural perspective. Secondly, the literature provides wider intellectual scaffolding for 
the study. Literature on the state and agrarian processes, and on agrarian transformations 
serves this purpose. Lastly, literature is also introduced to test how far concepts developed 
in one context can be applied in another, in this case to the experiences of the Lao PDR. In 
Chapter 8, the findings from the research are used to re-evaluate debates over the paths of 
agrarian transition, processes of agrarian expansion in the frontiers and de-agrarianisation, 
global land grabs, relations between small farmers and the market, actors in agrarian 
processes and the role and status of the state in economic globalisation. Table 2.1 
summarises how the literature is applied to the stated aims and objectives of the study. 
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Table 2.1 Links between the literature and research objectives 
Research objectives Relevant literature 
Research objectives: 
1. To understand the processes of 
rubber expansion into the frontiers: 
1.1 Who and/ or what are the key 
actors in the recent rapid 
expansion of rubber in the Lao 
uplands? 
1.2 How have these actors shaped 
and re-shaped agrarian relations in 
the uplands? 
 
Sets of literature relevant to this objective are: 
 
1. State and the agrarian processes: this set of 
literature is relevant for understanding the role of 
the state in the processes of upland 
transformations in the Lao PDR. How have the Lao 
and Chinese states shaped upland 
transformations? The data from the research will 
be used to reflect on the status of the state in the 
context of globalisation and ‘post-reforms’. 
2. Agrarian transformations: literature on 
Agrarian transformations in the frontiers provides 
a broad understanding of the processes that shape 
and re-shape the Lao frontiers (e.g. agrarian 
expansion and intensification). This set of literature 
provides empirical resources for comparison to the 
transformation taking place in the research 
settlements.  
3. Peasants, small farmers and the market: the 
debates on relations between peasants, small 
farmers and the market will help to evaluate the 
role of uplanders as agents of the transformations. 
It raises the question whether the transformations 
taking place at the local level (uplands) are solely 
determined by powerful agents (state and the 
market) at the macro level. 
4. Global land grabs: as current rubber expansion 
involves in new forms of land transfers, the debate 
on the actors and forms of land controls in global 
land grabs is relevant. The research investigates if 
there are some similarities or distinctions between 
land grabbing in the Lao uplands and those 
discussed in the literature.  
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Table 2.1 Links between the literature and research objectives (continued) 
Research objectives Relevant literature 
2. To understand the impacts of the 
current rapid expansion of rubber on 
upland spaces and peoples 
2.1 To what extent has rubber 
expansion shaped and re-shaped the 
upland landscape? 
2.2 To what extent, and how, has 
rubber expansion affected the lives 
and livelihoods of uplanders? 
 
The literature relevant to this objective includes: 
1. Agrarian transformations: this literature is 
brought into the study to evaluate how far the 
debates and concepts on agrarian studies (paths 
of agrarian transition, de-agrarianisation, and 
agrarian transformations in the frontiers) can be 
applicable to the situations of the Lao uplands. 
2. Global land grabs: this literature is applied to 
consider the transformations of directions and 
pattern of land use and land relations. 
3. Peasants, small farmers and the market: this 
literature frames the idea about relations 
between the uplanders and the market, how the 
market benefits or/and increases pressures on 
uplanders. The data from the research will 
provide evidence to evaluate whether the view 
that sees peasants and small farmers as the 
victim of the market and capitalism is still 
convincing. 
 
The chapter begins with a review of the literature on rural and agrarian transformations. In 
this section, a brief review of the path(s) of agrarian transition is provided (2.2.1). This is 
followed by an exploration of literature on agrarian transformations and processes of de- 
agrarianisation (2.2.2), together with a discussion of agrarian transformations in frontier 
zones (2.2.3). The discussion then turns to the literature on global land grabs focusing on 
the directions of land use changes and land property relations (section 2.3). The following 
section (2.4) explores the role of the state, as a key actor, in agrarian processes exploring 
state policies and practices related to agrarian development from the era of national 
developmentalism to the current era of globalisation literature. The final substantive 
section (2.5) reviews the literature on relations between peasants, small farmers and the 
market (and capitalism). 
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2.2 Agrarian transformations 
2.2.1 The paths of agrarian transition 
One of the key concerns in agrarian studies, which has been the subject of debate for more 
than a century, is the need to understand the process of agrarian transition - the structural 
transformation of agriculture and rural space through the penetration of the market and 
capitalism. The Marxist literature views agrarian transition as the transformations of a non- 
industrial to an industrial society. This transition, according to Marx, was associated with a 
process of primitive accumulation - a process in which agricultural producers were 
displaced from their means of production, especially land, thus creating a reservoir of free 
labour available for industrial capitalist development (Marx 1995: 365). From this point of 
view, proletarianisation was considered as a concurrent process with agrarian transition.  
Agrarian transition may take different trajectories in each society. Marx wrote: “[t]he 
history of this expropriation assumes different aspects in different countries, and runs 
through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at different historical 
epochs” (Marx 1995 [1867]: 365). Karl Kautsky (Kautsky [1899] in Banaji 1980: 45) makes a 
case for the context-specific nature and direction of the development of agricultural and 
industrial capitalism. He raises the issue of the peculiarity of land – namely its difference in 
fertility - as a significant factor influencing agricultural production, price, and profit. This 
differs from the industrial sector as the fertility of land does not have a huge influence on 
industrial production. In the agricultural sector, while he sees the advantages of a large-
scale farm over a small farm in terms of the utilization of machinery, accessing credit and 
markets, a small farm can benefit from its workers having a stronger motivation to work 
than landless wage labourers on a large farm (Banaji 1980: 69-70). Thus, Kautsky suggests 
that the extent and processes of capitalist relations have expanded into agriculture and the 
countryside in particular ways. From this he forged his famous ‘agrarian question’, writing: 
“[w]e should ask: is capital and in what ways is capital, taking hold of agriculture, 
revolutionalizing it, smashing the old forms of production and of poverty and establishing 
the new forms which must succeed.” (Banaji 1980: 46 emphasis in original). Kautsky (Banaji 
1980: 89-90) argues that the expansion of capitalism into agriculture was driven by urban 
industrial capitalism which transformed rural people from ‘peasants’ to ‘pure 
agriculturalists’ (commodity producers). Both small and large farms were subordinated to 
industry. Small farmers needed to hire out their labour to earn cash and thus reinforced 
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their dependence on industry. Large scale commercial farms were also forced to seek extra 
sources of income from industry. Kautsky comes to a conclusion, that shares much with 
contemporary discussions of de-agrarianisation9 (Bryceson 1996), namely that in a capitalist 
society, “pure agriculture is no longer a factor of well being” and “[f]or the peasantry there 
is no chance of recovering its golden age” (Banaji 1980: 90)10. 
Lenin, though accepting a generally ‘natural’ tendency that “capitalism requires the free, 
landless worker”, critiques this proposition as “too stereotyped”, as capitalism expands into 
the countryside in various forms (Lenin 1956[1899]: 179). He proposed two different paths 
of capitalist development in agriculture: a ‘junker path’ and a ‘peasant path’. The ‘junker’ or 
‘landlord’ path represents a slow transformation of feudal estates into large capitalist 
enterprises. Through the exploitative ‘junker’ path, which was identified by Lenin as 
‘capitalism from above’ (Byres 1996: 5), feudal landlords became new capitalist 
entrepreneurs and maintained their elite position while peasants were expropriated and 
transformed into landless workers (De Janvry 1981: 107). The ‘farmer path’ or Lenin’s 
‘capitalism from below’, which was Lenin’s preferred path for the development of 
agricultural capitalism for Russia (De Janvry 1981: 108; Byres 1996: 5), took place through 
the formation of a home market for large-scale industry which was created through social 
differentiation among middle peasants who were disintegrated into a rural bourgeoisie (or 
a well-to-do-peasantry) and a rural proletariat (allotment-holding wage-workers) (Lenin 
1956 [1899]).  
Lenin’s models of capitalism from above and capitalism from below have been a reference 
point for studying the possible multiple trajectories of agrarian transitions. Terence Byres 
(1991) applies Lenin’s models to the transitions taking place in Asia. Byres comments on the 
‘natural’ models of capitalist development that tend to assume that capitalism in 
agriculture may take place only when the country experiences full agrarian transition; this 
perspective, in Byres’s view, is “too stereotyped and narrow” (Byres 1991: 4). He has 
proposed six paths of agrarian capitalist transition building on the historical experience of 
                                                          
9
 De-agrarianisation will be discussed in section 2.2.2. 
10
 While Kautsky sees that agriculture loses its privileged status as the major source of well-being in a 
‘mature’ capitalist society through proletarianisation, a study of Rigg (2005a) shows that for many 
rural populations in some areas of the Lao PDR - a country which has not yet engaged intensively 
with capitalism - agriculture is no longer the main source of livelihood sustainability. But it does not 
occur under a process of proletarianisation, but rather through diversification and pluriactivity (De 
Haan and Zoomers 2003). 
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England, Prussia, the United States, France, Japan, and Taiwan/South Korea. Though 
agrarian transition in these countries was considered as following either an ‘above’ or a 
‘below’ path, Byres points to the particular characters of the transition taking place in each 
place.  
While Byres develops his ideas on the basis of Lenin’s understanding of capitalism from 
above and capitalism from below, the multiple trajectories of agrarian transition detailed in 
his work challenge any perspective (including Lenin’s) that seeks to define a general model 
for agrarian transition or capitalist development which is applicable to all poor countries. 
He argues that it is necessary to avoid assuming that “the few 'models' we have in mind 
exhaust the relevant possibilities” (Byres 1995: 569). 
The connotation of the agrarian transition as industrialisation leads to the view that the 
agrarian transition is already complete in the global North (Bernstein 2004: 202; De Koninck 
2004: 285). This process is, however, “still very much underway” in many countries in the 
global South (De Koninck 2004: 285). Furthermore, the trajectories of changes in these 
countries may not follow the paths observed in the global North. Drawing on the Southeast 
Asian experience, Rigg (2005b: 179) proposes a general typology of agrarian transitions 
predicting possibilities of agricultural and rural changes in the region in which he identifies 
six agrarian types ranging from subsistence to semi-subsistence, pluriactive (post-peasant), 
professional, pluriactive (post-productive, neo-peasant), and remnant smallholders (see 
Table 2.2). Subsistence is considered by Rigg as the agrarian type of the past as most rural 
households in the region have now moved to semi-subsistence (type 2) or pluriactive (type 
3) living arrangements.  
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Table 2.2 Generalised typology of agrarian transitions in Southeast Asia 
 
Source: Reproduced from Rigg (2005b: 179) 
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Rigg expresses his doubt as to how far the agrarian type 3 can persist believing that rapid 
transition to type 4 and type 5 will take place soon. He argues that rural households who 
are not successful in embracing new lifestyle choices but continue to have ties to the land 
will become type 6 remnant smallholders. 
In searching for a deeper understanding of the process of agrarian transition, a group of 
researchers working on The Challenges of the Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia 
(ChATSEA) project11, defines transition as “the transformation of societies from primarily 
non-urban populations dependent upon agricultural production and organized through 
rural social structures, to predominantly urbanized, industrialized and market-based 
societies” (De Koninck 2004: 286). According to the ChATSEA research project, several 
processes are involved in the transition: agricultural intensification and territorial 
expansion; market integration; industrialisation and urbanisation; mobility of population; 
intensification of regulation; and environmental changes (De Koninck 2004: 286). Transition 
in different contexts will show different mixes of these transition processes. This affirms the 
diversity and complexity of the pathways of agrarian transition; there is not only a variety 
of agrarian paths among the countries which the transition has already been complete and 
the countries where are still experiencing transition but also different trajectories among 
the countries which the transition is not complete. The following section discusses one of 
the major processes of agrarian transformation: de-agrarianisation. 
2.2.2 Rural transformations and de-agrarianisation 
Scholars have attempted to interpret what has happened in rural areas and how the lives of 
rural dwellers have changed. It has been recognised that there has occurred a 
diversification of rural household livelihoods combining both on-farm and off-farm work. 
There is work from around the world highlighting the growing significance of non-farm 
income over farm-based income (Meagher 1999; Ponte 2001; Rigg and Nattapoolwat 2001; 
Bryceson 2002). Bryceson (1996: 99) explains the decline of agriculture in terms of a 
process of ‘de-agrarianisation’, which is a process of livelihood reorientation, occupational 
adjustment, and spatial relocation of rural people away from a strictly agricultural base. The 
De-Agrarianisation and Rural Employment (DARE) Research Programme of Afrika-
                                                          
11
 This research project comprised a group of researchers who work on agrarian and rural studies in 
Southeast Asia. See http://catsea1.caac.umontreal.ca/ChATSEA/en/ChATSEA_Home.html.  
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Studiecentrum at Leiden University focused on attempting to understand rural 
transformations in African countries. Studies have pointed to the pressures and 
uncertainties that peasant households confront with the removal of agricultural subsidies 
under structural adjustment programmes (Madulu 1998; Chukwuezi 1999; Yunusa 1999; 
Bryceson 2002). There are also other factors pushing rural dwellers to drift away from 
agriculture, including those arising from population growth and land shortage (Madulu 
1998; Yunusa 1999); the need for capital (Chukwuezi 1999; Meagher 1999); and the level of 
education of the youth (Yunusa 1999). 
Although it was developed mainly on the basis of work in rural Africa, the concept of ‘de-
agrarianisation’ has also been applied to the situation in rural areas of non-African 
societies. In the Southeast Asian region, perhaps Rigg (2001; 2003; 2006b; Rigg and 
Nattapoolwat 2001; Rigg et al. 2008) is the most obvious scholar who describes Southeast 
Asian rural transformations in terms of a process of ‘de-agrarianisation’. Rigg points to a 
dramatic decline in the role of agriculture as a major source of income for the sustainability 
of household livelihoods. Basing his research in rural Thailand, he calls for ‘the need to 
divorce what is best for agriculture from what is best for rural people’ because agriculture is 
‘being squeezed’ (Rigg and Nattapoolwat 2001: 956) and becoming only ‘a side-line activity’ 
for many villagers (Rigg 2003: 213). In his later work (Rigg 2006b), Rigg makes a clear 
statement that there is an increasing tendency towards a de-linking between the lives and 
livelihoods of people in the global South and land (Rigg 2006b: 181). Rigg rightly points that 
landless people and the poor are not always the same; landless people are not necessarily 
poor. Thus the redistribution of land, together with other mechanisms for agricultural 
improvement, may not be able to resolve rural poverty as those people who benefit may 
not be the poor. Policies which focus on agricultural issues may lead to the unintended 
consequence of widening inequality within rural spaces. Rigg thus calls for a thoughtful 
reconsideration of how best to resolve rural poverty. 
A de-linking between the sustainability of rural livelihoods and farming is also documented 
in the case of Vietnam. Van de Walle and Cratty (2004) see the potential of rural non-farm 
activities to lift Vietnam’s rural poor out of poverty. They find that while land access has a 
positive influence on welfare, it has negative impacts on the probability of off-farm 
activities among rural households. In “Land in Transition: Reform and Poverty in Rural 
Vietnam”, Ravallion and Van de Walle (2008 cited in Akram-Lodhi 2010) discuss increasing 
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landlessness in rural Vietnam in relation to the reduction of rural poverty. They argue that 
an increase in landlessness is a sign of economic success in Vietnam; rural households 
which have moved out of poverty are those who have also moved from farm activities. 
They thus conclude that “rising landlessness has been a positive factor in poverty reduction 
in Vietnam as a whole” (Ravallion and Van de Walle 2008 cited in Akram-Lodhi 2010: 567). 
This argument is, however, critiqued by Akram-Lodhi (2010) who comments that Ravallion 
and Van de Walle misconstrue the links between landlessness and poverty in rural Vietnam, 
as well as in other developing countries. Akram-Lodhi (2010: 569) points to the 
heterogeneity of landless rural people: some rural landless may be the poor while some 
many not. For Akram-Lodhi (2007a: 167), increasing landlessness indicates the rising 
concentration of land. This raises the question of whether landlessness and the transition 
after reform opens the probability for rural diversification and the positive development of 
the rural labour market or whether reform leads to landlessness and makes diversification 
necessary as a survival tactic among the poor (Akram-Lodhi 2005: 108; Akram-Lodhi 2010: 
575-576). 
Tania Li (2009) also expresses her concern for this issue in her critique of the World 
Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (World Bank 2007a). She criticises 
the World Bank’s perspective in suggesting that rural populations who are not successful in 
agriculture “should exit agriculture” (Li 2009). Li comments that the report is too optimistic 
when it argues that “increasing wages for agricultural workers offers the greatest potential 
to lift millions out of poverty” (World Bank 2007 cited in Li 2009: 631). But this road to 
move unsuccessful peasants away from poverty is not smooth. In some poor countries in 
the global South, the opportunities for wage work are still limited. Large numbers of 
dispossessed rural populations find themselves in the situations of “three nothings - no 
land, no work, no social security” (Walker 2008 cited in Li 2010: 72). The question asked by 
Rigg (2006b) about how best to lift rural people out of poverty is still relevant but it needs 
to incorporate consideration of those contexts where there are limited non-farm options.  
Thus, moving away from the farm is not always the best way to support rural livelihoods. 
Meagher (1999) points to the significance of agriculture in generating non-farm 
opportunities and capital. Meagher also argues that the expansion of non-farm work while 
there is not enough support for the agricultural sector can lead to the intensification, 
instead of the alleviation, of rural poverty and income inequality. Researching rural villages 
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in China, Ploeg and Jinzhong (2010: 526) find that pauperisation is likely to happen when 
synergies between farm and non-farm activities fail. Similar situations are also found in 
Yaro’s (2006) study on rural Ghana. Yaro argues that “[d]iversification [deagrarainisation] 
per se does not automatically lead to livelihood security” (Yaro 2006: 155 italics in the 
original). For many rural households, the sustainability of livelihoods is based on their 
potential to combine on-farm work with off-farm work rather than completely moving 
away from the farm; apart from diversifying their livelihood into non-farm activities, rural 
households also intensify their farm activities.  
In addition to de-agrarianisation, scholars have also paid attention to the reverse (related) 
processes – re-agrarianisation. There is work pointing to a relationship between de-
agrarianisation and what might be called “re-agrarianisation”. Ploeg and Jinzhong (2010) 
observe the link between town and countryside, industry and agriculture in China. They find 
that rural migrants in China who spend extended periods of time in town still retain their 
connection with their villages and farms through various forms of arrangement. Farms are 
now intensified and ‘simplified’ rather than squeezed. Peluso (2011) observes that while 
forest villagers in Java now earn a great deal of income from urban, and distant industrial or 
rural sites, they do not move away permanently from their farm. Migrations of forest 
villagers are periodic, temporary and circular although some villagers may work outside the 
village several months per year. McKay (2003; 2005) reports a changing agricultural 
landscape from subsistence to commercial agriculture in frontier communities in the 
Philippines when women withdraw their knowledge and labour from their fields to take 
advantage of overseas work. A conversion from subsistence to commercial agriculture is 
supported by remittances sent from abroad. In this light, non-farm activities help to feed 
agriculture. What is important to remember is that this‘re-agrarianisation’ is not equal to 
the “reversal of a linear process of de-agrarianisation” (Hirsch 2011: 186). This raises the 
important point concerning the linearity of agrarian transition, highlighting that the word 
‘transformation’ might be more apposite. 
2.2.3 Agrarian transformations in the frontiers 
One current of agrarian transformations in many countries in the global South is 
agricultural expansion into frontier areas. Economist Edward Barbier (2005: 288-289) 
argues that economic growth in many countries in the global South, and especially in newly 
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opened economies, is significantly contributed to by resources in the frontiers. Market 
forces are seen as a significant condition stimulating the transformations taking place in the 
frontiers (Cramb et al. 2009; Fox et al. 2009). However, market expansion is not a single 
process. Rather, it is always associated with a process of spatial integration. Infrastructure 
development, especially the expansion of road networks, is a fundamental condition for 
market penetration in the frontiers. These dual processes of market and spatial integration 
have resulted in the increasing and intensifying integration of the frontiers into the national 
and global economies. 
The increasing global demand for particular crops has led to a remarkable increase in their 
planted area in the frontiers, such as cocoa (Li 2002a), oil palm (McCarthy and Cramb 
2009), coffee (Tan 2000; Agergaard et al. 2009), and recently rubber (Fox 2009; Mann 2009; 
Sturgeon 2010). Agricultural expansion is thus another side of market and economic 
integration in the frontiers. This process has, of course, re-shaped the frontier space. The 
transformations of the frontiers’ agricultural production system from semi-subsistence to 
market-led are well-recorded. Another process taking place in the frontiers is agricultural 
intensification. Increasing demand for agricultural commodities is a key driver for 
agricultural intensification in the frontiers (Cramb 2009; Hirsch 2009). Commercial crops 
require not only land for growing crops but also capital inputs - such as modern seeds, 
fertilisers, and machinery. However, this process may take place even though the 
production is mainly for household consumption; this occurs when people encounter limits 
to land access (Raintree and Warner 1986; Potter 2001).  
While agricultural expansion and intensification are a response to global market demand, 
the ways that this process operates in specific places are not always the same. These 
transformations may result from large-scale investment by outside investors such as a 
replacement of swidden agriculture by oil palm estates in Malaysia’s Sarawak (Cramb 2009; 
McCarthy and Cramb 2009), fast–growing tree plantations in Sarawak (Barney 2004), or 
Vietnamese rubber plantations in the Lao PDR (Baird 2010). Studies also show that 
peasants and small farmers take a significant part in this process (this will be reviewed in 
section 2.5). 
Agricultural expansion and intensification is not always done by local populations; migrants 
also play a crucial role in this process. Derek Hall (2011b: 508) notes that millions of people 
migrated to the frontiers of Southeast Asia during the 1990s and 2000s to become involved 
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in commercial crops, mainly the boom crops. He characterises three patterns of migration. 
Studies carried out in Thailand (Pinthong 1991; Phongpaichit and Baker 2002) report that 
large areas of forest in Thailand’s frontiers were cleared by new migrants from the central 
plain to expand commercial crops from the 1970s onwards. Ruf and colleagues (1996 cited 
in Li 2002a: 419-420) record the arrival of migrants in Central Sulawesi’s forest frontiers. 
Would-be migrants who used their kin and networks to gain access to information even 
hired buses to tour the frontiers seeking land and cocoa plantations set up by in situ 
farmers. Gaveau and colleagues (Gaveau et al. 2009: 598) record “unplanned mass 
migration to the mountainous areas of southwest Sumatra” in response to the rising price 
of coffee. It is estimated that around 100,000 migrants, largely from Java, moved to this 
area of previously low population density. In Vietnam, coffee best reflects how fast a 
commercial crop and migrants have arrived and transformed the frontier spaces. Coffee 
planted areas increased over 6.5 times between 1993 and 2000 (D. Hall 2011b: 512). 
Around 200,000 migrants settled down in the Central Highlands, Vietnam’s major coffee 
production area, in only five years of the coffee boom (Winkels 2004: 4).  
Agricultural expansion has never been only an economic process; it is rather very much 
about political issues too. De Koninck and De Déry (1997: 2) view agricultural expansion 
into the frontier in Southeast Asia as part of the state’s geopolitical strategy, allowing the 
state to control and consolidate both frontier spaces and the frontier’s populations. White 
(1999: 237) documents the rehabilitation of large-scale plantations in a southern region of 
West Java in the 1980s; the promotion of commercial crops to peasants was strongly made 
in those areas that had experienced uprisings against the government. A similar 
phenomenon has also been found in Thailand where the clearing of new forestland for 
commercial crops in mountainous areas was largely driven by security concerns and a 
desire to prevent people from joining the communist movement (Uhlig 1988: 15). Road 
networks which were developed in remote areas performed a two-fold function: to 
facilitate the penetration of the market in the frontiers and also to maintain national 
security (Thomas et al 2008 cited in Fox et al. 2009). 
Some scholars also point to the ‘soft’ control of the frontiers through agricultural expansion 
and intensification. Though ‘soft’ control may take different forms in each frontier, there is 
a common interest in ‘civilising the margins’ (Duncan 2004b). In the case of Southeast Asia’s 
frontiers, namely the uplands, there is a widely perceived attitude among the state and 
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lowlanders about upland areas as spaces where levels of ‘civilisation’ and ‘development’ 
are still low. The agricultural practices of upland people, namely various forms of shifting 
cultivation, are usually used as one of the criteria to justify the labelling of such people and 
places as ‘backward’ or ‘primitive’ (see, for example, McElwee 2004; Duncan 2004a; Cramb 
et al. 2009). There is a need to bring ‘civilisation’ from the core to these ‘backward’ spaces. 
The uplands and their populations have been identified as a primary target for 
‘development’, ‘modernisation’ and ‘civilisation’ either via the state or development 
projects (Duncan 2004a; Li 2007). Modern agricultural expansion into the frontiers is 
considered as one of the mechanisms to eliminate the ‘backwardness’ of the frontier. 
Hirsch (2009: 125) argues that agricultural expansion into the frontiers is associated with a 
process of “clearing of wilderness in response to global market demand” and “the state’s 
civilising mission on the outer boundaries of modernity”.  
Overall, a number of studies provide a picture of the links between the frontier’s 
transformations and the market and spatial integration, and the state’s civilising mission. 
Literature highlights agricultural expansion and intensification as two key different 
processes, but very much linked, that shape and re-shape the frontiers. Transforming the 
frontier spaces to a market-oriented production space, as some studies argue, pushes the 
risks to the frontier’s populations. (The issue of relations between the market and small 
farmers is explored in section 2.5). 
2.3 Global land grabs for farmland investment12 
In the introductory chapter, I provided a rough picture of the current situation concerning 
global land grabs. This section seeks to explore further debates and studies on global land 
grabs, focusing on land use transformation and property relations.  
Discussions on current global land grabs mainly focus on the rising demand for land for 
food and biofuel crops. These are seen as the major drivers for large-scale land acquisitions 
in the global South (Cotula et al. 2009: 52 - 55; Spieldoch and Murphy 2009: 41; Anseeuw et 
al. 2012). Borras and Franco (2012: 38) note that there is a dominant view in the literature 
                                                          
12
 Land grabbers may have different purposes in seeking control over land, for instance, 
development of protected areas, development of special economic zones, agricultural investment, 
and so on (see Zoomers 2010). The literature reviewed in this section is, however, limited to land 
grabbing for farmland investment. 
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on global land grabbing which emphasises the conversion of forestland and land previously 
used for domestic (subsistence) consumption into land dedicated to the production of 
export-oriented food crops and biofuels (see Table 2.3). Moreover, this process is seen to 
lie in the hands of foreign investors, especially from the global North, the Gulf regions and 
new emerging economies such as China. While noting that this dominant view resonates 
with experience in many places, Borras and Franco also warn against the simplification of 
land acquisitions (Borras and Franco 2011; Borras and Franco 2012: 39). In order to capture 
the complexity of land grabs, they propose a broad, four-fold typology of land use 
transformations. First, there is a land use change within the food regime. In this 
formulation, land remains within the ambit of food production, but the purpose of 
production has changed. Second is land use change involving a shift from food to biofuel 
production. A third type of land use change involves the conversion of land from to non-
food uses to food production13. The last type of change concerns a change from non-food 
uses to biofuel production (Borras and Franco 2012: 39-45 and see Table 2.3 for a summary 
of the typology). 
Table 2.3 The character, direction, and orientation of land use change 
Ideal Type From To 
A Food Production Food Production 
A1 Food for consumption Food for domestic exchange 
A2 Food for consumption, domestic 
exchange 
Food for export 
A3 Food for export, monocropping and 
industrial farming 
Food for consumption and domestic 
exchange, small-scale polyculture 
B Food Production Biofuel 
B1 Food for consumption, domestic 
exchange 
Biofuel for export 
B2a Food for consumption, domestic 
exchange 
Biofuel for local use and domestic 
exchange, but corporate-controlled 
B2b Food for consumption, domestic 
exchange 
Biofuel for local use and domestic 
exchange, but non-corporate-controlled 
 
                                                          
13
 The term ‘non-food’ is used broadly to describe land not primarily used for food production. This 
term includes forest land and other non-food lands (such as grasslands) (Borras and Franco 2012: 
43). 
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Table 2.3 The character, direction, and orientation of land use change (continued) 
Ideal Type From To 
C Non-food Production Food Production 
C1 Forest lands Food for consumption, domestic 
exchange 
C2 Forest lands Food for export 
C3 ‘Marginal’, ‘idle’ lands Food for consumption, domestic 
exchange 
C4 ‘Marginal’, ‘idle’ lands Food for export 
D Forest and marginal/ Idle lands Biofuel Production 
D1 Forest lands Biofuel for local use and domestic 
exchange 
D2 Forest lands Biofuel for export 
D3 ‘Marginal’, ‘idle’ lands Biofuel for local use and domestic 
exchange 
D4 ‘Marginal’, ‘idle’ lands Biofuel for export 
Sources: Reproduced from Borras and Franco (2012: 39) 
Note: The shaded rows represent those types of land use transformations that are the object of the 
anti-land grabbing movement and political campaigns; they all represent changes from 
local/domestic use to production for export. 
The direction of land use change brought about by such land grabs is not, however, limited 
to food and biofuel production. Cotula (2012: 17) notes a conversion of land used for non-
food and non-biofuel production. Some land is used for agricultural commodities required 
for industries such as rubber in the Lao PDR or cotton in Ethiopia. Large areas of land have 
also been grabbed in the global South to establish wood tree plantations.  
The process of global land grabbing has led to a linked concern for its effects on property 
relations. Studies have showed that the target for land deals is usually land which is 
ostensibly defined as ‘idle’, ‘marginal’, ‘waste’ land, or forest, implying that there is no pre-
existing occupant (Cotula et al. 2009: 62). Franco (2009 cited in Borras and Franco 2012: 49) 
points to vague statements about massive areas of land being defined as ‘non-
private’/‘public’. The label ‘non-private’ provides a means by which the state can claim 
ownership. For instance, around 70 per cent of Indonesia’s land is defined as forest estate 
(even when it is not covered by trees), and therefore owned by the state (Deininger et al. 
2011: 99). Such land is far from empty, but home and the main sources of livelihoods for a 
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large proportion of Indonesia’s population (Peluso 1992). Claiming that land is the state’s 
property allows the state to award land to land seekers, with little or even no regard to pre-
existing land users. Literature on global land grabs records that land in the frontiers where 
formal property rights are not well established is attractive to investors. The World Bank’s 
report on large-scale land acquisitions for agricultural investment records that “lower 
recognition of land rights increases a country’s attractiveness for land acquisition” 
(Deininger et al. 2011: 55) as it allows investors to gain control over land and resources at 
little cost (Li 2011: 284). The literature suggests that in order to prevent pre-existing land 
users being pushed off their land, existing land rights (including customary and common 
property) need to be legally and formally recognised (Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009: 3; 
Deininger et al. 2011: 98-103).  
Land grabs are not, however, taking place only in the peripheral areas where land tenure is 
not formalised. Such action and processes can also be found even in areas where property 
rights are well-established (D. Hall 2011a: 851). Barney (2004) reports, for example, land 
grabs taking place in eastern Thailand where the target land is under private property. 
Borras and Franco (2011: 27) write of land grabs in the Philippines where: “land investors 
and land speculators actually prefer land deals that have clear property documents, in 
order to ensure the investor’s security”. Land dispossession may occur even in areas where 
clear property rights have been established and well-recognised (Borras and Franco 2010a). 
This raises an issue of whether formalisation of land ownership can prevent land loss. 
Formal property rights or giving land title alone cannot guarantee land security (Jansen and 
Roquas 1998; Borras and Franco 2010a; De Schutter 2011). This leads to the question 
concerning the win-win character of land grabs, such as that proposed by Deininger and 
colleagues (2011), and the view that this is a pro-poor policy. Issues around the direction of 
land-use changes, evolving property relations and the possibility that land deals might be 
part of a pro-poor policy will be returned to in Chapter 8, drawing on the lesson of the 
fieldwork in the Lao uplands undertaken as part of this study. 
2.4 The state and agrarian processes 
The state, whether it is under a democratic or socialist system, has long played a significant 
role in agrarian processes. This section follows Araghi (1995; 2009) in differentiating the 
state’s role in the post war period into two broad phases: a phase during which a national 
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framework prevailed and a later globalisation phase. Table 2.4 provides a summary of the 
role of the state in agrarian processes. 
2.4.1 The state’s role in a national framework 
The three decades after the end of WWII were considered the heyday of state-led 
development. Development was generally framed under a national framework aiming to 
enhance the national economy. Araghi (1995: 345) terms this the era of “nationalist 
developmentalism”. In this era, the state was the crucial actor in directing national 
economic development, including both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. 
The role of the state in economic activities was most obvious in the case of countries under 
communist systems. One of the most significant policies adopted by communist countries 
was land reform. Bernstein and Byres (2001: footnote 57) note that following the victory of 
the communist movement in the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam, the new communist 
governments in each launched programmes aimed at the redistribution of land as a first 
phase in their economic policies. Land redistribution was later replaced by massive 
campaigns of collectivisation or communalisation of farms which involved coercion and, 
often, violence against large landowners and counter-revolutionaries in the countryside14. 
Collectivisation of farms was considered the only possible solution for resolving agricultural 
difficulties in communist countries (Fallenbuchl 1967: 1). Each communist state had 
different capabilities or capacities to deliver on its policies. In the Soviet and Chinese cases, 
collectivisation quickly led to the establishment of large-scale collective farms or 
communes. In the case of the Lao PDR, the communist state largely failed in its efforts to 
introduce collective farms. The communist government was not able to control or direct 
agrarian processes as it wished (Evans 1990). Many socialist states experienced the 
resistance of peasants and the consequent decline of agricultural production on the newly-
created collective farms. 
                                                          
14
 The establishment of collective farms led to the death of millions of peasants in the Soviet Union 
(Leonard 2011: 69). In China, it has been estimated that during the collectivisation campaign 
between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 people were executed (Moise 1983: 142). 
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Table 2.4 Summary of agrarian processes in relation to the role of the state and globalisation 
 Capitalist state Socialist state 
“State-led 
developmentalism” 
(Post war to the mid-1970s) 
* Land reform (private property) 
* Import-substitution industrialisation  
- Price control 
- Procurement programme 
- Taxation 
- Subsidies 
* Green revolution 
* Land reform (collectivisation of land and farms) 
* A centralised command and control system in 
agriculture 
 
Globalisation 
(Mid 1970s onwards) 
* State-subsidised farm 
* State as protectors (e.g. taxation) 
 
 
* Collective farms 
* A centralised command and control system in 
agriculture 
Reform in socialist countries - mid-1980s 
 
 
 
 
 
GATT and WTO  
* Withdrawal of the state as director of agrarian 
process.  
- De-collectivisation of farm (and land) 
- Market-oriented agriculture 
 
Agreement (1990s) 
* State as a facilitator for processes of liberalisation 
of agriculture 
(subsidies and other forms of protection 
progressively lifted) 
 
* State as a facilitator for processes of liberalisation 
of agriculture 
(subsidies and other forms of protection 
progressively lifted) 
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The state in non-socialist countries also played a crucial role in economic activities. One 
influential scholar whose work points to the significant role of the state in the achievement 
of agrarian development and industrialisation is Cristóbal Kay (2002) who investigates why 
the outcome of agrarian reforms, industrialisation, and economic development reflected 
through a lens of economic growth in East Asia (South Korea and Taiwan) was greater than 
in Latin American countries. He argues that one of the important conditions for the 
outperformance of East Asian countries’ development over Latin American countries 
relates to the respective state capacities. The state was strong in South Korea and Taiwan 
but not in Latin America where the state rarely gained domestic support causing difficulties 
for Latin American states in delivering policies of agrarian reform. 
During the heyday of state-led development, one significant purpose of agrarian 
development was to achieve self-sufficiency in food, to provide cheap food to feed the 
growing number of industrial workers. This was seen as the road to ‘modernity’ (Kay 2009: 
105-106). Many newly independent countries gave preference to the industrial sector over 
the agricultural sector and import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) was the economic 
model embraced by many countries in the South. When attention was paid to the 
agricultural sector, it was about how agriculture could contribute to national 
industrialisation by, for example, providing cheap labour to fuel the industrialisation 
process. This model of development was notably criticised by Michael Lipton (1977) in his 
‘urban bias’ model of development.15 To achieve the aim of self-sufficiency in food, the 
state intervened in agrarian processes in various ways. Though there were differences in 
the patterns and forms of the state’s intervention in each country, some consistencies can 
be identified. These include: various forms of land reform, the promotion of the green 
revolution, subsidies and market interventions. The state acted as a key agent of the green 
revolution. In some countries (such as in India and the Philippines), the state was involved 
in the expansion of the green revolution by supporting agricultural research as well as 
providing incentives (e.g. subsidies, credit, infrastructural development and more) to 
                                                          
15
 Michael Lipton (Lipton 1977) critiques agricultural development policies (in the form of ‘price 
twists’) in the South which, in his view, were shaped to benefit urban populations and industries at 
the expense of agriculture, the countryside and rural people. He argued that such policies 
preferentially benefitted the urban and industrial sectors, while they left rural people in poverty. Kay 
(2009: footnote 13) notes that Lipton’s ‘urban bias’ thesis stimulates a further consideration of rural 
– urban relations (e.g. in Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 20 No. 3 published in 1984 and Vol. 
29 No 4 published in 1993). Lipton’s thesis has, however, been thoroughly critiqued not least with 
regard to his division between rural and urban space (Moore 1984). 
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convince people to join the green revolution project (Djurfeldt and Jirström 2005). In other 
countries, like South Korea, peasants were forced by state officials to accept the green 
revolution project (Kay 2002: 1080). 
Another significant intervention of the state in agrarian processes can be seen in pricing. 
Rice was the agricultural product that best reflected the role of the state in the agricultural 
market, at least in Asia. David and Huang (1996: 463) note that no government in Asia, the 
world’s main rice producing region, left rice prices under the market mechanism without 
the state’s intervention. Some countries launched procurement programmes for certain 
agricultural products (such as rice and sugar). Farmers were required to deliver a set quota 
to be sold at a fixed price, usually lower than the market price, to support the state’s 
procurement programme (Kay 2002: 1082; Honma and Hayami 2006: 13). In addition to 
price controls, the state also intervened in agrarian processes through taxation which has 
been seen as a mechanism reflective of an ‘urban bias’ favouring industrialisation. Imposing 
heavy taxes on agricultural exports was used to lower domestic prices of food to ensure 
that the country would have sufficient cheap food to support national industrialisation. In 
Taiwan, agricultural exports were taxed at a higher rate than industrial exports (Wade 
1990: 76) reflecting which sector was given the higher priority.  
Overall, during the three decades after the end of WWII, the state, both socialist and non-
socialist, was a key actor in national development processes. Agrarian development 
programmes were framed under a national framework in which the state played a 
significant role. Though there is no doubt about the important role of the state, there is a 
question about how far the state could manipulate and shape national agrarian processes. 
Did the state have full autonomy in directing agrarian processes? Was the state always able 
successfully to deliver its policies? Looking at the role of the state in both socialist and non-
socialist countries, one may see that the state had different capabilities in implementing its 
policies. Different forms of political regimes and perspectives, differing non-domestic 
forces, and differing geo-political contexts influenced the potential of states to implement 
policies of agrarian development. ‘Strong’ states seemed to be more successful than ‘weak’ 
states in directing agrarian processes. Thus, though the state was a crucial agent in post-
war development, it could not fully control the whole process of economic development. 
The power and autonomy of the state came to be increasingly challenged under the context 
of globalisation and, more latterly with reform in the former socialist countries. 
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2.4.2 The state’s role in a globalisation framework 
The power and autonomy of the state have been questioned in the contexts of the collapse 
and then reform in former socialist countries and, more widely, given the effects of 
‘globalisation’. In the 1980s, the economies of the former socialist countries were 
transformed from centrally-planned economies to, increasingly, market-oriented 
economies16. The World Bank’s World Development Report 1996 had the subtitle ‘from plan 
to market’ (World Bank 1996) and set out the case for a rolling back of the state to allow 
markets to work ‘properly’. Thus, privatisation of state enterprises and the establishment of 
private property were regarded as priorities in both market and socialist economies. 
Another message arising from the Bank’s report was the necessity of integrating former 
socialist countries into the global economy, believing that this would lead to improving 
standards of living for people in these countries.  
The role of the state in agrarian processes came to be increasingly downgraded in the 
globalisation era. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) Uruguay Round in 
1986 (GATT became the World Trade Organization or WTO in 1995), is considered a turning 
point in the internationalisation of global trade. The state, which once was considered a 
crucial actor for the development of the agricultural sector and the national economy, 
came increasingly to be seen as an impediment, distorting markets. The WTO’s Agreement 
on Agriculture (AoA), resulting from negotiations at the GATT Uruguay Round, aimed “… to 
establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system…” and “… to provide for 
substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection in the areas of 
domestic support, export subsidies and market access” (WTO 2003: 3). Under this 
agreement, all member countries were required to reduce, though not eliminate, the 
subsidies they provided to their domestic and export sectors. They are also required to 
increase market access by reducing non-tariff import barriers resulting in the 
internationalisation of agriculture. 
There is a question of how to understand the status of the state in the context of 
globalisation and the internationalisation of agriculture. McMichael (McMichael 1992; 
                                                          
16
 It should be noted that changes in the former socialist countries occurred in two distinctive 
directions: i) the relatively absolute displacement of communist power (e.g. in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe); and ii) economic reforms while the party still maintained its control over 
the political sphere (e.g. in China, Vietnam, the Lao PDR, and Cuba). 
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McMichael and Myhre 1990) argues that what we see is the emergence of global regulation 
which subordinates national regulation to supra-national forces and institutions, thus 
“bypass[ing] the national regulatory structures” (McMichael and Myhre 1990: 60). He 
considers that the state has been restructured to serve global investors and to enhance 
global market forces (McMichael 1997: 646). Agricultural structures have thus been shifted 
from a national framework directed by the state to an international framework in which 
international agribusiness firms and supra-national organisations become dominant actors 
in directing global agrarian processes (McMichael 1992: 355-359; Kearney 1996: 127-130; 
Watts and Goodman 1997; Bernstein 2000:36-38).  
Though recognising strong forces of globalisation, many scholars warn against the view that 
global processes equate to the demise of the state. Weiss (1997) views the notions of the 
powerless state in the globalisation era as a ‘myth’. Drawing on her work on the 
restructuring of agro-exports in the Dominican Republic, Raynolds (1994) challenges the 
view that current agrarian processes are solely directed by the market. She points to the 
role of the Dominican state, in conjunction with transnational financial institutions and 
bilateral donors, in promoting non-traditional agricultural commodities in the context of 
the decline in revenue from its traditional agricultural commodities. Farmers are 
encouraged to get involved in non-traditional agricultural production through the 
implementation of laws giving tax benefits, state-subsidised credit, and cheap rental of the 
state’s land for non-traditional agricultural commodities for export. Drawing on the 
Dominican agrarian experiences, Raynolds criticises the ‘new internationalisation of 
agriculture’ school17, suggesting that its proponents tend to overlook the critical role of the 
state in the restructuring of national agriculture in the South. Raynolds argues that 
agricultural restructuring in the South cannot be viewed as solely determined by powerful 
global forces; there is a need to consider the local contexts and the role of the state in the 
restructuring process too. The continuing role of the state in the globalisation era can be 
seen clearly in transitional countries. The Chinese state still maintains its power in directing 
agrarian processes at both domestic and international levels (Rutherford et al. 2008: 144; 
Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010: 278).  
                                                          
17
 The work of the new internationalisation of agriculture school is based on the Mexican agrarian 
experience. One of the main arguments of this school is that internationalisation of agriculture in the 
South is concurrent with the demise of the peripheral state in agrarian processes (see Raynolds et al. 
1993: 1104 for a summary of the school's main argument) 
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Overall, the state, both socialist and non-socialist, was the most significant actor in 
directing agrarian processes. The state launched a range of policies to achieve national 
agrarian and economic development including land reform programmes, the promotion of 
the green revolution, agricultural taxation and subsidies. Each state had different levels of 
capability to deliver its agrarian development programmes. The power and autonomy of 
the state in directing the national economy and national agrarian processes have, however, 
been increasingly challenged in the context of globalisation and reforms in former socialist 
countries. Though the market is increasingly important in the current globalisation era, it 
has never fully displaced the state in economic processes. The state still plays an important 
role in agrarian processes but as a facilitator rather than in a deterministic manner. In the 
context of global capitalism, the state today plays a crucial role not only in its own agrarian 
processes but also in the agrarian processes in other countries; the role of the Chinese state 
is a case in point, as we will see later in the discussion. What is important to note is that the 
shift of the state’s power and role in agrarian processes before and in an era of 
globalisation is a shift in degree rather than kind. We thus need to situate the state in 
particular contexts, which this study is attempting to achieve, rather simply generalise by 
claiming that the power of the state these days is completely superseded by market forces.  
2.5 Peasants, small farmers and the market 
Under the context of globalisation and the collapse of the socialist economy in the former 
socialist countries, mainstream development organisations (such as the World Bank) define 
the market as the ‘medicine’ to heal the problems caused by ‘interventionism’ in both 
‘developing’ and post-socialist countries (Spoor 1997b: 1). The WDR 2000/2001 proposed 
that increasing market opportunities was necessary as a strategy to lift people out of 
poverty (World Bank 2001: 6-7). But the question is how far the market can bring a better 
life to people.  
Work on transitions in post-socialist countries points to the problems of the ‘market 
panacea’ (Spoor 1997a). Though there is evidence that peasant household income has 
increased and rural poverty has declined in many former socialist countries, the persistence 
of rural poverty is noticeable (Spoor 1997a; Spoor 2009). In Bulgaria, Meurs and Begg 
(1998) observe that reforms have resulted in an unexpected decline in agricultural 
productivity. After the reforms, prices of agricultural inputs, which had been heavily 
  
56 
 
subsidised, increased while prices of agricultural products were held down for the benefit 
of consumers. Moreover, Bulgarian peasants were not able to compete with imported 
agricultural products, which were often supplied under a subsidy programme of the 
exporting countries’ government. The reforms thus resulted in squeezing the products and 
profitability of Bulgarian peasants. 
Zbierski-Salameh (1999) records how reforms have affected Polish peasants who find that it 
becomes more difficult for them to earn profits from their farms. Peasants have 
encountered a situation where they have to pay for costs of inputs higher than what they 
earn from selling their outputs. This is due to the withdrawal of the state’s support for 
agricultural inputs causing peasants’ restricted access to credit and other productive 
resources to an even greater degree than during the late socialist period. The impact of 
reforms has led to the movement of peasants, who once were proponents for socialist 
reform, against the reformist policy. Instead of taking their produce to the market, peasants 
have involuted their agricultural production and have adopted a ‘closed-cycle production 
system’ - a system which is close to a subsistence system. 
In Vietnam, while an impressive outcome of reform can be observed, differentiation has 
increased (Tuan 1997; Akram-Lodhi 2005; Akram-Lodhi 2007a; S.Scott 2009). There has 
been a growth in the number of landless peasants facilitated by the liberalisation of land 
markets, combined with inequality in access to other assets and means of production, 
allowing land to be transferred from poor peasants who in some areas have become 
landless. Steffanie Scott (2009) looks at the impact of marketization on peasants in Vietnam 
through the lens of land policy and land marketization. Her findings are in line with those 
discussed by Akram-Lodhi (Akram-Lodhi 2005; Akram-Lodhi 2007a). Increasing differences 
in land holdings between poor and non-poor peasants are observed. Such differentiation is 
deeper in the central highlands and South-East regions where the number of landless 
households is on the rise. For example, nearly 40 per cent of the poorest households in the 
Mekong delta (in the Southern region) are landless (S. Scott 2009: 188). In this light, 
Steffanie Scott concludes that while the economic transformations generated by the 
reforms have opened up more opportunities and benefits for some groups, they have also 
left others more vulnerable. 
In the current contexts of globalisation and neo-liberalisation, the impact of global markets 
and global capitalism (especially, global agribusiness) on peasants and small farmers is at 
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the centre of concerns in the agrarian studies literature. Some studies argue that peasants 
are more vulnerable when they are integrated into global markets. For example, Akram-
Lodhi and Kay (2010: 279) conclude that there is a growth in poverty and inequality, and 
semi-proletarianisation in developing countries throughout the world due to global 
restructuring of agricultural production and trade facilitated by neoliberal globalisation. 
Araghi (2009) considers the impacts on peasants under what he calls ‘postcolonial 
neoliberal globalism’ through processes of global enclosure of food regimes, which creates 
a global division of labour at the expense of peasants in the South who have limited ability 
to compete in the global market. Large numbers of peasants have been partially displaced 
from their means of subsistence and means of production. The current global enclosure has 
thus intensified processes of de-peasantisation and de-agrarianisation. Kay’s (2000) study 
of agrarian transformations in Latin America points to the impacts of neo-liberalism on the 
Latin American peasantry. He points to agrarian restructuring in many Latin American 
countries which has stimulated the rapid growth of non-traditional agricultural exports 
leading to disparities between capitalist farmers, who can access the resources and 
technologies required for new kinds of agricultural exports, and peasant farmers, who 
cannot. The majority of Latin American peasants, as argued by Kay (2000: 132), are in a 
state of “permanent semi-proletarianization”  
Another dominant agrarian form under globalisation is the rise of contract farming. 
Scholars have quite different views on how contract farming affects the life of peasants. 
Watts (1992) views contract farming as a means of integration and subordination of 
peasants into global capital circuits. It shapes new forms of investors’ controlling 
production processes and household labour processes. Watts argues that peasants are 
turned from ‘independent’ peasant producers to semi-proletarians who work under the 
direction of the contractor; a peasant under contract farming is “little more than a 
propertied labourer, a hired hand on his or her own land” (Watts 1992: 91). Shiva (2004) 
expresses her worries about the issue of food security when peasants have lost their power 
to control agrarian processes and agricultural production to global agribusiness firms who, 
with their rising power to control agricultural chains, may sell food at prices that peasants 
are unable to afford. By contrast, Walker (2009) views contract farming as mechanism by 
which small farmers access agricultural inputs and avoid from the risks of being trapped in a 
cycle of debt. 
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There is a tendency to interpret the hardship that peasants encounter as being the result of 
the penetration of the market. This perspective appears in work under the political 
economy approach, which tends to see peasants and small farmers as passive victims of 
policies and practices determined by macro actors and structures, namely the market, 
globalisation, and the state. But the view that sees peasants as a passive victim of powerful 
external forces is also found in non-Marxist literature, such as neo-populist work which 
tends to view peasant society as a harmonious system with little differentiation among 
peasant households (Patnaik 1979). The ‘peaceful’, ‘harmonious’, ‘undifferentiated’ 
characteristics of the peasantries are seen as having been unsettled by external forces, 
especially capitalism and the state (Brass 1997: 206; Walker 2001: 149-150). 
Drawing on the experiences of the Thai uplands, Walker (2001; 2004) comments critically 
on the construction of upland images attached to a subsistence economy and the 
presumed harmony of upland communities, which are then shaken by the twin forces of 
the state and the market. These images of upland communities in northern Thailand are 
constructed by NGOs and some scholars, with the good intention to help protect the rights 
of uplanders who live in forest areas. The campaign thus presents the livelihoods of upland 
communities, and Karen ethnic communities in particular, as forest-dependent while 
downplaying their long historical engagement with commercial crops. This perspective is 
termed by Walker (2004) an ‘arborealised’ perspective of upland agriculture which may 
create new problems of legitimacy as uplanders seek to become agriculturalists. Walker 
notes that there is a disjunction between the images constructed by such campaigns and 
the reality of upland villages. The claim that upland communities produce only to meet 
their subsistence needs, and do not (and do not wish to) become involved in the market is 
presented by Walker as an agrarian ‘myth’. 
Rigg (2006a), while fully recognising the tendency towards social differentiation when rural 
communities are integrated into the market, warns against a pessimistic view seeing 
market integration as a single destructive process. He stresses that the pessimistic view 
“fails ... to tell the full story” of market integration because it exaggerates the productivity 
of the ‘traditional system’ and ignores the opportunities provided by the market (Rigg 
2006a: 131). Drawing on his research in rural areas of the Lao PDR, Rigg argues that market 
integration has brought both negative and positive effects to rural populations. While 
market integration may lead to a growing vulnerability of rural livelihoods for some, it does 
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provide opportunities for others. In this light, the response of peasants and small farmers to 
the market and capitalism is not limited to resistance. 
In Indonesia, capitalism is often seen as a destructive force making people poorer and more 
marginalised; in light of this, anti-capitalism is a major main theme of Indonesia’s agrarian 
movement – a movement which is a struggle over issues of land rights, natural resources, 
and trade policy (Tuong 2009: 182). While the Indonesian agrarian movement expresses its 
position as hostile to capitalism, the resistance of peasants in West Kalimantan as recorded 
by Potter (2009) does not fit neatly into such an anti-capitalism framework. Potter reports 
the resistance of peasants to the invasion of oil palm estates which transform them from 
independent peasants to labourers or peasants who can hold only a small piece of land. 
Peasants resist the arrival of oil palm companies employing both covert and overt means, 
depending on the political context. However, peasants’ resistance to the oil palm estates 
does not mean that peasants resist capitalism or the market per se. Potter notes that the 
market is not unknown to peasants (thus echoing Walker’s argument about northern 
Thailand) as they have been involved in growing cash crops such as rubber for the market 
for many generations. Moreover, they are also attracted by new cash crops such as pepper 
or cocoa (Potter 2009: 105). 
Barney (2004), who has observed resistance of peasants to plantations in Malaysia and 
Thailand, makes a similar point. He records the resistance of peasants in various areas of 
Thailand to the eucalyptus companies, with their close relations to some politicians, who 
attempt to access land classified as reserved forest but which has long been used by a 
considerable number of peasants. The attempts to evict and intimidate peasants have led 
to peasant protest. But Barney observes that in cases where companies employ ‘friendly’ 
strategies such as purchasing land from villagers or establishing contract relations with 
villagers, villagers’ responses are different. While some villagers may complain about the 
plantation projects, others have engaged in pulp production for the companies. Some 
companies are very successful in convincing villagers to grow eucalyptus for them; Barney 
notes that some companies obtain 100 per cent of their pulp products through contract 
farming relations with villagers. In the case of the displacement of longhouse communities 
from state-backed plantation (pulp paper plantation) in Sarawak, Malaysia, Barney records 
that force is often used to access land belonging to longhouse communities. This has not 
infrequently led to overt resistance from peasants such as roadblocks. Barney observes that 
the companies’ success in accessing land, and therefore displacing longhouse communities 
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from their land, is related to local views on new opportunities emerging from plantation 
estates (especially labour markets for young people) and new developments offered by the 
companies through the resettlement programmes, such as health and education services. 
Thus, while there are some households who strongly oppose such projects, the companies 
can persuade other households to ‘agree’ to be displaced. Drawing on this work in Malaysia 
and Thailand, Barney calls for the need to problematize relations between peasants (small 
farmers), the market, and resistance. 
Andrew Walker (2009) also raises a similar point about the local agency of peasants in 
Thailand in their engagement in commercial crop production. Drawing on his research in a 
lowland community in northern Thailand, Walker argues that while peasants (through their 
everyday practices) resist the companies who promote contract farming in the village, their 
resistance cannot be read as their resistance to the market per se. Walker argues that 
peasants do not seriously express a desire to return to traditional living as do James Scott’s 
(1985) peasants in Malaysia. What peasants in Walker’s study village are doing is to 
‘experiment’: trying new crops, new techniques, or establishing contract relations with new 
companies (Walker 2009: 76). 
There is also some work pointing to peasants as active agents in initiating market relations 
at local scales. This point is raised by Tan (2000) in the case of the transformation of 
Vietnam’s frontiers. Tan argues that highlanders in the central highlands of Vietnam not 
only participate in growing coffee for the world market but they are initiators, bringing this 
new commercial crop into the frontier areas of Vietnam (Tan 2000). The villagers’ role in 
the expansion of coffee gardens covering large areas in Central Highlands raises significant 
issues about the agency of so-called ‘marginal’ people in a process of economic 
development in the frontiers. It also highlights the necessity not to assume that the 
transformations which take place at the local level are the automatic outcomes of powerful 
macro forces. 
Overall, the literature reflects how far – and how quickly – peasants are willing to take 
advantage of the opportunities that arise from market integration. While there is a peasant 
movement criticising the impacts of capitalist development or globalisation, it cannot be 
read-off from this that peasants protest against capitalism per se. It should, rather, be 
considered as resistance to the ways and forms of the operations of capitalism (Brass 
2006). The ways that peasants from both lowlands and uplands respond to the market and 
capitalism raises the important question about the relations between peasants, small 
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farmers and the market. The influences of external forces on the transformations of 
peasant societies cannot be denied. However, a great deal of literature suggests that the 
agency of peasants should be taken seriously to understanding the complicated relations 
between peasants and the market. 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed three sets of related literatures on agrarian transformations. 
First, the literature on path(s) of agrarian transition, especially in frontier zones, has been 
used as a starting point to consider the possible path(s) of agrarian transformation in the 
uplands of the Lao PDR taking place from both ‘above’ and ‘below’ paths, as we will see in 
Chapter 6. Second is literature on rural transformations and de-agrarianisation which was 
explored to understand current debates on the role of agriculture (and land) and non-
agriculture in sustaining rural livelihoods. Data from the Lao uplands will be used to engage 
with this debate in Chapter 8, highlighting whether agriculture and land are still relevant to 
livelihoods and poverty. Third, a review of issues related to land use transformations and 
land grabs has set up an entrance and framework in understanding the complexities of land 
grabs and land right relations which will be presented in the two empirical chapters 
(Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) before returning to discuss more thoroughly in Chapter 8. 
The chapter has discussed the role of the state in agrarian processes. A key question is how 
far globalisation and global processes affect the role and status of the state. Chapter 6 will 
provide empirical evidence allowing the research to engage with this debate. The final 
section has explored debates concerning relations between peasants, small farmers and the 
market. This provided an understanding not only of relations between uplanders and the 
state and the market but also an approach to understand upland transformations from the 
micro perspective. In order to gain a better understanding of current situations in the Lao 
uplands, different sets of literature are linked together. For example, applying the literature 
on the state and agrarian processes, and the literature on small farmers and the market 
provides a means to understand the transformations in the uplands as the outcome of 
connections and negotiations between macro and micro processes moving beyond the 
dichotomy of macro-micro (structure-agency) determination. This will be seen through the 
paths of rubber expansion from ‘above’ and ‘below’ which will be presented in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter Three  
Research Methodology: 
Principles and Practices of Doing Research in the Lao Uplands 
3.1 Introduction 
Doing research in the Social Sciences can be messy, frustrating, and complex (Parr 1998 cited 
in Dwyer and Limb 2001: 2; Valentine 2001: 43). My research is no exception as the discussion 
in this chapter will show. The chapter follows, in large part, a narrative approach to describe 
the way the research was undertaken. It begins by setting out the research framework (section 
3.2) before moving to the challenges of obtaining research permission (section 3.3). This is 
followed by a discussion of how this influenced the selection of the research sites (section 3.4) 
and research methodologies (section 3.5). These sections elaborate how various elements of 
the research – its aims/objectives, broader justification, various academic concerns, and the 
research plans themselves – were compromised because of their embedding in a Lao setting. 
Section 3.6 describes how the data were analysed. The last section (section 3.7) addresses the 
important issue of positionality.  
3.2 Research Framework 
The research was framed by a combination of two key approaches: the everyday international 
political economy (IPE) and the sustainable rural livelihood approach. The research began by 
focusing on the actors in processes of current transformation by looking at the role and power 
of a range of actors from powerful ones such as the state, Chinese and domestic investors, and 
the less powerful, most obviously the uplanders themselves. These actors have different 
motivations and resources, and also benefit differently (Busch and Juska 1997). The research 
closely considered the asymmetries in the power relations between these actors. Some actors 
may have greater capability than others to negotiate and enforce things. Thus, the research 
recognises the significant role and power of the global market and the state in stimulating the 
expansion of rubber trees in the study communities. However, the research also paid 
cognisance to the point that is central to everyday IPE, namely that these dominant actors do 
not play an exclusive role (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007); rubber expansion is not the sole 
outcome of state and market machinations, but is partly a creation of those people who tend 
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to be considered powerless. Thus, agrarian situations in the four upland communities are not 
the outcome solely of structural determination. Transformations occurring in the study sites 
are (also) the outcome of negotiations between actors who have different capabilities and 
resources.  
A second approach incorporated into the research was the sustainable rural livelihoods 
approach which is also based on an actor-oriented perspective (De Haan and Zoomers 2005). 
Employing this actor-perspective, the research considered how macro-level implementation 
leads to internalisation processes at the micro level (Long 2001). Thus the government’s 
policies, regulations, and practices originating from the macro level were “mediated, 
incorporated, and often substantially transformed” as they entered local spaces and they also 
“mean quite different things to different interest groups or actors” (Long 2001: 45). The 
research adopted the sustainable rural livelihoods framework developed at the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex to capture how smallholders sustain 
their livelihoods under new opportunities and pressures emerging from state enclosure and 
market integration. The IDS’s sustainable rural livelihoods framework takes five aspects as the 
key to building an understanding of livelihoods: a particular vulnerability context, livelihood 
resources, livelihood strategies, livelihood outcomes, and institutional processes. The 
sustainability of livelihoods can be achieved through accessing different types of livelihood 
resources which are combined with livelihood strategies (such as livelihood diversification, 
agricultural intensification or intensification, and migration) to deliver (or not) a sustainable 
livelihood (Scoones 1998). The research, however, used livelihood activities instead of 
livelihood strategies because not all human activities are intentional or strategic (De Haan and 
Zoomers 2005). 
The livelihood activities of small farmers may involve several processes such as livelihood 
diversification, access to livelihood resources, and processes of inclusion and exclusion as 
access to livelihood resources of some farmers may compromise or inhibit the livelihood 
sustainability of others (Li 2002b). Furthermore, their livelihood activities may not be 
embedded in only one rural place, but rather in multiple places at different scales through the 
inter-local social networks of household members who are not rooted in only one place (De 
Haan and Zoomers 2003).Some livelihood activities may involve not only the mobilisation of 
their resources to cope with their vulnerabilities, but also the attempt to transform or re-shape 
the policies, regulations, and practices imposed from the macro level. However, the research 
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did not see small farmers as absolutely active agents who were always able to cope with their 
insecurity regardless of structural constraints. Rather, the research viewed the capacities of 
small farmers to mobilise their resources and achieve their livelihoods as being shaped by 
social relations, organisations, institutions, and power relations (De Haan and Zoomers 2005). 
That said, the agency of smallholders discussed in this research was considered as consisting of 
a range of capabilities with people “construct[ing] their own life course through the choices 
and actions they take within the opportunities and constraints of history and social 
circumstances” (Elder and Johnson 2002: 61). 
My research aimed to understand and interpret agrarian transformations in the Lao PDR from 
a local, grounded standpoint. Thus, in addition to gathering secondary data, primary data at 
the village level were collected with the expectation that combining data from both sources 
would allow me to capture the complexity of rural and agrarian transformations. Table 3.1 
identifies the sets of empirical data that I collected in order to address the research aims and 
objectives. These empirical data were used to address the research objectives (both empirical 
and conceptual levels) and to develop the argument made in Chapter 8.  
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Table 3.1 Relations between research aims and objectives and sets of empirical data 
Research aims and objectives Data used to address to research aims and objectives 
At empirical level: 
1. To understand the processes of rubber 
expansion into the frontiers 
1.1 Who and/or what are the key actors in 
the recent rapid expansion of rubber in the 
Lao uplands? 
1.2 How have these actors shaped and 
reshaped agrarian relations in the 
uplands? 
The research looked at the role of various actors involved in rubber expansion; 
1 State: 
1.1 Lao state: Lao state and the officials at the district, provincial and national levels: 
- The policies and practices of the state imposed on the uplands: 
a. Directly relevant to rubber expansion: such as promotion of rubber to upland communities, granting 
permission to investors to set up plantations in the upland 
b. Indirectly associated with rubber expansion: such as stabilising shifting agriculture, controlling the use of 
land and forestland, and commercialisation of upland agriculture, and policies on upland populations 
 1.2 Transnational state (the Chinese state):  
- The Chinese government’s policies and practices influencing the expansion of rubber in the Lao PDR 
2. Market: 
2.1 Market forces: the influence of rubber prices on the boom 
2.2 Market actors: 
a. Transnational market actors: practices of Chinese investors 
b. Domestic market actors: practices of domestic investors 
3. Smallholders: 
3.1 Perception of smallholders of rubber 
3.2 Reactions and practices of smallholders regarding rubber. 
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Table 3.1 Relations between research aims and objectives and sets of empirical data (continued) 
Research aims and objectives Data used to address to research aims and objectives 
At empirical level: 
2. To understand the impacts of current 
rubber expansion on the upland spaces 
and peoples 
2.1 To what extent has rubber expansion 
shaped and re-shaped the upland 
landscape? 
2.2 To what extent, and how, has rubber 
expansion affected the lives and 
livelihoods of uplanders? 
 
 
Data collected from the fieldwork included:  
1. Changes in the economy of the uplands 
2 Changes in land and forestland use 
3 Changes in land use rights and access, land management systems and controls, and property relations 
4. Livelihood opportunities emerging in the era of the rubber boom (wage labour) 
5. Pressures emerging from the rubber expansion: limited availability of agricultural land, decline of upland 
rice productivity, pressures on former/established livelihood activities 
6. Different capabilities of households in accessing agricultural land, and taking control over land and the 
conditions influencing their levels of capacity 
7. Households’ potential to diversify their livelihood activities, their agriculture, sources of income 
8. Potential of households to cope with unexpected crises 
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Table 3.1 Relations between research aims and objectives and sets of empirical data (continued) 
Research aims and objectives Data used to address to research aims and objectives 
At a conceptual level: 
1. To contribute to the 
(re)conceptualisation of agrarian 
transformations in Southeast Asia 
 
1. The notion of de-agrarianisation: 
- People’s occupations, livelihood activities (farm, off-farm and non-farm), income generation from each 
activity, the availability of off-farm and non-farm activities, and the ability of people to choose between 
farm, off-farm and non-farm activities 
2. The notion of actors in agrarian processes: 
- The policies and practices of the state 
- The practices of market actors and the role of market forces 
- The actions of smallholders 
3.Relations between small farmers, the market, and the state(s): 
- Policies and practices of the state imposed on the uplands and people and the reactions of uplanders to 
those policies and practices 
- Cooperation and conflicts (through policies and practices) between the state (and state officials) and the 
market regarding the operation of the market and the expansion of rubber in the Lao PDR and, particularly 
in the research sites 
- Market practices on the ground (via rubber): people’s views on rubber; people’s reactions to rubber 
(welcome, negotiate, manipulate and/or resistance) and forms of engagement (different forms of 
investment, and being wage labour) 
4. The notion of smallholders’ agency in agrarian processes: 
- Ability of smallholders to define their goals, meanings and motivations of life and act upon them given 
their circumstances and structuring relations 
- Ability of smallholders to bargain, negotiate, manipulate, or resist current agrarian situations  
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Table 3.1 Relations between research aims and objectives and sets of empirical data (continued) 
Research aims and objectives Data used to address to research aims and objectives 
At a conceptual level: 
2. To contribute to the 
(re)conceptualisation of global land grabs 
 
Data collected from the fieldwork to reflect on understandings of global land grabs including: 
1. Drivers of land grabs for rubber investment 
2. Actors involved in land grabs (Chinese investors, domestic investors, smallholders, the Lao and Chinese 
state, and local officials) 
3. Forms of land grabs (direct and indirect forms of land control) 
4. Scale of land grabs (large scale and micro scale grabbing) 
At a conceptual level: 
3. To contribute to the (re) 
conceptualisation of the state in the 
globalisation process 
 
Data used to address this issue were based on relations between the state and the market: 
1. Ability of the state to form policies and delivering on policies regarding rubber plantations 
2. Ability of market actors (Chinese and domestic investors) to achieve market penetration in the uplands 
(through the expansion of rubber trees) 
3. The role of state officials in rubber expansion (as mediator, facilitator, regulator, and controller) 
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3.3 Doing fieldwork in the Lao PDR 
It has long been realised that doing fieldwork confronts a gap between “what should be 
done” and “what can be done” (Marshall and Rossman 1999: 9). At the same time, it can 
also be the most exciting – as well as challenging – part of the research process especially 
when fieldwork is carried out in an unfamiliar setting. My first challenge was how to obtain 
research permission from the Government of the Lao PDR (GoL), especially given that the 
issues were, and still are, matters of heated debate among officials, development workers, 
and investors, and are therefore seen to be part of a ‘hot’ and sensitive topic. As a student 
from Thailand – the Lao PDR’s neighbour “which has its roots in centuries of interaction, 
contact, and conflict” (Rigg 2009: 708) – who did not have personal connections with any 
‘right’ people in the Lao PDR, I was told by a Thai professor with experience of working with 
NGOs in the country that the “possibility of you getting research permission in Laos is only 1 
per cent” (Jitti Mongkolnchaiarunya, personal email 11 October 2008). 
In order to obtain research permission from the GoL, as a foreign researcher, I needed to 
get a letter of acceptance from a local institution which needed to agree to act as a host 
institution during the period of the field research. With the assistance of a professor from a 
university in Japan, I established connection with the Faculty of Agriculture at the National 
University of Laos (NUOL), and they agreed to act as my host institution. As noted in some 
fieldwork guides (Crang and Cook 1995; Leslie and Storey 2003), obtaining research 
permission and the necessary visa can be a time-consuming process; it took almost 10 
months in my case.  
While some foreign researchers have found it possible to conduct research without official 
authorisation (Gros 2010), taking this approach in the rural areas of the Lao PDR is not 
advisable (Daviau 2010), particularly for a Thai national (see section 3.6 for a discussion of 
the particular character of working in the Lao PDR as a Thai national). The presence of a 
stranger is immediately noticed by the local populations and officials, especially in areas 
which are not tourist places. Doing fieldwork without an official seal can thus pose 
difficulties not only for the researcher but also for their research subjects (see Gros 2010 
for the case of China). I faced several situations that made me realise the importance and 
benefits of having official permission. On my second trip to Nalae district, for instance, 
there was an election for a new governor. I was informed by staff from the District 
Agricultural and Forestry Office (DAFO) that everyone was busy preparing for the election 
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and so no one could accompany me to the village. DAFO officials told me to wait for a few 
days and suggested that I might kill time by walking around the town. But only about half 
an hour after I had started exploring the town, I was approached by a high-school student 
who was a volunteer given the responsibility to maintain the ‘order’ of the district centre 
during the election. I was asked who I was, why I was in Nalae at the time of an important 
election, and many more questions. I was invited to go and see the police who asked me 
similar questions. Luckily I had research permission and could show them an official stamp 
from Vientiane explaining and sanctioning my visit to Nalae during such an important and 
sensitive time.  
But an official stamp, even one from Vientiane, was not always sufficient to gain access to 
my research sites. When I first visited the village of Houay Luang Mai, I was accompanied by 
DAFO staff and we met with the village headman and various village committees to inform 
them of the research and to ensure that other villagers would know about my research 
project. The following day I went to the village on my own (as the official could not 
accompany me) to begin my survey. While I was talking to an elderly Akha lady, a group of 
young male Akha approached me and began to question me about my presence in the 
village. I told them about my research and informed them that I had met and gained 
permission from the village headman and committees the night before. These young men, 
however, politely invited me to wait for the headman, even after I had shown them my 
research permission document. I spent a few hours sitting and chatting about a range of 
apolitical issues with these young Akha men before the problem was resolved when a DAFO 
official came to the village and assured them that my research project had been officially 
approved. Obtaining research permission was not only necessary as a step in a process of 
‘bureaucratic administration’; it also opened a channel to access ‘gatekeepers’ (state 
officials) who made it possible for me to access my research sites and subjects. 
Working in the Lao PDR, however, means that “government approval does not necessarily 
represent the end of the road regarding consent” (Leslie and Storey 2003: 82). I was also 
required to get permission from the local authority. More pertinent, I was put into the 
maze of the Lao bureaucratic system, which often made me feel uncomfortable by bringing 
my research under the eyes of the state’s bureaucratic system (see Hansen 2006; Scott et 
al. 2006; Bonnin 2010). I was required to submit my research plans to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. I was required to forward my plans and reports to my host institution every 
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month. I also had to inform the provincial and district authorities about my research plans 
before embarking on a fieldtrip. Finally, I was required to go back to the state’s offices again 
when I left my research sites to provide a report about my research activities. Not only was 
there this multi-layered requirement to report and inform different parts of the state’s 
apparatus about my work, but I was also told that I had to be accompanied by at least one 
state official throughout my field research: “it is a regulation of the government”18 
(Saythong Vilaywong, personal email, 4 September 2009), I was told. This is true of some 
other post-socialist countries (Scott et al. 2006; Bonnin 2010) where the state still has a 
well-honed system to control research activities. This inevitably impacts on the research 
process, and compromises the research in various ways. In the following section, I will 
discuss how this context – cultural, political and geographical – influenced the research: 
what I could do, and could not; and how, what and when I carried out my research 
activities. 
3.4 Research sites: justification and practices 
At the stage of research design, researchers should have a set of criteria for choosing their 
research sites and research subjects. This is determined largely by the research aim and 
objectives, with some consideration given to feasibility. However, when researchers start 
their fieldwork, things do not always go as planned. My own experiences reflect how far 
prior justifications, often crafted assuming the best, are forced to change when researchers 
enter the ‘field’, where feasibility becomes the key issue. During proposal preparation in 
Durham in 2008/2009, I was strongly inclined to conduct my research in both northern and 
southern regions of the country: studying villages in Luang Namtha province in the North 
and Champasak province in the South. However, as it turned out, my field research was 
conducted only in Luang Namtha due to feasibility issues. The first concerned physical 
access. The distance between Champasak and Luang Namtha is almost 1,400 kilometres, 
requiring almost 40 hours’ bus travel from the North to the South. It quickly became clear 
                                                          
18
 Though this was a regulation, the implementation of this regulation varied; while state officials in 
Sing district, Luang Namtha province insisted that their official accompanied me during my research, 
officials in Long district allowed me to go to the study villages on my own, without being 
accompanied.  
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that I would spend too much time travelling between the two regions, instead of doing 
research.  
The second consideration relates to the regulations that the GoL imposes on foreign 
researchers. Research projects have to be approved by the government, and permission 
also has to be sought from the local authority. A particular characteristic of rubber 
plantations in the South of the country is that they are dominated by large-scale concession 
plantations involving a loss of villagers’ agricultural land to Vietnamese rubber companies. 
Talking to some NGOs and scholars who work on rubber expansion in the South, these 
companies have good connections with local state officials (research diary, 13 September 
2009). This implies that my proposed work was not welcomed by these local officials, who 
were concerned that it might highlight villagers’ concerns and become a radical critique of 
the activities of Vietnamese rubber companies and, therefore, local officials. Due to these 
two factors, I decided to head to Luang Namtha in the northern region where rubber 
plantations are operated mainly under smallholder investment and a contract farming 
system.  
Before meeting up with people from the Luang Namtha Provincial Agricultural and Forestry 
Office (PAFO), I had established my own criteria for choosing my study villages. As my 
research aimed to understand how different levels of spatial and economic integration 
influence the way that people engage in the rubber boom, I had the intention of 
undertaking fieldwork in villages with different levels of market and spatial integration. This 
was, therefore, likely to involve a comparison between lowland and upland villages. My 
second criterion was about patterns of villagers’ engagement with rubber plantations. 
These two main criteria were discussed with a deputy head of the Luang Namtha PAFO and 
PAFO’s staff members who recommended that I undertake surveys in lowland villages in 
Namtha district which are intensively integrated into the market and where smallholder 
investment is the dominant form of rubber plantation. They also recommended that I visit 
Nalae district to identify survey villages which do not show a high level of market and 
spatial integration. Moreover, the local government’s policy whereby rubber was 
considered as a new alternative to lift Nalae out of the list of 47 poorest districts of the 
country was another condition encouraging me to undertake research in Nalae district. The 
first survey trip was thus conducted in two districts, Namtha and Nalae. In Namtha district, 
following discussions with Namtha DAFO officials I was accompanied to two lowland 
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villages (Baan Thung and Baan Moon) and two upland villages (Baan Klang and Baan 
Hmong) (see Appendix 1 for a summary of the surveyed villages).  
In the end, and after consideration, I decided not to conduct my research in any of these 
villages. My decision was based on a consideration of whether the villages suggested by 
Namtha DAFO’s officials could generate data that would meet the aims of the research, as 
well as issues of feasibility. While both lowland villages were ‘accessible’, at least in terms 
of language, only fifty per cent of Baan Thung’s households were involved in rubber 
plantations. In Baan Moon, while all households were involved in rubber plantations, many 
of them made their living from being state officials, trading rather than relying mainly on 
agriculture. The two upland villages were different, but again did not seem to suit my 
research. While the village of Baan Klang might have provided a picture of how concessions 
have transformed and re-shaped the lives of villagers who rely mainly on agriculture, there 
was already a Lao student collecting data for his Master’s thesis in the village, and villagers 
did not seem to be pleased by the prospect of being researched by two researchers visiting 
them almost at the same time. Finally, in Baan Hmong, the villagers had a long history of 
engagement in rubber plantation and the village is often referred to as a ‘model’ for 
resolving poverty. As a result, the village has been visited by many researchers; I was told 
that two other students were conducting research in this village – not to mention others 
who had completed their work (such as Manivong et al. 2003; Alton et al. 2005; Manivong 
and Cramb 2008; Chanthavong et al. 2009).  
In Nalae district, I met and held discussions with a deputy head of the Nalae DAFO and 
some of DAFO’s staff members. In this instance, feasibility became a crucial concern. One 
village which best suited my research was accessible only by walking, which took about 3-4 
hours. Due to the concern of local officials over my ‘safety’ and ‘convenience’ regarding 
staying overnight in the village, I had no choice but to travel back and forth between the 
district centre and my study village every day. Thus conducting research in this village was 
not practical as I would spend most of the time walking between the district centre and the 
village rather than undertaking the research. This village was not, therefore, on my survey 
list. DAFO officials took me and a lecturer from NUOL to one Khmu village, Baan Phu, 
located around 35 kilometres or one hour from the district centre. Since it is one of the 
district’s poorest villages, studying the role of rubber would have been very interesting. 
However, this village was not chosen simply because it was, in practical terms, almost 
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inaccessible. Villagers also seemed to be very busy in their fields. Its setting was also a point 
at issue. As a small district, Nalae did not have any car or motorbike rental shop. Though 
there was a bus running through the village every day, the timetable would only have 
allowed me a few hours to collect data before taking the bus back at around four o’clock. I 
was also taken to a lowland village located close to the district centre. Every household was 
involved in rubber either under contract with the Xiang Jiao Rubber Company from China or 
through villagers’ own investment, or both. Though I realised that this lowland village might 
not best suit my research it seemed to be an exceptional village for Nalae – a district where 
over 85 per cent of the population are uplanders. As mentioned earlier, the particular 
contexts of Nalae as one of the poorest districts in the country and the district’s strategy to 
use rubber trees as a new alternative for resolving the challenge of poverty were of interest 
to me. I also collected some data from Baan Dai, another village of potential interest. 
However, at the time that I collected the data, Baan Dai could be accessed only by a long-
tail boat, this raised safety concerns. About two weeks after I undertook my research in 
Baan Dai, I began to discuss another potential village with DAFO officials. This was the 
upland village of Baan Don Tha, a Khmu village where I finally conducted my research. I 
visited this village with DAFO’s internship-like staff19 to hold discussions with the village’s 
headman and committees and found that this village was one of the poorest in the district 
and most households had planted rubber trees under a contract system of relations with 
the Xiang Jiao Rubber Company. This village might not have suited my research as well as 
Baan Phu but, practically, it was accessible. The selection of my research site in Nalae 
district was, therefore, very much a compromise between the academic criteria that I had 
drawn up in Durham, and the important issue of feasibility.  
While I chose Baan Don Tha to represent a village where levels of spatial and economic 
integration are less intense, I selected a village in Sing district as a case where levels of 
regional and market integration are significant. This district is close to China - the most 
important market for Luang Namtha’s agricultural products. Selection of a study village in 
Sing, however, presented another kind of challenge. On my first trip to Sing district I went 
with a lecturer from NUOL, and we were accompanied by the Sing DAFO’s senior official 
                                                          
19
 There are many people, especially young people who have recently graduated, who want to be 
recruited as state officials, so they work as volunteers with the government. Generally, they do not 
get paid by the government. They are often assigned to accompany development organisations or 
business companies to the villages where the projects are delivered; therefore they get 
remuneration from these organisations.  
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who was also a member of the party at the district level. We visited two Akha villages and 
one Yao village. Smallholding and contract farming patterns were found in the two Akha 
villages (Baan Na Kao and Baan Na Mai) where villagers were intensively involved in 
producing sugarcane for the Chinese market. The Yao village of Baan Yao was the first 
village in Sing district where people had planted rubber trees. Most households there had 
set up their own plantations, with an average plantation area per household of around 
eight hectares. While both the Akha villages suited my research needs and requirements, 
accessibility to both of them again became an issue. DAFO officials expressed their worries 
about my conducting research in two villages which are difficult to access, less comfortable, 
and even ‘underdeveloped’. This caused me to turn to a Yao village which was easy to 
access and, at that time, still met my justifications for a research site. However, on my 
second trip to Sing, I had the chance to talk to local people in town, which kindled my 
interest in also conducting my research with Akha people, not only because they are a 
majority of the upland populations in Sing district but also because they are intensively 
involved in rubber. I convinced a DAFO official to take me to one Akha village (Baan Daen) 
located close to the Lao-Chinese border. The situation in this village was of great interest to 
me as villagers were intensively involved in cash crop and rubber production through cross-
border (Chinese) connections. Villagers from this village had also experienced a loss of 
some of their forestland to the Police Office, which was then said to have passed the land 
to a Chinese rubber company. However, this village was located about 22 kilometres north 
of Sing town, taking almost an hour for the DAFO official and me to access by motorbike, 
climbing up the hills. Though this village was most attractive to me, I realised that I could 
not carry out my research here on my own, given the government’s regulations and 
restrictions on my travel and access. 
It should be noted that official perspectives on rubber plantations in Sing district also 
determined where my research was carried out. While Luang Namtha’s provincial 
government generally promoted rubber plantations as a new alternative to alleviate 
poverty, there were variations among state officials at the district level. Some of Nalae’s 
DAFO officials, while they promoted contract farming rubber plantations to villagers, 
expressed their worries about how far rubber could resolve people’s poverty and 
environmental issues. Sing’s DAFO official who accompanied me strongly believed that 
rubber was the best way to lift people, and especially uplanders, out of poverty as well as 
to resolve the ‘problem’ of shifting cultivation in the uplands. His view on rubber raised 
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concerns on my part over the potential impact on my research subjects if I conducted my 
research in a village where, due to their loss of land to the Police Office, people might 
heavily criticise state officials. With this in mind, I took the decision to undertake my 
research in a village where smallholder investment was the dominant form, taking the view 
that this would protect my informants from any possible impacts emerging while they were 
being interviewed by me in front of the officials. A trekking trip was used as the strategy to 
explore the potential villages without being accompanied by state officials. After visiting a 
few upland villages which were geographically accessible, I convinced the DAFO official to 
take me to Baan Houay Luang Mai, an Akha village where I finally carried out my research. 
People in this village were intensively integrated into the market, mainly through sugarcane 
production. Its geographical location close to the Chinese border meant that it was well 
connected to the Chinese market. This village was thus suitable as a comparison settlement 
to Don Tha village where levels of market integration were less intense. Rubber in this 
village had developed under the villagers’ own investment, and there was no contract 
farming in the village. I felt, therefore, that any unintended consequence of its inhabitants 
being my research subjects would be minimal. 
Thus, after much travel and consideration, I arrived at my study site selection, based on 
levels of spatial and economic integration (with Don Tha village being a case of less intense 
integration and Houay Luang Mai village of more intense) and different patterns of 
villagers’ involvement in rubber trees (the 2+3 contract farming system in Don Tha village 
and a smallholder pattern in Houay Luang Mai village). However, concerned that I could not 
stay overnight in the villages and also worried about being accompanied by local officials 
which would inevitably affect the quality of the data I could obtain, I decided to extend my 
field research to two other villages expecting that, while I might not gain in-depth data, this 
would allow me to obtain a wider data set permitting comparison. I thus headed to Long 
district to undertake research in a village where rubber plantations had been set up as part 
of a concession programme and a village where the 1+4 contract farming system operated. 
I was introduced by a Lao friend of mine to his colleague who worked for a non-government 
organisation (NGO) in Long district. This person became my gatekeeper who introduced me 
to local officials, traders, and an interpreter. He also recommended which villages I might 
consider to conduct my research in. When I arrived at the Long DAFO with an official seal 
from the Luang Namtha PAFO, this Lao friend, with his personal connections to local 
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officials, was able to convince DAFO officials to allow me to go to the villages with my 
interpreter but without any accompanying officials. Thus, the villagers were more relaxed 
when they talked about the impacts of the concessions and the 1+4 contract farming 
system, and often commented critically on the role of the state agencies and officials in the 
process. Moreover, being able to make a connection with local people who live, work with, 
and have personal connections to local state officials made it easier to choose research 
sites which met my criteria. A survey in Long district was carried out in two Akha villages 
where the 1+4 contract farming system was the dominant form of plantation; as both of 
these villages were quite similar, I selected Baan Pha Lad due to its geographical setting 
which made it the more accessible. 
In Xiengkok borderland where the plantations largely operated under a concession system, 
there are only a few villages. I visited two villages; both were resettlement villages and 
parts of their agricultural land had been taken by the Jundai Rubber Company who claimed 
that it had gained permission to use the land from the army. I chose Baan Kaem Khong, a 
village of Kui and Lahu peoples, to conduct my research, again due to the practical matter 
of accessibility. Details on the four study communities will be returned to in Chapter 5. 
In sum, the selection of my research sites was very much a compromise between academic 
criteria and feasibility. This is a common experience that researchers face when they start 
their field research. Foreign researchers from the global North may encounter issues of 
feasibility when they arrive in the field in the global South, realising the impracticality of 
their selection criteria in the face of the conditions they face. While I shared this experience 
and had to change my research site from two different regions to only one region, as well 
as selecting villages that were ‘second best’ in terms of their academic suitability, doing 
research in the transition socialist Lao PDR also poses another set of limitations and 
challenges. As noted by some researchers (Scott et al. 2006; Thøgersen and Heimer 2006; 
Cornet 2010; Daviau 2010; Gros 2010) who work in other post-socialist countries, research 
activities, especially those conducted by foreign researchers, are subjected to state control 
and censorship in various ways. Thus, in my case, local state officials were taking part in the 
process of selection of research sites. Moreover, concerning the possible impacts of the 
research on research participants and the perspectives of the state agencies and officials in 
each area, this also directed me in terms of where my research should or should not take 
place. A researcher who works in the transition socialist settings not only faces these 
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tensions between academic, practical and political criteria, but such issues also extend to 
the methodologies used. These issues will be discussed in the following section. 
3.5 Research methodologies: plans and reality 
My research aimed to understand and interpret agrarian transformations in the Lao PDR 
from a local, grounded standpoint. Thus, in addition to gathering secondary data, I intended 
to draw my information from interviews and observations as I considered that these would 
be the best ways to collect the data needed to capture the complexity of rural and agrarian 
transformations. Foreign researchers from the global North may find methodological 
challenges when they are in the field in the global South (Howes et al. 2006), for instance, 
how best to communicate with research participants, how to access gatekeepers and 
research participants, how to work under time pressure, and so on. While I shared all these 
experiences, working in the Lao PDR also posed other profound challenges for my research 
methodologies. 
As indicated above, some transition socialist states still keep a close watch on research, 
especially social science research undertaken by foreigners, in order to ensure that research 
and researchers do not destabilise the power of the state and undermine socialist ideology. 
Scientific research is more welcome than social science research as it is not likely to 
undermine the power and authority of the state and the party. Social science research, in 
contrast, is the subject of suspicion and control. The state authorities thus prefer research 
to employ quantitative methods, a questionnaire survey in particular, as these are 
understood to be ‘apolitical’ (Chuan and Poh 2000 cited in Scott et al. 2006: 31). Both state 
officials and people are familiar with the questionnaire; for some people, the questionnaire 
is used as a synonym for research. In the Lao PDR, while qualitative methods are used by 
some aid donors – such as Chamberlain’s (2007) research undertaken on behalf of the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) - many state authorities still perceive a questionnaire 
survey as being a fundamental element of research.  
My research aimed to understand agrarian transformations from a local, grounded 
perspective. I sought to understand subjective views and understandings of people in terms 
of their social reality rather than through statistical description (Dwyer and Limb 2001:6). In 
order to achieve this, qualitative methodologies are required. However, the research policy 
and the research environment I encountered in the Lao PDR changed the research methods 
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I employed. As well as in-depth interviews, I intended to use observation as my key 
technique to gather non-verbal information, expecting that this technique would provide 
understanding of what was going on in the study villages. When it became clear that I could 
not stay in the village for long periods, observation became impossible; only popping in and 
out of research sites could not allow me to spend sufficient time to obtain the in-depth 
picture I was hoping to achieve. The qualitative data I collected, therefore, was based on in-
depth interviews (with both villagers and ‘elite’ participants) which I discuss below in more 
detail in section 3.5.2. In addition to qualitative methods, I eventually did a survey to 
provide an overview of the study villages; the application of surveys will be discussed in 
section 3.5.1. Both sections elaborate on the complications of fieldwork and the necessity 
of a fieldworker to be flexible in applying such research techniques as questionnaire 
surveys and in-depth interviews for gathering data from a rural poor setting, and some 
challenges and limitations in researching ‘elites’. 
3.5.1 A questionnaire survey – how did it work in the Lao uplands? 
It was not my intention to use questionnaires for my research. My initial decision related to 
the purposes of my research, which was to understand the everyday lives of people under 
on-going processes of agrarian transformations. I thus intended to employ only qualitative 
methods, presuming that these would allow me to capture the detailed, complex, 
sometimes contradictory and colourful features of peoples’ lives. When I began my 
fieldwork, I struggled with the question of who should be chosen as my research subjects 
for in-depth interviews (see section 3.4.2 for a discussion of issues relating to processes and 
some problems in selecting research subjects). Using questionnaire surveys came to my 
mind as a possible tool at the early stage of my research, to help me get not only an 
overview of the villages but also a general idea of whom I should follow up with the in-
depth interviews. I also considered that a questionnaire survey might be used as an entree 
to the village as villagers are more used to this form of research which is usually used by the 
government to gather information from villagers. Thus beginning the research with a 
questionnaire survey could make villagers more relaxed than starting the research with in-
depth interviews. I thus used a questionnaire survey in one lowland village, Baan Dai, in 
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Nalae district20. My questionnaire consisted of three sections; it started with a set of 
questions relating to general details of the household (such as number of household 
members, income, and expenses), questions on farming, and followed by more details on 
relations between households and rubber plantations. Before I conducted the 
questionnaire survey, I discussed the questions on the questionnaire form with two officials 
from the Nalae DAFO and the village’s committees to see if the questions were accessible 
and acceptable to the villagers. The range and nature of the questions were re-designed 
after I piloted it with the village’s committees.  
I carried out the questionnaire survey by myself but I was always accompanied by at least 
one intern staff member from the Nalae DAFO. I found several limitations in using 
questionnaire surveys; some limitations related to the villagers themselves but most of the 
limitations were mine. Villagers, who had already been informed by the village’s headman 
and committees about my research, generously gave their time to answer my questions, 
rather more so than I had expected. When I walked into the village, villagers would invite 
me to go to their houses to do my questionnaire. There were several times when, while I 
was conducting a questionnaire with one villager, other villagers would be sitting or 
standing around waiting to be interviewed. I was often asked: “have you done this house 
already? Shall we move to my house?” It became difficult for me to continue talking with 
respondents when they felt that their neighbours were waiting to answer my 
questionnaire. This situation raised both issues of privacy and the response of informants. I 
often turned questions from a household or an individual level to a village level to allow 
other villagers to participate in the conversations as well as to avoid discomfort of my 
interviewee.  
While villagers always gave their time, many did not expect that they might be visited again 
for in-depth interviews. When I informed villagers that I might visit them later for further 
conversations, some villagers replied that “I thought I had already done everything. Is it still 
not finished yet?” Some villagers even refused to be interviewed again: “I think I do not 
have any other things to tell you. I have told you everything” (research diary, 4 November 
2009). Moreover, when I undertook the questionnaire surveys, I sometimes found myself 
constrained by the fixed format of the questionnaire template, while also worrying that I 
                                                          
20
 Due to the issue of feasibility, I later decided not to conduct my research in this village (see section 
3.3 for a discussion on justification of my study villages). 
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might not be able to go back for further in-depth interviews. This raised doubts in my mind 
how far questionnaires were beneficial for my research. I was worried that I might gain only 
dry and voiceless statistical data rather than the insightful information I was hoping for. At 
the end of the third day of field research using the questionnaire survey, I decided to stop. I 
still conducted a survey to gain an overall picture of the study villages. But instead of 
arriving in the villages with questionnaire forms, I brought only a few pages containing lists 
of key questions to be asked in a semi-structured format. These became my guideline for 
gathering data from villagers. Instead of concentrating on filling in the questionnaire form 
page by page, I wrote down all my respondents’ answers and response in my research 
diary. In this way, I did not have to stick rigidly to the questionnaires, and could flexibly 
switch between different sets of questions depending on the responses of individual 
villagers. In some cases, I gathered only general data on the households but there were 
several times when conservations were extended into other realms. Thus, in-depth 
interviews were sometimes undertaken at the same time as the general data were 
collected. In those cases where conversations were limited only to general data or were 
stopped, for example, by the unexpected arrival of guests (relatives from other villages, 
traders, and officials), these respondents were informed that they and their family’s 
members might be visited again for further conversations. While finishing filling a 
questionnaire form tended to make respondents feel that the research had been 
completed, when I did not use a questionnaire form, it seemed understandable to villagers 
that my research had not been completed and they might be visited again. Generally, 
villagers seemed to ‘welcome’ me into their house again.  
While I resolved the problems emerging when I conducted the questionnaire survey in Baan 
Dai, a new problem emerged when I collected background data without using the 
questionnaire form: some questions were not asked. Missing answers for some questions 
would not have happened if I had asked questions in an orderly manner, using a 
questionnaire. While being flexible in asking questions following respondents’ answers 
allowed each conversation to evolve naturally, and villagers seemed relaxed to talk to me 
like this, it sometimes meant that some questions were `missed’. In order to cope with 
these missing answers, at the end of each day, I checked and listed the missing questions. 
Generally, these questions were asked when I visited villagers again for in-depth interviews. 
However, there were some households where I did not undertake in-depth interviews. In 
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these cases, the questions remained unanswered (see Appendix 2 for a summary of 
questions with missing answers).  
Table 3.2 summarises the socio-economic condition of households in the study villages. 
While I intended to get a similar number of surveyed households from each economic 
stratum, this was possible only in Houay Luang Mai. When I started my survey in each 
village, I discussed the households’ economic status with the village’s headman and 
committees so that I might obtain a broad insight into conditions. The village’s gatekeepers, 
however, tended to guide me towards households that they were familiar with raising the 
problem of possible bias. I therefore also interviewed some households which were not on 
these lists of ‘recommended’ households. When I went back to discuss the economic status 
of each household in the survey with the village’s headman, it became obvious that the 
number of households falling into the ‘poorest’ category was above other categories. Time 
pressure did not allow the possibility of conducting a further survey. Moreover, the number 
of households in each category made it impossible to get the same number of surveyed 
households from each group. For instance, there were only a few households from Kaem 
Khong village that could be classified as less poor households. Limits in selecting samples 
and missing data raise a concern of the representativeness of the samples. That said, and 
notwithstanding both limitations, overall I got a general picture of the current situation and 
trends in the study villages. 
Table 3.2 Summary of households surveyed and socio-economic status in the study 
villages, 2009 
Villages Poorest Poor Less poor Total 
Houay Luang Mai  9 8 8 25 
Pha Lad 15 8 8 31 
Don Tha 11 6 5 22 
Kaem Khong 6 8 4 18 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009-2010 
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3.5.2 In-depth interviews 
I employed in-depth interviews as my main data collection technique as these allowed me 
to capture how villagers experience and make sense of their everyday lives and activities 
(Marshall and Rossman 1999: 110). In-depth interviewing also allowed me to understand 
how interviewees perceive, view, interpret, and react to particular issues and situations. I 
employed in-depth interviews with two main respondents: villagers and ‘elites’ (I discuss 
below the differences and limitations of employing this technique to both groups of 
informants.) As in-depth interviews are “a conversation with a purpose” (Kahn and Cannell 
1957 cited in Marshall and Rossman 1999: 108), I attempted to make my interviews like 
conversations with my respondents rather than a kind of “question and answer”. It was not 
only me who guided these conversations, but my respondents also framed and shaped our 
conversations. Though I had lists of questions that I intended to explore, I did not stick to 
my question lists. In many instances it was only a few questions at the early stage of the 
conversations that were framed by me; from then on, questions and conversations were 
generally shaped by the responses of my informants. There were several times when I 
learnt that it is always worth letting interviewees shape conversations because these 
revealed relevant and significant issues that would otherwise have been overlooked. But, as 
pointed out by O’Brien (2006: 29), the best way to discover the situation in the field is “to 
let our informants talk and [researchers] just listen”. Letting informants speak always led 
me to gain data which I had not anticipated. 
 3.5.2.1  In-depth interviews with uplanders 
In-depth interviews were the major method for gaining local, grounded perspectives from 
villagers. Table 3.3 provides a summary of my interviewees in each study village. I attempted to 
undertake in-depth interviews with villagers of different economic status (poorest, poor, and 
less poor), gender (female and male), and generations (young, middle-aged, and old-aged 
groups). As noted above, I discussed who I should interview with each village’s headman and 
committees, as key gatekeepers at the village level, giving them my ideas on particular types of 
villagers I would like to interview. My criteria, however, were too numerous for these village 
gatekeepers, while some recommended villagers were too busy to be available for interview. I 
later adopted a snowball sampling technique by asking my interviewees to recommend further 
potential interviewees, as a means of breaking away from the gatekeepers’ recommendations  
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Table 3.3 Summary of interviewees from the study villages 
 
Village 
Less Poor Poor Poorest Total 
Female Male Female Male Female Male  
young 
 
middle old young middle old young middle old young middle old young middle old young middle old  
Houay 
Luang 
Mai 
1 2 1 2 2 3 2 1 0 1 3 1 1 4 1 1 2 2 30 
Pha 
Lad 
1 2 0 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 0 2 3 1 26 
Kaem 
Khong 
1 1 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 1 2 0 17 
Don 
Tha 
1 2 1 1 0 3 1 1 0 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 4 25 
Total 4 7 2 5 7 8 4 5 1 6 9 5 4 9 2 5 8 6 97 
Source: Fieldwork interviews, 2009-2010 
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(see 3.5.1). There were also some interviewees who were accessed by chance and who I 
just happened to run into. Though I had my preferred categories of interviewees, so that I 
could cast my interpretive net as widely as possible, some were hard to access; this applied 
to younger women and the elderly (see Table 3.3). The most accessible villagers were those 
of middle-age, both female and male, and these therefore form the majority of my 
interviewees.  
I conducted in-depth interviews with villagers in my study villages in order to collect data at 
three levels: village, household and individual. Table 3.4 provides a summary of the data 
collected at each level using such in-depth interviews. 
Table 3.4 Summary of data collected by in-depth interviews, 2009-2010 
Levels Data collected interviewees 
Village - the village’s history, settlement, migration 
- an overview of the villages’ socio-economic 
development 
- an overview of the villages’ agriculture, land 
and forest relations 
- the villages’ engagement with the market 
- an overview of cash crops and rubber 
plantation in the study villages 
- villages’ headmen and 
committees 
- elderly villagers 
- other villagers  
- teachers 
 
Household - household history, migration, settlement 
- an overview of household economy 
- household relations to land and forest 
- households and market relations 
- households’ involvement in rubber 
plantation 
-villagers 
Individual - life history 
- personal experiences of market relations 
and state involvement 
- explanations and perspectives on situations 
they confronted/confront and responses to 
them 
- views about the future 
-villagers 
Source: Fieldwork interviews, 2009-2010 
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It is important to note that while in-depth interviews allowed me to get data from my study 
villages at individual, household, and village levels, the boundaries between these three 
levels were never clear. When I conducted the in-depth interviews, I usually began with 
questions on each respondent’s personal life and history (such as childhood, migration, 
personal experience of the market, views about the future etc.) before extending into sets 
of questions at the household level (such as household agriculture, household land use, 
household crisis and so on) and conversations reflecting conditions in the village more 
widely (settlement, infrastructure development, market integration, rubber expansion into 
the village, and so on). When I did in-depth interviews with villagers, I found that individual 
stories and experiences reflected not only individual life and perspectives, but they also 
reflected on wider socio-economic situations, either at a village level or beyond. Thus the 
individual life of my interviewees can be linked to, for instance, political conflicts in the Lao 
PDR, migration and resettlement policies, policies on and implementation of opium 
eradication, disease, and so on. It is also important to note that there were always 
difficulties in identifying whether my interviewees’ perspectives reflected individual views 
or household views. The lines between these three levels were never, therefore, altogether 
clear.  
All in-depth interviews were conducted by myself. Realising that tape-recording might 
affect the ways in which informants responded to the research (Crang and Cook 1995: 29) 
and give the sensitiveness of my research topics, I did not use any kind of voice–recording 
when I conducted in-depth interviews. I was afraid that voice-recording would create a 
sense of insecurity among my upland interviewees who might not understand why their 
voices had to be recorded and whether this would have an impact on them. Thus the 
interviews were recorded in the form of note-taking. Before and during the interview, I 
always assured interviewees that they and their identities would remain anonymous. I also 
informed my informants that they could stop the conversation with me at any time in case 
they felt uncomfortable. However, none of my interviewees asked that the interview be 
stopped. This might be optimistically interpreted as indicating that my interviewees felt 
comfortable in allowing me to explore their lives, but it may also reflect power relations 
between me and my research subjects. My identity as a Thai student studying in the UK, 
often accompanied by a local state official, with an official letter from the state asking 
villagers to give their cooperation, might have caused the villagers to think they had no 
choice but to answer my questions. 
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Language barriers were another challenge. I did my research with four ethnic groups (Akha, 
Khmu, Kui and Lahu) in four upland communities. It was impossible for me to learn their 
languages. Thanks to the similarity between the Lao and Thai languages, this allowed me to 
conduct my research in Lao/northern Thai21. Most of my upland interviewees can 
communicate in Lao and they were able to understand my northern Thai. There were a few 
cases where villagers could not communicate in Lao/northern Thai, and in these instances 
an interpreter was needed. In the case of Don Tha village, two interviews (both 
interviewees were female) needed to be carried out through interpretation and in these 
cases a Lao local state official who accompanied me into the village acted as my interpreter. 
In the case of Houay Luang Mai, I employed one young male Akha in the village as my 
assistant and interpreter but most of the interviews were carried out using Lao/northern 
Thai, with the exception of a few elderly villagers. In Pha Lad, as some villagers had recently 
moved from distant uplands, it was always difficult to conduct the interviews in 
Lao/northern Thai. Around one-third of the interviews in this village were carried out 
through an interpreter who was also an Akha but from a village near the district centre. In 
Kaem Khong village, all interviews with Lahu villagers and most of the Kui villagers were 
carried out in Lao/northern Thai. As Kui villagers can communicate in Akha, one interview 
was conducted through my Akha translator. Bearing in mind that translation is not a neutral 
exercise (Smith 1996; Temple and Young 2004; Turner 2010), this need for interpretation 
injected further challenges into the research process including loss of meaning. Thus, 
during conversations with villagers, data was (re)checked regularly to minimise any 
misunderstanding or misinterpretation. Research notes were made in Thai, attempting to 
maintain the senses and meanings which might otherwise have been lost in direct 
translation from Lao into English. 
 3.5.2.2  In-depth interviews with the ‘elite’  
When we talk about ‘elite’ interviewing or researching, there is a question of what we 
mean by elite. How does researching or interviewing ‘elites’ differ from researching 
ordinary research subjects? (See Richards 1996: 199; Scheyvens et al. 2003: 183; and Smith 
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 North-eastern Thai is the closest Thai dialect to the Lao language. While I can fully understand it, I 
have very limited ability to speak this dialect. I can, however, manage to speak northern Thai which 
is closer to the Lao language than standard Thai. Thus I used my northern Thai to conduct my 
research. 
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2006: 646). For methodological purposes, I follow the general view that elites are those 
individuals who are “exercising the major share of authority, or control within society, 
organizations and institutions. Elite status stems from the control of human, capital, 
decision making and knowledge resources” (Desmond 2004: 264). Following the suggestion 
of Marshall and Rossman (1999: 113) that elite interviews allow a researcher to gain an 
overview of an organisation (in the case of my research, the organisations of the state and 
private companies), including its policies, practices and future plans, and its relationship to 
other organisations, I carried out elite interviews with state officials, traders, and investors. 
The nature of ‘elite’ interviews poses different challenges from researching ‘down’ for a 
researcher (Cormode and Hughes 1999 cited in Scheyvens et al. 2003: 184; Desmond 2004: 
262). Doing ‘elite’ interviews in the Lao PDR was no exception. The challenges I confronted 
came through two sets of overlapping issues: practicalities and positionality (Scheyvens et 
al. 2003: 184). As far as practicalities were concerned, the greatest challenge came not 
from deciding whom I should interview but gaining access to them. When I began my 
research in September 2009, I discussed the potential ‘elites’ that I should interview with 
Ajarn (a lecturer) Saythong in the Faculty of Agriculture at NUOL, my host institution in the 
Lao PDR. In order to gain access to state officials, an official letter from the president of 
NUOL to the head of the respective state agency was required. Letters were sent to six 
state agencies in Vientiane, the capital city of the Lao PDR. Ajarn Saythong and I were told 
that we needed to call back later to check whether we would be allowed to meet any 
officials from these agencies, and if so when we could meet them. However, when we 
called back, we were always informed that “your request is being considered, please could 
you ring back again tomorrow”. However, Ajarn Saythong, with his direct experience in 
dealing with the Lao bureaucratic system, was adept at sorting out this problem and 
suggested that, although we had not yet got a confirmed time, we should present ourselves 
at the agencies in question and see if there was someone whom we could talk to. I initially 
hesitated to use this solution as I felt that it might disturb officials while they were busy at 
work. I finally decided, however, to follow his suggestion. In this way, I managed to 
interview officials from four state agencies. It should be noted that Ajarn Saythong’s 
personal connections were also very significant in helping me gain access to these officials; 
he knew at least one person (his ex-students, his former undergraduate classmates, or 
friends) in the four organisations where I undertook elite interviews (see the list of elite 
interviewees in Appendix 3).  
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The situation in Luang Namtha was different. When Ajarn Saythong and I got to the Luang 
Namtha PAFO, the deputy head of PAFO, who had already received a copy of the letter 
from NUOL’s president, was waiting to discuss my research project. He even invited one of 
the PAFO’s officials who was able to provide me with a huge amount of data on rubber 
plantations in Luang Namtha to join the meeting. When I went to the district level, with a 
letter from PAFO in my hand, I was always impressed by senior officials at the DAFO who 
allowed me to interview them, even when I had not made an appointment in advance. 
DAFO officials also provided me with a letter to access other government agencies in each 
district. It is important to note that one significant reason why senior officials at local levels, 
especially at the district level, willingly agreed to be interviewed was the nature of the 
political and bureaucratic system in the Lao PDR – namely, its top-down structure. Thus 
local authorities always facilitated my research when they saw that my project had been 
approved by the central state in Vientiane. That said, I did find some difficulties in getting 
appointments to interview state officials when I became ‘familiar’ with local officials. I often 
found, to my frustration, that appointments were postponed or even cancelled at the last 
minute.  
The status of the interviewer can make ‘elite’ interviewees feel important; for example, to 
be interviewed by a ‘VIP interviewer’, for instance, a professor from a university or a 
‘Farang’ (western) student, has a cachet in the Lao PDR. Being a young female student from 
Thailand, this did not apply in my case. Possibly as a result, I faced difficulties getting 
appointments to interview some high-ranking officials because they usually had a tight 
schedule. Serendipity sometimes played a part, however. For example, in the case of the 
head of the Luang Namtha PAFO whose schedule was too tight to put my name in his 
appointment diary, I had the opportunity to have conversations with him during breakfast 
in his favourite noodle shop. My conversations with him lasted from only 20 minutes to 
over an hour and the topics that we covered were various: his life experiences, his family, 
rubber plantations, the provincial government’s policies on poverty alleviation, and so on. 
An ability to establish personal connections in the field was also an important channel to 
gain access to some elites. In Sing district, as a regular customer of one noodle shop run by 
the Sing district’s deputy governor’s wife, I had several opportunities to have conversations 
with this senior official over my meals. Moreover, when I had built a good relationship with 
this lady, I was introduced to and able to have conversations with her father who had been 
a governor of Sing district and was a member of the communist party at a provincial level. 
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Thus it was not only the letter from Vientiane but the ability to make personal connections 
in the field that played a significant (and challenging) part in opening-up channels of 
communication and thus gaining access to ‘elite’ informants22.  
In addition to interviewing state officials, I intended to interview traders and rubber 
investors. But, as noted by Richards (1996: 204), we are not able to interview all those we 
wish to. While I could manage to interview some traders which allowed me to gain some 
notion of their roles and relations, I had very limited opportunities to conduct in-depth 
interviews with rubber investors. Investors from China usually stayed in the Lao PDR only 
during the planting seasons. When they were in the Lao PDR, they tended to stay on their 
distant plantations and they were extremely busy preparing for rubber planting or taking 
care of their plantations. The only possible place I could meet Chinese investors was at 
Chinese restaurants in town where they went for dinner. However, the language barrier 
became an insurmountable obstacle as I could not speak Chinese and most of the Han 
Chinese investors could not speak Lao. While I could have found a Chinese interpreter, it 
was not practical to hire an interpreter while I was unsure if I might meet Chinese investors 
who would allow me to interview them. Thus, I only managed to interview Tai Lue–Chinese 
investors from Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan province as their 
language shares roots with and similarity to my Thai. I had the chance to have short 
conversations with several Tai Lue-Chinese investors but I could have long conversations 
with only three. I also managed to interview a Tai Lue-Chinese who worked as one of the 
leaders of a management team of a Chinese rubber company. In addition to Chinese 
investors, I also managed to arrange interviews with two local investors. One investor had 
provided rubber seedlings for upland communities in Long district under informal deals. 
The second had set up rubber plantations under a form of a joint venture management 
with a Chinese investor. Though I had limited opportunities to conduct in-depth interviews 
with investors, and a ‘gap’ was my inability to interview Chinese investors, I do not regard 
this as compromising the reliability of my research and its findings as my project’s focus is 
at the micro level – namely, villagers’ perspectives.  
While I was allowed to conduct in-depth interviews with local officials, this does not imply 
that I could always gain the insightful data I wished to collect. Both the state officials and 
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 I use ‘interview’ when I refer to information I obtained from formal interviews. For informal 
conversations, such as conversations with senior officials at a noodle shop, I refer to my research 
diary. 
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business people were friendly during the interviews. But some of my questions were not 
directly answered; instead, the interviews were turned around. This was a confirmation of 
what is noted by Richards (1996: 201), that elite interviewees have the power to control the 
information that I was attempting to discover and explore. Both Chinese and local 
investors, though I always assured them that I was interviewing them in connection with an 
academic project and any information would never be passed to the Lao authorities, 
remained worried that there might be some negative impacts on them or their investment 
(such as being taxed at a higher rate). Lao officials at the local level, especially at the district 
level, were similarly worried about the implications for them if state authorities at a higher 
level were dissatisfied with the findings of my research project. This is not to mention my 
identity as a student from Thailand - a country which has never been socialist and is not 
always a good neighbour of the Lao PDR. This fact also no doubt affected the response of 
my interviewees working in the Lao bureaucratic system (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle 2000: 
3). Finally, with regard to the process of elite interviewing, it is important to note the role of 
time and growing familiarity. At the beginning of my fieldwork, some officials were very 
careful in discussing certain topics (such as the impact of rubber plantations) with me. But 
as the months passed, these officials became more relaxed and open-minded, as our 
relationship changed. While the establishment of a friendship provided me with the chance 
to access some information that I might not otherwise have been able to obtain, it created 
an ethical dilemma for me as to whether I should use this data in my thesis, especially if it 
might impact negatively on them.  
In sum, my research employed both qualitative and quantitative methods to gathering the 
data. While household surveys can provide an overview of the study villages and an 
overview of conditions in households, they may have some limitations in reflecting how 
people perceive and make sense of the situations they confront. This limitation is due to 
the close-ended nature of questionnaires which may not permit the gathering of 
information on the respondents’ perspectives, attitudes and opinions. Moreover, as 
questionnaires are tightly structured, they do not allow for conversations reaching beyond 
the questionnaire’s structure. In contrast, in-depth interviews are open-ended and semi-
structured, or even unstructured, allowing for in-depth data to be captured. However, as 
qualitative methods rely on the people’s eyes, data collected via these methods may be 
questioned in terms of the validity – to what extent people’s perspective and interpretation 
of the situations, situated in a particular context, can reflect the overview picture of the 
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phenomenon (Bryman 1988). Following a suggestion that mixed methods help to gain a 
better understanding (Bryman 1988; Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2005), I thus combined a 
questionnaire survey together with in-depth interviews, using them as complementary and 
elaborative to each other.  
3.6 Data analysis 
Quantitative data were entered into Microsoft Excel for descriptive analysis of, for instance, 
agricultural land areas, fallow periods, cattle, and income. In this research, data obtained 
from the survey (quantitative data) were not used to test pre-existing theories. Rather, they 
were used as descriptive data to provide an overview of trends illuminating what was going 
on in the research sites. They were also used to check and supplement themes and 
arguments developed based on the qualitative methods and secondary data. By the same 
token, data collected by qualitative methods were also used to explain statistical 
descriptive data. While data obtained from qualitative and quantitative methods may be 
contradictory to each other (Brannen 2005: 176), this was not the case of my research. I 
found that data from both methods were corroborative and elaborative to each other. 
While I intended to undertake preliminary data analysis at the end of the day on which the 
data were collected, this was not always practical due to time pressures. However, I 
managed to carry out preliminary data analysis as soon as time permitted; I usually could 
manage to carry out preliminary analysis no later than a month after the data were 
collected. At this stage, data was roughly categorised. Key words, which emerged from the 
data collected were also highlighted and linked together in order to develop possible 
connections and themes. While Strauss (1987 cited in Crang and Cook 1995: 78) suggests 
that high-level coding should not be carried out at the initial stage of data analysis in order 
to avoid prejudgement of events, I agree with Jackson (2001: 202) that this suggestion is 
difficult to follow. I tried to link the data to existing literature; the data that supported and 
disproved current debates and literature were highlighted at this stage. Conducting 
preliminary data analysis while I was still on fieldwork permitted me to develop “new topics 
and questions that might need to be pursued with further ‘fieldwork’” (Crang 2005: 219).  
When I returned to Durham, I followed a suggestion of Crang and Cook (1995: 76) by 
rereading all the primary materials I had at the early stage of data analysis. My research 
diary was also taken into the analysis which reminded me of the context - such as 
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atmosphere, emotion, hesitation, and so on – in which the data were collected as well as 
my positionality which allowed me to see how the materials from the field were collected, 
and to interpret the relationship between myself and research participants (Crang and Cook 
1995: 30). Taking the research diary helped me to “avoid producing a cold, over-
rationalised account which does not do justice to the intersubjective richness of the 
research encounters that it has drawn on” (Hunt 1989 cited in Crang and Cook 1995: 77). I 
looked closely and thoroughly at my ‘field materials’ (records of interviews and informal 
discussions, summary of surveys, research diaries, notes, and sketch maps) and noted down 
key words, and ideas that emerged from the field materials. The secondary data (such as 
the government’s policies, reports from the government’s agencies and non-government’s 
agencies, and news) were also analysed in the same manner. I later went back to these 
notes looking for connections and disconnections between key words and ideas which 
allowed me to categorise the data, both primary and secondary, and develop themes. 
While some new themes emerged (such as land property, and resistance), some were 
dropped (such as the family farm). These themes were later linked to concepts and existing 
literature. When I came to the stage of thesis-writing, which I began with the empirical 
chapters, my chapters were structured through themes which were linked to existing 
literature. I went to and fro between the literature and the themes (and field materials). 
While I took an Nvivo training course, I did not use any software programme for analysing 
my qualitative data. This was due to two main reasons. Firstly, it was time consuming for 
me to learn and become familiar with. Moreover, as I recorded my data in Thai which is not 
a language the programme supports, a huge amount of time was required to translate all 
my field materials into English. Secondly, translating field materials into English before the 
analysis stage would inevitably lead to loss of meaning of the materials. This would raise 
questions over reliability of the analysis. In order to maintain the original meaning, I kept 
my field materials in Thai while secondary data were maintained in their original language 
(Lao, Thai or English). Data analysis, both primary and secondary, was undertaken in the 
Thai language. Translation into English was carried out only at the writing stage.  
3.7 Positionality and ethical issues 
The positionality of a researcher, without doubt, has implications for the way in which the 
research can be carried out and the data that can be accessed. Traditional views on 
qualitative research seem to see “a simple and unproblematic dichotomy - insider or 
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outsider” (Herod 1999: 320). Herod also notes that being an ‘outsider’ is presumably 
perceived to limit a researcher’s ability to gain a full understanding of phenomena in the 
field due to differences in cultural background, language, and so on. From this standpoint, 
being an ‘insider’ is privileged as it is perceived that it allows the researcher to gain, though 
not a full, but a better understanding of the field context. 
Considering that I am a female Thai student not conducting research at ‘home’, I should 
theoretically be an ‘outsider’. However, this was not quite true. As a Thai person, I share 
some similarities of culture and language such that my ‘otherness’ was different from, for 
instance, a western researcher who works in the global South. My positionality could thus 
not be simply categorised as ‘outsider’ or ‘insider’; rather, I occupied an in-between 
category.  
Not being an ‘insider’ posed two different sets of challenges for my research process and 
activities. Firstly, as a foreign researcher conducting research in the Lao PDR, I shared 
similar problems to those of any other foreign researcher in the transition socialist Lao PDR. 
As a foreign researcher, I had to go through the government’s channels to do my research, 
meaning that state officials were involved in my research activities; this included the 
selection of my research sites, and the research itself (see section 3.2 and 3.3). The state’s 
involvement in my research activities certainly affected the quality of the data I was able to 
collect. This would have been because my research participants censored themselves when 
I interviewed them to avoid the potential harm they might face should they say the ‘wrong 
thing’ in the official’s presence. There were also some situations when I stopped 
conversations when they started critically commenting on the state’s policies and its 
officials, concerned that this might create difficulties for them. This was particularly the 
case in Houay Luang Mai village where the local official expressly stated that he supported 
rubber trees and in the case of villagers in Long district where disputes between villagers 
and rubber companies over land issues still existed at the time of the research. In the case 
of Houay Luang Mai, I always insisted that the Akha man who acted as my assistant and 
interpreter inform villagers before starting interviews that they should speak in their own 
language when they were making comments about the state. Their comments were later 
translated to me in the evening, when the officials had left. This strategy, however, also 
posed another issue about the role of the interpreter in my research as I had to rely on 
what my assistant said. His positionality, as a member of a more prosperous family, no 
doubt influenced both the reactions of villagers to my questions and the information he 
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allowed me to know; this is not to mention that there might have been some information 
lost before we could find an appropriate time and place to discuss an interview. In the case 
of two villages in Long district, I was allowed to go to the village with my interpreter. I 
insisted to my interpreter that data and information I gained from villagers was not relayed 
to anyone else except me.  
Secondly, my identity as a female researcher from Thailand posed another set of challenges 
for my research which differed from those facing foreign but non-Thai researchers. The 
perspective of Bangkok and Thai people in general is to look down on people in Thai 
peripheral areas as ‘Baan Nok’ or ‘country bumpkins’ and the same is true of the Lao (Evans 
2002: 37). The history of the relations between the two countries makes it difficult for Lao 
officials easily to trust a Thai. The attitude of Thai people who claim brotherhood between 
Lao and Thai but consider themselves to be a ‘big brother’ is not appreciated by the Lao. A 
Lao senior official mentioned an equal status between the Lao PDR and Thailand when the 
Lao PDR joined the ASEAN in 1997: “Now things have changed; we are equal partners with 
the same rights. Thailand can no longer consider itself the ‘big brother’. We now have to 
exercise the mutual respect” (Sisouvong 2002 cited in Pholsena and Banomyong 2006: 35). 
It is thus totally understandable that the state may feel uncomfortable allowing a 
researcher from Thailand to freely make contact and research its populations, especially in 
areas where the reach of the state is not strong. Thus, my research was kept closely 
scrutinised, even more so than would be the case with non-Thai foreign researchers. For 
instance, while I could not conduct research without official research permission – which 
was like a ‘ticket’ for me to do my research (see 3.2) – some foreign researchers, such as a 
Japanese student I met in Sing district, had been able to undertake field research without 
official research permission. Moreover, being a Thai also had some implications for the 
ways that my participants reacted to me, and to my research. Shamefully, due to a 
perceived attitude of Thai cultural superiority, Lao people, especially ‘elites’, sometimes 
feel uncomfortable participating in research conducted by a Thai researcher.  
It should be noted that my research was affected not only by the Lao elites’ perspective but 
also by my own view of those people who were involved in the research. Preconceptions I 
had about state officials in a single-party state were a case in point. Growing up in a non-
socialist country, I had formed an idea that the officials were the state’s and party’s 
mechanism to maintain the power of the state and the party, assuming that my research 
would be closely scrutinised by state officials. This made me uncomfortable when I went to 
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the study sites with local state officials. However, I have learnt that the boundary between 
local state officials and villagers is not so clear. Many local state officials are not those who 
come from a privileged background. Thus they share some similarities with poor villagers. 
Many of them felt sympathy for the problems villagers encountered from the projects that 
the state was involved in. As time went on, I maintained an open mind to, respect for, and 
sympathy with local state officials, as well as Lao people, trying to avoid any biased 
attitudes towards them.  
Being a student from Thailand also posed difficulties for me in dealing with people’s 
expectations. Villagers who watch Thai television programmes perceive Thailand as a 
‘modern’ and a ‘rich’ country. Thus a student from Thailand is assumed, also, to be rich. 
This misunderstanding, in combination with the status of a postgraduate student from the 
UK, led some villagers to have the expectation that I could or had the potential to find 
projects to improve their lives (see High 2010 for similar expectations of her in the southern 
region of the Lao PDR). These expectations of villagers bore heavily on my shoulders 
(Daviau 2010: 198), making me feel guilty that while I could gain enormous benefits from 
researching them, I could not and do not have the ability to bring benefits to them or meet 
their expectations. I was a taker while they were givers. I could not promise them any 
material benefits from my research, only informed them that I hoped my research would 
reflect their problems and hopefully have some positive and beneficial policy implications 
for them. However, I am not even sure that my research can really bring any benefits to 
them23. I also faced expectations from some local officials who misunderstood that on 
completion of my studies I would work at a very high rank in the Thai bureaucratic system. 
It was thus expected that I would be able to find opportunities for them to get a place and 
scholarship to study at a university in Thailand. 
In sum, while it is clear that I am not an ‘insider’, I was never considered as a full ‘outsider’ 
either. As a Thai person, I share some cultural similarities with the Lao people. This posed 
another kind of challenge for me which was different from that faced by non-Thai 
researchers. I might not be considered as an ‘other’ like a western researcher and while this 
was helpful in accessing some insights – for example I was able to ‘read’ some cultural signs 
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 Anthropologist Walcott (1995 cited in Scheyvens et al. 2003: 155) admits after three decades of 
anthropological work that “I have no evidence that my own research ever helped anyone I thought it 
might help or intended to help”. 
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that foreign researchers might have missed – it also meant that I faced some expectations 
that were different from a western researcher (Mohammad 2001: 106-109). For instance, I 
was supposed to understand the Lao style bureaucratic system and culture. I was expected 
to follow unwritten but well-realised local ‘rules’ (often unstated). Moreover, being a Thai - 
not really a stranger to Lao officials – I was seen to have ‘much’ knowledge on Lao culture 
and therefore that I should not be allowed to gain too much information. Thus my ‘in-
between-ness’ posed different challenges from those researchers who either conduct 
research in their ‘home’ context (‘insiders’) and those who undertake research in another 
culture (‘outsiders’).  
While I was conducting the fieldwork, I was acutely aware of ethical considerations and my 
responsibilities as a researcher. There were a number of ethical issues that I had to deal 
with during the fieldwork which are worth noting here. Some derived from the general 
ethical practices that every researcher is expected to follow such as informing research 
participants about the research, its findings and its uses; informing and ensuring that 
research participants have the right to stop participating in the research if they feel 
uncomfortable; and ensuring that informants’ identity is anonymised. I strictly followed 
these general practices. However, there were many other ethical issues that were specific 
to the context of doing research in rural Lao PDR. First of all, there were issues concerning 
how the findings from my research might be used, bearing in mind that the Lao PDR 
remains a one party, communist state. One of the key findings of my research is that 
uplanders had very positive opinions on rubber and they were eager to get involved in 
rubber, seeing it as the way to improve their lives. Some state agencies also viewed rubber 
as the means to resolve the poverty ‘problem’ in the uplands and even used the expected 
poverty alleviation effects of rubber as an excuse to allow investors to access land. The 
findings and argument of my research might be used to justify the promotion of rubber 
trees. This may lead to increasing vulnerability of people’s livelihoods as it is highly 
uncertain that the promise of rubber will be fulfilled. While I cannot control how my 
research might be used, I am aware of this potential problem. Thus, I highlight the potential 
risks that villagers are likely to encounter when their production system is transformed 
from semi-subsistence (based mainly on shifting agriculture) to a market-oriented system 
(rubber as a mono-crop). I discuss these risks in section 7.5.3 and section 9.3.2. 
Secondly, there was an ethical issue around giving gifts to my gate keepers. I was advised to 
do this in order to impress my gatekeepers and, according to my Lao friends, this would 
  
98 
 
make things easier for me. I struggled with the notion of giving ‘gifts’ in order to secure a 
return: permission and assistance to do the research. In the end I decided not to take the 
advice offered by my Lao contacts. I told my friend that I had completely forgotten to bring 
a gift. However, he went to a shop and bought me a pack of instant coffee and insisted that 
I must bring it as a gift for the gatekeeper. “It’s culture. It’s the way to pay respect to 
them”, he told me. Despite my carefully considered position, I found that, in the end, I 
could not escape the norms of gift-giving. Giving gifts to villagers was also another ethical 
consideration. I felt uncomfortable giving gifts to any of my interviewees. But working in 
very poor villages, I often felt guilty that I was not entirely sure how far my research 
subjects could benefit from my research. So, in return for their time I did give stationery 
and some sweets to their children. Of course these gifts in no way balanced what they gave 
me in terms of their time, hospitality and knowledge.  
The third ethical concern was about how to prevent, or at least minimise, disturbance to 
my research subjects. While this is a general issue for any researcher, the research 
environment in the Lao PDR required me to pay particular attention to the issue. As 
discussed in sections 3.3 and 3.4, I was generally accompanied by local officials to the 
villages. It was common for state officials to inform villagers that they would visit the village 
on a particular date and villagers were ‘required’ to be waiting for their arrival regardless of 
whether they were free or not. The first time that I visited Baan Don Tha, villagers were 
busy harvesting their upland rice. There were only the elderly and children in the village 
while most working age adults were in their field huts near their rice fields. The officials 
suggested that we could ask villagers to come back to the village on the following day for 
our interviews. When I told the officials that it would be a great disturbance, they simply 
replied, “it’s OK. Never mind.” I had to insist that I did not want to disturb people and I 
could meet them at their rice fields in the evening to introduce myself and arrange an 
appropriate time to interview them. A very similar experience was repeated in the other 
villages as well. And I had to insist to the local officials that I did not wish to ask villagers to 
stop working in order to find time for my research.  
Doing research in poor villages which have – and are –facing rapid transitions in the context 
of post-socialist Lao PDR posed these important ethical issues which required me to think 
and act carefully during my fieldwork, and to reflect on the impact of the research on my 
research subjects. I can honestly say, however, that there are outstanding issues of concern 
which I was not able to confront, in particular the question of the ways that my research 
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might be used in the future. However, I hope that I was able, at least, to minimise any 
unexpected effects on my research subjects. 
3.8 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the challenges of undertaking social science research in the 
transition socialist setting of the Lao PDR. It has shown how the particular contexts of the 
Lao PDR influenced the research process and activities, and the data collected. The chapter 
has pointed to some general challenges that foreign researchers encounter when they 
undertake field research outside their ‘home’. It has also, however, highlighted a set of 
challenges and problems that are particular and peculiar to the Lao PDR, a country with a 
set of security concerns that sometimes make field research especially difficult. It was also 
true that the place where I chose to undertake my fieldwork – the Lao uplands, among 
minority people - injected another set of challenges into the field process, both practical 
(language) and political (the sensitive nature of such border zones).  
In light of these challenges, the chapter has also shown some of the difficulties a researcher 
face in attempting to follow a research plan in the field. Particular research methodologies, 
while they may seem to be academically the most appropriate, often come unstuck in the 
real world, requiring the researcher to be able to be flexible in applying each research 
method. Finally, the positionality of the researcher has been discussed in this chapter, 
particularly relevant given my position as neither an ‘insider’ nor an ‘outsider’, but 
occupying an ‘in-between’ social space. 
This discussion of research methodologies in practice and my positionality leads to the 
consideration of the question of how far the research can represent what is going on in the 
field. In the process of data collection, I attempted to collect data from different groups of 
people assuming that this way would permit me to gain knowledge and gather insightful 
data from different perspectives and standpoints. When these data were used at the stage 
of writing, I attempted to allow the voices of my subjects to be heard. But this does not 
mean that I can claim that my research provides a ‘full’ understanding of the field. I can 
honestly say that the knowledge gained from my research is only ‘partial’ and ‘situated’ 
(Clifford 1986; Haraway 1988). The next chapter will provide an overview of the Lao PDR 
highlighting its agricultural development. 
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Chapter Four  
The Lao PDR and Its Agricultural Context 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a background to the Lao PDR, with a particular focus on the country’s 
agricultural context. It is bordered by Vietnam to the East, China to the North, Thailand and 
Burma (Myanmar) to the West, and Cambodia to the South (see Map 1.1). The Lao PDR has 
no easy access to the sea although most of its western boundary is demarcated by the 
Mekong River which has historically been a very important transportation route. As a poor 
country surrounded by more powerful neighbours, the Lao PDR has had to maintain good 
relations with its neighbours regardless of ideological differences (Rigg 1997: 161). With a 
population of 6.4 million in 2010, a land area of 236,800 square kilometres, and a GDP of 
US$ 4.3 billion, the Lao PDR is ranked as one of the world’s poorest countries (see Table 4.1 
for general data on the country). 
The Lao PDR has had a long history of struggling to maintain its independence from the 
domination of its neighbours, especially Siam (Thailand), and later from France, the colonial 
power which ruled the country as a part of French Cochinchina from the late 19th century 
until 195424. Since independence, the country has been divided and suffered from civil war. 
In 1954 when Laos (as it was then) achieved independence from France, the U.S. was 
fearful of communist expansion in the mainland Southeast Asia and, as a result, invested 
considerable resources in preventing the expansion of communism. At this time the 
country was highly reliant on foreign aid which accounted for around 80 per cent of the 
country’s budgetary expenditure; of that, American aid to the country comprised over 80 
per cent of the country’s foreign aid (Evans 1991: 90; Barbier 1973 cited in Guégan no date: 
2). Notwithstanding US largesse, the conflict between the Royal Lao Government (RLG) 
supported by the US and the communist Pathet Lao (later, officially, the Lao People’s 
Revolutionary Party [LPRP]) escalated, culminating in victory for the LPRP in 1975. For the 
decade following the victory of the Pathet Lao, the country seemed to be ‘forgotten’ by the 
                                                          
24
 Due to limited space, this chapter cannot provide an in-depth historical account of the country. 
Martin Stuart-Fox’s (1997) A History of Laos and Grant Evans’s (2002) A Short History of Laos: the 
Land in Between provide good overviews of the country’s history. 
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world community, almost isolated from the global economy and the non-communist world 
(Rigg 2009: 703; Bird and Hill 2010: 118). 
Table 4.1 The Lao PDR: an overview 
Land Area       236,800 square kilometres 
Population (2010)     6.4 million* 
Urban population (2010)    33 per cent** 
Life expectancy (2009)     67 years** 
Literacy rate      73 per cent** 
 (Population aged 15 and over who can read and write, 2005)  
Population below poverty line (2007/2008)  27 per cent*** 
Children under five malnourished (2006)  37 per cent*** 
GDP (2010)      US$ 4,262 million* 
- Agriculture      34.4 per cent of GDP* 
- Industry      26.6 per cent of GDP* 
- Services     39.1 per cent of GDP* 
GDP growth (2010)     8.4 per cent* 
Imports (goods and services)    US$ 2,124 million* 
Exports (goods and services)    US$ 1,440 million* 
 Foreign direct investment    US$ 838 million* 
Sources: *Word Bank (2011); ** Central Intelligence Agency (2011) available from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/la.html [accessed 3 November 
2011]; *** UNDP (2010). 
In order to provide the background necessary to contextualise the current transformations 
of Lao upland agriculture, which will be discussed more fully in chapter 6 and chapter 7, this 
chapter provides an overview of the country’s development and, particularly, the role and 
status of agriculture. For the purposes of the thesis, the chapter divides the historical 
evolution of the Lao PDR into two broad periods: firstly, the period of the planned economy 
spanning the years from the victory of the LPRP in 1975 through to 1986, and secondly, the 
period of the market-oriented system from 1986 with the introduction of the New 
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Economic Mechanism (NEM) or ‘Chin Thanakaan Mai’ - ‘New Thinking’. For each of these 
two periods, an overview of the country’s development will be presented followed by a 
discussion of the status of and challenges to agricultural development.  
4.2 The socialist Lao PDR: independence and development 
challenges (1975–1986) 
Following the victory of the LPRP, the Lao PDR followed the Marxist–Leninist line of the 
Vietnamese government. However, the country’s particular conditions made it impossible 
for the new communist government to complete the transition to socialism as the model 
envisaged.  
4.2.1 The socialist Lao PDR: new dependencies in the independence 
period  
Having suffered from colonisation by France for over a half century, civil war for two 
decades, and then being under US sanctions, the LPRP faced considerable challenges as it 
attempted to bring ‘true’ independence to the country. The key challenges the new 
government faced were associated with shortages of two important resources: skilled 
personnel and financial resources. 
Human capital deficiencies: the victory of the LPRP led to the loss of most of the country’s 
educated elite who had served in the administration of the RLG. Dommen (1985: 141) notes 
that of 120,000 civil servants, who served the old regime, 48,000 fled from the country, 
30,000 were sent to prison, and 40,000 were sent to the re-education camps to be 
inculcated with the new political orthodoxy. The country lost not only those who were 
skilled, well-educated and experienced in making the decisions demanded to run the 
country’s administration; they even lost those with even a small amount of managerial 
experience (Evans 1991: 98). A shortage of skilled and experienced personnel therefore 
became a significant obstacle for the new government in its attempts to run the country. In 
this situation, the communist Pathet Lao was not confident about its power to control the 
country at the beginning of the socialist period, and the government was in a dilemma over 
whether to recruit people from the old system to serve the new regime. The LPRP itself did 
not have sufficient human resources – those who had both experience and political 
qualifications – to guide the new regime. Large numbers of the LPRP’s supporters were 
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members of the various minorities who, though they may have developed some skills in 
fighting, were not in a position to replace the well-educated but politically-untrustworthy 
people who ran the RLG (Luther 1983: 11). However, the new government did not seem to 
have many choices and, thus, the government recruited members of the ethnic minorities 
to serve the bureaucratic system in the mid-level administration (Stuart-Fox 1986: 53-54; 
Batson 1991: 144-145). 
Lack of financial resources: the influence and role of the U.S. on the Lao PDR evaporated 
when the LPRP took over the country. While the country may have become more 
independent from the influence of the U.S., it also lost the most significant source of 
revenue for the government’s budget. The country needed to seek new sources of income 
which was not easy for a poor, land-locked country where mountainous areas account for 
around 80 per cent of the country’s total area. In contrast to its communist allies, Vietnam 
and the USSR, where industrialisation had developed or at least taken root before the 
revolution, at the time the LPRP gained control of the country, the Lao PDR was “still pre-
feudal” (Phomvihane 1980 cited in Evans 1995: 41) and the majority of its population relied 
on subsistence-oriented agriculture, with very little surplus to be extracted for the 
country’s development (Evans 1991: 90). While new types of taxation were introduced, 
such as agricultural taxation, they were generally unable to generate as much revenue as 
the government wished due to both people’s poverty and the weakness of the state’s tax 
collection mechanism (Evans 1988a: 11-12; Bourdet 2000: 36). A World Bank report 
published at the end of the 1970s (1979 cited in Evans 1991: 91) records that “in 1977 Laos 
had no national savings, and … the country was fully dependent on the outside world to 
finance its development needs”. The new government could not even pay the state’s 
employees and civil servants. Instead, state officials were encouraged to develop their own 
vegetable gardens as well as to raise pigs, ducks, chicken and fish (Evans 1988b: 243; Sirikrai 
1996: 130-131). A shortage of financial resources in combination with the government’s 
priority to allocate much of its limited budget for security purposes impeded any attempt at 
reconstruction and the restoration of a country destroyed by war.  
These two conditions meant that the new communist government had to turn to its allies 
for assistance. Large numbers of Vietnamese and Russian experts were sent to the Lao PDR, 
replacing the American experts, to assist the new government in running the country’s 
administration. Assistance from the socialist bloc countries ranged from military assistance 
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to development in agriculture and forestry, mining and infrastructure25 (Stuart-Fox 1991: 
189-199; Stuart-Fox 1997: 177-178). Members of the LPRP and young politically-trusted 
students were sent to Vietnam and the USSR for training in various fields. Some of this 
training did not fit the needs of the Lao PDR. One example – which does not seem to be 
apocryphal – was students who enrolled on courses in train maintenance and engineering 
when the country did not have a train system (Fry 1998: 157). The USSR and Vietnam also 
became new sources of foreign aid for the Government of the Lao PDR (GoL), accounting 
for around 60 per cent of foreign aid to the country during 1975-1985 (OECD cited in 
Guégan no date: 7). Even so, aid from its communist allies could not fill the gap left by the 
U.S. and its western allies (Stuart-Fox 1997: 177). The dire financial situation that the 
country found itself in after 1975 meant that “the Lao leaders never quite refused aid, 
wherever it came from” (Guégan no date: 7) although the amount of aid from the non-
communist bloc and international organisations was far less than aid provided by the 
country’s communist allies. 
Though realising the different paths of the revolutions in the Lao PDR and the USSR, the 
LPRP hoped that the Lao PDR would be able to create a modern industrial economy while 
bypassing capitalism (Evans 1995: 65; Stuart-Fox 1997: 169). However, this aim was not 
achieved. Evans (1988a: 10-11) notes that before the revolution, the industrial sector and 
mining accounted for around five per cent of GDP, with less than 10,000 workers. Industries 
in the Lao PDR, though they basically produced consumer products, needed to import raw 
materials, especially from Thailand – its principal neighbour to the west with which it had 
generally poor relations (Stuart-Fox 1991). The new government faced difficulties in 
developing the country’s industries; it lacked skilled manpower to run factories and could 
not provide the raw materials needed for production. Even the agricultural sector could not 
provide raw materials needed for agro-industrialisation. The cooperatives heavily promoted 
in the late 1970s entirely failed to modernise agricultural systems and increase agricultural 
productivity (this issue will be discussed in the following section). Ten years after Liberation, 
the economy of the Lao PDR was still very close to being a ‘natural economy’. 
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 Stuart-Fox (1991: 189-194) records that Vietnamese troops were sent to the Lao PDR to assist the 
new communist government maintain its internal security and to build infrastructure (especially 
roads and bridges). The number of Vietnamese troops fluctuated, but by the end of 1980, more than 
50,000 Vietnamese soldiers were in the Lao PDR. 
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The socialist government was unsuccessful in developing the economy of the country under 
the socialist model: the planned economy. The replacement of privately owned enterprises 
by state enterprises in a combination of fixed-price controls over commodities created 
economic problems instead of economic sustainability. Unexpected weather conditions 
after the revolution made the economic situation worse. The country faced food shortages, 
especially in urban areas; and state enterprises completely failed to resolve this problem. 
Dual markets – the state’s market and the unofficial parallel or ‘black’ market – emerged. 
The shortage of food and of foreign exchange meant that the economy relied increasingly 
heavily on the ‘black’ market which the state was unable to control. The gap between 
prices in the official and the ‘black’ market widened26 (Worner 1997; Bourdet 2000), and 
the inflation rate worsened. This made it difficult for people in towns, especially state 
officials on low wages, to make ends meet. Two years after the victory of the Pathet Lao, 
the Lao economy was in an even worse state than it was during the final years of the civil 
war. The GNP at the end of 1977 was around ten per cent lower than in 1974 - a year 
before the victory of the LPRP (Evans 1988b). 
The communist government led by the LPRP failed not only to resolve the economic 
problems of the country but also to improve the standard of living of the Lao population. 
While government records show increasing numbers of social services provided to the 
people – such as schools and teachers, health care centres and staff, and food aid 
programmes – they were generally inadequate in terms of both quality and quantity due to 
limited resources. While the number of schools, teachers and pupils increased, around 80 
per cent of students left school before completing a primary level education. Many ex-
school students, especially in rural areas, could not maintain their rudimentary reading and 
writing skills after leaving school. Urban and rural disparities in literacy were evident 
(Stuart-Fox 1997: 193; Ireson 1998: 50-51). Healthcare services were also far from 
adequate. The Health Minister (Phonsena 1985 cited in Stuart-Fox 1997: 193) noted that in 
1985 – 10 years after the revolution – only 18 per cent of Lao villages were able to access 
drinking water while people suffered from endemic disease and malnutrition. 
                                                          
26
 One example was the price of rice in the ‘black’ market in 1976 (a year after the LPRP took over 
the country), which was four times higher than the price determined by the state. This gap widened 
to nearly nine times in 1979 (Aray 1983 cited in Bourdet 2000: 54 notes 7). 
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Overall, in 1985, ten years after the LPRP had taken over the country, the Lao PDR, while it 
might have become independent from American domination, was far from being 
independent from foreign influence. Lack of resources needed for the country’s 
development in combination with its geographical conditions (a land-locked and 
mountainous country), poor infrastructure, a low level of development in agriculture and 
industry, and political instability did not allow the country to maintain its independence 
from foreign influences and to fully determine its own future. The survival of the country, 
perhaps more accurately the survival of the LPRP, was heavily reliant on its communist 
allies, especially the USSR and Vietnam. The country became independent from one power 
to become dependent on another power bloc. The new regime was also unsuccessful in 
accumulating the wealth necessary to drive socialist reconstruction and development. Ten 
years after the LPRP began to follow the socialist model, the country was still listed as one 
of the UN’s least-developed countries. In short, changes in economic policies and practices 
were needed if the regime was to survive and the country to prosper (this issue will be 
discussed in section 4.3). 
4.2.2 Lao agriculture: an uncompleted socialist transformation 
“In our country … scattered agriculture took on a natural and autarkic 
character which was still very backward, and the mode of production was still 
pre-feudal” 
(Kaysone Phomvihane 1980 cited in Evans 1995: 41) 
The revolution in the Lao PDR did not fit with Marx’s theory that communism would be 
rooted and developed in an advanced capitalist society. In the Lao PDR, the revolution 
transformed the ‘primitive’ to a communist society, bypassing the stage of capitalism 
(Evans 1995: 65). Gaining control of the country while industry had not yet taken root, the 
communist government led by the LPRP considered agriculture as both fundamental to 
industrial development and a new vital source of revenue to resolve the budget deficit. A 
range of policies and practices was introduced, including agricultural taxes, controlling 
agricultural trade, and so on, to extract revenue from the agricultural sector to support the 
state apparatus. These policies were, however, far from successful (Evans 1991: 94-95). 
Collectivisation, after it was delayed at the beginning of the regime, was heavily promoted 
in the late 1970s. For the leader of the party, the imposition of collectivisation was 
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regarded as the route to complete the socialist transformation in agriculture, with the hope 
that it would increase productivity in agriculture. The government believed that by 
implementing collectivisation, it would generate internal surplus to fulfil the country’s 
dream of self-reliance and support the state’s administration (FBIS 1978 cited in Evans 
1995: 48; Bourdet 2000: 37). Collectivisation also politically served as a tool to prevent the 
formation of capitalism, as stated in a booklet provided for managers of the cooperatives: 
“[t]o eradicate the genesis of oppressor classes and class oppression in the country so that 
the way to capitalism is virtually blocked” (no author 1980 cited in Evans 1995: 93). 
The campaign on collectivisation was fairly successful statistically as the number of 
cooperatives established rapidly increased. Over a thousand cooperatives were established 
within two years after the heavy campaign began (Kaison Phomvihane 1979 cited in Stuart-
Fox 1997: 179; Bourdet 2000: 36 table 3.1). In 1986, the year that the NEM was launched 
(see below), there were around 4,000 cooperatives throughout the country (Evans 1995: 
59, table 3.1). However, cooperatives in the Lao PDR were not akin to those in the USSR or 
Vietnam. One state official from the Cooperative Department remarked that the majority of 
the cooperatives were ‘weak’ cooperatives as they were “pseudo cooperatives. Just 
cooperatives in name, but really only labour exchange groups” (Evans 1988a: 76). 
Modernisation of agriculture through the cooperatives was, in fact, a failure. Modern 
agricultural inputs and machinery in the Lao PDR were scarce; the cooperatives’ demand 
for them was nowhere near met (Bourdet 2000: 39; Ireson-Doolittle and Moreno-Black 
2004: 101). Nor was increasing agricultural productivity through the cooperatives ever 
achieved. Bourdet (2000: 45) notes that “there are no economies of scale in rice 
production” under the cooperatives. 
It is important to note that while the number of cooperatives was quite impressive, most of 
the cooperatives were organised in the lowlands where people farmed paddy. Cooperatives 
were rarely organised in the uplands where hill peasants practiced shifting agriculture27. 
The notable exceptions were some upland areas in the old liberated areas where people 
could access paddy (Ireson-Doolittle and Moreno-Black 2004: 104). However, the number 
of cooperatives covering hill populations was still very small. For example, in Houa Phan 
                                                          
27
 A villager from an upland community in Luang Prabang informed Ireson-Doolittle and Moreno- 
Black (2004: 104) that the village never encountered the cooperative system. 
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province, only 10 out of 300 cooperatives that existed in 1984 were made up of upland 
people (Evans 1988a: 75). Considering that collectivisation of agriculture was the state’s 
main mechanism for modernising Lao agriculture, we can count it in large part a failure, 
particularly in the uplands where the state’s role was minimal28. Ten years of the state-
planned economy meant nothing for upland agriculture which was still dominated by a 
subsistence-oriented system. When we look at the transformations of agriculture in the Lao 
uplands before and after the implementation of the NEM in 1986, viewing upland 
agricultural transformations as indicative of the transformation from socialist to post-
socialist agriculture does not quite reflect the reality of the situation because upland 
agriculture in a large part had never been socialist.  
4.3 The Lao PDR: a country in transition (1986-present) 
This section provides an overview of the transition taking place in the Lao PDR from 1986 
onwards. The first portion focuses on the general development of the country when the 
NEM was launched in 1986. It then moves to a discussion of Lao agriculture under condition 
of spatial and economic integration. This will be followed by an exploration of upland 
agriculture and the emergence of rubber in the Lao PDR. 
4.3.1 The Lao PDR: hope and reality in the era of market integration 
“It is inappropriate, indeed stupid, for any party to implement a policy of 
forbidding the people to exchange goods or to carry out trading. The 
implementation of such a policy by the party is suicidal.” 
(Kaysone Phomvihane cited in FEER 1981: 183) 
Soon after the implementation of the state-planned economy, the Party realised that this 
path was failing to improve the country’s economy. Economic problems had significant 
implications for the status of the LPRP in leading the country; the Party’s leaders realised 
that the legitimacy of the regime depended on economic prosperity (Evans 2002: 197). It 
became necessary for the party to re-think its path to socialism. The party considered that 
it was a mistake to ‘bypass’ a capitalist stage (Stuart-Fox 1989: 81; Evans 1995: xv). A rush 
into socialism by imposing centrally-determined economic activities and wiping out any 
                                                          
28
 This is not to say that the uplands were out of the reach of the socialist state. In fact, the socialist 
government attempted to establish its power and authority in the uplands, seen through the 
establishment of schools and healthcare development projects in the uplands. These state projects, 
however, were generally also unsuccessful (Stuart-Fox 1997: 193). 
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non-socialist forms of economic activity was seen to ignore the reality of the country (FEER 
1987: 177; FEER 1988: 169). The country thus, as Kaysone Phomvihane –  the Party’s 
General Secretary and the Prime Minister – noted, needed to adopt “multiform economic 
cooperation with foreign countries” (Phomvihane 1988 cited in Stuart-Fox 1989: 81). State 
enterprises were encouraged to adopt “socialist economic accounting” and their managers 
were ordered to abolish the old line of thinking and adopt the new mechanism29 (FEER 
1987: 177; FEER 1988: 171; Evans et al. 2002: 197-198).  
It should be noted that apart from the Party’s realisation of the failure of its socialist policy, 
the relaxation of socialist economic forms was also stimulated by the USSR – its communist 
ally – which advised the Lao PDR to slow down the socialist transformation. The country 
was also advised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to stabilise its economy through 
liberalisation (FEER 1981: 183; Luther 1983: 17-18). The country’s short period of high 
communism, with its very limited success, also meant, however, that the country did not 
experience ‘shock therapy’ or a ‘big bang’ as did those countries in Eastern Europe30.  
The transition began in the early 1980s when the first-five year plan (1981-1985) was 
launched. Wide-ranging reforms, however, were not introduced until 1986 when the Party 
Congress approved the NEM. Since then, a raft of policies and laws has been amended and 
introduced to facilitate the operation of the market and private firms (see Table 4.2). When 
the new economic direction was proposed, some members of the party expressed their 
concerns31. However, by the end of the Millennium Party members’ concerns were about 
“how the NEM [marketization] should be extended and fine-tuned, not whether it 
require[d] rethinking and retooling in any fundamental sense” (Rigg 2005a: 22)  
 
                                                          
29
 The Far Eastern Economic Review (1981: 183) cited a comment made by an analyst in Vientiane 
after Prime Minister Kaysone Phomvihane called for reform that “Kaysone seems to be saying, ‘there 
is a beautiful socialist cake. But now let’s keep it in the fridge’.” 
30
 In their study of reform in failing states from 1977-2004, Chauvet and Collier (2008: 17) classify the 
Lao PDR as a failing state with no sustained reform. 
31
 Stuart-Fox (1997: 195) notes disagreements among the Party’s members about the economic 
direction of the country. The NEM proposed by PM Kaysone Phomvihane was not appreciated by the 
Deputy Prime Minister Nouhak Phoumsavanh and his allies who drew their power from the control 
of economic production. Only support from the army’s leader, Khamtai Siphandon and General 
Sisavat Kaeobunphan, made the new economic direction possible. 
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Table 4.2 Lao landmarks of transition, 1980s-2011 
Year Events 
Early 1980s - Relaxation of control of private trade; traders were allowed to import and export 
commodities through a licence granted by the government 
- Allowing peasants to sell their agricultural products to private traders 
1986  
 
- Freeing up the market in rice and other stables 
- The endorsement of the NEM at the party congress 
1987 - Price of most essentials market-determined 
1988 - Price decontrolling: abolition of forced procurement of strategic goods 
- Private investment: allowing private investment in sectors previously reserved as 
state monopolies 
- Adoption of a unified market-conforming exchange rate 
- Explicit recognition of the rights of households and the private sector to use land 
and private property 
1989 - Operation of first joint venture bank with a foreign bank 
1990 
 
- Introduction of privatisation law and labour law 
- Passing of privatisation decree 
1992 
 
- Operation of a full branch of a foreign bank (from Thailand)  
- Introduction of Commercial Bank and Financial Institutions Acts 
- The Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), was launched with the assistance from the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
1994 - Approval of new investment law which provided incentives (taxes and approval 
process) for foreign investment 
1997 - Introduction of new land law allowing the transfer of land titles to relatives and 
their use as a collateral in obtaining bank loans 
- The Lao PDR joined the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) 
- The Lao PDR applied for full membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)  
1998 -The Lao PDR was granted official observer status at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Since then it has been preparing for WTO membership  
- The Lao PDR joined the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
2001 - ASEAN’s approval of the Strategic Framework for the GMS 
2002 - Passing of New Foreign Exchange Decree improving private sector access to foreign 
exchange 
2003 - Declining of the number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)  
- Signing bilateral trade agreement with the U.S.  
2004 - Introduction of new foreign investment law allowing 100 per cent foreign owned 
enterprises. The new investment law provides incentives for foreign investment in 
seven sectors and in three specified promoted zones (based on geographical location 
and socio-economic conditions) 
2010 - The Lao PDR and China agreed on their comprehensive bilateral strategic 
partnership aiming at expanding cooperation in economic and trade, investment and 
agriculture 
2011 - Opening of a stock market 
2012 -The WTO’s approval for Lao membership 
Sources: Based on Rigg (2005a: 21-22 table 2.1), updated from Far Eastern Economic Review (1981: 
184), Stuart-Fox (1989: 82), Sirikrai (1996: 155), Fane (2006: 213), and Bird and Hill (2010) 
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Since the NEM was introduced, the GoL has moved forward, embracing new elements of 
economic development. One of the most significant was the decision to join the Greater 
Mekong Sub-region (GMS)32. While GMS members may share some similarities of history 
and culture (ADB 2012: 3), the levels of global market involvement and economic 
development among its members varied enormously (see Table 4.3). Countries such as 
Thailand have long been engaged in the global market while countries such as the Lao PDR 
and Vietnam had participated in the global market for less than ten years before the GMS 
regional cooperation programme was launched. While Lao leaders appreciate the 
development gaps within the group, they hope (along with the ADB), that cooperation 
among the members will, over time, narrow these gaps (Sayasone 2011).  
Table 4.3 Overview of the economic conditions of the GMS members at the onset of 
cooperation (1992-1995) 
 GDP in 1995* 
(billions of US$) 
Agricultural 
contribution to 
GDP in 1993** (%) 
GDP growth 
1992** (%) 
 
GNI per capita 
1992** 
(current US$) 
Cambodia 3.0797 47 N/A N/A 
China 483.0468 20 14.2 390 
The Lao PDR 1.1808 58 5.6 250 
Burma  40.7661 63 9.7 N/A 
Thailand 109.4261 9 8.1 1,870 
Vietnam 9.8877 30 8.6 130 
Sources: * is based on IMF (1999); ** is based on World Bank (no date) 
Note: Only Yunnan province of China has joined the GMS cooperation. 
Being land-locked which was historically regarded as a disadvantage for development is 
now turned to an advantage, as the Lao PDR has become a link between the GMS’s 
members (Jerndal and Rigg 1999: 39). Located at the heart of the GMS, the Lao PDR dreams 
of becoming the hub of the GMS. The Lao PDR is linked to other GMS countries through 
two major economic corridors: i) the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC) linking Vietnam 
in the east to Burma on the west through southern Lao PDR and Thailand, and Burma, and 
                                                          
32
  The GMS is a regional economic cooperation network comprising six countries of the Mekong 
basin, namely, Cambodia, Vietnam, the Lao PDR, Thailand, Burma (Myanmar), and Yunnan province 
of China. The GMS project was formed in 1992 with assistance from the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) as the main donor. The GMS now sets nine priority sectors of cooperation: agriculture, energy, 
environment, human resource development, investment, telecommunications, tourism, 
transportation infrastructure, and transport and trade facilitation (see ADB 2012).  
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ii) the North-South Economic Corridor (NSEC) linking China’s Yunnan to Thailand through 
the northern part of the Lao PDR (see Map 4.1). The Lao PDR has the hope that these 
economic corridors will transform the country from being land-locked to land-linked, 
facilitating tourism, investment and good transportation. The former Prime Minister 
Bouasone Bouphavanh expressed the view that these evolving road links will allow Lao 
commodities to compete with goods from other countries in the global market (Xinhua, 28 
March 2008)33.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33
 “Lao PM urges public participation in GMS Summit”, Xinhua 28 March 2008. Available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/28/content_7876357.htm [accessed 22 June 2008] 
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Map 4.1 The Greater Mekong Economic Corridors 
 
Source: ADB (2012: 11) 
In addition to the Lao PDR, China also views the GMS as its economic opportunity. In 
Beijing’s view, the GMS is one of the key mechanisms to develop and modernise China’s 
western hinterlands – a region where economic development has been slower in coastal 
areas. Linking Yunnan province (and, later Guangxi province) to the GMS has served two 
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key strategies of Beijing. First, the GMS is seen to provide opportunities for economic 
growth in China’s hinterlands. The growth would assist China to overcome its regional 
(spatial) disparities. The GMS has coincided with Beijing’s “western development strategy” 
or “Going West”. Under the 10th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development (2001-2005), Beijing offered preferential policies, such as infrastructure 
development, investment environment, and education development, to develop its inner 
regions (Masviriyakul 2004). Second, linking its western frontiers to the GMS would allow 
deeper economic links to develop between China’s western frontiers to South and 
Southeast Asia. Economic connections with the GMS and Southeast Asia have served 
China’s ‘Going Global’ strategy, often referred to as ‘Going Out’, which was initiated in the 
late 1990s but was formalised in the early 2000s under the 10th Five-Year Plan for National 
Economic and Social Development. The key principle behind the ‘Going Global’ strategy is 
the growth of domestic industries through accessing new sources of raw materials 
demanded for its industrial development. Tax benefits, low-interest loans, relaxation of 
foreign exchange control, and other such policies, have been launched to encourage 
Chinese investors to go abroad and develop overseas resources and raw materials to fuel 
China’s economic growth (Rutherford et al. 2008; YDOC 2007 cited in Shi 2008: 24). This is 
affirmed by Rutherford and colleagues (Rutherford et al. 2008) when they note that the 
structure of Chinese trading and investment in the three lower Mekong countries (the Lao 
PDR, Vietnam, and Cambodia) is dominated by imports of natural resources to China and 
the export of manufactured goods.  
Development and cooperation under the GMS framework present highly asymmetrical 
relationships among the members. Currently, China is the most important engine in driving 
GMS cooperation. It holds the greatest power in negotiating with other GMS members. 
Thailand is another key actor, but Thailand’s role in the GMS is far behind that of China. 
China’s continuation of its dam construction projects on the upper Mekong illustrates the 
relative powerlessness of downstream members (Percival 2007). The future of many 
millions in the Mekong region is being increasingly influenced by decisions made in 
Beijing34.  
                                                          
34
 One intellectual in Vientiane who does not appreciate the increasing power of China over the Lao 
PDR said: “when the Chinese piss in the Mekong, we’re the ones that drown…” (Worldcrunch, 
“China’ big design on small and strategic Laos”, 14 July 2012. Available at 
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For a poor country like the Lao PDR which has a long history of heavy reliance on foreign 
aid, it does not have much power in negotiating with China and other GMS members. 
Historically, the Lao PDR had stronger ties to Vietnam than China; both the LPRP and the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) hold Marxism-Leninism as their ideology. Close alliance 
between the LPRP and the CPV caused tensions between Vientiane and Beijing. Relations 
between Vientiane and Beijing worsened when the Lao PDR supported Vietnam in its 
invasion of Cambodia in the late 1970s. Hanoi managed to maintain its strong ideological 
and political influence on Vientiane through the special relationships which were formed 
under the close links that existed between the LPRP’s first generation leaders and the CPV’s 
leaders. Today, officially, the LPRP still maintains close connections with Hanoi. However, 
since diplomatic normalisation between the Lao PDR and China in 1988, China’s influence 
has significantly increased. Some observers (Storey 2005; Percival 2007; Lintner 2009) point 
out that the Lao PDR is on a slow move from Vietnam’s embrace to China’s. The head of 
China’s Youth Volunteers Team in the Lao PDR describes relations between the Lao PDR 
and its two communist neighbours in the following terms: “Vietnam as the country’s closest 
peer and China as its most reliable elderly brother” (Xiaofeng 2006)35. 
China’s expansion of economic influence over the Lao PDR has gone together with the 
growth in China’s soft power in the Lao PDR. While, in terms of bilateral aid, Japan is the 
Lao PDR’s largest aid donor, China’s aid has significantly risen and has become the second 
largest aid donor to the Lao PDR. The 1997 Asian economic crisis gave a golden opportunity 
for Beijing to increase its influence on Vientiane by increasing aid, fee-interest loans, trade, 
and investment helping the Lao PDR to stabilise its currency. China’s assistance was shortly 
followed by a series of bilateral agreements between the two countries covering economic 
and technical cooperation, investment, and infrastructure development (Storey 2005). 
Several of Beijing’s soft power projects went into the construction or renovation of 
significant landmarks in Vientiane: the US$7 million National Cultural Hall, the 13-kilometre 
Central Avenue, and the Patuxai Victory monument and its surrounding parks. In the old 
royal capital of Luang Prabang, 400 kilometres to the north of Vientiane, the Sino-Lao 
                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.worldcrunch.com/chinas-big-designs-small-and-strategic-laos/world-affairs/china-s-big-
designs-on-small-and-strategic-laos/c1s5865/#.UOnv8ORFX4t [accessed 15 November 2013]). 
35
 Mekong Press, “China’s aid flows downstream to Laos”. Available at 
http://www.newsmekong.org/china_s_aid_flows_downstream_to_laos [accessed 15 December 
2012] 
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Friendship Hospital, locally known as the ‘Chinese hospital’, was built in 2003. When the 
Lao PDR hosted the 25th Southeast Asian Games in 2009, it was China – the country which 
was not among the eleven countries competing in the games - which offered to build the 
20,000-seat new stadium. Without China’s assistance, the venue for the Games would have 
been nowhere near as spectacular (Lintner 2009). Recently, in supporting Vientiane to host 
the Ninth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit held in November 2012, Beijing provided 
generous assistance to Vientiane. China provided around 500 million Chinese Yuan 
(approximately £49 million) for the preparations. Leading Chinese construction companies 
and Chinese labour were sent to Vientiane helping the Lao PDR to build a National 
Convention Centre, reconstruct and extend the Vientiane Wattay International Airport, 
build the ASEM leaders’ villa district and other relevant supporting projects for the summit 
(Vientiane Times 31 May 2012; Xinhua 3 November 2012)36.  
China’s assistance does not come without costs to the recipient country. One of the most 
obvious examples is the GoL’s granting of a 50-year concession, after which it may be 
extended, to a Chinese-led joint venture to develop a ‘new township and industrial zone’ on 
the outskirts of Vientiane. This concession was a form of repaying China for its assistance in 
building the new sport complex used for the Southeast Asian Games (Will 2012 and see 
Reuters 6 April 2008)37. There is no doubt that Chinese assistance goes to the Lao PDR to 
serve the interest of China. China’s primary interest in the Lao PDR is more economic than 
political. Sommer (no date: 5) cites the view of GTZ staff on this issue: “Laos is simply too 
small for China to take a more direct political influence. In terms of a natural resource base 
and a transit country to Thailand and other ASEAN countries however, Laos is important for 
China”. Thus, Beijing has paid special interest in assisting the GoL to transform land-locked 
Lao PDR to a land-linked country. One example is the case of the development of the road 
                                                          
36
 Vientiane Times, “Beijing pledges further support to Laos” (31 May 2012); Xinhua, “China-Lao 
relations more crucial to development in new era: Lao Deputy PM” (3 November 2012). Available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-11/03/c_131949354.htm [accessed 15 November 
2012]. 
37
 Reuters, “In the eyes of Laos' Communist rulers, trading Vientiane's biggest wetland for a new 
sports stadium seemed like a good bargain” (6 April 2008). Available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/07/us-laos-chinatown-idUSBKK24347820080407 [accessed 
18 December 2010]. With disputes over this huge project coming not only from development 
agencies but also from within the government, the project has been scaled down from 1,600 hectare 
to 365 hectares. The construction work began at the end of 2012 (Vientiane Times, “Chinese firm 
breaks ground on That Luang marsh development”, 25 December 2012). 
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Route 3 (known as R3) linking Yunnan to Thailand through the Lao PDR’s Luang Namtha and 
Bokeo provinces. Road development in the Lao PDR cost US$97 million and the Lao PDR 
contributed only US$7 million dollars letting China, Thailand, and the ADB paid US$30 
million each38. Recently, China’s Export-Import Bank (EXIM) has agreed to provide a loan to 
the GoL to cover the cost of the US$7 billion high-speed railway project linking Vientiane to 
Lao-China border in Luang Namtha39. While the Lao PDR and its people would gain some 
benefits, it is China who gains most from accessing Bangkok, and other Southeast Asian 
countries which will provide a huge market for China’s goods. The Lao PDR’s natural 
resources also attract China. In 2011, the Lao PDR was reported to be among China’s top 
ten foreign investment destinations (Vientiane Times 18 August 2011)40. Resource-
associated investment, especially mining, hydropower, and land development (both 
industrial and agricultural projects), is the most attractive for investors. China’s economic 
influence has brought concerns to some Lao people who are worried that the country could 
soon become a China town. Nonetheless, they cannot deny that Chinese investment is a 
significant engine for the country’s economic growth. 
 
                                                          
38
Xinhua, “Route completed linking S China with N Thailand via Laos”, (28 March 2008). Available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/31/content_7892681.htm [accessed 31 December 
2012]. 
39
 The project was originally planned as a joint venture between the two countries. However, the 
Chinese construction firms decided to withdraw from the project due to their concern over the 
profitability of the project. The GoL, with the approval from the National Assembly, decided to 
continue and assume the total cost of the project, believing that land-linked status would lead to the 
development of the country. However, there is a concern as to how the GoL will pay the loan back to 
China’s EXIM Bank (The Nation, “Laos to pursue high-speed railway”, 22 October 2012. Available at 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/aec/Laos-to-pursue-high-speed-railway-30192745.html 
[accessed 19 December 2012]). 
40
 Vientiane Times, “Laos in top ten Chinese new investment destinations”, 18 August 2011. 
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Figure 4.1 Lao economic performances, 1985-2010. 
 
Sources: Extracted from Far Eastern Economic Review (1987: 180); World Bank (2008; 2011; no date) 
Note: Exports and imports of goods and services for 2010 are estimated. 
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Looking at the economic record of the Lao PDR since the NEM was launched, it is not 
surprising that there is no call for a re-thinking of the country’s economic direction from 
Party’s members and the GoL. Though its size is still small, the Lao PDR’s economic 
performance has been impressive (see Figure 4.1). 
The Lao economy today is no longer isolated. It is, however, attached far more to the 
regional than to the global market; trading between the Lao PDR and the other countries of 
ASEAN accounts for around 70 per cent of the country’s total trade, with Thailand 
accounting for around 50 per cent of total trade (World Bank 2007b: 19). However, the 
country has recently attracted investors from Vietnam and China, its socialist neighbours 
(see Figure 4.2). An increase in foreign direct investment is considered as a significant 
mechanism to maintain the country’s economic growth. Currently, FDI inflows to the Lao 
PDR are dominated by investments in the natural resource sector, especially mining and 
hydropower, which account for over 80 per cent of the total FDI (World Bank 2009: 18) (see 
Figure 4.3). The trends in FDI and the country’s exports (Figure 4.4) reflect the country’s 
heavy reliance on the exploitation of its natural resources.  
Figure 4.2 Share of accrual FDI in the Lao PDR by country (percentage of total), as of 
August 2009 
 
Source: Reproduced from World Bank (2009: 18) 
Note: The accrual FDI is based on approved FDI data provided by the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment (MPI) and calculated by the World Bank’s staff. 
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Figure 4.3 Actual FDI by sectors (US$ millions), 2006-2014 
 
Source: Reproduced from World Bank (2009: 18) 
Note: Data for 2011-2014 are estimated. 
Figure 4.4 Exports by sectors (US$ millions), 2007-2012 
 
Source: Reproduced from World Bank (2011: 10) 
Note: Data for 2011-2012 are estimated. 
The performance of the Lao economy since the country embarked on the NEM seems to 
offer hope to both the GoL and aid donors that the country is on the right track. For the GoL 
and aid donors like the ADB and the World Bank, economic growth almost equates to 
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development and, for a country which still faces a persistent problem of poverty, to poverty 
alleviation. However, economic growth does not provide benefits for everyone and the 
challenge of market integration and economic development is the determination of 
winners and losers, both relatively and absolutely. 
The Lao PDR’s GDP per capita has rapidly increased from approximately US$ 200 in 1990 to 
around US$ 500 in 2005, reaching US$ 1,200 in 2010 (see Figure 4.1e). However, the Lao 
PDR is ranked number four among the countries in the Asia and Pacific region in terms of 
the proportion of its population (44 per cent) living below the poverty line (less than US$ 
1.25 per day). Only Nepal (55.1 per cent), Bangladesh (49.5 per cent), and Uzbekistan (46.3 
per cent) have larger proportions of poor (ADB 2010: 66, 69). Rural poverty accounts for 
over 80 per cent of total poverty (Gaiha and Annim 2010: 2).The country is ranked at 138 
out of 183 in the UNDP’s latest Human Development Index; among the GMS members, only 
Cambodia (139) and Burma (149) are ranked at a lower level than the Lao PDR (UNDP 2011: 
126). The question remaining is why the country which has achieved such impressive 
economic growth still has such a high proportion of poor people. A possible explanation is 
that the country’s economic growth is based on the mining and hydropower sectors which 
can only absorb a small percentage of the population. The agricultural sector, in contrast, 
while it contributes only 34 per cent of GDP, accounts for almost 80 per cent of the labour 
force (ADB 2010: 140, 160-161). The Lao PDR may be able to convince foreign investors to 
come to the country, but the benefits of this engagement for its people are questionable. 
While for the World Bank, the ADB and the GoL there may be no doubt about marketization 
as the pathway to poverty alleviation, for critics there is the outstanding question of how to 
make market integration also work for the poor. 
Poverty in the Lao PDR may be understood through the two perspectives of ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
poverty (Rigg 2005a: 25-35). ‘Old’ poverty focuses on the geographical marginality of 
people. This version of poverty has produced a rhetoric centred on ‘dearth’: limited road 
and market access, the absence of government services and development, and the 
character of livelihood systems (with upland populations who practice shifting agriculture 
seen as primitive). In order to resolve old poverty, development interventions that address 
these limitations are required, and in particular development interventions that provide 
road access and promote market integration. Such development interventions have the 
potential to bring a better life to people living in old poverty. However, they may also 
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create ‘new’ poverty both mentally (through the arrival of modernity) and instrumentally 
(through the unintended outcomes of the development projects)41.  
It is likely that spatial and economic integration can create both winners and losers. This 
pattern of economic development seems to be the only possible direction open to the 
socialist government as it attempts to think about the nation’s development and 
prosperity. Thus, bringing the market to the people (and the people to the market) has 
been prioritised by the government with the hope that this will lift its people out of 
poverty. However, what is left unexplored is the question of how the market really works at 
the local level. How far can such policies of integration bring a better life to the Lao people? 
Or, indeed, are such interventions, in a real sense, harmful to the people? These questions 
will be explored in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 through the lens of rubber expansion in the 
uplands of Luang Namtha. 
4.3.2 Lao agriculture in transition 
4.3.2.1 Subsistence agriculture under marketization 
“We should be aware that the commodity economy, including the simple 
commodity economy, is more advanced than the natural and self-sufficient 
economy. Therefore, our state must encourage and develop the commodity 
money relationship...with a view to turning the natural economy into the 
socialist-oriented commodity economy.” 
   (Kaysone Phomvihane 1986 cited in Evans 1995: 55). 
“Our previous cooperative policy was in the old style practiced by other 
socialist countries. After some investigations into the actual situation in Laos, 
we decided to change direction and start from the family.” 
(Kaysone Phomvihane 1988 cited in Evans 2002: 195). 
                                                          
41
 One of the attempts to resolve ‘old’ poverty in the Lao PDR was the implementation of a 
resettlement programme. While the programme may bring upland populations closer to 
‘development’ – by promoting road and market access – it has also created ‘new’ poverty as settlers 
struggle to make a living in a new settlement area (Cohen 2000; Evrard and Goudineau 2004; Baird 
and Shoemaker 2005). 
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Having failed to modernise its agriculture through collectivisation, the GoL continued – and 
continues – to have a primary concern with the development of the country’s agricultural 
sector since the NEM was adopted. As noted by Bourdet (Bourdet 1995), there were two 
major agricultural reforms introduced in the mid-1980s. Firstly, the subsidies provided by 
the state to cooperatives were removed and the market mechanism in agricultural 
production was introduced. Secondly, property rights were reformed through allocating 
land use rights to peasant households. It is important to note that property rights reform in 
the late 1980s involved usufruct rights, not full private property rights. To begin with, these 
agricultural reforms seemed to have little impact on performance. While this was partly 
due to the severe weather conditions in the late 1980s, Bourdet (1995: 179-180) argues 
that it was also partly because of the status of Lao agriculture which was dominated by 
subsistence-orientated systems with low technological inputs and low productivity; in the 
early 1980s, only six per cent of cultivated areas were irrigated (FEER 1982: 192). 
Since the introduction of the NEM, though agricultural performance has been better than it 
was previously under the high communism era, commercialisation of agriculture has 
remained quite slow. Data from the National Statistical Centre (2000 cited in Rehbein 2007: 
47) show that in the late 1990s, 80 per cent of the Lao population worked in agriculture, 
with around 60 per cent being classified as ‘subsistence’. According to the latest Agriculture 
Development Strategy (MAF 2010a: 2-3), rice-based agriculture, which is the dominant 
agricultural system practiced by rural households, accounting for around 70 per cent of the 
country’s total cultivated area, is nearly all subsistence with less than ten per cent of the 
output being marketed. While agriculture contributes 34.4 per cent of GDP (World Bank 
2011: Annex 1), the highest percentage of any sector, the export value of agricultural 
commodities is far behind that contributed by the mining and energy sectors (see Figure 
4.4).  
Levels of market involvement vary between regions. Farming households in the lowlands, 
especially in the Vientiane plain42 and the Mekong river corridor43, are much more involved 
                                                          
42
 The Vientiane plain extends from Vientiane City, and includes some parts of Vientiane and 
Bolikhamxay provinces covering the high plains and lower slopes. The landscape is dominated by a 
typography of middle mountains. The rural population in this area is around 300,000, with upland 
shifting cultivation and animal husbandry being important to livelihoods.  
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in market exchange than those living in the mountainous areas. According to the World 
Bank (2006: 10), nearly 50 per cent of rural households in the Vientiane Plain are involved 
in selling rice while only 14 per cent of rural households in the central-southern highlands 
have ever sold rice. 
While modernising agriculture has been prioritised by the GoL, success has been limited. 
Lao agriculture is still reliant on traditional methods, with low levels of modern machinery 
and technological inputs such as improved seeds and fertilizer. The number of tractors used 
by Lao farmers gives a good reflection of this. In 2008, only 1,080 tractors were owned by 
Lao farmers, or 9.2 tractors per 100 square kilometres of arable land, which is far behind 
Vietnam, its socialist neighbour, with an average tractor ratio of 256.744. Accessing 
agricultural credit is still limited, preventing farmers from purchasing modern agricultural 
inputs. Though agriculture absorbs the labour of the majority of the country’s population, 
the proportion of public resources allocated to agriculture is quite small and on a declining 
trend (see Figure 4.5); government expenditure on agriculture and infrastructure 
development accounted for only seven per cent of total domestic expenditure in 2005 
(World Bank et al 2007: 23).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
43
 The Mekong river corridor covers the banks and floodplains of the Mekong River and the lower 
alluvial valleys of its tributaries. The area is well-suited to wet-rice agriculture. With a population of 
approximately 1.5 million people, it is the most densely populated area of the Lao PDR. 
44
 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/laos/agricultural-machinery-tractors--data.html [accessed 20 
November 2011] and http://www.tradingeconomics.com/vietnam/agricultural-machinery-tractors-
wb-data.html [accessed 20 November 2011]. 
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Figure 4.5 Shares of public domestic expenditure (percentage), 2000-2005 
 
 
Source: Reproduced from World Bank et al (2007: 23) 
The geography of the country not only causes difficulties in linking farmers to the market 
but also requires large budget allocations for infrastructure development. Though 
infrastructure has been improved, it still leaves a lot to be desired. Irrigation is one 
example. In the 2007/2008 agricultural season, the cultivated area under irrigation across 
the country accounted for approximately ten per cent of total agricultural land. The 
irrigated cultivated area was particularly small in the northern region where it accounted 
for only 2.4 per cent of the region’s total agricultural land (MAF 2010a: 6 table 1). 
Currently, agriculture is still the most important sector and employs the bulk of the 
population. However, Lao agriculture is still mostly subsistence and high levels of inputs are 
required to develop the agricultural sector. The GoL, however, has limited potential (both 
financial and human) to fulfil this task. The country’s agricultural system is currently 
comprised of two main farming systems: the lowland rain fed and/ or irrigated farming 
system, and the upland swidden farming system. For many state officials, the lowland 
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system is preferred. The following section discusses more fully the approach of the GoL to 
its ‘unwanted’ upland shifting agriculture in the context of the expansion of rubber in the 
Lao PDR. This provides the higher level background to the understanding of the rubber 
boom in the study villages, which will be returned to in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
4.3.2.2 Upland agriculture and the rubber boom 
Shifting cultivation45 is the dominant form of agriculture in the uplands. This system is 
mainly practiced by non-Lao ethnic people46. It was estimated that in 1990 around 210,000 
households practiced shifting cultivation, covering an area of approximately 249,000 
hectares (GoL 2005: 39). The area under shifting cultivation dropped to 79,559 hectares 
(48,225 households) in 2009 (MAF 2010b)47. The shifting agriculture of the uplanders is 
generally considered by the state to be a ‘destructive’ and ‘unsustainable’ system. Apart 
from being regarded as the cause of the loss of forest areas (GoL 2005: 42), shifting 
agriculture mainly practiced by people living in the mountainous areas is considered by the 
GoL to have a close link to the poverty problem in the uplands (MAF 1999; GoL 2003a; 
2005; WB 2006; ADB 2008). The ADB notes that ‘most shifting cultivators live in poverty, 
their farming system unable even to meet household food consumption needs,’ (ADB 2008: 
1). According to the ADB’s participatory poverty assessment (PPA) report (ADB 2001 cited in 
Rigg 2006a: 125) which was conducted in 2000 in 84 rural villages, 90 per cent of poor 
villagers relied on swidden agriculture. In 2001, the government issued Prime Ministerial 
Decree No 10 identifying 47 districts as the first priority poorest districts and 25 districts as 
the second priority, out of a total of 143 districts throughout the country. Richter and 
colleagues (Richter et al. 2006) point out that over half of the first priority poorest districts 
are located in the remote highlands and most of them are difficult to access. They also note 
                                                          
45
 In this thesis, shifting cultivation, shifting agriculture, and swidden agriculture are used 
interchangeably to refer to the main agricultural system in the uplands. While realising that there is a 
variety of systems practiced by different groups of people, I use these terms in a broad sense to refer 
to the farming system that dominates dry-rice cultivation, in which the plot is used before being 
(usually temporarily) abandoned. Shifting cultivators generally return to their abandoned plots when 
soil fertility is restored. The system is different from the wet–rice paddy system, in which land is used 
permanently, and often with high levels of inputs. 
46
 It is important to note that while this system is mainly practiced by non-ethnic Lao uplanders, 
some ethnic Lao and lowlanders also practice shifting cultivation. 
47
 It should be noted that there might be an issue over accuracy of the areas used for shifting 
agriculture and the number of swidden farmers. Notwithstanding some possible inaccuracy, the data 
give us a picture of trends of shifting agriculture in the Lao PDR. 
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that in 2002/2003, shifting agriculture was widespread across the 47 poorest districts 
(Richter et al. 2006: 60).  
In addition to being seen as a cause of poverty and the decline in forest areas, shifting 
agriculture is also linked to opium cultivation. The United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) (2008: 8) asserts that most opium poppy cultivators live in poverty. The 
government has pointed to a strong correlation between opium and poverty by reporting 
that opium fields were found in 67 districts in 2002; of these districts, 32 were among the 
47 poorest districts (GoL 2003a:122).  
In order to resolve the upland ‘problems’ that centre on shifting agriculture, several policies 
and development programmes have been introduced. The GoL stated in the late 1980s that 
stabilising shifting cultivation should be achieved by providing alternatives to villagers, not 
by ordering or forcing them to abandon the practice (GoL 2005: 3). One of the most 
significant policies – which has had a serious impact on upland populations and agriculture 
– is the Land Use Planning and Land Allocation Programme (LUP/LA) or ‘beng din beng 
pa’48, introduced initially in 1994. The programme aimed to promote crop production by 
replacing shifting cultivation with permanent field agriculture, and in so doing to protect 
forest, and to utilise allocated forest on a sustainable basis (GoL 2005: 5-6). The programme 
which was supported by the World Bank, and multilateral and bilateral development 
agencies, assumed that land-rights security would increase land owners’ incentives to 
intensify the use of land and make productive investments. The LUP/LA allocates forest 
lands to the community for sustainable management, and also allocates potential 
agricultural land and degraded forests to households, based on three-year temporary land 
use rights. Long-term use rights can be applicable only after the land has been permanently 
used for three years (GoL 2005: 5). According to the programme, villagers cannot use plots 
which have been left for more than three years. The abandoned plots, including three-year 
fallows, should automatically return to the village to be re-allocated to other villagers who 
have the potential to develop them for sedentary farming (Ducourtieux et al 2005: 506). 
The plots under shifting cultivation cannot be granted a long-term use right; the 
government, influenced by the World Bank, believes that this programme should convince 
villagers to abandon shifting agriculture and establish permanent farms. The land-rights 
policy implemented through the LUP/LA programme reflects how shifting agriculture is 
                                                          
48
 This literally means allocating land and forest.  
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perceived among Lao leaders. Upland agriculture is generally referred to by state officials 
and lowlanders as a ‘primitive’ system as compared to the ‘modern’ permanent agriculture 
practiced mainly by lowlanders. 
Between 1995/1996 and 2002/2003, the LUP/LA programme was implemented in 6,830 
villages (more than 50 per cent of the country’s villages) with the allocation of more than 9 
million hectares of land (GoL 2005: 6). However, the success of the programme is 
questionable as the programme has led to increased livelihood vulnerability for many 
upland people who have not been able to make their living from the three allocated plots 
(Satoshi et al 2006). Some research points to emerging social differentiation among 
villagers who have unequal access to the benefits of the programme (Ducourtieux et al 
2005). Indeed, it has been suggested that the programme has generated displacement and 
impoverishment (Vandergeest 2003: 51). The programme, which was intended as one of 
the tools to resolve poverty in the uplands has, arguably, thus created ‘new’ poverty in the 
uplands (Rigg 2005a: 29-35). 
In addition to the LUP/LA programme, commercial crops have been introduced to the 
uplands. It is believed that agricultural commodities will improve the quality of life of 
upland populations who face restrictions on practicing shifting cultivation. Cash crops are 
considered to provide cash income for uplanders so that they are able to buy rice to fill any 
shortages during the year, even to have rice to eat without growing it (Ducourtieux et al 
2006: 66). Moreover, commercial crops also function as opium-substitute crops. The GoL 
and international organisations, especially the UNODC, have attempted to introduce 
commercial crops in the former opium cultivated villages aiming to prevent villagers 
returning to opium cultivation. The GoL and development organisations have worked 
continuously to develop the necessary market infrastructure and skills so that uplanders are 
ready for market integration49. However, the success of such replacement schemes is still 
very limited. Shifting cultivation cannot be easily eliminated by introducing cash crops. 
Ducourtieux and colleagues (2006: 74) suggest that if newly introduced crops fail to provide 
a more productive and secure alternative to shifting cultivation, then “the failure of the 
cash crop proposed is predictable” (Ducourtieux et al. 2006: 74). 
                                                          
49
 It is stressed in the government’s ‘Strategy for Reform in the Agriculture and Forestry Colleges 
towards 2020’ that the objective of the reform strategy for technical agricultural education is to 
develop skilled persons for market-based development in the agricultural sector (MAF 2008: 4). 
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In the early 2000s, while the GoL was struggling with how to eliminate shifting cultivation 
and resolve the problem of poverty in the uplands, a new commercial crop emerged: 
rubber. While some proposed commercial crops may have an uncertain future, rubber is 
different. It has been greatly welcomed by uplanders who heard stories about the profits 
that rubber farmers in China and a Hmong village in Namtha district (the first village to 
grow rubber trees in the country’s northern region) could earn. Moreover, rubber has 
become of interest to the GoL in promoting it to Lao farmers. Douangsavanh and colleagues 
(2008: 13) note the reasons why the GoL adheres to the promotion of rubber trees to small 
farmers:  
- The rubber tree has the potential to be an alternative crop for poverty 
reduction 
- The rubber tree can be substitute for opium cultivation and unregulated 
shifting cultivation 
- Households can secure their income from the nature of the operation of the 
rubber market: a quota system in which the price is set in advance. 
- Rubber farmers can earn income in the early year of plantation establishment 
due to its potential for intercropping. 
Though it has a very short history in the Lao PDR, rubber has become an attractive crop for 
both Lao farmers and investors. In the 1990s, rubber was planted in Bachiangchalernsouk 
district of Champasak Province by a state company, in an area of only 50 hectares. Since 
then, the area of rubber has constantly increased, accelerating since 2003 (Manivong and 
Cramb 2008). It is estimated that the planted area of rubber nationwide in 2008 was 
140,550 hectares; of this, only 23 per cent was run by small famers while the rest was 
under private companies, either through direct investment and involvement or through 
contract farming systems. It was predicted that the total area of rubber planted in 2010 
would be almost 250,000 hectares (Manivong 2009).  
It should be noted that there are many actors from different levels involved in the rapid 
expansion of rubber trees in the Lao PDR. Besides the Lao state, neighbouring countries 
have played a crucial role in promoting rubber plantations within the Lao territory. One 
example is the Chinese state which has facilitated the rubber boom through its opium 
replacement programme which is promoted in the context of China’s ‘go out strategies’. 
The programme provides both financial and non-financial support for Chinese investment 
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in several sectors, including agribusiness (Rutherford et al. 2008: 15; Shi 2008: 24-27). The 
programme was timed to coincide with the influx of rubber investment in Luang Namtha 
(Shi 2008: 23). Chinese investors in the Lao PDR also have the perception that their 
investment in the Lao PDR is the way to modernise Lao society. As one said, ‘Laos is poor 
and dirty.’ ‘But we have many friends there already. We can make money and help make 
Laos more like China.’ (Asia Times, 19 September 2009). Shi (2008) notes the views of a 
manager of a Chinese rubber company who asserts that rubber trees are a better means of 
promoting upland development than development projects offered by western agencies: 
‘the westerners have been here for so long, building one bridge, one hospital, one school,... 
villagers are still poor, still living in the way they did ten, twenty, fifty year ago. What we 
bring is real development, real modernity.’ (Shi 2008: 72, italics added). The question is 
whether the rubber tree can truly bring ‘real’ development to the Lao people. Will it be 
another version of ‘new’ poverty imposed in the uplands? And how far can marginalised 
uplanders who are not yet familiar with the market deal with the huge influx of capital into 
the uplands? These issues will be explored in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the Lao PDR, focusing on the period from 1975 to 
the present. The poor socialist state led by the LPRP faced challenges when the country 
turned to communism in 1975. As discussed, various conditions limited the ability of the 
state to achieve full socialist transformation. Cooperatives generally failed and even during 
the high point of communism in the Lao PDR, agriculture was mostly not socialist, but 
subsistence. The latter half of the chapter discussed the transition to the market. The 
chapter explored the economy of the country as economic and spatial integration has 
proceeded, pointing to the hope that this will transform the country from a land-locked to a 
land-linked state. Both the economic and social aspects of this transformation have been 
explored, providing the links between economic and social development. The chapter has 
noted the hope of policy makers that market integration, especially at the regional level, 
will become the means of bringing economic growth and development. Almost 30 years 
since the NEM was first introduced, a call to return to socialist transformation is rarely if 
ever heard. The central concern among Lao leaders today is more about how to link the 
economy of the country into global and regional market better. Practically, market 
capitalism is not seen as the enemy of the country. While integration has been 
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accompanied by improvements in social and economic indicators, the country is still close 
to the bottom of the Human Development Index. The agricultural sector on which the 
majority of the population depend to make their living still needs improvement. After more 
than 20 years of market integration, Lao agriculture is still dominated by rice-based 
subsistence systems, especially in the uplands where swidden farming is the dominant form 
of agriculture and which is also considered as being one of the causes of poverty in the 
uplands. New commercial crops had been introduced with very little success. It was just at 
this juncture, in the early 2000s, when rubber – a new commercial crop – was introduced. It 
quickly became attractive to uplanders, the state, and investors who, though they may 
have slightly different views on the crop, consider rubber trees as a new hope. In the 
following chapter, the particular context of Luang Namtha province, which has the largest 
planted area of rubber in the country, and the location of the study sites will be discussed 
in order to provide the background to the later empirical chapters. 
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Chapter Five  
Research Communities 
5.1 Introduction 
In the preface of his fascinating book, The Art of Not Being Governed: an Anarchist History 
of Upland Southeast Asia, James Scott (2009:ix) refers to the vast area of the Asian 
hinterlands - known as the Southeast Asian mainland massif, covering 2.5 million square 
kilometres and composing some 100 million people of diverse ethnicity - as ‘Zomia’. Scott 
views Zomia, a term borrowed from Van Schendel (2002), as “the largest remaining region 
of the world whose people have not yet been fully incorporated into nation-states” (Ibid). 
Scott accounts Zomia as a ‘stateless’ space and as a zone of ‘refuge’ or ‘asylum’ (J. Scott 
1998: 22, 31, 143) whose population have chosen to move away from civilisation and away 
from lowland domination (p. 128). Scott, however, warns that his argument may not fit the 
current situation in Southeast Asia’s hinterlands, as the state has ‘engulfed’ and drawn such 
spaces into its peripheral areas (J. Scott 2009: xii).  
In the case of the Lao PDR, the state has long attempted to transform the frontier space 
from a ‘stateless’ space, as Scott (2009) calls it, to a ‘state’ space. In order to gain a better 
understanding of the state’s integration of the frontier areas and populations, it is 
necessary to look at how the state has viewed this marginal space and people. 
The victory of the communist movement in the Lao PDR, as well as in Vietnam, could not 
have been successful without war-time alliances with ethnic minorities in the frontiers. 
Promises, including hints at future political autonomy, were given to attract the support of 
the ethnic peoples in the margins who hoped for some future political reward. However, 
after the revolution, these promises of political autonomy were toned down (Pholsena 
2006). Moreover, the communist state came to view the frontiers as needing to be even 
more firmly attached to the state and socialist project (Michaud 2009).  
After the civil war, a key challenge for the new socialist regime was to build a socialist 
nation in a country where the top leadership of the LPRP was lowland-Tai-Lao dominated 
while, according to the State Planning Committee and National Statistic Centre (1999 cited 
in Evrard and Goudineau 2004), the non-Tai-Lao population make up more than 40 per cent 
of the country’s inhabitants. While the socialist government officially talks of a ‘multi-
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ethnic’ Lao nation, the Lao government emphasises cultural unity centred on an ethnic Tai-
Lao conceptualisation of Lao-ness. Kaysone Phomvihane, the LPRP’s leader stated that: 
“Lao culture must be the basic culture shared by all the ethnicities, and must 
be the one to provide the connections for the exchange of culture between all 
the ethnicities; spoken and written Lao is the common language and written 
Lao is the regular writing of all the ethnic groups; nevertheless, each ethnic 
group should still preserve its spoken language, and their separate customs”. 
(Phomvihane 1982 cited in Evans 2003: 213) 
The socialist government officially speaks of a multi-ethnic Lao nation where everyone is 
equal. However, as Grant Evans points out, the socialist state “is found wanting for it is 
clear to everyone, especially the minorities, that they are not equal citizens” (Evans 2003: 
214). It is evident that Tai-Lao speaking lowlanders are considered superior; as Kaysone 
Phomvihane stated: “the ethnic Lao group has a greater population than others, located in 
almost all the provinces and holding a superior degree of economic and cultural 
development” (Phomvihane 1981 cited in Pholsena 2006: 175). The perception of cultural 
hierarchy between Tai-Lao and other ethnic groups is rooted in both the particular history 
of the Lao PDR and the influence of Marxist-Leninist theory. The formation of the Lao 
kingdom was founded on the political and economic control of the Theravada Buddhist, 
Lao-Tai lowlanders. This Buddhist kingdom, as with those Buddhist polities in Siam and 
Burma, held the view that “there were uncivilized people living on the frontiers” (Keyes 
2002: 1173). This heritage combined with Marxist-Leninist ideology strongly influenced by 
evolution theory. People were classified by their different levels of ‘cultural development’. 
A ‘scientific’ classification of people was also determined by their different degrees of Lao-
ness. The degree of Lao-ness was over-simplified by reference to the geographical location 
of populations. People were classified as Lao Loum (Lao in the lowlands), Lao Thueng (Lao in 
the midlands or in the uplands), and Lao Soung (Lao in the highlands)50. The first category 
applied to the Tai-Lao speaking people. The Lao Thueng was applied to Mon-Khmer and 
Austroasiatic groups while Lao Soung was applied to Tibeto-Burman, and Hmong-Mien 
                                                          
50
 Lao Thueng are sometimes referred to as ‘uplanders’. However, in this thesis, the term ‘uplander’ 
is used as a broader term to refer to non-lowlanders. Thus, ‘uplander’ used in this thesis includes 
people who both belong to the state’s category of Lao Thueng and Lao Soung. The thesis, however, 
does not subscribe to the idea that Lao Thueng or Lao Soung are more backward than Lao Loum. 
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groups (Evans 2003: 214). Lao Thueng and Lao Soung who live in the margins and practice 
shifting agriculture are placed at a lower level of the ‘civilisation ladder’ (Chiengthong 2010) 
than those Lao Loum who farm paddy and practice Buddhism51. Cultural traits and practices 
of ethnic people in the frontiers are viewed as ‘backward practices’ and their ‘animist 
rituals’ “have bad impacts on solidarity, productivity and life of diverse ethnic groups as 
well as of the nation” (LPRP's Central Committee 1992 cited in Pholsena 2006: 71-72). 
With this in mind, the ‘backwardness’ of the margins need to be addressed. The 
government’s project of ‘civilising the margins’(Duncan 2004b) aims to resolve the 
frontiers’ ‘problems’, namely security, poverty, superstitious beliefs and practices, shifting 
cultivation, and opium cultivation. Various ‘development’ mechanisms and policies have 
been imposed on the frontiers and frontiers’ populations. One of the key mechanisms has 
been the state’s territorialisation of the margins through an internal resettlement 
programme which was heavily implemented between the mid-1990s and early 2000s. The 
programme aimed to deal with both the security issues and backwardness of the frontiers. 
Some politically untrustworthy minorities were a particular target and were relocated to be 
close to more politically-trusted ethnic minorities. For instance, in the politically sensitive 
Lao-Thai borderlands, Hmong villages have often been resettled close to Khmu 
communities to prevent any possible uprising which might be influenced by Hmong in 
Thailand (Friederichsena and Neef 2010). The internal resettlement programme can be 
seen as the mechanism by which the state expects to fulfil its mission of civilising the 
frontiers. The project aims to eliminate ‘backward’ economic activities and cultural 
characters prevalent in such areas. Thus, besides being used to resolve the problem of 
access and lack of state services in the margins, the internal resettlement programme was 
also used for stabilizing shifting agriculture, eradicating opium cultivation and addiction, 
and cultural integration (Baird and Shoemaker 2005). People in the highlands and uplands 
were forced to relocate into ‘focal sites’ often at the edge of the lowland valleys and close 
to roads. The rational of the ‘focal site’ strategy was that it makes bringing ‘development’ 
and state services more cost-effective than it would do so to many small scattered villages 
in the hills (Rigg 2005a). Some villagers were relocated to a consolidated village where small 
                                                          
51
 While Buddhism is no longer the state’s religion and the socialist state tried to limit some activities 
of the Buddhist Sanha, the LPRP does not consider Buddhism as the enemy or as an obstacle to the 
Lao socialist project. The communist state even expected to use Buddhism to serve the new regime 
(Evans 1993). 
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settlements have been combined together in larger settlements. Village consolidation is 
thus similar to the ‘focal site’ strategy but on a smaller scale (Baird and Shoemaker 2005). 
Thus people who lived in the ‘stateless’ zone have been relocated to bring them under the 
state’s gaze and control. Resettlement villagers are supposed to be provided with 
infrastructure, state’s services and agricultural land in the ‘focal sites’. However, narratives 
about the ‘focal sites’ is about a shortage of land and the increasing livelihood vulnerability 
of the resettled households (Lyttleton et al. 2004; Baird and Shoemaker 2005; Rigg 2005a; 
and see section 5.3.2.1 for the resettlement experiences in the study sites). It is important 
to note international aid agencies made a significant contribution to the Lao government’s 
internal resettlement programme. It was estimated that at least 80 per cent of associated 
costs of the resettlement programme have been funded by international aid agencies 
(UNDP 1998 cited in Baird and Shoemaker 2005: 11). 
The policies introduced into the frontiers aiming to link the ‘uncivilised’, ‘underdeveloped’ 
space and people to ‘development’ re-produced the state’s views of the socio-economic 
hierarchy between Lao-Tai lowlanders and other populations. That said, such development 
projects were an attempt to make ethnic minorities living in the margins of the Lao PDR 
more like the Lao-Tai speaking lowlanders. This was not only encouraging (or forcing) them 
to adapt sedentary agriculture life but also to become more ‘Lao’ by adopting the language, 
clothing, and ways of life of the Lao Loum. Baird and Shoemaker (2005: 11) record that in 
the southern province of Attapeu, the provincial government has built Lao-style houses in 
the resettlement villages of ethnic minorities to “teach people how to make Lao permanent 
houses”. Civilising the margins in the Lao PDR is thus more about ‘domestication’ (McCaskill 
and Kampe 1997) through a process of ‘Lao-loumification’ than it is about development.  
The Lao uplands, as well as the mountainous areas in Southern China and Vietnam, are not 
only being enclosed by the state but also by the market. The exercise of state power over 
the margins today is not just an issue of national security and nation-building but also of 
managing upland space and its people for economic purposes (Michaud 2009). This 
mountainous area “is now increasingly opening up to investment, regional planning, and 
development interventions, often as countries [China, Vietnam, and the Lao PDR] change 
from socialism to [a] more liberal market and political system” (Forsyth and Michaud 2010: 
1). The mountainous region is now connected to both the state and the market and the 
uplands of Luang Namtha province - the mountainous province in the north-west of the Lao 
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PDR – is no exception. That said, the geographical setting of Luang Namtha does not permit 
easy connection to Vientiane - the country’s capital city and economic centre. Luang 
Namtha was the country’s borderland and a marginal region during the high period of 
communism in the Lao PDR. This situation has begun to change as the country is spatially 
and economically integrated into the wider regional and global markets. Indeed, this 
‘marginal’ land has become one of the centres of economic integration. In light of these 
transformations, Luang Namtha is a particularly appropriate place to undertake this 
research; it offers an insight into how a marginal borderland is transformed in the context 
of market and state integration. Based on primary data obtained from the fieldwork and 
secondary data, this chapter provides an overview of Luang Namtha province before 
introducing the four communities that were chosen as the study sites.  
5.2 Luang Namtha Province 
Luang Namtha province is in the north-west of the Lao PDR, located 700 kilometres from 
Vientiane, the country’s capital city, or about 20 hours by bus. It shares a border with two 
other Lao provinces - Bokeo in the south-west and Oudomxay in the south-east. It is also 
bordered by Myanmar in the north-west, following the course of the Mekong. Finally, to 
the north, it shares a 140 kilometre land border with China’s Yunnan province (see Map 
5.1). 
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Map 5.1 Luang Namtha province and the study sites
 
Luang Namtha covers an area of 8,325 square kilometres, with more than 85 per cent of 
this being classified as mountains rising to between 800-2,000 metres above sea level. In 
2009, the province had a population of 160,000 people, or 2.6 per cent of the country’s 
total population52. It was recorded that in 2005, about one-third of the province’s total 
population lived in Namtha district where the provincial capital is located. The majority of 
the population live in rural areas, making up nearly 80 per cent of the total in 200553. 
Schipani (2007: 9) notes the ethnic diversity of Luang Namtha; it is home to more than 20 
ethnic groups54. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the major ethnic groups in Luang Namtha. 
                                                          
52
 Lao Statistics Bureau, “population” [online]. Available at 
http://www.nsc.gov.la/index2.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=37&Itemid=38 [accessed 
12 September 2011]. 
53
 Lao National Tourism Administration, “Luang Namtha” [online]. Available at 
http://www.tourismlaos.org/web/show_content.php?contID=42 [accessed 12 September 2011]. 
54
 Schipani (2007: 9) raises the point that the use of the term ‘ethnic minority’ is 
something of a misnomer for ethnic people in Luang Namtha as their number is far 
greater than that of ethnic Lao who make up only a small proportion of the province’s 
inhabitants. 
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Table 5.1 Main ethnic groups in Luang Namtha, 2005 
Ethnic groups Percentage of the province’s population 
Akha 25.1 
Khmu 24.5 
Tai Lue 12.2 
Tai Dam, Daeng, Khao 10.1 
Hmong 5.0 
Lahu 3.6 
Tai Yuan  3.5 
Yao (Iu-Mien), Lanten 3.1 
Other 7.2 
Total 100 
Source: Luang Namtha Population and Housing Census, 2005 reproduced from  
 Schipani (2007: 9).  
The geography of the northern region of the Lao PDR is dominated by a range of high 
mountains. Although road connection has vastly improved, it still leaves a lot to be desired. 
Poor roads make it difficult to travel between Luang Namtha and the country’s capital city. 
However, its setting allows Luang Namtha to be connected to its three neighbouring 
countries (China, Burma, and Thailand) rather more easily than to Vientiane. Luang Namtha 
is one of the two provinces55 in the northern region of the Lao PDR where roads (R 3 and R 
13B) provide links with Kunming, the capital and largest city of Yunnan province of China, 
and to Bangkok, Thailand’s capital (see Map 4.1 and Map 5.1). New and/or improved roads 
have brought new problems to communities close to such arteries of communication, such 
as a demographic shift or HIV vulnerability found in a study of Lyttleton and colleagues (see 
Lyttleton et al. 2004) and a boost in trade (Edmonds and Fujimura 2006 cited in Rigg and 
Wittayapak 2009: 83). Road no. R3 and R 13B have made the movement of people and 
goods between northern Thailand and south-western China via Luang Namtha significantly 
easier. This process of spatial and economic integration has led to the growth not only of 
Luangnamtha - the provincial centre (see Picture 5.1) – but also of border towns located 
along the roads (such as Sing and Borten), which have become important transportation 
and economic development nodes. 
 
                                                          
55
 Another province is Bokeo where construction of a bridge over the Mekong River linking Houaysai 
district with Chiang Khong district in Thailand’s Chiang Rai province is close to completion. 
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Picture 5.1 Luang Namtha’s provincial centre 
Source: http://www.luangnamtha-tourism.org/lnt_info/lnt_info.htm [accessed 22 May 2012] 
In terms of economy, agriculture is still the main economic activity of Luang Namtha’s 
population. As in many other provinces of the Lao PDR, Luang Namtha’s traditional 
agriculture is a combination of wet-rice cultivation in the lowlands and dry-rice shifting 
cultivation in the uplands. Due to its geographical context, together with the large upland 
populations, shifting agriculture was the dominant agricultural system until quite recently. 
In the early 1990s, the area used for wet-rice cultivation was less than one-third of the 
shifting cultivation area. However, successive government policies (to stabilise shifting 
cultivation, resettle upland populations, and support permanent paddy cultivation) have 
resulted in a significant decline of shifting cultivation, while the paddy area has increased 
(see Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 Rice production areas in Luang Namtha, 1985–2010. 
 
Sources: National Statistics Centre (2006 cited in Thongmanivong et al. 2006 : 194) for the data from 
1985 to 2004; Balbi et al (2011: 11) for the 2010 record.  
Luang Namtha has become a modest rice-surplus province; in 2010, provincial demand for 
rice was 55,000 tons while the province produced around 55,650 tons, notionally a surplus 
of 650 tons (Vientiane Times, 28 February 2011)56. However, this cannot be interpreted as 
meaning that Luang Namtha’s population do not face a rice shortage. A deputy head of the 
Luang Namtha PAFO stated that only Namtha and Sing districts could produce more rice 
than their domestic demand required (interview, 24 September 2009). This is due to the 
geographical conditions of the two districts, which both benefit from quite large areas of 
land suitable for wet-rice cultivation (see Table 5.2). The amount of exported rice was more 
than the surplus the province generated. A case in point is the example of Sing district: in 
2010 Sing exported 6,000 tons of rice to China while the district produced a rice surplus of 
only 800 tons (Vientiane Times, 28 February 2011). While some families, generally those 
living in the lowlands, generate cash from selling their rice surplus, there are many more 
who still struggle with rice shortages. A survey of 470 families in Sing and Nalae districts in 
1997 found that over a period of ten years, only in one or two years did villagers not face 
rice shortages, while there were three or four years when they faced severe rice shortages 
(i.e. for six to seven months per year) (Kaufmann 1997 cited in Foppes and Ketphanh 2004: 
39). In the Lao PDR, where rice sufficiency is used as one of the key indicators of poverty, 
                                                          
56
 Vientiane Times, “Luang Namtha export rice to China”, 28 February 2011. 
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three districts of Luang Namtha - Long, Nalae, and Vieng Phoukha - are on the list of the 47 
poorest districts in the country. The vice governor of Luang Namtha province stated that in 
2010 around 30 per cent of the province’s households were identified as poor 
(Phitthoumma 2011). 
Table 5.2 Areas of paddy, upland rice and major cash crops planted in the districts of 
Long, Nalae, and Sing, 2008/2009 
 Long district Nalae district Sing district 
Paddy rice 1,665 ha 408 ha 4,875 ha 
Upland rice 1,195 ha 2,230 ha 380 ha  
Sugarcane 60 ha 0 ha 1,950 ha 
Cassava 500 ha 0 ha n/a 
Banana 82 ha 0 ha 50 ha 
Pumpkin 191 ha 0 ha n/a 
Watermelon 80 ha 0 ha 380 ha 
Maize 10 ha 659 ha 180 ha 
Sesame 120 ha 60 ha n/a 
Peanut 30 ha 10 n/a 
Sources: i) Sing DAFO agricultural extension official, interviews, 23 June 2010 
  ii) Nalae DAFO official, interviews, 29 August 2010 iii) Long DAFO (no date) 
The major cause of poverty is limited access to agricultural land, which is by no means 
exceptional for Luang Namtha. Chamberlain (2007: 38) observes that limited access to land 
for rice cultivation is the major problem facing poor villages in the northern region. He also 
notes that in upland areas, poverty (rice insufficiency) was also prevalent because upland 
populations were encouraged or forced to reduce or abandon shifting cultivation when no 
alternative paddy land was available to them. For over a decade, the government and 
development agencies (such as the GTZ and the ACF) have attempted to link Luang 
Namtha’s rural populations into the market by promoting agricultural commodity 
production. However, their attempts have not been very successful, mainly because there 
is an absence of land in easily accessible areas. Thus these crops are more prevalent in the 
valley of Sing district than in the mountains of Long or Nalae districts (see Table 5.2).  
In the early 2000s, while the government and development agencies may not have been 
successful in bringing agricultural commodity production to Luang Namtha’s population, 
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especially those who live in the uplands, rubber emerged as a new alternative crop, being 
attractive not only to villagers but also to the government as a new means of resolving 
problems in the uplands, namely shifting cultivation, opium production, and poverty. Cohen 
(2009: 427) notes the rapid expansion of rubber in the northern part of the Lao PDR after 
2003 and writes of “the urgent need by both former opium growers and the GoL for a 
substitute cash crop for opium, the expanding market for rubber and high prices, declining 
rubber production in China, the investment impetus from China’s own opium-replacement 
policy, and the universal appeal of rubber as an ideal ‘modern’ crop”. 
5.2.1 Rubber in Luang Namtha 
In the mid-2000s, the governor of Luang Namtha province set rubber as a priority crop to 
substitute for shifting cultivation and to reduce poverty. The provincial governor 
encouraged households who did not have a paddy field to set up at least one hectare of 
rubber plantation57. The deputy head of the Luang Namtha PAFO explained to me that the 
provincial government hopes that the income generated from rubber trees will help to 
remove Luang Namtha’s three districts (Long, Nalae, and Vieng Phoukha) from the list of 
the country’s 47 poorest districts. The provincial government is attempting to do this not by 
granting concessions to investors, but through promoting a contract relation system 
(interview, 24 September 2009). However, as permission can be granted at different levels 
of state authority (provincial or national), some investors have managed to sidestep this 
provincial policy by obtaining permission at the national level to establish plantations under 
a concession or take a concession-like form. There is diversity within the Lao state, as we 
will see in Chapter 6, permitting the persistence of various forms of rubber investment even 
when the provincial government may not be favourably disposed to the system in question. 
Currently, four forms of rubber plantations are found in Luang Namtha: (i) smallholder 
investment; (ii) the 1+4 model of contract farming; (iii) the 2+3 model of contract farming; 
and (iv) the concession model. Manivong and colleagues (2003: 3) record that in 2003 the 
province’s total planted area of rubber was only 985 hectares and the government was 
aiming to increase the planted area to 10,000 hectares by 2010. In 2008, the Luang Namtha 
government announced that it would stop promoting further rubber planting until socio-
                                                          
57
 There is a confusing perception among the state’s officials about this policy; some officials refer to 
this policy as one household one hectare while others, for example the deputy head of the Sing PI 
(interview, 22 June 2010), refer to it as one labourer one hectare. 
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economic and environmental assessments had been undertaken. However, by that time 
around 21,000 hectares of rubber had already been planted (Hicks et al. 2009: 23). The 
rubber planted area has now far exceeded the government’s plan; more than 30,000 
hectares of land are now planted to rubber (see Figure 5. 2 and Table 5.3), giving Luang 
Namtha the largest area of rubber in the country. 
Figure 5.2 Luang Namtha’s rubber planted areas, 1994-2009 
 
Sources: Data for 1994–2006 are based on Shi (2008: 13); data for 2008 are based on Hicks et al 
(2009: 23) and data for 2009 are based on interviews with the deputy head of the Luang Namtha 
PAFO and Luang Namtha PAFO’s forestry official (interviews, 24 September 2009) 
Table 5.3 Status of rubber plantations in Luang Namtha, 2009 
Investment form Granted areas (hectares) Planted areas (hectares) 
2+3 contract farming  31,590 8,491 
1+4 contract farming  5,949 3,606 
Concessions  12,161 11,907 
Smallholder investment  - 7,000 
Total 49,700 31,004 
Source: Based on interviews with the Luang Namtha PAFO’s deputy head and the Luang Namtha 
PAFO forestry official (interview, 24 September 2009) 
In sum, Luang Namtha is a mountainous province at the edge of the country which is not 
yet well-connected to the country’s capital city. However, its geographical location allows it 
increasingly, both spatially and economically, to be connected to China, a rising world 
power. This particular characteristic of Luang Namtha thus provides the context for an 
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exploration of how the market infiltrates and operates on the frontiers of a country where 
capitalist development has only recently made an impression. It also provides the context 
for the collection of empirical evidence to understand recent transformations in rural 
spaces which have not been fully incorporated into the ambit of the state. The following 
section looks more closely at the four upland communities chosen as research sites for this 
study.  
5.3 Research communities 
This research is based on fieldwork conducted in four upland communities in three districts 
of Luang Namtha (see Map 5.1). Three of the villages are located in districts classified as 
among the country’s 47 poorest (Baan Don Tha in Nalae district, and Baan Kaem Khong and 
Baan Pha Lad in Long district). Only Baan Houay Luang Mai is situated in a district not 
among the country’s 47 poorest. All three districts, however, share similarities in the 
predominance of mountainous areas and the diversity of their populations. The geography 
of each district has influenced the degree of spatial and market integration, providing a 
valuable context for comparison of how the rubber boom has transformed upland spaces 
and upland livelihoods under conditions of economic and spatial integration (these issues 
will be returned to in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). An overview of the three districts is 
summarised in Appendix 4, providing a background to understanding the particular 
contexts of the four study communities discussed in the following section.  
5.3.1 Overview of the research communities: people and places 
The fieldwork was carried out in four upland communities. All of the study villages are 
resettlement villages58 where people have been relocated from their previous villages in 
the mountainous areas between the late-1990s and early 2000s. There is only one village - 
Houay Luang Mai in Sing district - where the first group of settlers moved to the current 
village’s location in the mid-1980s. Table 5.4 provides a summary of the study villages in 
terms of their settlement, populations, and accessibility to the district’s town and provincial 
centre.  
                                                          
58
 A resettlement village is a village which has been recently settled by people who have relocated 
from their original village, usually in a mountainous area, to a new settlement in the lowlands or 
valley sides close to road access, and easily connected to the district town. The majority of such 
resettlement villages in the Lao PDR are an outcome government policy. 
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Table 5.4 Summary of the study villages 
 Kaem Khong  
(Long district) 
Pha Lad 
(Long district) 
Don Tha 
(Nalae district) 
Houay Luang Mai 
(Sing district) 
Year of settlement - 1998: settlement of 
Lahu villagers 
- 2003: settlement of Kui 
villagers  
- 1999: 11 households 
first settled 
 
-1989: settlement of four 
households  
-mid-1990s-2003: 
settlement under the 
GoL’s  relocation and 
consolidation 
programme 
-1985: voluntary  
settlement 
- 1990s to early 2000s: 
settlement under the 
GoL’s resettlement 
programme 
Ethnic components Kui and Lahu Akha Khmu Akha 
Households 35 households 
(17 Lahu and 18 Kui 
households) 
73 households 37 households 61 households 
Distance to the district 
centre 
32 kilometres 4 kilometres 2 kilometres 7 kilometres 
Time travelling by car to 
the district centre 
1 hour 10 minutes 5 minutes 10 minutes 
Distance to the 
provincial centre 
141 kilometres 105 kilometres 80 kilometres 67 kilometres 
Time travelling by car to 
the provincial centre 
3.5 hours 2.5 hours 2 hours 1.5 hour 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009–2010 
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Kaem Khong village (see Picture 5.2), which, in 2010, was home to 18 Kui households and 
17 Lahu households with 192 inhabitants in total, lies on the left bank of the Mekong River - 
the river which demarcates the border between the northern Lao PDR and Burma. The 
village is about 13 kilometres upriver from Xiengkok (see Map 5.1). It is also located just 
opposite Xienglap, a large Lue village in Burma’s territory, which can be accessed only by 
taking a boat across the Mekong. Kaem Khong is one of three small hamlets located in this 
border area; there is another Lahu village located about one kilometre downstream from 
Kaem Khong and another Kui village about one kilometre upriver from Kaem Khong. The 
village is bordered by the river on one side and the mountain range on the other. There is 
only a small area of land considered as ‘flat’ land (approximately 29 hectares) on the 
western side of the village, which was supposed to be cleared for paddy fields. However, 
water supply for this piece of land is not yet developed and, thus, it has never been used for 
paddies. Some villagers used this land to grow dry-rice or corn while others just left it idle. 
This land is now used by a Chinese rubber company as the company’s rubber nursery (this 
issue will be discussed in Chapter 6). This mountainous area on the northern side of the 
village is used by villagers as their primary livelihood resource (collecting forest products or 
practicing shifting agriculture).  
Picture 5.2 Baan Kaem Khong, 2010 
Source: Fieldwork, 2010 
Driving about an hour from Kaem Khong on road R 17B and passing the small town of Long 
and a few villages, the road arrives at the second study village, Baan Pha Lad (Picture 5.3). 
This is a resettlement community of Akha people located about four kilometres to the 
north-east of the town of Long. Eleven Akha households settled here on the hillside along 
route R 17B in 1999. The village then expanded when new households relocated to the area 
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in the early 2000s. In 2010, there were 75 Akha households living in this village with an 
average household size of six. Since the R 17B was improved in the mid-2000s, the village 
has been connected year round to both Long and Sing towns, the latter of which is located 
about fifty-three kilometres to the north-east. Unlike Kaem Khong, where there is no flat 
land available, Pha Lad has a compact area of flat land which has recently been cleared for 
wet-rice cultivation. The village headman notes that around two-thirds of the households 
access paddy, which averages around 3,000-4,000 square metres per household (interview, 
3 February 2010). Walking to the northern side of the village, there is a mountain range 
which villagers use for shifting cultivation and collecting NTFPs.  
Picture 5.3 Baan Pha Lad, 2010 
Source: Fieldwork, 2010 
Route R 17B connects to R 17A, through the main town of Sing district to the third study 
village, Baan Houay Luang Mai (Picture 5.4). This Akha village in 2010 was home to 330 
residents in 61 households. The village is located on the edge of the Sing valley, about 
seven kilometres east of Sing town. It is the only study village to have a well-paved road 
connecting it with Sing town. The village is also easily accessible to the Pang Thong Lao-
Chinese border checkpoint which is about five kilometres from the village. Houay Luang 
Mai is surrounded by a flat area to the west, which is now used for paddy-rice fields and 
sugarcane plantations, and a range of mountains to the east. The village can access quite 
large areas of flat land compared to Baan Pha Lad in Long district. This allows four-fifths of 
the households to be able to access paddy fields with an average of 0.5 hectare per 
household (interview, village committees, 26 December 2009). The uplands surrounding 
the village vary. The gently sloping hills on the northern side of the village are used for 
growing dry rice and some commercial crops, with two hectares reserved as the village’s 
sacred forest. The range of mountains to the south-east of the village are reserved as a 
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protected area to ensure that Houay Luang Mai and the surrounding areas can benefit from 
a stream that runs through this land. To the east and north-east of the village the mountain 
slopes are steeper and the land is used for shifting cultivation by villagers who cannot 
access paddy or who cannot rely solely on wet-rice cultivation.  
Picture 5.4 Baan Houay Luang Mai, 2009 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009 
In Nalae district, two kilometres along the dirt road to the south of the town is the fourth 
study settlement, Baan Don Tha (Picture 5.5). The village is home to around 250 Khmu 
residents in 37 households. The village is located alongside the dirt road which links the 
district town to several villages in the southern areas of Nalae and Pha Udom district of 
Bokeo province. Travelling to the district centre is easy for villagers, taking only five minutes 
by motorbike or around 15-20 minutes on foot. Travelling to the provincial centre, 
however, is far more difficult and costly. The distance from the village to the provincial 
centre is about 80 kilometres but it takes around two hours by car or three hours or more 
by bus due to the circuitous road, which follows the mountain slopes. This ‘all season road’ 
may take up to four hours from the town of Nalae to Luangnamtha, the provincial centre. 
Due to the limited availability of flat land in Nalae (see Table 5.2 and Appendix 4), villagers 
cannot access agricultural land in the surrounding area. Small patches of flat land near the 
village have already been occupied by lowlanders who have long lived in the area, even 
before the settlement of Don Tha’s villagers. 
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Picture 5.5 Baan Don Tha, 2009 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009 
Looking at the four study villages in terms of their geographical location, Kaem Khong (in 
Long district) and Don Tha (in Nalae district) are located in areas that are not easily 
accessible compared to Houay Luang Mai (in Sing district) and Pha Lad (in Long district). The 
geography of these upland communities is also quite different. Villagers from Baan Kaem 
Khong and Baan Don Tha settled in areas where flat land is limited. In contrast, villagers 
from Baan Houay Laung Mai and Baan Pha Lad had access to flat land allowing them to 
clear new paddy fields. These differences in geographical locations and conditions of each 
village have influenced the way in which villagers make their living and the degree to which 
they have been involved with both the state and the market.  
5.3.2 The state and the upland communities 
This section explores relations between the Lao state and the upland communities by 
looking through the ‘lens’ of two major policies implemented by the Lao government: the 
resettlement programme and the Land Use Planning and Land Allocation Programme 
(LUP/LA).  
5.3.2.1 Resettlement programme  
In the Lao PDR, resettlement of the population from mountainous and/or remote areas is 
not a new phenomenon; resettlement was common-place during the war (in the 1960s and 
1970s). After the victory of the LPRP in 1975, some upland and highland populations who 
lived in sensitive areas were relocated into ‘safe’ areas to prevent them providing any 
support to the Royalist movement. The new internal resettlement programme was 
  
150 
 
implemented again between the mid-1990s and early 2000s. While security was regarded 
as one of the objectives of the policies, bringing people to development was claimed to be 
the most significant aim of this ‘new’ resettlement programme (see page 137-138). The 
resettlement programme was introduced throughout the country although the 
implementation has been varied in each area. In Luang Namtha province, where the 
mountains have been home to many ethnic groups, the programme was introduced in the 
late 1990s and continued until the early 2000s. The programme not only resulted in a 
decline in the number of villages in the uplands but also led to an unplanned and 
unexpectedly large migration of those people who used to live in the mountainous areas 
(Evrard and Goudineau 2004). All of the villages presented in this research are resettlement 
villages (see Table 5.5 for different waves of resettlement in the study villages). 
Table 5.5 Year of settlement in the study villages 
 Kaem Khong Pha Lad Don Tha Houay Luang 
Mai 
Year of first 
settlement 
1998 
(Coercive) 
1999 
(Coercive) 
1989 
(Coercive) 
1985 
(Voluntary and 
later coercive) 
Year of massive 
coercive 
resettlement  
1998 and 2003 2000 2001-2003 1997 
Year of last 
settlement 
2003 2004 2004 2007 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009-2010 
The four study villages are best considered as the production of the state’s intervention in 
the uplands rather than the creation of ‘natural’ processes resulting in a ‘traditional’ village. 
The village as the outcome of the state’s intervention in the mountainous areas is most 
apparent in the case of the settlement of Baan Don Tha (in Nalae district), Baan Kaem 
Khong and Baan Pha Lad (in Long district), where the villagers were ‘convinced’ to relocate 
to their current location. The settlement of Baan Houay Luang Mai (in Sing district) was 
slightly different from the other three study villages. The village was settled in 1985 by 24 
households who had cleared paddy fields in the area surrounding the current village 
(interview, Ar-Sha, a 55-year-old man, 23 December 2009). This group of villagers decided 
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to move from their previous village in the highlands in order to live close to their paddy 
fields and to the road. Ar-Ju, a 46-year-old Akha man who moved to Houay Luang Mai in 
1985 noted that his family had cleared paddy in the late 1970s in this area and the family 
had relied more on rice produced in the paddy fields than rice produced through shifting 
cultivation for a few years before the relocation. Before moving, the family had to spend 
more than a month carrying rice from their paddy fields to their home in the hills. Thus the 
family decided to move down to the site of Houay Luang Mai (interview, 25 December 
2009). However, by the time they moved, nine households had paddy fields, of which only 
two could produce sufficient rice from the paddies to meet their needs. For those who had 
not yet cleared land, they hoped that settlement in this area would give them access to 
both the road and to flat land, which they could then use for wet-rice cultivation. Ar-Sha 
was one of the villagers who did not have a paddy when he first settled in the village in 
1985, and at this time the family began clearing flat land for paddy as well as continuing to 
practice shifting cultivation. The combination of the two systems continued until 1992, 
which was the first year Ar-Sha produced sufficient rice from his paddy field to meet his 
family’s needs (interview, Ar-Sha, a 55-year-old man, 23 December 2009). 
The situation for villagers who migrated because of the government’s policies is quite 
complex. Coercive resettlement in all the study villages from the late 1990s to the early 
2000s was embedded in the discourse of developmentalism. While bringing development 
into the areas where ethnic populations lived has been a stated significant task of the GoL 
since the 1970s, the government has had very limited capacity to bring development to 
people living in the remote mountains. It became clear that people needed to be moved 
down from the hills in order to gain access to ‘development’ (Evrard and Goudineau 2004: 
944). While directly forced (or coerced) resettlement did not explicitly occur, the state-
induced resettlement in all the four study villages could be considered as indirectly forced 
(coerced) resettlement. This occurred through several sets of government policies. Some of 
these policies caused difficulties for villagers as they sought to make their living in the high 
mountains, especially policies directed at stabilising shifting cultivation and the massive 
campaigns on opium eradication (see Cohen 2000). Some policies aimed at convincing 
villagers to move down from the hills by highlighting the improvements that would result in 
their quality of life. The promises were considered as a guarantee by the government to the 
mountain peoples, who were afraid that their lives would get tougher if they did not move 
down from the hills. Ja Kae, a 39-year-old Lahu man from Kaem Khong village, said that his 
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family and other Lahu households, who originally lived in a village located on the left side of 
the Mekong (around eight kilometres upstream from the current setting) were encouraged 
by officials to relocate with claims that in this way they would access ‘development’. 
“We were told that the government wanted to improve our living conditions 
but they could not bring a road, school, water supply, or a doctor into our old 
village. They said we needed to move down to the flat area to be able to access 
these services. We were promised that the government would provide paddy 
for us if we moved to the lowlands. We moved because we wanted paddy but 
when we arrived, no paddy was available.” (Interview, Ja Kae, 9 March 2010)  
Limited availability of agricultural land in the resettlement areas was the main problem that 
most of the relocated villages faced. In Kaem Khong village, villagers could access forestland 
to practice shifting agriculture. In Pha Lad village, only villagers who moved to the village 
early were able to seize flat land, while those who moved later, especially from 2002 
onwards, could not access flat land to clear paddies. Thanks to the forest land surrounding 
the settlement, villagers could make a living from collecting NTFPs and shifting cultivation. 
In Nalae, one DAFO official admitted that the government could not provide agricultural 
land for relocated villagers (interview, forestry official, 5 December 2009). This resulted in 
the return of Don Tha’s villagers to use land in areas they had just moved from. This 
inability to provide agricultural land to relocated villagers was one of the justifications of 
the state authorities in Nalae district for being more flexible in implementing the 
resettlement programme. One DAFO intern noted that the resettlement policy was de facto 
ignored as the government could not provide land for resettled villagers. Thus some upland 
villages still exist in the hills (interview, 3 December 2009). 
The situation at Houay Luang Mai was quite different. Some villagers had cleared paddies in 
Houay Luang Mai area while they were at Houay Luang Kao, the old village in the highlands. 
When they relocated to Houay Luang Mai with the encouragement of the government, they 
were thus able to access paddy fields. The villagers who could not access paddy were those 
who relied on shifting agriculture when they were in the old hamlet.  
The resettlement programme has inevitably affected the livelihoods of resettled villagers in 
all the study villages. A common theme is that the state and development agencies were 
rarely able to keep their promises. Romagny and Daviau (2003: 3) note that local 
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authorities in Long district conceded that the government did not have the capacity to 
manage the massive resettlement initiated by the state’s policy. For many relocated 
villagers, moving into the new setting became a nightmare. A 50-year-old Akha man from 
Houay Luang Mai noted that in the early years of relocation almost every household lost 
some of its members from disease. His family lost four members in the first year of 
resettlement (interview, 24 December 2009).  
The resettlement experiences of villagers in the study villages contribute to understanding 
the resettlement programme in the Lao PDR and relations between the state and villagers 
in remote areas. Some scholars who work on resettlement state that the implementation of 
this policy involved coercive practices and was far from voluntary (Evrard and Goudineau 
2004; Baird and Shoemaker 2005; Baird et al. 2009). The experiences of resettlement in the 
four study villages is no exception as only the early movement of Houay Luang Mai’s 
villagers can be considered as voluntary. However, it is important to note that the ‘coercive’ 
resettlement programme in the study villages was not driven by the direct exercise of the 
state’s power; it was propelled through the introduction of the state’s policies making 
villagers ‘choose’ to relocate to the lowlands with the hope that they could build a better 
life from the ‘development’ that the state and development agencies promised they would 
be provided with. These promises from the state – even though they eventually often 
proved to be false - stimulated mountain peoples to move into the state’s space where they 
came to be governed by the state at a higher and more intensive level than previously.  
5.3.2.2 The Land Use Planning and Land Allocation Programme 
The Land Use Planning and Land Allocation Programme (LUP/LA) was first introduced in the 
mid-1990s under the name of the Land and Forest Allocation Programme. The programme, 
which was initially called ‘baeng din baeng pa’, literally meaning to divide and distinguish 
land and forest, is now officially referred to as ‘mob din mob pa’ meaning to give land and 
forest. The programme, while it recognises the right of villagers to manage and access the 
forest and forestland, also makes it quite clear that the forest and land belong to the state. 
The expression of one of Sing’s DAFO officials that villagers appreciated him because he 
“mob din mob pa”, meaning gave land and forestland to the villagers, reflects how the state 
views the land and forest. Forest and forestland which were originally an ‘open’ access 
resource for villagers have become restricted by this policy, which involves zoning and 
mapping of the village’s boundaries and categorising of land and forestland within the 
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boundaries of the village (see Picture 5.6 for an example of a LUP/LA map). Table 5.6 
provides a summary of the implementation of the programme in the study villages. 
Table 5.6 Forestlands classified by the LUP/LA programme in each study village 
 Houay Luang Mai Don Tha Pha Lad Kaem Khong
59
 
Year LUP/LA  
carried out 
1998 2001 Early 2000s Early 2000s 
Conservation 
forest  
9 ha (3.0%) 214 ha (including 
protection forest) 
159.5 ha (10.9%) 1,068 ha (24.8%) 
Protection forest 100 ha (33.4%) 214 ha (including 
conservation 
forest) 
142.3 ha (9.8%) 525 ha (12.2%) 
Production forest 55 ha (18.4%) 12 ha 286 ha (19.6%) 115 ha (2.7%) 
Regeneration 
forest 
25 ha (8.4%) N/A 251.5 ha (17.3%) 210 ha (4.9) 
Sacred forest  4 ha (1.3%) N/A 5 ha (0.3 %) 3.5 ha (0.1%) 
Agricultural use 
zone  
106 ha (35.5%) 266 ha 613 ha (42.1 %) 2,382 ha (55.3%) 
total 299 ha (100%) N/A 1,457.3 ha 
(100%) 
4,303.5 (100%) 
Sources: Data of Houay Luang Mai village are based on the LUP/LA map and data provided by Sing 
DAFO; Data of Pha Lad and Kaem Khong village are extracted from the LUP/LA map of each village 
provided by the Long DAFO. Baan Don Tha’s data are based on Kallanbinsk and Lundgreen’s report 
(2005: 163) 
 
Picture 5.6 An example of a LUP/LA map in a village in Sing district, 2010 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009 
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 Three small villages were included in this LUP/LA programme. As there were only a few villages in 
this area, the forestland being classified as agricultural land was very high, compared to the other 
three study villages.  
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The LUP/LA programme makes a distinction between forestland and farmland, including 
both lowland paddy fields and upland areas which are farmed on a permanent basis. 
Forestland is classified into conservation forest, protection forest, production forest, 
regenerated forest, and degraded forest (see section 4.3.2.2). There has been a rapid 
decrease in every village in the forestland that villagers can use for their upland agriculture 
(see Table 5.6). In all villages, around 50 per cent of forestland that villagers formerly used 
for conducting shifting cultivation are banned for all kinds of agriculture. This unforeseen 
decline in forestland for agriculture affected upland agricultural practices but to different 
degrees in each village. Lahu and Kui people from Baan Kaem Khong mentioned that the 
programme had not affected them deeply because there was plenty of forestland classified 
as agricultural land. Even though the agricultural land displayed on the LUP/LA map had to 
be shared with two other small hamlets, the total area of land and forestland in this area 
was still abundant.  
At Houay Luang Mai village, there were only 106 hectares of forestland permitted for 
upland cultivation, which meant that each household had access to only 2-3 hectares for 
their upland agricultural activities. If villagers’ rice production relied only on upland 
cultivation, this small allocated area would no doubt end up leading to a rapid decline in 
land fertility and upland rice production and thus in widespread rice shortages. However, 
Houay Luang Mai’s villagers had begun to clear paddies from the late 1970s. At the time 
that the LUP/LA was carried out in the village, most villagers could get enough rice or even 
produced a rice surplus from their paddies and most villagers had already stopped shifting 
cultivation. The implementation of the programme thus did not really lead to the use of 
forestland as agricultural fields. Except for the forestlands that were permanently used as 
small gardens producing corn, sesame, peanuts, and vegetables, most of the allocated 
forestland was left idle, to be regenerated.  
According to Long DAFO officials, the LUP/LA programme was implemented in Pha Lad in 
the early 2000s but when talking to villagers about this programme, it became apparent 
most did not realise that the project was being carried out in their village. Only a few village 
leaders knew about the programme. However, some villagers recalled that they were told 
by DAFO officials to stop pioneer shifting cultivation, to practice upland dry-rice cultivation 
on certain plots, and not to clear new fields every year. Villagers found that they were 
forbidden to clear some parts of the forest in the southern portion of the village’s land 
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which had been demarcated as protection forest. Some forest near to the village was 
classified as conservation forest which also prohibited agricultural activities. Villagers, 
however, were not forced to use the land and forestland as informed by DAFO officials. In 
fact, access to the forest and farm land was an outcome of discussion and negotiation 
between villagers.  
Overall, implementation of the LUP/LA programme has had an impact on villagers in all the 
study villages, but to varying degrees. The programme has removed authority for accessing 
and managing forest resources from villagers, and given it to the state. Forest and 
forestland which once were not ‘legible’ to the state have become more ‘legible’ and 
accessible to the state to control and manage. However, the experience of the LUP/LA 
programme in the study villages also points to significant variations in the state’s practices 
in implementing its policy in different areas. This leaves some room for villagers to 
negotiate in terms of accessing resources so that they can survive in the new settings. 
5.3.3 The market in the uplands 
While growing sufficient dry rice for subsistence is an essential economic activity, uplanders 
have also long been involved in the market (Hill 1998; Walker 2004). In the four study 
villages, though the level of market interaction was not intense, villagers have never relied 
solely on subsistence. The most significant crop produced in the mountainous areas of the 
Lao PDR in the past was opium. Villagers from all the study villages mentioned that they 
had been involved in growing, consuming, and trading opium. Cohen (2000: 180) records 
that opium was the main cash crop for the Akha in Sing district60. This was also the case for 
many Akha from Pha Lad village who said that opium was, in the past, the most significant 
source of wealth for villagers. A 41-year-old Akha man said that his family planted around 
one hectare of opium poppies, producing between two and three kilogrammes of opium. 
As none of the family’s members was addicted to opium, all of the opium production was 
sold. He noted that selling only one kilogramme of opium could generate sufficient cash to 
buy rice for the whole year (interview, 5 February 2010).  
                                                          
60
 It is worth noting that the quantity that opium that Akha could produce was not high and it was 
sometimes even less than the demand from family’s members for many Akha households (Cohen 
2000: 180). 
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Villagers were also involved in the market through the trade in forest products. Villagers 
from Don Tha remember that they used to carry NTFPs and surplus rice to Boten, a small 
town located near the Lao-Chinese border to the north-east of Luangnamtha, exchanging 
their goods for salt. Villagers from all the study villages recorded that there were plenty of 
forest products in the areas where they used to live, before they were relocated. After the 
end of the war in 1975, villagers recalled being visited by traders - some were lowland Lao 
from Luang Namtha or Bokeo while others were Chinese traders - who came to buy forest 
products from villagers. Thus, mountain dwellers have long been involved in the market 
although the level of intensity was not as high as those living in the lowlands.  
Market engagement by upland populations has recently intensified as agricultural 
commodities have been produced from the 1990s. There is still, however, a significant 
difference in levels of market involvement of villagers from the four study villages. Both 
state and development agencies have long attempted to promote commercial crops for the 
upland populations. But this has never been easy. In the study villages, the geographical 
setting of each village, which determines the degrees of market accessibility, is the most 
significant condition determining the success or failure of cash crop promotion. As China 
has become the major market for the agricultural commodities produced in Luang Namtha, 
villages that are located close to the Lao-Chinese border have become more intensely 
engaged in the production of agricultural commodities. Villages far away from the border 
crossing and difficult to access can easily be left behind. 
Among the four study villages, Houay Luang Mai was the village involved in the market to 
the highest degree due to its location which is only about five kilometres from the border 
crossing point (see Map 5.1). The village has been encouraged to plant cash crops (maize, 
sesame, peanut, and sugarcane) for the Chinese market since the 1990s. From the early 
2000s, sugarcane became an important source of income for villagers. Some villagers have 
even turned some of their paddies over to sugarcane.  
Pha Lad village which is about 65 kilometres from the border ranks number two in terms of 
the value of cash crop production. This village is increasingly involved in producing cash 
crops for the Chinese market though their quantity and value are some way behind those 
produced by Houay Luang Mai’s villagers. In 2009, a few households grew corn using their 
own investment; the crop was sold to Chinese traders. Six households grew passion fruit 
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under a contract system with a Chinese investor. Around ten households had sugarcane 
plantations. 
Don Tha and Kaem Khong are the two study villages where the degree of market 
involvement was the lightest. Neither village was easily accessible; in order to get to the 
two villages, an investor and a trader had to drive on steep and narrow roads. Thus the cost 
of transporting commodities from the villages to the market in China was comparatively 
high61. Both state and development agencies in Nalae and Long districts have attempted to 
convince investors to promote commercial crops but the location of the two villages 
remains an obstacle. Long DAFO did convince one investor to promote corn in Kaem Khong, 
but the cost of transportation was high and the quantity of crop produced was not 
sufficiently large to make it profitable for the investor. Thus, corn was promoted for only 
one agricultural season. The situation in Don Tha was better than Kaem Khong as villagers 
were supported by the Friends of the Upland Farmers Company (FUF) to grow commercial 
crops under a contract system in the early 2000s. Villagers grew corn, sesame, and peanut 
for the company but, again, the quantities of these crops were not large due to the limited 
availability of land.  
Overall, the four study villages have long been involved in the market. In the past, they 
were involved in the market through opium production and NTFPs. From the 1990s, they 
have been part of the market as producers of agricultural commodities. However, due to 
differences in the geographical location of each village, the level of market integration in 
each study village has varied. Villagers from all the study villages have recently been 
engaged in a new boom crop in the region - rubber. Rubber, while it took different paths in 
arriving in each study village, has become the commercial crop of choice, dominating 
agricultural areas of all the study villages. Villagers will soon become intensively engaged in 
the market at a rate and intensity which has never been seen before. Details on the arrival 
of rubber are discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
                                                          
61
 A study estimated that the average transport cost in the Lao PDR is 7.5 THB (£0.11) compared to 3. 
2 THB (£0.05) per kilometre in Thailand (NAFES 2006 cited in Fullbrook 2007: 51). 
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5.3.4 Livelihoods of the villages 
The dominant view of the economic system that characterises upland communities is that it 
is a subsistence system based on shifting agriculture. This view has been recently 
challenged as scholars have argued that the livelihoods of hill populations are no longer so 
intimately attached to a subsistence economy (see for example Walker 2001; Walker 2004; 
Rigg 2006a; Michaud and Forsyth 2010). This section brings evidence from the study 
villages to explore the livelihoods of the resettlement hill peoples - how the subsistence 
and non-subsistence activities are combined by the mountain populations in order to 
improve their lives. Figure 5.3 provides an overview of livelihood activities embraced by 
villagers in the study villages. 
According to Figure 5.3, only villagers from Houay Luang Mai and Pha Lad villages cultivated 
wet-rice. However, the role of paddies in the livelihoods of villagers in the two villages was 
slightly different; most of Houay Luang Mai’s villagers relied only on paddies while most 
villagers from Pha Lad village needed to combine paddy rice production with dry-rice 
cultivation to have sufficiency in rice. This difference is related to the history of the 
settlement and the geographies of the two villages (see section 5.3.2). 
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Figure 5.3 Percentage of surveyed households’ engagement in each livelihood activity, 
 2009 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009-2010 
Note: Other activities include trading and handicraft production. In the case of Houay Luang Mai, it 
also includes selling of NTFPs as they were sold in the Chinese market. 
In Baan Don Tha and Kaem Khong, none of the village households cultivated wet-rice as 
there was no flat land available for them to use for paddy production. Villagers from both 
villages thus had no choice but to grow upland dry-rice. In the case of Kaem Khong, while 
shifting cultivation was practiced by most of the households, some households decided not 
to continue in 2009 due to the rapidly shortening fallows resulting from the arrival of the 
Chinese rubber plantation (this will be discussed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8). In 2009 
villagers from this village were heavily reliant on wage labouring in the Chinese rubber 
plantations which became the most significant source of household income (see Figure 5.4). 
Villagers from the other three study villages were also involved in paid labouring work. 
However, apart from Kaem Khong’s villagers, a high percentage of villagers hiring out their 
labour was found only in Pha Lad. This was because the demand for labour to work in the 
rubber plantations of the Chinese companies in Long district was higher than in other areas 
(this issue will be returned to in Chapter 7). 
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Figure 5.4 Average annual income of surveyed households generated from each activity, 
2009  
         
Source: Fieldwork, 2009–2010 
Except for villagers from Baan Kaem Khong, the other three villages were all involved in the 
production of commercial crops. However, the number of households producing cash crops 
was significantly higher in Baan Houay Luang Mai because it is located close to the Lao-
Chinese border crossing point and is easily accessible. While the number of households 
growing cash crops in Baan Don Tha was quite significant (around 50 per cent), the quantity 
and production value were not great due to limited land for growing crops and difficulty in 
accessing the village. 
In all the study villages, the collection of NTFPs was a significant livelihood activity. The 
percentage of households which collected NTFPs was high in the villages of Don Tha, Pha 
Lad, and Kaem Khong. Villagers from Houay Luang Mai were intensively involved in trading; 
they took goods (NTFPs and garden produce) to sell in the markets in China and in so doing 
generated quite large amounts of cash. The location of their village close to the border 
allowed them easy access to the market in neighbouring China. Thus the amount they 
earned was significantly higher than for those villagers from Baan Don Tha who took their 
products to sell in Nalae’s morning market, where both the number of buyers and prices 
were significantly lower. Villagers from Baan Houay Luang Mai could earn cash from selling 
surplus rice and cash crops, especially sugarcane. This provided not only the cash for their 
basic needs but also opportunities to accumulate wealth (new investment) and for 
consumption. Recently villagers from Baan Kaem Khong have been able to earn significant 
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income from hiring out their labour to the Chinese rubber plantations. There were few 
other income earning activities however.  
In sum, a combination of subsistence and market-based livelihood activities was common in 
all of the study communities. Degrees of subsistence or market activities in each area 
varied. Levels of market involvement were not intense in some upland areas. Nonetheless, 
the livelihoods of populations from all the study sites highlight the point that the upland 
economy is not, and perhaps never has been, entirely subsistence in character. This was the 
case even before the arrival of rubber in the uplands.  
5.4 Summary 
This chapter has provided the background contexts of the four study villages. It began with 
an overview of the province of Luang Namtha giving a picture of recent changes in this 
mountainous province located at the frontiers of the Lao PDR, particularly with regard to its 
deepening connections, especially with China. The chapter then went on to outline the 
particular context of each of the study villages, showing how their geographical locations 
have shaped their engagement with the market and the Lao state. Attention was especially 
focused on the state’s resettlement programme and forestland management policies, 
which have inevitably affected the livelihoods of villagers. The chapter has shown that 
there has been an increase in the role of the Lao state in the lives and livelihoods of the 
upland populations. Levels of intervention are now at their most intense than at any time 
since reform took hold in the mid-1980s. The final section focused on the current livelihood 
activities of villagers, focusing on their involvement in both subsistence and commercial 
activities. This history of market engagement in the study villages also shows how the 
market is viewed by both the state and uplanders. This issue will be more throughly 
discussed in Chapter 8. The following chapter focuses on a theme which was introduced 
above but which forms the core of the thesis and therefore requires further elaboration, 
namely: the expansion of rubber into upland communities.  
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Chapter Six  
Rubber Expansion in the Frontiers of the Lao PDR 
6.1 Introduction 
While never isolated from the market and lowland influences (Walker 2001), it has been 
only recently that upland communities in the Lao PDR have been pulled into the market at 
an accelerated pace. Since the country adopted the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 
1986, the uplands’ links to the lowlands and the market have quickened, with a range of 
processes and development programmes such as an expanding road network, migration 
especially through resettlement and village consolidation, and the introduction of cash 
crops. Levels of uplanders’ market involvement have increased, either directly or indirectly, 
by this wide range of development processes. The degrees of market engagement among 
the upland communities studied as part of this project were, however, varied; while some 
upland communities were intensely involved in the market, others continued to be 
dominated largely by a semi-subsistence economy (see Chapter 5). A new wave of 
integration of upland communities into the market noticeably took place in the early 2000s, 
propelled by the rubber boom. There is no doubt that the rapid boom in rubber in the Lao 
PDR was a response to increasing demand and prices in the world market. Thus market 
integration in the Lao uplands clearly comes from ‘above’: through market forces 
articulated through the regional economy. However, the market is never the only actor in 
this process. This chapter aims to illuminate the process of integration of the uplands into 
the market by looking through the lens of the recent rapid expansion of rubber. This 
chapter seeks to clarify how external and internal processes, actors and structures have 
shaped agrarian situations at a village level. It also seeks to explore how upland populations 
respond to the arrival of the market, of which rubber is the concrete form. The chapter thus 
deals with the following questions: what outside agents and actors have shaped the 
processes of market integration in the hills of the Lao PDR? How have uplanders responded 
to these processes?  
The chapter begins with a consideration of the external processes and agencies which re-
shape the upland landscape. It looks at how the uplands have become increasingly 
connected to the market through these processes. The chapter then turns to explore how 
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upland populations view and respond to such recent and intense processes of market 
integration.  
6.2 Rubber expansion from ‘above’: the state-orchestrated 
rubber boom 
This section aims to illustrate the paths of market integration in the uplands of the Lao PDR 
through an examination of the expansion of rubber tree plantations. The section considers 
how external agents and agencies influence processes of agrarian change in the uplands of 
the Lao PDR. Though there is no doubt that the rapid expansion in the area planted to 
rubber in the uplands of the Lao PDR is a response to increasing global demand for rubber, 
rubber expansion has never been solely determined by market forces. The first section 
shows the combination of global market demand and the ‘will to improve’ (Li 2007) the 
uplands of the socialist Lao state and how these combine to drive agrarian changes in the 
Lao frontiers. This will be followed by a discussion of another more aggressive path of 
market integration in the uplands, reflecting relations between the Lao state, the market, 
and uplanders in agrarian processes in a region which has not yet been fully integrated into 
the global economy. 
6.2.1 Rubber expansion and the ‘will to improve’ 
This section begins with stories about the paths of rubber expansion in Don Tha village, 
highlighting the role of transnational capital and the Lao state at the local level (district and 
provincial) in the development of the market in the uplands.  
In early 2006, Khmu from Don Tha were called to gather at the house of the 
village’s headman. They were visited by a manager from the Xiang Jiao Rubber 
Company62, a rubber company from China, who was accompanied by the Nalae 
DAFO officials. The officials introduced the company and its project to promote 
rubber plantations under a 2+3 contract farming system. The officials declared 
that the company’s project had been agreed by the authorities and villagers 
were supposed to give ‘cooperation’ to the company’s project. To persuade 
villagers to participate in its project, the company showed a video and photos 
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of the lives of rubber farmers in Xishuangbanna prefecture in Yunnan Province, 
China. Rubber farmers’ new houses, new motorbikes, new TVs, new electric 
appliances, and many more were showed and it was said that all these items 
came from the profit that farmers had received from rubber plantations. 
Villagers were promised that they would have all these things if they planted 
rubber trees. 
A study tour in Xishuangbanna for the company’s target villages’ committees 
was organised. Four Khmu from Baan Don Tha joined the trip, which was very 
successful in inspiring villagers to join the company’s project. Stories about the 
well-being of rubber farmers in Xishuangbanna quickly spread. Later, a study 
tour was organised to a Hmong village in Namtha district which was viewed as 
a successful rubber planting village, for one member of each of Don Tha’s 
households. Similar stories about how rubber had brought better lives to 
Hmong farmers were repeated again and again. Villagers were strongly 
encouraged by government officials to participate in the project; they were 
told that joining the project would be the best way to make a living in the near 
future when shifting cultivation would not be allowed to continue after 201063. 
In the first year, the company persuaded almost 20 households to plant rubber 
trees with the company, covering areas of 12 ha. More households joined the 
company’s project in later years. Almost 40 ha of fallow land have been 
converted to rubber plantations under contract relations with the company. 
(Summarised from research diary based on fieldwork at Don Tha village  
and Nalae DAFO, September–December 2009) 
The above field notes summarise how rubber travelled to the upland communities in Nalae 
district. The ways that rubber arrived in Nalae highlights relations between the state, the 
market, and poor small farmers. Rubber expansion in Don Tha village, as well as in other 
upland communities in Nalae, shows the significant role of the local state as the mediator 
between the market and small farmers. In Nalae, a district which is classified as one of the 
47 poorest districts in the country, the state has long struggled to find a solution to poverty 
in the uplands (interview, Nalae district’s senior official, 30 August 2010). Various crops 
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have been introduced into Nalae, such as corn, sesame, peanut, cardamom, and cassava. 
However, these crops have had limited potential to lift Nalae’s population out of poverty. 
At the time that rubber was booming, the state was still looking for ways to improve the 
lives and livelihoods of its people. Rubber became the answer for resolving the uplands’ 
problems. It was shifted from the fifth priority to the first priority of Nalae DAFO’s strategic 
plan in 2004. The question was how poor uplanders in Nalae could be linked to and gain 
benefits from rubber. Nalae’s inhabitants had heard about rubber and the benefits it could 
reputedly bring for a while. However, large numbers of Nalae’s uplanders were unable to 
participate and benefit from the market to the same degree as people from some other 
parts of the province such as those from Sing or Namtha districts (see section 5.3.3). They 
did not have capital to set up plantations by themselves. The district’s geographical location 
and the difficulty of accessing the area by road makes Nalae less attractive for investment 
than other parts of the province (especially Sing or Long districts), which have seen a huge 
influx of investors seeking land either under a concession or a contract farming system. 
Promoting rubber under a contract farming system was thus considered the best tool for 
linking poor uplanders to the rubber boom (see section 5.2.1). Luang Namtha’s provincial 
government considers that it was its duty to bring at least one rubber investor to the 
district to promote rubber, expecting that this would generate cash for upland people in 
Nalae and, hopefully, remove the district from the list of the country’s poorest districts. 
With this encouragement, in 2006, the Xiang Jiao Rubber Company from China was 
permitted to promote rubber under a 2+3 contract farming system in an area of 2,000 
hectares in Nalae. The state not only granted permission to the company to establish 
rubber plantations under this system but also guided the company to villages where the 
project might be operated. It also acted to minimise the potential negative impact of the 
project on people. The state negotiated on behalf of the uplanders over conditions of the 
contracts as well as profit sharing between villagers and the company. The role of the state 
in linking Nalae’s uplanders to the rubber boom so that they might benefit highlights the 
state’s “will to improve” (Li 2007) its populations.  
The state played a crucial role in the operation of the Xiang Jiao Rubber Company’s rubber 
project; without the support from the state, the company could not have established its 
plantations as quickly as it did. The company, which employs two DAFO staff members full-
time, has worked closely with DAFO officials to extend rubber plantations. These two DAFO 
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officials have played a significant role in extending the area of rubber under the company’s 
control. One DAFO official who worked with the company in 2006 recalled that: 
“At first, the company did not take DAFO staff with them. It was difficult to get 
‘cooperation’ from villagers. This changed when the company was 
accompanied by DAFO staff. Villagers trust officials more than the company. It 
then became easier to convince villagers to participate in the project”  
(Interview, a Nalae DAFO official, 3 December 2009) 
The ‘cooperation’ villagers gave to the company’s project after the presence of the officials 
reflects relations between the market, villagers and state officials in the Lao PDR. The fact 
that villagers trust state officials more than the company staff members shows that the 
market could hardly operate in the Lao uplands without the facilitation of the state. While 
large numbers of uplanders wanted to plant rubber, they were hesitant to make deals with 
the Chinese rubber company. Their doubts were rooted in the experiences they had with a 
Chinese investor who encouraged villagers to plant cassava but did not go back to buy the 
produce when the cassava price went down. In order to convince villagers to participate in 
the company’s contract farming project, the company needed the state to establish trust 
with villagers64. Though the state may have had very limited success in bringing the state’s 
development projects to the uplands, villagers perceived that there was little room for 
people, especially uplanders, to object to the state’s projects. The presence of the state’s 
officials accompanying the company potentially led to (mis)understandings about the 
project. Some villagers understood that this was the state’s project and they had to join. 
This is a particular characteristic of relations between the Lao state and society. Thus when 
investors receive cooperation from the state, regardless of how they got it, their project 
would stand a much greater chance of success (this will be discussed in greater detail in 
section 6.2.2). None of Don Tha’s villagers said that they were forced to plant rubber trees 
for the company. A few villagers, however, recalled that they were at first hesitant of 
joining the project as they were unsure about the future of the rubber market. However, 
they finally decided to join the project mainly because they were told several times by 
DAFO officials that practicing upland shifting cultivation would not be allowed after 2010. 
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Local officials convinced them that to make a living, each household should have about one 
hectare of rubber plantation65. It is true that most villagers had a strong desire, which was 
inspired by stories of the success of rubber farmers in China, to set up rubber plantations 
(this will be discussed in section 6.3) but the motivation to convert their limited fallows to 
rubber also came from the increasing pressures which villagers faced from the 
government’s policies on forest conservation and upland shifting cultivation. 
Looking at market integration through the lens of rubber expansion into upland 
communities in Nalae district, reveals some particularities of the operation of the market in 
the Lao uplands, raising questions about the market/state distinction. At one level, it is 
scarcely surprising that the market has come to the uplands. However, the market did need 
the support of the state to gain access – to win the trust of local people. While the state 
facilitated the market and considered the market as a tool for building better lives for its 
populations, the state does not fully trust the market and thus does not let the market fully 
function without its involvement; the state acts to control and attempts to mitigate some of 
the negative effects of the market. This shapes the specific nature and character of the 
market in the Lao uplands.  
6.2.2 A brutal path of rubber expansion  
“You take my life when you do take the means whereby I live” 
William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act 4, Scene 1  
This section discusses another path of agrarian transformation occurring in the hills of the 
Lao PDR. The section begins with stories from Kaem Khong village where large areas of 
forest and fallow land have been replaced by large-scale rubber plantations belonging to a 
Chinese rubber company. This will be followed by a discussion of the role of the state and 
the relations between state agencies and transnational capital in a process of upland 
transformations. 
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 While the Deputy Head of Luang Namtha PAFO said that the Luang Namtha government 
recommends that villagers have one hectare of rubber trees per household, a senior official of Sing 
district Planning and Investment Office reported that the government promotes one hectare of 
plantation for every adult member of the household. This shows variation in officials’ perception of 
the government’s policy. 
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Stories from Kaem Khong village: 
In 2007, Kaem Khong’s villagers were visited by a manager and a few staff 
members from the Jundai Rubber Company who were accompanied by two 
members of the Army. Villagers were told that the company had got 
permission from the government to establish rubber plantations in remote 
areas of Xiengkok including in areas surrounding Kaem Khong village. Villagers 
claimed that the forest and land surrounding their village had been allocated 
to them by the Long DAFO since early 2003. They insisted that they did not 
want to give the land to the company. However, the company insisted that it 
had been granted permission from the military to use the land. Two men 
claiming to be soldiers even told villagers that they should give ‘cooperation’ to 
the company otherwise they would be put in jail. Giving ‘cooperation’ was 
equal to letting the company take their land. These two soldiers also claimed 
that the forest and fallow land which villagers used for their upland rice 
cultivation also belonged to the Lao state. According to the claims of the 
army’s officers, the state has full rights to take the land and give it to the 
rubber company or anyone else. The company then began to clear the land 
including the villagers’ fallow land. The company, which employed labourers 
from other areas, even cleared the villagers’ rice fields that were waiting to be 
harvested. Villagers went to see Long district’s DAFO officials, asking them to 
resolve the problem. DAFO officials, however, could not stop the company 
taking land from the villagers. The only way they could help was by attempting 
to negotiate with the company to leave at least some land for villagers to 
cultivate their upland rice. The company, however, still continued clearing the 
villagers’ land. One staff member of the Long DAFO estimated that at the end 
of 2009, the company had set up more than 10,000 hectares of rubber 
plantations. The company continued to expand its planted areas. In 2007, the 
company which, as always, was accompanied by the two men said to be from 
the Army at the provincial level, asked to use an area of flat land to set up the 
company’s rubber nursery. The company promised villagers that they would 
return this flat land to them within three years. This land was supposed to 
return back to the village in early 2010. However, at the end of 2010, the 
company had still not returned the land to the villagers. Many villagers worry 
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that they will not get their land back as the company has started planting 
rubber trees. Villagers these days find difficulty in accessing agricultural land. 
In 2009, only two years after the company had established their rubber 
plantation, around 10 households decided not to grow upland rice and instead 
sold their labour to the company to work on the rubber plantations and thus 
earn cash to buy rice.  
(Summarised from research diaries based on fieldwork in  
Kaem Khong village in January, February, March, and August 2010) 
This account from Kaem Khong village reflects another path of agrarian transformation in 
the uplands. Kaem Khong’s experience shows close links between the Chinese rubber 
company and some state agencies – the army in this case – in transforming the upland 
landscape which was once dominated mainly by subsistence-oriented shifting agriculture 
into a new landscape dominated by a permanent cash crop (rubber trees). Building a 
connection with the army, a privileged organisation in Lao society, is the most fruitful 
strategy, even more so than with other organisations of the Lao state, for the Jundai 
Rubber Company to be able to access a cheap resource (land) in the Lao frontiers for its 
accumulation. While the Luang Namtha governor may have had a policy of not granting 
investors permission to set up plantations under a concession form, this policy was not 
applied in the case of the Jundai Rubber Company. A Luang Namtha PAFO official, who did 
not want to be named, said that the deal between the company and the army in the 
borders of Long district was made without taking account of the views of other state 
agencies (interview, 24 September 2009).  
According to the company’s promotional map, the Jundai Rubber Company had been 
granted 300,000 hectares of military land along the Mekong River in the frontier areas of 
Long district, for setting up rubber plantations (Shi 2008: 16 table 2.1).The concession area 
which was said to be only on military land belonging to the Department of Defence covers 
more than the total area of Long district, and greatly exceeds the land which is actually 
under the control of the army. 
According to data from a senior official of Long DAFO (interview, 1 February 2010), an area 
of five km² along the border is supposed to be maintained as forest for national defence 
and security. But clear demarcation has never been made. Thus some upland villages which 
are located in the area might have never realised that they live on military land. Some 
  
171 
 
villages had moved, with the encouragement of state agencies, to settle on land claimed by 
the military. This was the case of villages along the Mekong River in Xiengkok whose 
populations were convinced by Long district authorities to relocate to their current area of 
residence. The army, until that time, had made no attempt to remove people from the land 
it claimed. In 2003, when some areas of the land claimed by the army were allocated as 
Baan Kaem Khong’s communal forest and forest land by Long DAFO under the LUP/PA 
programme, there was no objection from the army. The land became valuable to the army 
only when there was rapidly increasing demand for land by Chinese investors for rubber 
plantations. It was at this time that the army began to exert its claims not only to military 
land but also to land in contiguous areas which officially was not military land. The 
experience of Kaem Khong village is not unique; an Akha village in a remote corner of Sing 
district has also lost 200 hectares of their communal land to the Homeland Security Office 
(at a provincial level) who took their land before passing it on to the Chinese rubber 
company (Phanvilay 2010: 183). While some local state officials consider the military claims 
over Kaem Khong villagers’ land as illegitimate, they obviously did not want to get involved 
in the conflict. The privileged status of some state organisations, such as the military or the 
police, in Lao society (Evans 2002) allowed them to grab land from villagers with little, if 
any, objection from other state agencies. 
Looking at this path of rubber expansion, we can see close links between transnational 
capital (Chinese capital in the case of rubber expansion in the northern region) and some 
privileged state agencies (such as the Army, the Homeland Security Office in the above 
cases). Some NGO workers said that many concessions granted in the Lao PDR are carried 
out through the connections that investors have with state agencies or high-ranking 
officials (research diary, 13 September 2009). At the time that the demand for land for tree 
plantations, and especially for rubber trees, rapidly increased in the mid-2000s, there were 
no systematic policies and regulations pertaining to land lease and land concession. In 
practice, granting concessions to investors could be made at any level of the state. A senior 
official from the Department of Forestry, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, admitted 
that some land concessions were awarded without careful considerations of the benefits of 
the project for the Lao people and the Lao state. He also noted that many concessions were 
granted by state agencies at a local level (either district or provincial) without the approval 
of central government (interview, 11 September 2009). However, some concessions were 
also awarded at the national level without consideration of views and information from the 
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local level. When discussing large-scale concession projects with local officials, their fingers 
pointed upwards, to the higher levels of government. At the time that rubber boomed in 
the Lao PDR, the state lacked the mechanisms, tools and knowledge to deal with an array of 
eager investors in an appropriate and coherent way. Moreover, opinions regarding rubber 
investment, and concession in particular, diverged among state agencies. For example, 
while the National Land Management Authority (NLMA) expressed its concerns over the 
impacts and long-term profitability of rubber, the Committee for Planning and Investment 
(CPI) endorsed both rubber investment and land concessions (Laungaramsri 2012). The 
state at this point may be labelled a ‘disorganised state’. However, the ‘disorganised’ 
character of the state is far from being an obstacle for transnational capital to access land 
in the Lao PDR; rather the reverse. Investors are likely to gain more benefits from such a 
‘disorganised’ state as they can make connections to officials from various organisations 
(e.g. the Army, the Homeland Security Office, Agriculture and Forestry Office, and Planning 
and Investment Office) and at different levels (from district, to provincial, up to national 
levels). Through established connections with the state’s actors, land seekers were able to 
jump at the chance to obtain land. Martin Stuart-Fox summarises land grabbing in the Lao 
PDR as: “… simply a matter of greed. Officials are grabbing what they can. Companies need 
land and are prepared to pay well. It all goes under the table" (cited in MacKinnon 2008).  
As we will see in Chapter 7, plantation concessions have severely affected the lives and 
livelihoods of people when their forest resources and their farm land, both considerable 
and significant means of making a living, have been taken by rubber companies. However, 
this does not imply that there is no violence with rubber projects under the contract 
system. This can be found in the case of Pha Lad village, an Akha village in Long district.  
There is no concession plantation in Pha Lad village: only villagers’ investment and a 
contract system with the Kunming Rubber Company, a Chinese state-run rubber company 
based in Yunnan, China. The company has successfully taken 100 hectares of land from the 
village to set up its rubber plantation under a 1+4 contract farming system. According to 
this system, villagers contribute only one part (land) while the company is responsible for 
four parts (labour, capital, knowledge and technologies, and market access). The company 
looks after all the planted trees for the first three years before giving 30 per cent of the 
trees to villagers as a return for their contribution of land. Villagers have to look after these 
trees using their own budget and labour. It is unclear to villagers if they have to sell the 
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rubber latex to the company. Some villagers think that they have a right to sell latex to any 
buyer, while other villagers understand that they have to sell the latex back to the Kunming 
Rubber Company.  
Though the plantation system of the Kunming Rubber Company is called the 1+4 contract 
system, the way that the company deals with villagers is very close to a concession form. 
The Kunming Rubber Company successfully negotiated permission from the government in 
Vientiane to obtain large areas of land. Shi (2008: 16 table 2.1) records that the company 
has the right to access 166,667 hectares of land in four provinces (Luang Namtha, 
Udomxay, Bokeo, and Xaiyaboury) to establish rubber plantations. But the company’s 
executive stated that according to an agreement signed with the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry of the Lao PDR, the company has obtained permission to set up 33,333 
hectares of demonstration rubber plantations66 and to promote local people in the 
establishment of 133,333 hectares of plantations under a contract system in the four 
provinces (Yang 2008).  
Though the GoL has granted permission to establish plantations on a huge area of land, the 
GoL has not, or more accurately cannot, indicate where exactly the plantations should be 
set up. It is the company itself which has to seek available land. The Kunming Rubber 
Company visited Long District Administration Office showing an approved official letter 
from Vientiane, asking the district administrator to seek land for them. One DAFO official 
reported that this made local officials feel ill at ease as they did not know how they would 
find such a large area of land for the company. This same official noted that local officials 
were not directly involved in seeking land for the company:  
“What we did was only give an official letter from the district administration or 
DAFO to the company to show it to a village’s headman. The letter only 
informed the headman that the company’s projects had been approved by the 
government. We only asked villagers to consider if they could provide some 
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 A Lao official described a demonstration plantation as a planted area where the company sets up a 
training centre for local farmers to obtain the necessary knowledge and skills relevant to rubber tree 
cultivation. In practice, however, the demonstration plantation does not fulfil this task and it is, de 
facto, a form of concession. 
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cooperation with the company. We have never told villagers that they have to 
give land to the company if they do not wish to do so”  
(Interview, Long DAFO senior official, 10 February 2010) 
Villagers in Pha Lad village saw that local government did more than providing a letter of 
introduction for the company. An ex-headman of the village explained that when he was 
the village’s headman, he was called by the district administrator who advised that the 
village should allow the company to establish the plantation. He was told by the district 
governor that the rubber boom would lead to the arrival of outsiders seeking to buy land 
from villagers. This would result in the loss of village’s land to outsiders. With the ‘good 
intention’ to prevent land transfer and to keep land for villagers, the district governor 
advised the ex-headman to convince the villagers to allow the Kunming Rubber Company to 
use land in the village to set up the company’s rubber plantation. The village’s ex-headman 
was told that establishing a 1+4 contract farming relation with the company would prevent 
land transfer to outsiders as land still belongs to the village (interview, 3 February 2010). 
Villagers were then visited by the company, accompanied by local officials. The company 
asked for 100 hectares of land for its plantation. The village did not have any piece of 
communal land as large as 100 hectares. However, the company still insisted that it did not 
want many small pieces of land. Many villagers expressed the view that they did not want 
to give land to the company. Some villagers worried about the availability of land for their 
upland cultivation in the future. The villagers also wanted to keep land as an investment for 
themselves. Discussions and negotiations between the villagers and the company – the 
latter said to be backed by some local officials – lasted about a week.  
Many Pha Lad’s villagers, especially those who had come to settle in the area lately and 
could not access paddy fields, strongly resisted giving land to the company. However, there 
was little room for opposition. Kong, a young Akha man in his early 20s from a less poor 
household said that: “it had already been determined from ‘above’ and we could not 
oppose it” (interview, 4 February 2010). A female Akha in her late 30s from a poor 
household who has lost around three hectares of her fallows to the company remembered 
that the officials who came to the village also tried to persuade villagers to give land to the 
company. She said that “it was impossible not to give land to the company. The company 
had already made a deal with the district administration” (interview, 3 February 2010). An 
ex-headman admits that there were some villagers who did not want to let the company 
  
175 
 
set up a rubber plantation on the village’s land. He said that it was the village’s committees 
who had to visit and persuade villagers to allow the company to set up their plantation 
(interview, 3 February 2010). When I first met the village’s headman and committees in 
2010, they claimed that it had been an agreement of all members of the village to give the 
village’s communal land to the company. The village’s headman also insisted that there was 
no objection from villagers. But one villager provided an alternative viewpoint, stating that 
they were forced to give land to the company:  
“While we were sitting in the village discussing and refusing to add our 
signatures on the document that the company and the officials brought, the 
company began clearing forestland. We then realised that we had no choice 
but had to give land to the company – at least we got some trees. We then had 
to sign our name saying that we allowed the company to establish a plantation 
on our land. If we did not sign, we might get nothing.”  
(Interview, Mr Sha Bo, a 38-year-old Akha, Pha Lad, 9 February 2010) 
Villagers said that the land given to the company was not only the village’s conservation 
forest area but also the fallow land of individual village households. More than 50 per cent 
of the 31 surveyed households reported that they had lost some of their fallow land to the 
company. The company’s rubber plantation is under the 1+4 contract system with the 
village as a whole; this 100-hectare area of land was considered by the company and local 
officials as the village’s communal land. Thus no compensation was paid to households who 
had lost their fallow land. The company has already given 30 per cent of the benefits that 
the village should get under the contract. These trees have been allocated to all 
households. The number of rubber trees each household was allocated depended on the 
number of adult members who were still active at work. Most household were given 224 
rubber trees but the households where most of the members were children or elderly 
people only received 160 rubber trees. Thus, one household (HH 7) found that they only got 
160 trees for the loss of five ha of their fallow land, amounting to more than the fallow land 
the household had left to meet its needs (interview, Mr Nae, a young Akha man, 4 February 
2010). 
The rubber plantation under the contract system in this village is thus very close to the 
concession pattern. The only difference is that instead of paying a concession fee or land 
rental, the company pays 30 per cent of trees as rental for the land it obtains. This system 
  
176 
 
has surely negatively affected the livelihoods of villagers, but the impacts found in Pha Lad 
are, in general, less than in Kaem Khong village due to the different sizes of plantations in 
the two areas.  
Reflecting on rubber expansion in these two areas in Long district, we see that state 
agencies have played a significant role in backing up and supporting the penetration of the 
market, resulting in rapid changes in the agrarian situations in the uplands. The ways in 
which the rubber company could gain access to land in the uplands clearly show the 
‘violent’ aspects of agrarian transformations in the uplands, with which the state has been 
directly involved. Launching the “new economic mechanism” (NEM) does not mean a 
‘rolling back’ of the state but ‘putting the state back in’ (Evans et al 1985 cited in Peluso 
2007). Looking at the road to capitalism in Poland, Staniszki (1990: 128) points to a linkage 
between political power and capital, which is also apparent in the case of the Lao PDR. 
Agrarian transformations in the uplands which are led by transnational capital (the Chinese) 
have alienated upland peoples from their means of making a living. This process of land 
dispossession has been backed up by the state, which, under some circumstances, 
considers that this violent aspect is acceptable for the ‘development’ of the country. This 
can be seen in the opinion expressed by the Head of PAFO in Champasak, a southern 
province where a large number of villagers have been affected by large-scale rubber 
plantations: “we accept that there will be some problems with villagers initially, but if we 
don’t change today from local production to industrial production, when will we do it?” 
(cited in Baird 2010: 29).  
This section has explored how rubber companies gain access to land, at a low cost, in the 
uplands. It has revealed that the sometimes brutal manner of operations was part of the 
rubber expansion, and that this was because of state involvement, rather than in spite of it. 
This shows the sometimes violent aspects of market integration; people’s livelihoods are 
undermined by market integration – or rather by the way that market integration is 
orchestrated. The means by which rubber companies could access land in the uplands 
shows unequal power relations among different actors in the frontiers, which were not only 
between the state, market and society but also within the state itself. The arrival of Chinese 
rubber companies in the three study villages also reflects how the state was strengthened 
and weakened allowing capitalism to expand into the state’s frontiers. It is quite clear that 
the state played a significant role in facilitating the expansion of rubber, and thus 
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supported market penetration into the study communities. Rubber expansion in the study 
villages reflected the non-monolithic character of the Lao state: different state agencies 
(such as the NLMA, CPI, MAF, and the Army) and state agencies at different levels (national, 
provincial, and district) had different, sometimes diverging interests and thus acted 
differently when it came to rubber investment. Some state agencies, such as the Luang 
Namtha provincial government, may have been aware of the potential negative impacts 
and risks of rubber investment, and especially concession investment, on people’s 
livelihoods and in response they attempted to craft and deliver policies to regulate rubber 
expansion and prevent, or at least ameliorate, the impact of rubber on people’s livelihood 
vulnerability. However, other state agencies, such as the Army and the Police Office, 
appeared to be more interested in the profits that their organisations could obtain from the 
deals they negotiated with Chinese investors, than the impacts that upland populations 
would encounter as a result of the loss of their land. It is also important to emphasise that 
state officials, even at local levels, also had different opinions and dealt differently with the 
rubber boom. Some officials, especially those who did not have connections with local 
people, tended to follow the policies or instructions determined by the state at higher 
levels, without harbouring any doubts or questioning those policies. Some local officials, 
especially those who had a rural background or social links with local people and who 
usually served at lower ranks within the state organisations, while they may have seen the 
opportunities offered by the rubber boom, seemed to be highly concerned over the loss of 
villagers’ land to Chinese rubber companies. The worries of local officials in Long district, 
who were concerned over the risks and long-term profitability of rubber, were a case in 
point. However, their worries rarely led to any changes regarding the expansion of rubber 
into the uplands. Rubber companies continued to expand their plantations either through 
contract farming or concessions in the uplands. However, capitalism has not taken only one 
path into the uplands. The following section will explore another path of market 
integration, with rather different outcomes. 
6.3 Rubber expansion from ‘below’: uplanders’ orchestrated 
rubber boom 
 “We stayed in a house of Khmu in Xishuangbanna. They told us that they were 
badly off before they grew rubber trees. They told us that if we had land we 
should plant rubber trees, as many as we could. Rubber would provide wealth 
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for us. They said even some lazy farmers, they could make a living from only 
the 70 rubber trees they had.” 
(Interview, Uncle Mong, a 59-year-old Khmu who joined a study tour to  
rubber plantations in Xishuangbanna, Don Tha village, 5 December 2009) 
 “The Chinese said, when rubber trees could be tapped, they could earn 
around 1 Yuan from one rubber tree each day.  I have around 2,000 rubber 
trees so I can earn 2,000 Yuan every two days67. It will be better than any kind 
of cash crop. This year I sold 40 tons of sugarcane and earned only around 
6,000 Yuan. Now Akha in Laos are still poor. We are poorer than those who live 
in China or in Thailand. But we will have as good a life as them when we can 
sell our rubber latex.”  
(Interview, Mr Woo, a 50-year-old Aka man, Houay Luang Mai, 
 23 December 2009) 
The above quotations show how rubber can become the new hope for uplanders. Stories 
about the success of rubber farmers in the uplands of Xishuangbanna Autonomous 
prefecture in Yunnan Province, China were the most influential drivers stimulating Lao 
farmers from both lowlands and uplands to start planting rubber spontaneously. In Houay 
Luang Mai, rubber expansion was exclusively driven by villagers’ desires to emulate villagers 
in China. The location of the village, which is situated close to the Lao-Chinese border, not 
only meant that villagers could get involved in the marketplace in Xishuangbanna either as a 
seller or a buyer, but also provided ample opportunities for villagers to observe and obtain 
information about what was going on on the other side of the border. The improving 
standard of living of China’s uplanders who farmed rubber was observed by the Lao 
uplanders. The Akha from Houay Luang Kao and Houay Luang Mai regularly mentioned the 
new and modern items that rubber farmers in China had such as new and modern houses, 
motorbikes, even cars, televisions, radios, and mobile phones. “Without rubber, they could 
not have these things” was a sentence repeated frequently by Houay Luang Mai’s Akha 
during the fieldwork. The improved life of Uncle Long Ma (Box 6.1), an Akha from Daen 
village who had become a well-off Akha since his rubber started produce latex, is the 
experience that other uplanders dream about.  
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           Box 6.1 Uncle Long Ma’s story 
It was around eleven o’clock when a Sing DAFO official and I arrived at Baan 
Daen - an Akha village located around 20 kilometres from the town of Sing and 
only four kilometres from the Lao-Chinese border. Uncle Long Ma was the first 
villager we met at the entrance to the village while he was practicing to ride his 
new motorbike recently brought from China, at a cost of 6,000 CYN68. Uncle 
Long Ma was one of first villagers to plant rubber in 1997. His inspiration came 
solely from what he saw and heard about rubber from Akha villages in China. “I 
visited relatives in China and saw that they could earn money every day from 
rubber”, said Uncle Long Ma. Uncle Long Ma and a few other villagers 
converted their upland rice fields to rubber. Unfortunately, others’ plantations 
were damaged and destroyed by an unexpected frost in 2000. Only Uncle’s 
rubber survived. In 2003, his 1,000 rubber trees began to produce latex. All 
latex is sold to a Chinese trader who crosses the border to collect it at his house 
every week. While today only 1,000 trees can produce latex, he has another 15 
hectares of rubber trees; all of his plantations are his own investment. With the 
money earned largely from rubber, he is now described as the richest Akha in 
the village. While most of the houses in the village are built either of bamboo 
or wood, his house is a modern two-storey house made of concrete and wood. 
The family have a television, a radio and a mobile phone (though the reception 
is extremely poor in the village). The most noticeable symbol of his wealth is 
the family’s pick-up, which is the only car in the village. It was just about a 
week before we arrived that Uncle Long Ma, who at that time was unable to 
ride a motorbike, decided to buy one. He thought that his life would be made  
easier with the motorbike; it would allow him to visit the town of Sing and 
China more easily. Uncle Long Ma never hesitated to show how his life has 
become better since he started selling rubber: “when we got money from 
sugarcane, we thought it was good. It was a lot. But when we sell rubber, we 
can earn far more than we got from sugarcane. It is a lot better.” After about 
half an hour of interview, we left Uncle Long Ma’s house and spent around an  
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Box 6.1 Uncle Long Ma’s story (continued) 
hour walking around the village, visiting a villager’s rubber nursery, and 
arranging a meeting with the village’s committee for the following day. At the 
time we left the village, Uncle Long Ma was still diligently learning to ride his 
new motorbike. 
(Research diary, Baan Daen, Sing district, Luang Namtha,  
12 November 2009) 
The stories of successful rubber farmers in China have stimulated the hopes of uplanders in 
the Lao PDR. One such story is that of Uncle Lene, one of the poorest Akha who started 
planting rubber when he lived in Baan Houay Luang Kao, as shown in Box 6.2. 
Box 6.2 The story of Uncle Lene 
It was in 2003 when Uncle Lene and his family, while they were at Houay 
Luang Kao village, decided to start planting rubber. The family was inspired by 
the wealth of rubber farmers in Xishuangbanna. “The Chinese said rubber is 
good. We grow today, we can earn from it for many many years,” he said. The 
family decided to spend the money they had accumulated, mainly from 
selling NTFPs and buffaloes, to invest in a new cash crop that they did not 
know much about. However, “the Akha in China know. They know everything 
about it. We have learnt from them,” Uncle Lene said. The family, as did 
many Lao farmers, hoped that it would make their family’s living standards 
improve in line with the Chinese Akha. At the time when the boom was not at 
its peak, the family paid around 3-4 CNY per seedling69. As there was no road 
link to Houay Luang Kao, Uncle Lene’s son spent five hours walking from the 
village to buy rubber seedlings from a rubber nursery in Xishuangbanna. 
Some 100 seedlings were put in a woven basket which was then carried on 
his back, walking for another five hours back to the village. The seedlings 
were then intercropped with the upland rice the following day. In 2003, his 
son made six trips to buy seedlings from Xishuangbanna. This family moved to 
Houay Luang Mai in 2007 and could not access paddy fields. They also had 
found difficulties in gaining sufficient rice practicing dry-rice cultivation in a 
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Box 6.2 The story of Uncle Lene (continued) 
new settlement where land is limited. They hope that when their rubber 
begins producing latex, their lives will be better. Uncle Lene said hopefully: 
“We will have cash to buy rice. My descendants will not starve”. 
(Research diary, based on interview with Uncle Lene, a 60-year-old Akha,  
Baan Houay Luang Mai, 23 December 2009) 
The above stories reflect the views of uplanders about rubber and the possibilities offered 
by market integration. For poor villagers, such as Uncle Lene, who struggle to make their 
living from their current livelihood resources, rubber is considered a new hope for the 
survival of the family. Stories from those less poor households are different; rubber is a new 
source of further wealth accumulation. This can be reflected through the stories of Uncle 
Ponu - who, at the end of 2009, owned over six hectares of rubber trees (Box 6.3). 
Box 6.3 The story of Uncle Ponu 
Uncle Ponu was the first villager in Houay Luang Mai to set up a rubber plantation, 
in 2003. Having observed the wealth of Akha in China who own rubber 
plantations, Uncle Ponu decided to invest the capital he had accumulated from 
selling surplus rice and sugarcane to set up a plantation of his own. In the first 
year, only 200 seedlings were bought from China, at a cost of four CNY per 
seedling. He planted rubber on forestland claimed to be his fallow land though he 
had never practiced shifting cultivation since the family had moved to the area in 
1985. In 2004, while other villagers were still hesitating to plant rubber, Uncle 
Ponu planted more than 500 seedlings. When villagers decided to allocate the 
village’s communal land to individual households, Uncle Ponu was first allocated a 
small plot of land which was easily accessible. However, he exchanged that plot 
with another household who had been allocated a larger plot but located far from 
the road. For Uncle Ponu, with “a big plot we can plant more rubber, we will get 
more”. The family have continued planting more rubber every year. In 2010, he 
had around 3,000 rubber trees (around 6.6 hectares). He still intended to plant 
more rubber, “Akha in China said there was no land available in China. They could 
not expand the plantation. They told us to plant as many [rubber trees] as we can. 
The more we plant, the more money we earn”, said Uncle Ponu.  
(Research diary based on interviews with Uncle Ponu [56-year-old Akha] and  
Ar- Jo [a 21-year-old son of Uncle Ponu], Baan Houay Luang Mai, 24 June 2010) 
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The above stories from Uncle Lene and Uncle Ponu highlight not only a picture of how 
rubber arrived in the Lao uplands but also how enthusiastic uplanders were about being 
involved in and benefiting from the market. While rubber arrived in Houay Luang Mai in 
2003, it started booming in the village in 2005 when many households began planting 
rubber, following the example set by Uncle Ponu. Due to the demand for land for growing 
rubber, villagers decided to allocate the village’s forest and fallow land to individual 
households to establish rubber plantations, first in 2005 and continuing until 2007. Each 
household who moved to Houay Luang Mai before 2007 was allocated around 2-4 hectares 
of land depending on the distance between the allocated plot and the road. In 2010, only a 
small piece of the village’s sacred forest and watershed areas remained as communal land. 
All other categories of the village’s forest (production forest, conservation forest, 
protection forest, regeneration forest, and degraded forest) had been allocated to the 
village’s members for setting up plantations. At the end of 2009, only 2 out of 61 
households reported that they had not planted rubber trees. The village’s total planted 
area at the end of 2009 was 115 hectares; the average planted area among those who had 
a plantation was two hectares per household (research diary, Houay Luang Mai, 25 
December 2009). Most households stated that they would plant more in 2010. Rubber 
expanded rapidly in Houay Luang Mai from less than one hectare in 2003 to more than 100 
hectares in 2009 without the push or any concrete promotion policies from the state. The 
experience of the village shows how far uplanders wished to be engaged in and benefit 
from the market  
Picture 6.1 Rubber intercropped with 
upland rice
 
Source: Fieldwork, Houay Luang Mai, 2010 
 
Picture 6.2 Going to have more rubber  
Source: Fieldwork, Houay Luang Mai, 2010 
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The beginning of rubber in Pha Lad village – a recent Akha resettlement village in Long 
district – also shows that the arrival of rubber was somehow out of, and beyond, the state’s 
plan. In the mid-2000s, the time when villagers were forced to stop cultivating opium, the 
local authorities and the European Union (through an EU project) organised and sponsored 
a study tour to Yunnan province in China for villages’ representatives. The study tour aimed 
to provide a chance for uplanders from Long district to learn about the new livelihoods of 
Chinese uplanders after they had stopped growing opium. Rubber was not included in the 
study tour programme; it was not of interest to either the local government or the EU staff.  
“The EU was not interested in rubber at that time. They just wanted to take 
villagers to study animal raising like pigs, chicken, cows, and goats. The cash 
crops that they took us to see were corn, cassava, sugarcane, banana etc. They 
did not intend to take us to see rubber trees. But when we asked people in 
Xishuangbanna about cash crops that we should grow, the answer was always 
rubber. Hill people in Xishuangbanna told us that rubber was the best: no risks. 
We were told that rubber was even better than rice. We became interested in 
rubber. We then asked the EU to take us to Xishuangbanna again, and on this 
trip we went to learn about rubber in particular.” 
(Interview, Mrs Kaen, an Akha woman in her late 40s,  
Baan Pha Lad, 4 February 2010) 
Soon after the second study tour trip to Xishuangbanna, a few households began planting 
rubber. In 2006, around one-fifth of the village’s households were planting the crop; the 
household’s plantation size varied between one and two hectares. A number of 
households who established their own plantations have gradually expanded their area of 
rubber since then. Two-thirds of the surveyed households reported that, at the end of 
2009, they had their own plantation, with an average plantation size of 1.5 hectares per 
household. The boom also stimulated the village’s ex-headman - Uncle Lu, who is now in 
his 60s - to invest 3.25 million LAK to set up a rubber nursery in 2006, with the hope that 
he could make a profit from it as demand for rubber seedlings was growing70. 
Unfortunately, due to his lack of experience and skills, Uncle Lu could not grow as many 
healthy seedlings as he wished. Two years later, he had to sell two of his buffaloes to raise 
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money to pay off the debts he had incurred borrowing money from relatives and people 
from the district town (research diary based on interview with Uncle Lu, Baan Pha Lad, 3 
February 2010). 
In Kaem Khong village, rubber arrived in the village along a slightly different path. Villagers 
first heard about the wealth of rubber farmers in the early 2000s. This news was 
confirmed in the mid-2000s by investors from Xiengkok and the town of Long district who 
were seeking to make deals with villagers to invest in and set up plantations in the village. 
This ‘deal’ was called by both investors and villagers the ‘70-30’ contract system. 
According to this deal, the investor supplies seedlings for villagers who contribute land and 
labour to look after the trees for seven years. After that, the investor takes 30 per cent of 
the trees with the land, leaving 70 per cent of rubber trees for villagers. Both investor and 
villagers then take full responsibility (taking care and marketing) over their respective 
plots. A few households began planting rubber in 2005 under this system. This number 
noticeably grew in 2007; among the 18 surveyed households, there were only two 
households planting rubber with an outside investor in 2005, but 14 in 2007. 
This informal deal will lead to the transfer of some parts of land previously used by 
villagers to outside investors. In a context where land has become limited since the arrival 
of the Jundai Rubber Company in 2007 (see section 6.2), villagers commented that the 
arrival of rubber causes more hardship for their lives because agricultural land becomes 
increasingly short (the impacts of rubber expansion will be returned to in Chapter 7). 
However, villagers have never hesitated to insist that, even in retrospect, they would still 
have planted rubber with the local investor. In the era of the rubber boom, it was not only 
outside investors who look for land from uplanders but also villagers who have sought 
investors to provide capital for them to set up their plantations. A Lue investor from a 
village near the town of Long district said that he was visited by the headman and villagers 
from a Kui village asking him to provide rubber seedlings for villagers: “They said villagers 
want to plant rubber but they did not have cash to buy seedlings. They asked me to 
provide seedlings for villagers” (interview, 10 February 2010). 
The desire of villagers to be integrated and hopefully to benefit from the rubber boom is 
also found in Don Tha village – the village where the rubber expansion was encouraged by 
the local state. While the Xiang Jiao Rubber Company found that they could not easily 
convince villagers to participate in the company’s rubber projects when it started its 
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project in 2006, just one year later Nalae’s uplanders were eager to plant rubber with the 
company. The company could not even supply sufficient seedlings to meet the demand of 
uplanders. Some of Don Tha’s households who had already prepared land for rubber were 
disappointed that they could not get as many seedlings as they wished. Some villagers 
could afford to buy rubber seedlings from Luang Namtha; other poorer villagers had no 
choice but to wait for seedlings from the company the following year.  
How has rubber become the hope of uplanders at a level that no other cash crop ever 
achieved? To answer this question, it is necessary to look at the current situation of 
livelihoods in the hills. As outlined in Chapter 5, the Lao uplands are still dominated by a 
semi-subsistence economy in which shifting cultivation is the main agricultural system. In 
the context of rising pressures from both government policies and natural disasters, this 
system has limited potential to provide sustainable livelihoods for uplanders. Availability 
of off-farm and non-farm work in the uplands and the potential for mobility to seek work 
outside are also limited. Thus, the news about the profits made from rubber became a 
spark of hope for uplanders. Rubber has become the new hope to resolve hunger, as 
suggested by Uncle Lene; his hope is shared among villagers from all communities, and 
especially those poorer villagers. 
Rubber is not only the hope for resolving poverty but is also the hope for villagers to 
consume the ‘modern’ items that are becoming so prevalent in the lowlands and among 
China’s uplanders. Villagers, especially from Houay Luang Mai, often mention a new 
house, a motorbike, a television, a radio, a mobile phone and so on as the desired 
outcome of selling rubber latex like those farmers in China. One young Khmu woman from 
Don Tha village, expressed her hope in the following way: 
“Now we are poor. We do not have enough rice to eat. Our house is old and 
decaying. We do not have any good things like lowlanders or Thai people. But 
we hope we will be better off when we can sell rubber [latex]. We will 
probably have a new house and perhaps a motorbike. If you come back to visit 
us again, we may be able to offer a better welcome.” 
(Interview, Mrs Noy, a 32- year- old Khmu, Don Tha village, 7 December 2009) 
The hope that rubber will increase their consumption potential is associated with a 
situation where uplanders are usually looked down upon by the state’s officials and by 
lowlanders. They are often characterised as ‘backward’ and poor in comparison to the 
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‘modern’ lowlanders. This is seen to be due to the differences in their way of life, religious 
practices, and their unwelcome swidden agriculture. The potential to consume similar 
material products of modernity as ‘modern’ lowlanders would make uplanders feel that 
they are not so very different from those ‘modern’ people in the lowlands. Villagers 
however have different potential to engage in the rubber boom, which may lead to 
differentiation among uplanders in the future (this issue will be discussed in section 8.5.2). 
This section has illuminated another path of the rubber boom in the uplands of the Lao 
PDR. The ways in which rubber arrived in the study villages reflects how the market – in this 
case for rubber – is viewed by the uplanders. The response of villagers to rubber shows that 
uplanders did welcome the arrival of the market. Moreover, evidence from the study 
communities also shows that it was also often less powerful uplanders who were the key 
actors in bringing the market into the uplands. The trajectories that rubber followed into 
the study communities point to the necessity to consider upland populations themselves, 
so often portrayed as weak, as potential actors in current processes of agrarian 
transformations in the Lao uplands; agrarian transformations in the Lao PDR are not only 
shaped from ‘above’, therefore, but also, and significantly, from ‘below’. This reminds us 
that we cannot assume that what is going on at a local level is automatically determined by 
powerful external processes and actors. It is necessary to take account of the views and 
perspectives of local people so often portrayed as marginal to events if we are to gain a 
better picture of how transformations are taking place, and how they are shaped and re-
shaped by interconnections between forces and actors across scales. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter has attempted to illuminate how the uplands of the Lao PDR are being 
integrated into the market through the lens of the rubber boom, tracing the trajectories 
and the experiences of the four study villages. While the boom in rubber trees in the 
uplands is stimulated by forces that can be located in the global market, rubber arrived in 
each community following different paths. The chapter has characterised these paths into 
two broader trajectories: the path from ‘above’ and from ‘below’. The path from ‘above’ 
shows the important role of external forces and actors in shaping agrarian situations at the 
local level. The chapter has discussed the good intentions of the state to improve the well-
being of its ‘weak’ and impoverished uplanders. Embracing the ideals of the market as the 
mechanism for poverty reduction, the state facilitated the establishment of links between 
  
187 
 
market and uplanders, which was apparent in Don Tha village. Aiming at “making markets 
work for the poor”, the local state authorities in Nalae district also tried to regulate the 
operation of the market, attempting to minimise the impacts of the market on the poor 
uplanders. Thus, the state acted both as the protector of the ‘weak’ uplanders and as a 
facilitator, greasing access to the uplands for – in this case – Chinese capital.  
These links between the state and the market are also reflected in the experiences of 
villagers from Kaem Khong and Pha Lad villages where areas of their land have been taken 
by the rubber companies using the power and authority of the state. The ways in which the 
rubber companies could gain access to land in both villages reflects the non-monolithic 
characteristics of the Lao state (the army, the district authorities, and the national 
government) which had different interests and acted differently in dealing with the rubber 
boom. The arrival of the rubber companies in the uplands rather than revealing the 
‘weakness’ of the uplanders instead highlights the ‘weakness’ of the Lao state to deliver 
“desirable political goods” (Rotberg 2003: 3). The arrival of the rubber companies was 
brutal in the manner that their operations further accentuated the vulnerability of an 
already vulnerable population. Their so-styled ‘backward’ agricultural systems which the 
state has been trying to eradicate has made the state tolerant of the violence uplanders 
experienced in their encounters with the market (in the form of the rubber companies), 
and a level of violence, it is suggested, which would not have occurred had this been in the 
lowlands. What the experience also shows is that the state - market distinction is far from 
clear. 
The experience of the other two villages, Houay Luang Mai and Pha Lad, reveals a rather 
different story. Here the rubber boom has been orchestrated from ‘below’, showing the 
less powerful uplanders themselves as the key actors in recent processes of agrarian 
transformations in the uplands. The important role of small farmers in shaping the upland 
landscape and in seeking solutions for their poverty raises important issues of the necessity 
to consider local people as significant actors in the changes outlined, instead of 
automatically assuming that the transformations taking place at the local scale are solely – 
or even mainly – determined by external forces and actors. The ways that uplanders 
responded to the boom in rubber illuminate how the market is more than just welcomed by 
uplanders. The debate on state-market relations, and small farmer-market relations will be 
returned to in Chapter 8. In the following chapter, the impact of the rubber boom on the 
upland landscape and populations will be explored. 
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Chapter Seven  
Transforming the Uplands in the Age of the Rubber Boom 
7.1 Introduction 
In addition to interventions orchestrated by the state, it is undeniable that the market is 
another key actor in processes of upland transformation (Li 1999; 2002; Tan 2000; Tan and 
Walker 2008). There is concern among market pessimists that the penetration of the 
market into upland areas poses a ‘threat’ to the ‘sustainability’ of communities (see a 
critique of this view in Walker 2001). But for some scholars, “things aren’t that bad” (Rigg 
2005a: 148) as market penetration also provides new ‘opportunities’ for some people. The 
question here – and which is addressed in this chapter – is which groups of people can 
benefit from this process of market integration and how far can they access new emerging 
‘opportunities’ and, importantly, which groups of people gain ‘less’ or even ‘lose’ from their 
involvement in commodity exchange. 
Considering the rubber tree as one of the new commodity crops being introduced into the 
upland areas of the Lao PDR (albeit the most important), this chapter examines how upland 
landscapes and upland livelihoods have been transformed under the context of the rubber 
boom. The central question that threads its way through this chapter is: how far has market 
integration brought new opportunities and/or new threats to upland populations? The 
chapter begins with an overview of the transformations of the upland economy (7.2), 
before turning to look more closely at the transformations of land rights and land control 
(section 7.3). This is followed by a consideration of the emergence of new classes. The final 
section discusses how livelihoods of uplanders are being affected by the rubber boom, and 
what their future might hold. 
7.2 Transformations of the upland economy and land use 
The uplands of the Lao PDR have long been involved in the market. However, their levels of 
market involvement were formerly shallow. The economy of the upland was based around 
semi-subsistence production in which shifting cultivation was the dominant form of 
agricultural production which was able to produce little, if any, surplus for the market. In 
the context of the research sites, the physical landscapes of Baan Houay Luang Mai and 
Baan Pha Lad were a combination of flat land suitable for wet rice agriculture and sloping 
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areas suited to shifting cultivation. While flat land in Baan Houay Luang Mai was used for 
both subsistence (paddy rice) and commercial (paddy rice and sugarcane) production, the 
flat land in Pha Lad was rarely able to produce a rice surplus for the market. The sloping 
land of the two communities shared similar characters to Baan Don Tha and Baan Kaem 
Khong - the two other study villages; it was covered by a patchwork combination of upland 
rice fields, fallows, and forest.  
Sloping land was used by villagers in the four communities for shifting agriculture mainly 
geared to meet household requirements. There were, however, different degrees to which 
this sloping land was used for swidden agriculture in each village. As most of Houay Luang 
Mai’s villagers could access paddy land, they had largely withdrawn from shifting 
agriculture. Shifting cultivation was therefore practiced by a relatively small number of 
households. Pha Lad’s villagers, however, could access only small areas of flat land and 
generally could not produce sufficient rice from their paddy to meet their needs. They thus 
had to continue swidden agriculture. Shifting cultivation was intensively practiced by 
villagers in Baan Don Tha and Baan Kaem Khong as it was the only source of rice for the 
villagers. While the main purpose of upland rice cultivation in the study villages was to 
meet the need for household consumption, some villagers did sell rice. Some villagers sold 
rice because they produced a surplus; other villagers sold rice even when they faced a rice 
shortage because of their need for cash.  
Forest land was formerly a crucial resource for making a living in the uplands. In addition to 
providing food and non-food products for household consumption, the forest also provided 
non-timber forest products (NTFPs) for sale, which was the most important source of cash 
for villagers in Baan Don Tha, Baan Pha Lad, Baan Kaem Khong as well as for those villagers 
in Baan Houay Luang Mai who did not have sugarcane plantations. Thus, the forest served 
important subsistence and market functions.  
Villagers from the four research communities grew cash crops before the arrival of rubber. 
However, cash crop production was limited in extent in most of the communities, with the 
exception of those villagers who planted sugarcane in Baan Houay Luang Mai (see section 
5.3.3). Here the area of land used for producing commercial crops was comparatively large, 
as some villagers had converted parts of their paddy fields to sugarcane plantations. Only 
small areas of land in the other three communities were used for cash crop production. 
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Land used for such commercial cropping was almost unnoticeable compared to that used 
for subsistence production. 
In Kaem Khong, the village where levels of market involvement were least intense, the area 
planted with corn varied among households from only 0.2 to two hectares, generating 
around 200,000–400,000 LAK for the households71 (interview, Mr Nu- a Lahu in his late 30s, 
9 March 2010). In the village of Don Tha in Nalae district, land was mainly used for shifting 
agriculture. In the mid-2000s, corn was introduced by the Friends of Upland Farmers 
Company (FUF). Villagers grew corn for the company under a system of contract relations. 
Mr Boon Yoo, a Khmu in his late 40s who was the FUF’s coordinator in Don Tha village, 
remembered that almost every household planted corn for the FUF but only over very small 
areas; the village’s planted area was approximately 2-3 hectares (interview, Mr Boon Yoo, 4 
December 2009). In Baan Pha Lad, corn was first planted for the market in the mid-2000s by 
a few villagers who could afford to buy corn seed. However, here too the village’s total 
planted area was less than three hectares (interview, Pha Lad village’s ex-headman, 3 
February 2010).  
In sum, while the four study communities were involved in the market before the arrival of 
rubber, their levels (intensity and extent) of market involvement were limited. Only a 
handful of Houay Luang Mai’s villagers who planted sugarcane were intensively integrated 
into the market. Other villagers were linked to the market but to a lesser degree through 
the sale of NTFPs and rice. The economies of the study communities, especially Baan Don 
Tha, Baan Kaem Khong, and Baan Pha Lad, were substantially oriented to subsistence 
production. Land was thus used mainly for subsistence production, with only small areas 
allocated to market production (see Table 7.1). 
The arrival of rubber, then, has brought significant changes to land use in the uplands. As 
summarised in Table 7.1, a considerable area of sloping land in all the study communities 
today has been converted from forest and swidden fields to rubber plantations. The upland 
landscape which was formerly dominated by forest and swidden fields (Picture 7.1) is now 
covered largely by seemingly endless rows of rubber trees (Picture 7.2). 
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 It was approximately £15-£30 at 31 December 2003 
(http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic?free=1). 
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Table 7.1 Economy and land use changes in the study sites, late 1990s–2010 
Village Before the rubber boom (late-1990s–early 2000s) Under the rubber boom (mid-2000s-2010) 
Subsistence orientation Market orientation Subsistence orientation Market orientation 
Houay Luang Mai Flat land: Paddy fields and sugarcane plantations Flat land: Paddy fields and sugarcane plantations 
- Paddy rice production by 
majority of the households 
- Sugarcane production 
- Surplus of paddy rice  
- Paddy rice production by 
majority of the households 
- Sugarcane production 
- Surplus of paddy rice  
Sloping land: forest and swidden fields Sloping land: forest and swidden fields (decreasing) 
 and rubber plantations(increasing) 
- Upland rice production (by 
minority of the households) 
- Food and non-food use of 
the forest 
- Sale of NTFPs  - Upland rice production (by 
minority of the households) 
- Food and non-food use of 
the forest 
- Rubber production (villagers’ 
investment) 
- Sale of NTFPs (in decline) 
Don Tha Sloping land: Forest and swidden fields Sloping land: forest and swidden fields (decreasing) 
and rubber plantations (increasing) 
- Upland rice production by 
every household 
- Food and non-food use of 
the forest 
- Sale of NTFPs (in decline) - Upland rice production by 
every household 
- Food and non-food use of 
the forest 
- Sale of NTFPs (in decline) 
- Rubber production (a 2+3 
contract farming system) 
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Table 7.1 Economy and land use changes in the study sites, late 1990s–2010 (continued) 
Village Before the rubber boom (late-1990s–early 2000s) Under the rubber boom (mid-2000s-2010)  
Subsistence orientation Market orientation Subsistence orientation Market orientation 
Pha Lad Flat land: Paddy fields Flat land: Paddy fields 
- Paddy rice production by a 
few households 
None - Paddy rice production by a 
few households 
None 
Sloping land: Forest and swidden fields Sloping land: forest and swidden fields (decreasing) 
and rubber plantations (increasing) 
- Upland rice production by 
most households 
- Food and non-food use 
from forest 
- Sale of NTFPs - Upland rice production by 
most households 
- Food and non-food use of 
the forest 
- Sale of NTFPs (in decline) 
- Rubber production (villagers’ 
own investment and a 1+4 
contract farming system) 
Kaem Khong Sloping land: Forest and swidden fields Sloping land: forest and swidden fields (decreasing) 
and rubber plantations (increasing) 
- Upland rice production by 
every household 
- Food and non-food use of 
the forest 
- Sale of NTFPs - Upland rice production by 
most households (in 
decline) 
- Food and non-food use 
from forest (in decline) 
- Sale of NTFPs (in decline) 
- Rubber production (large 
areas of Chinese plantations; 
smaller size of villagers’ 
plantations under an informal 
deal with local investors 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009–2010 
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Picture 7.1 A combination of upland rice fields and forest, Nalae 2010 
                       
Source: Fieldwork, 2010 
Picture 7.2 Today’s typical landscape dominated by rubber trees, Nalae 2010 
                   
Source: Fieldwork, 2010 
There is a slightly different degree of land use transformation in each of the study 
communities; the variation is associated with both how land was used before the rubber 
boom and the different ways in which rubber has expanded into each village. Far-reaching 
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transformations in land use have occurred in Kaem Khong village due to the role of the 
Jundai Rubber Company, which has led to the conversion of large areas of forest and 
villagers’ agricultural land to plantations. A similar set of changes, but to a lesser degree, 
was also found in Pha Lad village where 100 hectares of the village’s forest and fallow land 
were taken by the Kunming Rubber Company. Though Kaem Khong’s and Pha Lad’s villagers 
themselves have set up their own plantations, either through their own investment or by 
means of informal deals with local investors, the size of villagers’ plantations is far smaller 
than that of the company. In Baan Houay Luang Mai, there have been substantial 
transformations of land use as land which was formerly largely left as forest or old fallows 
has been converted to (villagers’) rubber plantations. The rubber boom has stimulated 
villagers’ desire to convert the forest and, generally, old fallow land to rubber. Among the 
four study villages, Houay Luang Mai is the village with the smallest area of land left for 
shifting agriculture. In Don Tha village, there have been changes of land use mainly through 
land being converted from shifting agriculture, to rubber plantations. As the Nalae DAFO 
worked closely with the Xiang Jiao Rubber Company in recruiting villagers to plant rubber 
with the company, the village’s forest is in general maintained because the local state has 
managed to control the actions and activities of the rubber company. While the areas of 
land being converted to rubber among the four communities vary, the four study villages 
share similarities in terms of the direction of land use changes. The boom in rubber has 
transformed the land and forest which had previously been used for producing food mainly 
for upland households’ consumption to the production of a single agricultural commodity 
for export – rubber.  
7.3 Transformations of land use rights and access72  
Rubber has not only transformed the ways in which forest and land in the uplands are used, 
but also land use rights, land access and land control. These changes involve a process of 
exclusion – a process which is considered in opposition to that of access by Hall and 
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 This section refers only to sloping land. Flat land, which is used mainly for paddy rice and 
sugarcane production is excluded because there has been no significant change in land rights and 
access before and after the rubber boom. I follow Ribot and Peluso’s (2003: 153 ) definition of access 
as “the ability to derive benefits from things” (italics in the original). Access in this study is used to 
refer to the ability of relevant actors to control and benefit from land. While there are cases where 
land access and control are based on land use rights, such rights are not a guarantee of access as 
some actors may gain access and control without land use rights. By the same token, actors who 
have land use rights may not gain access and control over land. 
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colleagues (2011: 7). They classify exclusion into three main types: “the ways in which 
already existing access to land is maintained by the exclusion of other potential users; the 
ways in which people who have access lose it; and the ways in which people who lack 
access are prevented from gaining it” (Hall et al. 2011: 7-8). In the context of the rubber 
boom in the uplands of the Lao PDR, a previous system of land rights, access and control 
has encountered new challenges as new actors and processes have infiltrated upland space 
(Peluso and Lund 2011). This section aims of illuminate the complexity and diversity that 
accompanies these issues: how have land rights been transformed? How are land access 
and control variously shaped? And how are benefits among actors apportioned? 
Land in the Lao PDR is, according to Decree No 61 (GoL 2003b), the property of the national 
community in which the state is responsible for the management and allocation of land use 
rights to the individual, families, economic organisations, and state organisations. Although 
villagers in the four research sites do not have ownership over land, they were allocated 
land use rights by the state authorities through the Land Use Planning and Land Allocation 
Programme (LUP/LA) between the late 1990s and early 2000s (see section 5.3.2.2). The 
programme recognised both collective and private rights over resource uses within the 
newly demarcated boundaries of the village. The right to access most of the forest land 
(conservation, protection, production, regeneration, and sacred forest) was allocated as a 
communal right to all members of the village in accordance with regulations introduced at 
that time. Private access was recognised only on agricultural land. Ideally, an individual 
household was allocated three plots of swidden and fallow land for practicing shifting 
agriculture, and no more. This was an attempt by the state to establish private rights over 
land used for swidden agriculture.  
The outcome of this state policy, however, was different from that intended. In practical 
terms, land access and control in the research communities were based largely on the 
collective system. As summarised in Figure 7.1, forest was under communal rights and 
access in all four communities. This category of land permitted access by all members of the 
community. Before the arrival of rubber, private rights over fallows were not recognised by 
members of the research settlements. Land for shifting cultivation was not claimed as 
private land by individual households in most of the study communities. Villagers from Pha 
Lad and Kaem Khong villages did not claim private rights because land was relatively 
abundant. In Houay Luang Mai, villagers who had access to paddy land did not practice 
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shifting cultivation and therefore they did not have a keen interest in claiming private rights 
over sloping land. Shifting agriculture was practiced only by a small number of households 
and access to swidden and fallow land for these poor households was generally not limited. 
The situation in Don Tha village was slightly different. Fallows were claimed and accessed as 
collectivities among relatives. Their claims were not because of the implementation of 
LUP/LA programme; rather it was the pressure that villagers encountered when a large area 
of forest land which they had previously used was taken by the state to establish the 
district’s conservation forest.  
Overall, land access in the upland communities before the rubber boom was mainly under 
collective rights in which levels of exclusion for access by villagers were generally light. 
However, this system has been eroded in the era of the rubber boom. New forms of land 
rights and land exclusions have emerged. Current forms of land rights can be broadly 
categorised into three forms: state, private, and communal rights with new and attendant 
complicated forms of land access and control (see Figure 7.1). 
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Figure 7.1 Transformations of land rights and control (late 1990s-2010) 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009–2010 
  
198 
 
7.3.1 State land rights 
Transformations of land rights from communal rights to state rights were found in Kaem Khong 
village. Before the rubber boom, land rights belonged to the village through the LUP/LA programme. 
Land access and control were arranged on a communal basis. Land rights were taken from the village 
and therefore from the villagers when the rubber company arrived at the village with the military in 
attendance. The military claimed the rights over not only land which officially belonged to the army 
but also land which the Long district authorities had previously allocated to the village. Land was 
later passed on to the Jundai Rubber Company which was granted permission by the army to use the 
military’s land. Villagers felt they had no choice but to relinquish their land and felt that there was 
no hope that they might get the land back in the future: “When the company leaves, the army may 
take the whole land. We will never get it back” (interview, Mrs Koy, a 40-year-old Lahu, 28 February 
2010). 
The Jundai Rubber Company now has access and control over land which was not formally granted 
to it through the support and backing of the army. While villagers could collect broom grass from the 
land, which now is formally part of the company’s plantations, they are absolutely excluded from 
using the land for agriculture. The rubber boom experienced in Baan Kaem Khong highlights the 
exercise of the power of the army in unofficially claiming and taking over communal land rights from 
this relatively powerless upland community. Kaem Khong’s experience also shows that through a 
channel of the state, namely the military, transnational capital has been able to gain access and 
control over land even when it was not officially granted land use rights. 
7.3.2 Communal land rights 
While communal land rights are challenged by the arrival of rubber, communal land rights (mainly in 
connection with sacred and protection forest) still exist but over much smaller areas. Before the 
arrival of rubber, communal land included fallow land and forest land mainly used by villagers as a 
source of food and non-food for household consumption, as well as for market exchange. In the 
context of the rubber boom, fallow land has been privatised and thus only forest remains as 
communal property. Some restrictions are imposed on the use of forest; generally, villagers are 
allowed to use it only for collecting NTFPs.  
In Pha Lad village, the arrival of the Kunming Rubber Company which set up the 1+4 contract 
farming system with the village has resulted in the emergence of another form of communal land 
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rights over the company’s plantation. As discussed in section 6.2, the company preferred to establish 
a contract with the village as a whole instead of dealing with individual households as had the Xiang 
Jiao Rubber Company in Nalae district. Land on which the company has set up its plantations is now 
recognised as part of the village’s communal lands. While some of this land was previously part of 
the village’s communal land, other areas had already been claimed by villagers. The arrival of the 
company thus caused the transformation of some private land rights to communal land, which was 
then passed on to the company. It is important to note, however, that while this land may be de jure 
communal land, villagers have lost their power of control over the medium term to the company; 
this situation will last for 35 years. 
7.3.3 Private land rights  
The GoL introduced private land use rights over land used for shifting cultivation through the LUP/LA 
programme. However, both swidden and fallow land in the four study communities were under 
collective rights, either communal or kin. The rubber boom has brought significant changes to land 
use rights in the uplands. When rubber is planted on the land, the individual rights over that land are 
recognised by other villagers. Villagers who were quick to participate in the boom, usually those who 
had capital and labour, could turn previously communal land into their private land and could do so 
over a significantly larger area than those who were late in joining the boom. The increasing demand 
for land for rubber plantations also stimulated villagers to make claims for private rights over fallow 
land. At the time of the fieldwork, none of the fallow land in any of the study communities was left 
for communal access for shifting cultivation. Villagers who had good knowledge of where their 
ancestors cleared and/or used land before the boom were able to make claims and assure their 
private rights over large areas. By contrast, villagers who did not know about or who did not have 
ancestral claims, usually those who moved to the area late, could claim private land rights over only 
small areas (see the stories of Mr Kae and Mr Tan in Box 7.1).  
Box 7.1 Claiming land: stories from Houay Luang Mai and Don Tha villages 
Mr Kae from Baan Houay Luang Mai 
Mr Kae moved from Houay Luang Kao to Houay Luang Mai with his parents in 
1988. As the family could produce sufficient rice from their paddy fields, they had 
never practiced shifting agriculture in Houay Luang Mai. In the mid-2000s when 
rubber arrived, Mr Kae returned to grow upland rice. This was the first time in a 
period of almost 20 years that his family grew upland rice. He returned to shifting  
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Box 7.1 Claiming land: stories from Houay Luang Mai and Don Tha villages 
(continued) 
cultivation not because of demand for rice from shifting cultivation, but rather a 
demand for land to establish his rubber plantation. In the first year, the family 
cleared around one hectare of the village’s forest land on which 500 rubber 
seedlings were planted. Before the village allocated the village’s communal land 
to individual households to set up plantations in 2005, Mr Kae claimed the rights 
over the old fallow land that his family had used before they moved to the current 
settlement. Some fallow land had been left uncultivated for more than 20 years. 
Claiming the rights over the old fallow land plus the land allocated by the village 
allowed the family to gain control over large areas of land to establish their 
rubber plantation. Being aware of the changes, Mr Kae was in a position to turn 
around ten hectares of the village’s communal land and make it his own. 
(Research diary based on an interview with Mr Kae, a 40-year-old Akha, 23 June 2010) 
Mr Tan from Baan Don Tha 
Mr Tan, a Khmu in his late 50s, moved from a Khmu village in Pha Udom, Bokeo 
province to Don Tha in 2001. As a late comer, he could not claim any ancestral land 
in the village and has been struggling to access land to cultivate upland rice. The 
land where he grew upland rice was the village’s communal land which was 
determined annually by the village’s committees. Mr Tan’s wife in her early 40s 
said, “it has been tough living here as a new comer. We could not access old 
fallows. When we came here, it was the village’s committees who told us where we 
could use land. Some years, we got good land. But some years we got land with low 
fertility meaning that we faced many months of rice shortage. We are new 
newcomers. We had nothing.” In 2009, Mr Tan had three plots of fallow covering 
an area of five hectares. When rubber arrived, Mr Tan and his wife could only plant 
200 trees (less than 0.5 hectare). Mr Tan said, “we wanted to plant more like other 
villagers [have done]. But we do not have land. We have only about five hectares. 
Today, we already face rice shortages. If we plant more rubber, we will face 
shortages of rice for a longer period each year. We do not have as much land as 
those who have lived here for many generations.” 
 (Research diary based on an interview with Mr Tan and his wife,  
a poorest household from Baan Don Tha, 24 December 2009) 
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The four communities share a similar experience in the manner in which private land rights have 
been enacted through individual households’ establishment of rubber plantations, using this to 
make claims over their ancestral fallow land. Private land rights in Houay Luang Mai village were also 
established through the allocation of the village’s communal land to individual households beginning 
first in 2005 and continuing until 2007 when only small areas of land were left, so making it difficult 
if not impossible for late settlers to access land. 
While villagers could hold private land rights over plantations, the ways that rubber has arrived in 
each village resulted in important differences in how land controls are manifested. That said, while 
some villagers could gain full access and control over the plantations they have set up, others could 
not. Fieldwork from the four study villages captures three categories of private land rights and land 
controls over plantations, as follows. 
  1). Villagers hold private rights and have full control over land 
Villagers holding both rights and control over land were found in the cases where plantations were 
set up by villagers themselves. While this form was observed in all four villages, there was a 
difference in degree in each village. Villagers from Houay Luang Mai could gain full control over their 
newly-established private land rights to the greatest degree (see Table 7.2). This was followed by 
those villagers from Pha Lad village. As discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, these two villages had, 
historically, been more intensely involved in market exchange than both Don Tha and Kaem Khong 
villages. Market involvement allowed them to accumulate capital and to use this capital to invest in 
rubber plantations. However, the connections to the market for Pha Lad’s villagers were far behind 
those from Houay Luang Mai. Thus they could not accumulate capital and use it for investing in 
rubber plantation to the same degree as villagers in Houay Luang Mai. By contrast with these two 
villages, it was quite difficult for villagers from Don Tha and Kaem Khong villages to establish rubber 
plantations without support from outside investors (this will be discussed below).  
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Table 7.2 Areas of rubber land under private rights and full control, 2009. 
Village Numbers of surveyed 
households 
Average size of land (Ha)* 
Baan Houay Luang Mai 24 out of 25 2.3 
Baan Pha Lad 21 out of 31 1.5  
Baan Don Tha 12 out of 22 1.2 
Baan Kaem Khong 1 out of 18 1.1 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009-2010 
Note: This is the average size of land holding among the households having private rights and full control over 
land (not an average for the whole community). 
Pha Lad’s villagers also gained private land rights and full control over a small portion of rubber 
plantation established by the Kunming Rubber Company who returned 30 hectares of the plantation 
to the village as compensation for the village’s contribution of land. Every household was allocated 
rubber and land, either 160 trees (0.4 hectare) or 224 trees (0.5 hectare) depending on the number 
of the household’s labourers (see section 6.2.2 and section 7.3.2).  
  2). Villagers hold private rights but gain full control over only part of the land  
Fieldwork in Kaem Khong village reveals another form of transformation of land rights and land 
control. Private land rights were recognised when villagers set up their plantations. However, as 
discussed in section 6.3, villagers found that they could not establish the rubber plantations without 
making informal deals with local investors who supplied seedlings. This leads to villagers transferring 
30 per cent of their rubber land to these local investors. In 2010, 17 out of 18 surveyed households 
reported that they were under this arrangement with an average size of plantation of 2.5 hectares. 
Villagers thus could gain full control over only 70 per cent of the land. While the LUP/LA programme 
had the aim of establishing private rights over upland agricultural land, in theory private rights and 
control of land by outsiders are not allowed. However, the rubber boom has pushed this regulation 
to one side and outsiders’ control of land has become both prevalent and, importantly, locally 
acceptable. Many local state officials said that they have established rubber plantations on the hill 
areas under this sort of informal deal. One senior official from Sing district said that:  
“I have my family and sisters. My salary is not enough to take good care of all of them. I 
cannot look after them for their whole life. I have to provide something for them. 
Everyone has rubber. I thought I would set up a rubber plantation for them. But I came 
from another area. I do not have land here. The only way I could have a rubber 
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plantation was by giving rubber seedlings to [upland] villagers to plant. They have 
plenty of land but could not afford to buy seedlings. I could buy seedlings but did not 
have land. So we cooperated. Things fall into place.” 
(Interview, a senior official from Sing District, 25 June 2010) 
While villagers consider this sort of informal deal with a local investor as a tool for letting them take 
part in the rubber boom, some local investors see the boom as an opportunity to obtain access and 
control over land in the uplands. Uncle Boonmee, a Lue farmer from a village near the town of Long 
district, stated that: “If I do not get the land, I will not give them rubber seedlings. It is not worth 
enough to get rubber trees without land. We do not know about the rubber price in the future. But 
rubber trees with land are fine. If rubber latex prices drops, [at least] I still have the land.” 
(Interview, 10 February 2010). While outside investors do not obtain formal land rights over the 
plantations, they can gain land access and control through the local recognition of villagers. The fact 
that many state officials are also involved in this form of land deal provides confidence to investors 
in the security of such a land arrangement. The governance spaces of the Lao state through which it 
implants – or, in this instance, does not – its policies, gives an opportunity for outsiders to obtain 
land access and control over land even when they do not have formal land rights. 
  3). Villagers hold private rights but have lost control over their land  
In Don Tha village, rubber plantations were mainly established under a 2+3 contract farming system 
between the villagers and the Xiang Jiao Rubber Company. This form of investment offers another 
pattern of transformation of land rights and control. Land which was under collective arrangement, 
mainly kin and relatives, became private when villagers set up the plantations. Villagers’ private land 
rights were recognised in a similar way to private rights established by smallholder farmers, 
especially those from Baan Houay Luang Mai. However, as villagers set up their plantations under a 
contract system lasting for 45 years, the company has, in effect, taken control over the land. While 
villagers hold private rights over the land, they have temporarily lost the power to control how the 
land can be used. By contrast, the company gains access and control over villagers’ land through the 
establishment of contracts with villagers, mediated and encouraged by the state. The experience of 
Don Tha’s villagers highlights how obtaining private land rights does not automatically mean people 
can gain land control and access. 
In sum, the rubber boom has quickly led to the establishment of private land rights over both land 
used for rubber plantations and fallows. Private land rights and land control are, however, shaped in 
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different ways by different actors. Thus, while land rights are generally privatised, there is a variety 
of forms of land access and control. Privatisation of communal land is not always smooth. Conflicts 
between villagers who claimed their rights over the same fallow land have emerged. One example 
was the case of My Pae - one of the poorest Akha in Baan Pha Lad - who was engaged in a bitter 
dispute with another villager over the fallow land which was used by both of them but at different 
times (see Box 7.2). 
Box 7.2 Mr Pae and conflicts over land access 
Mr Pae is a 59-year-old Akha who moved from his old village, which is about a two-
day walk from the current village, to Pha Lad village in 2000. At that time, he could 
access the forest land and used it to grow upland rice without any restriction either 
from the state or other villagers. He said, “land was plentiful. Nobody owned it. We 
used it for a few years and left it allowing the forest to regenerate. We moved to 
another old fallow or even natural forest land. It did not really matter if that fallow 
land had been used previously by someone else. We could use it. It was the same 
for the plot we left. Other villagers might use it. There was no problem.” He recalled 
that in the early 2000s, local state officials told villagers not to clear new forest land 
and they should grow dry-rice on a few designated plots. However, this did not 
influence the ways in which villagers accessed land for shifting cultivation. Things 
began to change in the mid-2000s, when there was an increase in demand for land 
to establish rubber plantations. Some villagers began claiming their rights over the 
fallows they used. Mr Pae claimed four plots of fallow land covering an area of nine 
hectares. In 2008, one plot amounting to around 1.5 hectares was taken by another 
villager to plant rubber. Mr Pae claimed that this plot should belong to him as he 
first used it in 2003. However, the disputant claimed that his ancestor had used that 
plot even before Mr Pae moved to the area. The case was brought to the Long 
DAFO. In an attempt to address the conflict, DAFO officials suggested Mr Pae and 
his disputant divide the plot and each of them take half. However, this suggestion 
was not acceptable to either of them. The plot was finally taken by Mr Pae’s 
disputant who then sold it to a Lue from the town of Long district. Mr Pae could do 
nothing about getting the land back.  
(Research diary based on an interview with Mr Pae, Pha Lad village, 4 February 2010) 
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The establishment of private land rights in the uplands resulting from the rubber boom has made it 
possible to transfer land use rights unofficially from villagers to outsiders. Some villagers from Pha 
Lad mentioned that some parts of the village’s land have been transferred to people from the 
district’s town. However, none of the interviewees in Baan Pha Lad stated that they themselves had 
sold their land. One villager from Baan Houay Luang Mai said that in 2008 he sold his 600-tree 
plantation, which was established in 2006, to a Yao villager in a nearby village for six million LAK73 
(interview, Mr Tue in his 45 years old, 24 December 2009). Though transferring land rights to 
outsiders is generally still rare, it may well increase, especially when villagers encounter a crisis and 
need cash. Rubber, in conjunction with other transformations in the Lao political economy, has 
unsettled customary practices and thereby opened up a space for the developments outlined above. 
Overall, the arrival of rubber has led to significant changes in land rights and controls in the uplands. 
While privatisation of land rights and access is a general trend, the fieldwork reveals a diversity of 
land rights and control in the four research sites. The particular contexts of village settlement, 
market integration, relations to the state as well as the ways in which rubber has arrived in each 
community have variously shaped land rights and control. Empirical data from the fieldwork also 
highlights the need to distinguish between forms of land rights and land control as people may hold 
formal land rights without also having the power of control over it. 
7.4 Emergence of new rural classes 
From a Marxist point of view, primitive accumulation is seen as a strategy to free up people from 
their means of production to create the free labour needed for industrialisation. Lenin (1899 cited in 
Brookfield and Parsons 2007: 2) argued that, in a process of primitive accumulation, some peasants 
can be successful in transforming themselves to a new status of farmer capitalist while those who 
are less successful fall into the status of the proletariat. Taking rubber expansion in the Lao PDR as a 
process of capital accumulation, this section explores how far and in what ways rubber, and the 
processes of capitalist accumulation that are attendant on the expansion of rubber, are leading to 
the emergence of new classes in the uplands.  
                                                          
73
 Approximately £476 as at 31 December 2008 (http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/). 
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7.4.1 The emergence of a rural entrepreneurial class in the Lao uplands 
Reflecting on the current rubber boom in Luang Namtha, there are signs of the emergence of a new 
rural entrepreneurial class in the uplands. However, it is also clear that most of the people who have 
the capacity to develop themselves into this class are not uplanders, but rather local traders and 
local officials from the lowlands who are newly connected to the uplands. These nascent (or existing) 
entrepreneurs are those who can gain benefits from their engagement with the rubber boom by 
providing rubber seedlings to upland villagers who want to set up plantations but cannot afford to 
buy seedlings. In Kaem Khong village, where only one household was in a position to invest their 
own capital, the only possible way for villagers to have their own plantation and derive benefits from 
it was to become involved in an informal deal with local investors - usually local officials and traders 
from the district town.  
One Lue lady who ran a guesthouse in Sing district mentioned that her family owned around 30 
hectares of rubber plantations in several Akha villages surrounding Sing district (research diary, Sing 
district, 22 December 2009). A wife of a senior official from Sing DAFO said that she had around six 
hectares of rubber plantations on land in one upland community. She bought the land in exchange 
for rubber seedlings that she ‘gave’ to the villagers (research diary, Sing district, 30 June 2010). An 
ex-member of the LPRP at Luang Namtha provincial level proudly talked about 40 hectares of rubber 
plantations owned by his son who is now a senior official at the Luang Namtha Provincial Planning 
and Investment Office (research diary, Sing district, 26 June 2010). 
Most of the new entrepreneurs, such as those noted above, can access land in the uplands by 
exchanging rubber seedlings for it. But it is also likely that some local officials access land in the 
uplands through use of their official position and the status that comes with it. One senior official 
from the Sing DAFO confidentially expressed his belief that through his official status and as a 
member of the party, he was able to access land anywhere he wanted:  
“If I want to plant rubber, I can get land for free from any village. I have worked for 
villagers for ages. Villagers know me very well. If I told them, they would definitely give 
me a plot of land for sure. Some officials did it this way. But I do not want to do that. I 
do not want to make villagers to have a negative memory of me.” 
(Interview, Sing DAFO senior official, 20 December 2009)  
The above message may suggest that some state officials use their status in state organisations or in 
the Party for their private capital accumulation. While Lenin’s new farmer capitalists in Russia were 
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those successful peasants who could generate surplus from agriculture for further accumulation, a 
large number of the new rural entrepreneurs in the Lao PDR are those who can turn their political 
capital (as state officials or members of the Party) into economic capital for private gain. Eyal and 
colleagues (Eyal et al. 1998) analyse the transition to capitalism in post-socialist countries in central 
Europe which they characterise as ‘capitalism without capitalists’. They argue that in the post-
socialist era when economic capital has become a dominant form and a new major source of power 
and privilege replacing social capital (institutionalised as political capital), political elites who can 
maintain or increase their status in the new regime are those who can adjust or convert their 
devalued social capital which they possessed under a socialist regime to the new valuable economic 
(and cultural) capital in a post-socialist context.  
The case of the Lao PDR is slightly different as social capital and political capital are still valuable as 
sources of power and privilege. In the context of transition, it is the elites who are able to use their 
capital under the socialist regime for further (economic) capital accumulation. In the context of a 
weak (or absent) civil society to balance the power of the state and state officials, the elites’ 
accumulation of capital has, sometimes, verged on the brutal. We thus should not expect these new 
rural entrepreneurs to be key agents in challenging current political structures. Instead, they may 
want to maintain the current system because of the benefits they can derive under the current 
system. Maintaining the current political regime does not prevent them from accessing the benefits 
that have emerged in the new market system. The rise of markets thus does not automatically lead 
to the erosion of the status of the socialist Lao state, indeed it may cause it to reinforce and bolster 
its position. We see, in other words, something of a puzzle: a resurgent state in the context of a 
liberalising economy. 
7.4.2 The emergence of a semi-proletariat class 
Marx predicted that primitive accumulation would finally create free labour forces. But in the case of 
upland communities in Luang Namtha, the ‘full’ processes of proletarianisation have not yet taken 
place. There are, however, processes of semi-proletarianisation occurring in at least two directions 
and as an outcome of two processes: through contract farming relations and, indirectly, through the 
pressures imposed on uplanders to leave their farms.   
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 7.4.2.1  Semi-proletarianisation through contract farming relations 
These processes are found in Don Tha village where most of the households could not afford to buy 
rubber seedlings to establish their own plantations and had to be under contract relations with the 
Xiang Jiao Rubber Company (see section 6.2.1). Under the contract which lasts 45 years, villagers 
have to be responsible for the labour needed to work in the plantations. Villagers have changed their 
status from ‘free’ peasants to the status of semi-proletarians on their own land. Details about how 
and when villagers have to work in the plantations are scheduled by the company. Contract farming 
has implicated uplanders in a new system of work. As the contract lasts for a long period of time, 
villagers have lost rights over their land for more than half of their lives. This is very different from 
the contract farming found in a village in northern Thailand reported in a study by Walker (2009), 
where villagers are intensively involved in contract farming for short-lived annual crops such as 
pepper, garlic and onions. According to Walker, villagers can move to strike up relations with a new 
investor every year if they are not happy with their old investor. In the case of rubber trees, 
however, villagers are trapped in constraining contract relations with a foreign company for close to 
a half century.  
While a 2+3 contract farming system is seen as the best system for the uplanders, it was found that 
there is often an informal revision of the contract between villagers and the investor. The Deputy 
Head of the Luang Namtha PAFO stated that due to the long period before the benefits of rubber 
plantations begin to accrue, some poor villagers find it difficult to make a living during this waiting 
period. Thus, following informal negotiations between villagers and the company, villagers are paid 
for their work in the plantations but as a result may get only 20-35 per cent of the profits from their 
land when their rubber reaches maturity (interview, Deputy Head of the Luang Namtha PAFO, 3 
December 2009). Villagers have thus become paid labourers on their own land. 
It is important to note that instead of opposing this process, in general, uplanders expressed their 
willingness to be engaged in such systems as they consider this as the only possible way they could 
derive benefit from the current expansion of rubber (see section 6.2.1). This process, therefore, has 
to be understood not just as an outcome of the forces of transnational capital, but also the agency of 
villagers themselves. The process of semi-proletarianisation in the uplands of the Lao PDR, while it 
may have been stimulated from ‘above’, is also partly propelled by the people from ‘below’. 
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 7.4.2.2  Increasing pressure for uplanders to curtail their farm activities 
Applying the primitive accumulation concept to analyse current land grabs in the southern province 
of the Lao PDR, Kenney-Lazar (2011) rightly argues that proletarianisation occurring in the process of 
primitive accumulation should be seen as a ‘side effect’ of land enclosure. Such a ‘side effect’ of 
capital accumulation can be clearly seen in the case of Kaem Khong village where villagers have lost 
most of the land they used for making their living whether as agricultural land, or as forest land for 
the collection of food and other commodities. While the company has not taken all of the land from 
villagers, the small amount left cannot sustain villagers’ livelihoods. Due to this increasing pressure, 
some villagers have decided to exit from farming and become wage labourers on the company’s 
plantations (this will be discussed in section 7.5). 
Another means by which semi-proletarianisation occurs is when villagers cannot find the means to 
obtain cash except by selling their plantations. This situation is found in areas where livelihood 
choices are very limited. In Kaem Khong village, Mr Ja Sae, a middle-aged Lahu from a poor 
household, reported that he had recently sold all of his plantation to obtain the cash needed to 
cover the healthcare costs of a seriously ill relative. Mr Ja Sae sold his plantation at a relatively cheap 
price as plantations located in the Kaem Khong area are less attractive to lowland investors to buy 
due to their inaccessibility (interview, Mr Ja Sae, 1 September 2010). At the time of the fieldwork, 
selling plantations was relatively rare. However, a decline in upland rice production resulted in 
extended periods of rice shortage, while alternative livelihoods were not available, leading to a rising 
number of households who had no choice but to sell their plantations. The separation of uplanders 
from their land and farm activities in a context where alternative livelihood activities are limited will 
lead, it is suggested, to more vulnerable livelihood situations for such upland people. The following 
section illuminates the impacts of rubber expansion on the livelihoods of upland populations. 
7.5 Upland livelihoods: current situation and portents for the future 
Today the Lao uplands are increasingly connected to the market. The processes of market 
integration have recently accelerated due to the boom in rubber propelling the connection between 
the uplands and the market at a rate which has never been seen before. As discussed earlier, the 
economy of the Lao uplands is on the move from a semi-subsistence system towards a market-
oriented economy in which rubber is fast becoming the dominant product of the uplands. This 
transformation has no doubt affected the livelihoods of the upland populations. Current livelihoods 
are being increasingly shaped by wider processes of state involvement and market integration, and 
  
210 
 
rubber plays a large role in this process. This section thus seeks to investigate how the rubber boom, 
in combination with other wider processes of integration, has influenced the lives and livelihoods of 
the upland populations, and to answer whether or not, and how, former dominant livelihoods of 
people are being affected by the boom. Have any new alternative livelihoods emerged? And what 
are uplanders’ future livelihoods likely to be? 
7.5.1 The rubber boom and the erosion of former livelihoods 
 1). Shifting cultivation 
“I used to have plenty of rice from my Hai [upland fields] before the company came. 
The fallow land was for as long as 15 years or more. Now the fallow period is only 2-3 
years. How could I get enough rice from this short-fallow land? How many hectares of 
Hai do I have to work on to get enough rice for my family? Even if I could put labour to 
work on a large plot of Hai, where is the land I can use? Everywhere the land is now the 
company’s rubber plantation.” 
(Interview, Mr Song – a middle-aged Kui from a poorest household,  
Kaem Khong village, 10 March 2010) 
Shifting cultivation was the main source of livelihood for the majority of the households in all the 
study communities, with the exception of pioneer settlers in Houay Luang Mai who enjoyed the 
prestige and advantages of being first arrivals in clearing and working paddy. Today, Houay Luang 
Mai’s latecomers and the majority of villagers from Don Tha, Kaem Khong, and Pha Lad villages still 
grow upland rice, either as their only rice farming system or in combination with wet rice. This 
agricultural system has not always been able to provide sufficient rice for the demands of the upland 
households. Before the rubber boom, this system was already under pressure from both 
uncontrolled natural disasters and, importantly, the restrictions imposed by government policies. 
The arrival of rubber, however, has pressured shifting agriculture in a negative direction. As 
discussed above, large areas of fallow land and also forest have now been converted to rubber trees. 
Fallow land has become increasingly valuable and villagers have thus begun claiming it for their own 
use. Upland land available for each household to use for dry-rice cultivation is dwindling. Fallow 
periods are shortening (Table 7.3), leading to declining soil fertility and an increase in weeds. This 
has resulted in a growing requirement for labour input even while yields decline. This was the main 
reason why some households from Kaem Khong village decided not to grow upland rice in 2009: “It 
requires us to work harder than we did but we would get less than we used to. It is not worth it” 
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(interview, Mr Oun-a Kui in his early 40s from a poorest household - who stopped practicing shifting 
cultivation in 2009, 9 March 2010).  
Table 7.3 The current situation of shifting cultivation, 2009. 
 Percentage of 
surveyed households 
practicing shifting 
cultivation in 2009 
Average areas of 
fallow land of 
surveyed households 
practicing shifting 
cultivation in 2009 
(hectare) 
Average fallow period 
of surveyed household 
practicing shifting 
cultivation in 2009 
(years) 
Houay Luang Mai 28 5.54 4.4 
Pha Lad 83.9 4.97 5.38 
Don Tha 100 7.65 4.55 
Kaem Khong 83.3 5.7 3.6 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009–2010 
 2). Collection of Non-Timber Forest Products 
Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs) have traditionally played an important role as a supplement to 
upland households’ income and as a reservoir of food for hungry periods. Except for broom grass 
and bitter bamboo shoots which can be found in young fallow areas, most of the high-value NTFPs 
are usually found in the primary forest or old fallow areas. The dramatic decrease in forest land 
resulting from the expansion of rubber plantations in all the study villages has affected the 
availability of NTFPs. The amount of NTFPs that villagers collect has dropped in all the four villages. 
In 2009, the average household from Kaem Khong village was earning 562,000 LAK (£40.60) from 
selling NTFPs of which broom grass contributed more than 80 per cent (462,000 LAK or £33.40)74. Mr 
Chai, who collected NTFPs in Kaem Khong and a few nearby villages for a Tai trader from Burma, 
noted changes in NTFP availability in the area. In 2009, he was only able to collect five tons of bark, 
six tons of sugar palm fruits, and ten tons of broom grass. Four years ago, he collected around ten 
tons of bark, ten tons of sugar palm fruits, and six tons of broom grass (interview, Kaem Khong 
village, 10 March 2010). 
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A similar situation was found in Don Tha village. Villagers mentioned that they rarely found red 
mushrooms, cardamom and bark - all high-value NTFPs which used to be prevalent in the area. Mrs 
Pu, a 44 year-old Khmu lady from a poor household, noted that her household collected only 4-5 
kilograms of bark in 2009. Before the arrival of rubber, her household could gather bark amounting 
to around 30-40 kilograms. In 2009, she was impressed by the amount of broom grass that she sold 
which was some 60 kilograms giving her almost 300,000 LAK (£21.70)75 (interview, 5 December 
2009). Table 7.4 shows the trend of changes in NTFP trade in Nalae district, highlighting the decline 
of some NTFPs which were usually found in primary forest or old fallow land, and an increase in the 
availability of broom grass which is mainly found in young fallow land and immature rubber 
plantations. 
Table 7.4 Amount of Non-timber forest products exported from Nalae district (2001-2008) 
Forest Products  2001 2005 2006 2008 
Sugar palm fruit (maak dtao) (tons) 
62 50 18 1.5 
Cardamom (maak nhaeng) (tons) 3.2 0.6 4 1 
Galangal (maak kha) (tons) 2.6 0 2 1 
Bark (nang dteing) (tons) 100 54 79 18 
Red mushroom (tons) 0.102 0.215 0 2 
Rattan String (strings) 6,000 10,000 15 tons 0 
Broom grass (tons) N/A N/A 3 20 
Bamboo shoots (tons) N/A N/A 25 20 
Sources: Data for 2001 and 2005 are based on RDMA (2007: 15); data for year 2006 and 2008 were provided 
by the Nalae DAFO during the fieldwork in 2010. 
As NTFPs were one of the major sources of upland household income, a massive drop in the amount 
of most NTFPs has, inevitably, affected the well-being of uplanders, especially of those households 
who face rice shortages. These days, broom grass is still abundant as the rubber has not yet 
matured. The availability of broom grass will, however, decrease when the rubber trees mature. 
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Thus, NTFPs will no longer provide a supplement for upland livelihoods. As Mrs Bung, a 48 year-old 
Akha from Pha Lad village and from one of the poorest households said: “both bark and sugar palm 
fruits are rare these days because natural forest and old fallow land have become rubber 
plantations. Today, we can collect broom grass from new rubber plantations. But when rubber trees 
have matured, there will be no broom grass in the plantations. It is likely that we will not have 
anything to sell” (interview, 7 February 2010).  
 3). Livestock-raising 
In addition to NTFPs, livestock, especially buffaloes, were another source of upland households’ 
income. Selling cattle was a significant channel for addressing households’ shortage of food. Since 
rubber has been brought up to the hills, the number of cattle in each study village has dramatically 
dropped. The experience of Mr Loon from Don Tha village highlights how livestock can no longer 
provide a solution to the subsistence crisis that many upland households face: 
Mr Loon - a Khmu man in his early 60s - is one of the poorest Khmu from Don Tha 
village. Before the arrival of rubber trees, his household faced rice shortages for an 
average of two months a year. This rice gap was mainly filled by cash earned from 
NTFPs. When the household was in need of a large amount of cash, selling one of the 
household’s buffaloes was always the solution. Before the rubber boom, he had five 
buffaloes. Like other villagers, Mr Loon raised his buffaloes by letting them find grass in 
open grass fields and fallow land, which were abundant. Things changed as rubber has 
come to dominate the upland landscape. In 2007, his buffaloes entered and destroyed 
the rubber plantation of a Khmu villager from a nearby village. Mr Loon was asked to 
pay 4.5 million LAK (£237) as a fine for 30 destroyed rubber trees76. He had to sell one 
of his buffaloes to get the money to pay the fine. To avoid being fined again, Mr Loon 
decided to sell all of his buffaloes. He said, “I had to sell my buffaloes before they 
destroyed more rubber trees. Otherwise, I would have to sell them to pay the fine and I 
would not get any kip77 from the buffaloes I had raised for several years”. He also 
mentioned that some villagers whose buffaloes destroyed others’ plantations did not 
show up and let the plantation owners take the buffaloes as they might have to pay a 
fine greater than the money they could get from selling the buffaloes. As a partial 
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solution, the rubber company and the Nalae DAFO convinced villagers to raise their 
cattle in fenced pastures. This area was the village’s fallow land which is about a two-
hour walk from the village settlement. However, villagers found that the area was not 
suitable for raising cattle. Mr Kiam - a 25-year-old Khmu from a less poor household - 
noted that four out of his six buffaloes died in the first year they were raised in the 
fenced pasture. Most villagers have thus decided to sell their buffaloes.  
(Research diary based on interview with Mr Loon, 4 December 2009 and  
Mr Kiam, 5 December 2009, Don Tha village) 
This story from Don Tha village highlights how rubber has affected the potential of uplanders to 
continue livestock raising. A similar story was also found in other upland communities. Mr Oun, who 
belonged to one of the poorest households in Kaem Khong village, noted that before the arrival of 
the company, villagers from Kaem Khong and a few nearby villages were encouraged by Long DAFO 
and as part of an EU project to raise cattle. Around 100 hectares of land was provided as an open 
grazing area for villagers to raise their cows and buffaloes. This area is now the company’s rubber 
plantation. The loss of the grass fields for the cattle, in combination with the necessity to avoid being 
fined when their cattle destroy rubber trees, has likewise forced villagers to sell their cattle 
(interview, Mr Oun in his early 40s, 9 March 2010). Table 7.5 summarises how far rubber expansion 
has affected villagers’ potential to raise cattle and, thus, their capability of resolving the households’ 
livelihoods crisis.  
Table 7.5 Surveyed households’ average number of cattle, early 2000s-2009 
 
Village 
% of surveyed households 
having cattle 
Average number of surveyed 
households’ cattle 
 (head/household) 
Before the 
rubber boom 
Under the 
rubber boom  
Before the 
rubber boom 
Under the 
rubber boom  
Don Tha 77.3 36.3 5 1 
Houay Luang Mai 72 36 5 1 
Kaem Khong 77.8 0 3 0 
Pha Lad 77.4 9.7 4 <1 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009-2010 
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In sum, the traditional livelihoods of the upland populations which were formerly linked to shifting 
cultivation, collecting NTFPs, and livestock-raising have been shaken by the rapid expansion of 
rubber trees because of the way that rubber intrudes into traditional livelihood activities. The 
following section will turn to discuss the new livelihoods that have emerged from the rubber boom.  
7.5.2 Emergence of new livelihoods 
Mr Oun is a Kui man in his early 40s who belongs to the poorest household category in 
Kaem Khong village. His livelihood was formerly heavily reliant on upland agriculture. 
Some of the fallow land he previously used was taken by the Chinese rubber company 
in 2007. Two years later, Mr Oun decided not to grow upland rice as his household 
could not access fertile forest land and land with short fallow periods that he could 
probably use did not seem to be able to provide sufficiently high yields of rice to meet 
his needs. Mr Oun and his wife managed to get an annual contract from the company to 
clear weeds and grass out of the company’s plantations covering an area of ten 
hectares, which they manually cleared three times a year. The company paid them 
15,000,000 LAK (£1084.60) plus ten roof tiles. Mr Oun and his wife also went to work as 
day–wage labourers in the company’s plantations and were paid 30,000 LAK (£2.17) per 
day. In 2009, the household earned around 17,000,000 LAK (£1,229.21) from hiring 
themselves out as labourers in the company’s plantations accounting over 90 per cent 
of the household’s total income. In 2009, the household spent 3,000,000 LAK (£216.92) 
buying 1.5 tons of rice. Mr Oun noticed that since the rubber company came to the area 
in 2007, there has been a dramatic increase in demand for wage labour in the area. 
Before the arrival of the Chinese rubber company, his household could get paid only 
100,000 LAK (£7.23) per year from wage labouring in paddy fields owned by Tai villagers 
in Burma. He noted that although the company had taken lots of land from villagers, it 
had also brought more opportunities for villagers in terms of wage labouring78.  
(Research diary based on an interview with Mr Oun,  
Kaem Khong village, 9 March 2010) 
The story from Kaem Khong highlights the increasing opportunities for villagers to earn cash from 
being wage labourers, which is a direct outcome of the rubber boom. Kaem Khong’s villagers have 
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the highest opportunity to get hired because the Chinese rubber company has set up a large size 
plantation in a very sparsely-populated area. Indeed, villages in this area cannot supply sufficient 
labour to the rubber company. The company has to bring villagers from other areas including villages 
near the town of Long district or even from Luang Prabang and Udomxay provinces. The arrival of 
the rubber company in the area provides a new and important source of cash for Kaem Khong’s 
villagers. In 2009, household average income contributed by wages was 9,183,000 LAK (£663.99) 
compared to only 275,000 LAK (£13.95) before the establishment of the company’s plantations (see 
Table 7.6). 
Table 7.6 Average household annual income from wage labouring in each village, 2009 
Village Number of surveyed 
household involved in 
wage labouring 
Average income 
(GBP/household) 
Don Tha 10 out of 22 14.10 
Houay Luang Mai 15 out of 25 30.37 
Kaem Khong 18 out of 18 663.99 
Pha Lad 28 out of 31 110.34 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009-2010 
Pha Lad’s villagers can also access weeding jobs in the company’s plantations which are located in 
Chor Pan village, which is around half an hour’s walk from Pha Lad village. However, as there are 
many villages located in this area and the plantation size is smaller than in the Kaem Khong area, the 
opportunities in Pha Lad are not as great as they are for Kaem Khong’s villagers. 
In Houay Luang Mai, most of the rubber plantations in the surrounding area belong to local 
investors. There is no company with a large plantation in the area. Villagers hire labour out to the 
rubber plantations of lowland Lue or Yao people. Some villagers from the poorest household 
category also work in the paddy or cash crop fields (e.g. in watermelon fields) of Lue people. Among 
the less poor household group, only one out of eight surveyed households indicated that the 
household’s members were involved in wage labour in 2009. 
In Houay Luang Mai, the opportunities to get hired are generally lower than in Kaem Khong and Pha 
Lad villages. Wage labour plays a less important role in household livelihoods as villagers still have 
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other livelihood opportunities, especially those from cash crop production. The exception is in the 
case of two households from the poorest category who do not grow sugarcane. Mr Ler is the poorest 
Akha; he has neither paddy field nor does he engage in cash crop production. He and his wife usually 
hire out their labour to work in both the rubber plantations of Lue or Yao people, and in the paddy 
fields of the lowland Lue. In 2009, the household gained 1,800,000 LAK (£130.15) from wage 
labouring which contributed one-third of the household’s total income (interview, Mr Ler, a 40-year-
old Akha, 17 November 2009). Another household which is heavily reliant on wages is that of Mr Ya 
Tu. In 2009, the household gained 3,600,000 LAK (£260.30) accounting for almost 85 per cent of 
total household income. However, most of the cash the household earned came from Mr Ta Yu’s 
work as a full-time staff member in a guesthouse owned by a Lue from the town of Sing. Thus, for 
this household, rubber did not really increase the opportunities for productive employment 
(interview, Mr Ya Tu, a 27-year-old Akha, 26 December 2009). 
In Don Tha, though labouring opportunities increased with the expansion of rubber plantations, 
villagers’ opportunities were still fewer than for people in Kaem Khong and Pha Lad. This is because 
of the patterns of rubber investment in Nalae. With the exception of the Xiang Jiao Rubber 
Company’s demonstration plantations which covered an area of 320 hectares, rubber plantations in 
Nalae are under smallholder management, either through villagers’ own investment or in the form 
of a contract farming system. These plantations are, therefore, mostly looked after by the owners. 
Additional labour is required only when household labour is not sufficient. In 2009, Don Tha’s 
average annual income from wage labouring was 195,000 LAK (£14.10) per household which was the 
lowest among all the study villages. Kaem Khong’s villagers could earn significantly higher income 
from labouring than households in the other villages could earn from the same activity 
(approximately 47 times, 21 times, and 6 times higher than households from Don Tha, Houay Luang 
Mai, and Pha Lad respectively).  
In a context where traditional livelihood activities can no longer deliver a sustainable livelihood for 
uplanders, the emergence of wage labouring opportunities provide some hope to villagers for their 
survival while waiting for their rubber to mature. However, opportunities vary in each area. On 
balance it is only Kaem Khong’s villagers who live in the least densely-populated area, near large-
scale plantations, who have access to sufficient opportunities to meet the livelihood shortfall that 
the expansion of rubber has engendered. This raises a wider point and question: what is the future 
of upland villagers’ livelihoods in the context of the rubber boom? This will be discussed in the 
following section. 
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7.5.3 Assessment of the past, looking to the future 
The previous two sections have showed how rubber expansion into the uplands has affected upland 
livelihood activities. The vast majority of households in the study villages could not access paddy 
fields and have to make their living from shifting cultivation. Rapid transformations of the upland 
landscape, which was formerly dominated by forest and upland agricultural land, into boundless 
rows of rubber trees have no doubt had profound effects on people whose livelihoods were heavily 
reliant on the forest and shifting cultivation. As discussed in section 7.5.1, the arrival of rubber trees 
has resulted in shorter fallow periods which inevitably affect upland rice yields. This situation has led 
to increasing periods of rice shortage in the uplands. Figure 7.2 shows the current situation of rice 
surplus and shortage in the study communities.  
Figure 7.2 Rice surpluses and shortages in the study communities, early 2000s-2009. 
  
Source: Fieldwork, 2009–2010 
As shown in Figure 7.2, since rubber has expanded into their settlements, villagers from Don Tha and 
Kaem Khong villages have had to endure longer rice shortages. The variation in degrees of rice 
shortage among the four upland communities is mainly related to the availability of paddy fields in 
each village. Most of the villagers from Houay Luang Mai can access paddy fields and thus they faced 
rice shortages for only a short period each year. In Pha Lad village, the situation of rice shortage was 
not very serious in 2009 because the remaining upland agricultural land was relatively large and 
some households could also grow rice on their newly-cleared paddy fields. There are no paddy fields 
available in Don Tha and Kaem Khong villages, however, and thus villagers have to rely only on 
upland rice cultivation. A rapid decrease in upland agricultural areas and a decline in the fertility of 
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the remaining (but shrinking) land base have caused rice shortages in Don Tha and Kaem Khong 
villages to extend to over four months each year.  
The rapid expansion of rubber trees has also affected the availability of food in the uplands in other 
ways. Food which was partly available in the forest and swidden fields has now decreased and 
villagers have to buy more from the market, requiring more cash. However, neither NTFPs nor 
livestock, which used to be the primary sources of household income, can generate sufficient cash to 
meet this need. The arrival of rubber trees has led to a sharp decline in the number of NTFPs, as 
outlined above. The possibilities for uplanders to have cattle have also weakened. Thus the boom in 
rubber has pushed uplanders into a more vulnerable situation. They are, it could be said, facing an 
existential squeeze: declining availability of food is causing villagers to turn to the market to meet 
their needs; but a concomitant decline in cash generation from NTFPs and livestock is also 
compromising their ability to meet this shortfall through market exchange. 
Some officials consider that rubber development in Luang Namtha may bring more jobs for people in 
areas where employment opportunities are currently limited (research diary, Head of the Luang 
Namtha PAFO, 26 October 2009; see also Vientiane Times, 29 July 2011)79. It is undeniable that the 
arrival of rubber has brought some more jobs for uplanders (as shown in Table 7.6). Narratives from 
Kaem Khong village highlight that without working on the plantations of the Jundai Company, many 
households would not have rice to fill their cooking pots. However, employment opportunities are 
available only in some areas. Furthermore, even in areas where there is high demand for labour, 
there is still a big question as to how far this emerging livelihood activity can provide livelihood 
sustainability for the upland populations over the long term.  
Baird (2010: 22), while he notes that moving away from the farm is not always a problem as it can in 
many cases provide better lives and living than staying on the farm, points to the differences 
between people who choose to move away and those who are forced to find alternative livelihoods 
to survive. While rural residents in some areas have chosen to diversify their livelihoods into non-
farm work (see, for example, Rigg 2001; Rigg 2006b), this research shows that a precipitate move to 
off-farm work, such as was the case for many villagers in Kaem Khong, was not a choice, rather a 
necessity. Such distress de-agrarianisation may have begun in the Lao uplands but its potential to 
sustain the livelihoods of uplanders remains uncertain (this issue of distress de-agrarianisation will 
be returned to in Chapter 8). It is clear that there is considerable demand for cheap labour largely 
                                                          
79
 Vientiane Times, “Rubber factory construction underway in Luang Namtha”, 29 July 2011. 
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drawn from upland communities to work in Chinese rubber plantations. However, a question is 
whether this demand will be long-term. Today, there is concern among Lao officials over the limited 
labour demand on rubber plantations when trees have matured (Syvongxay 2012), leading to 
questions over the sustainability of such work and therefore the livelihoods that are underpinned by 
it.  
Investors tend to view Lao peasants as lazy and undisciplined with an unwillingness to work hard. 
Thus they prefer to import Chinese workers to work in their plantations rather than hiring 
‘undesirable’ Lao people. While there is a rule requiring investors to employ local labour, it is 
questionable how far the regulation can be (and needs to be) implemented. Previous studies on 
large-scale plantations in the southern region of the Lao PDR (Laungaramsi et al. 2008; Baird 2010) 
reveal a volatile employment situation. The Deputy Head of the Luang Namtha PAFO also expressed 
his worry on this issue: “we hope investors will employ our people. But we are not so sure. When 
rubber is mature, they may claim that our people do not have the knowledge and skills required for 
tapping rubber. They may claim that they need to import Chinese people to work for them”80 
(interview, 24 September 2009). High labour demand thus does not guarantee that Lao uplanders 
will be employed. This raises concerns over the optimistic views among those who consider large-
scale agricultural development as a vehicle to generate employment opportunities and, thus, 
alleviate poverty for rural residents (Deininger et al. 2011).  
Both villagers and officials also hoped that the lives of upland populations would be better in the 
near future and that this would occur because of the contribution of rubber to rural livelihoods. At 
the time that the fieldwork was carried out in the four study communities, the process of 
transformation was still – and inevitably – on-going. In a real sense, the process of agrarian 
transition is never ‘complete’. At the time of the field work, rubber was not generating income for 
farmers and thus a clear picture of the contribution of rubber in the study sites could not be 
captured. However, drawing on the current situations that uplanders were facing, trajectories of 
transformations may be roughly predicted by looking at the possibilities of future transition paths, as 
shown in Table 7.7 
                                                          
80
 Chinese large scale investment in rubber plantations has brought a concern among local people that there 
will lead to an influx of a large number of Chinese workers coming to work in the Lao PDR. This may lead to the 
destruction of the Lao way of life and culture (Woodman 2011). 
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Table 7.7 Possible future scenarios of transformations in the study communities 
 Both rubber production and rubber prices remain buoyant Either rubber production or rubber prices are depressed 
Baan Houay 
Luang Mai 
- Rubber will be the main source of income for most 
households. 
- Some households (mainly less-poor households) will also earn 
cash from sugarcane. 
- Collecting NTFPs will decline rapidly. 
- Households with paddy will be unlikely to face rice shortages. 
- Shifting cultivation will decline due to limited availability of 
agricultural land; households without paddy may decide to 
stop practicing shifting cultivation and use cash generated from 
rubber to buy rice. 
- While most of the households will earn profits from rubber, 
some will earn more than others. Thus it is likely that social 
differentiation within the village will significantly increase. 
Pioneer households who voluntarily settled in the area first and 
have been able to access paddy land accumulated wealth from 
their paddy land to establish large rubber holdings will earn 
more profits than households which were forcibly relocated by 
the state and do not have access to paddy and in general have 
much smaller rubber holdings. 
- For the group of less poor households, sugarcane will be the 
main source of household income. 
- Collection of NTFPs will decline but villagers, especially poor 
households, will have to continue with this activity. 
- Households with paddy will still have rice to eat. 
- Land available for shifting cultivation will decrease and thus 
yields will drop. However, households without paddy will face 
rice shortages and may lack cash to buy rice. 
- Poor households may sell their labour but this is unlikely to be 
sufficient to provide sufficient cash to make a living. 
- Land loss may be occurring when poor households need cash 
but cannot find alternative livelihoods.  
- Differentiation within the village will exist but it will be 
determined largely by villagers’ ability to access agricultural 
land (especially paddy), not by rubber. Internal differentiation 
may be at a lesser degree than a situation where rubber 
production and prices remain buoyant.  
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Table 7.7 Possible future scenarios of transformations in the study communities (continued) 
 Both rubber production and rubber prices remain buoyant Either rubber production or rubber prices are depressed 
Baan Pha Lad - Rubber will be the major source of income for most of the 
households 
- Some households will benefit from other cash crop 
production (but to a much lesser degree to sugarcane 
production in Baan Houay Luang Mai). 
- The majority of the village’s households will produce rice from 
combining paddy and shifting cultivation; some households 
who have recently settled will rely only on shifting cultivation.  
- Collecting NTFPs may decline and not be attractive for 
villagers who may find that generating cash from rubber is 
more attractive. 
- Wage labouring in Chinese rubber plantations may become an 
alternative source of income for villagers but this may not be 
guaranteed as the company may wish to employ Chinese 
labourers over locals. 
- Internal differentiation may emerge but at a lesser degree 
than in Baan Houay Luang Mai. 
 
 
- The majority of the village’s household will combine paddy 
and shifting cultivation while those who do not have paddy 
fields will rely on shifting cultivation. Those households with no 
access to paddy may be at a higher risk of rice shortage. 
- Some households may earn cash from commercial crops. 
However, cash crops may not make a great contribution to 
households’ livelihoods.  
- Villagers will have to continue collecting NTFPs which will be a 
significant supplement for households. 
- Wage labouring in Chinese plantations will be unlikely to 
continue. Villagers may access wage opportunities on lowland 
farms. But this is unlikely to provide much cash. 
- Land loss is likely to occur among those poor households who 
need cash but cannot generate it from the available livelihood 
activities.  
- Internal differentiation may occur, especially between 
households which can diversify their livelihood activities and 
those who cannot. 
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Table 7.7 Possible future scenarios of transformations in the study communities (continued) 
 Both rubber production and rubber prices remain buoyant Either rubber production or rubber prices are depressed 
Baan Don Tha - Rubber will be the main source of household income. 
- As returns from shifting cultivation are likely to be low, 
villagers who have rubber plantations may not be interested in 
continuing with shifting cultivation and instead use cash 
generated from rubber to buy rice. Villagers who do not have 
plantations will have to practice shifting cultivation and face 
shortages of rice. 
- Cash generated from other cash crops may not occur due to 
limited availability of agricultural land. 
- Collecting NTFPs may continue and it will be particularly 
important for households that do not have rubber holdings. 
- Some households may be involved in wage labouring in the 
plantations of the Chinese company or investors from the 
district centre. Wage labouring will become a significant 
activity for households who do not have a plantation. However, 
the opportunities for such employment may not be as high as 
in Baan Kaem Khong. 
- Internal differentiation will emerge, especially between 
households who have a plantation and those who do not. 
Differentiation is likely to be at a lesser degree than in Baan 
Houay Luang Mai. 
- Livelihoods of villagers will be highly vulnerable as rubber 
does not deliver on its promise while returning to traditional 
livelihoods is not possible. 
- While shifting cultivation is unlikely to provide sufficient rice 
for households, villagers will have to continue practicing it as 
the only source of rice available. Rice shortages will be 
prevalent. Cash generated from other activities may not be 
sufficient to buy rice to cover the whole year. 
- Villagers will have to continue collecting NTFPs even while the 
amount of NTFPs declines. 
- While demand to secure wage labouring will be high, the 
opportunities will decreased.  
- Selling land to outsiders may be prevalent as villagers need 
cash to buy rice. This will happen to both households with and 
those without a plantation. 
- Internal differentiation will be reduced in the context of 
widespread poverty.  
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Table 7.7 Possible future scenarios of transformations in the study communities (continued) 
 Both rubber production and rubber prices remain buoyant Either rubber production or rubber prices are depressed 
Baan Kaem 
Khong 
- Rubber will be the main source of income for the village’s 
households. 
- Some villagers may practice shifting cultivation to obtain rice 
while some villagers may stop practicing it, due to low returns, 
and use the cash generated from rubber to buy rice. 
- Villages may access wage labouring opportunities in the 
Chinese rubber company, but this will be highly uncertain. 
- Villagers may be involved in collecting NTFPs but income 
generated from NTFPs may be far behind income provided by 
rubber. 
- Internal differentiation may emerge between households 
which have a plantation and households that do not (such 
households who have sold their plantation before the rubber 
can generate income). However, the level of internal 
differentiation may not as high as that occurring in Baan Houay 
Luang Mai. 
- Like Baan Don Tha, there will be great uncertainty concerning 
livelihood sustainability of villagers when rubber cannot secure 
their livelihoods and returning to previous activities is 
impossible. 
- Villagers will continue collecting NTFPs but this will not be 
able to provide the cash they need. The availability of NTFPs 
will continue to decline. 
- Villagers may work as wage labour in Chinese rubber 
plantation but the opportunity to be hired will be highly 
uncertain. 
- Villagers will have to continue shifting cultivation even as 
yields decline. Rice shortages will be common while villagers 
may find it difficult to generate cash from other activities.  
- Selling non-profitable rubber plantations to outsiders may be 
prevalent as the only way that villagers can obtain cash needed 
to resolve their livelihood crisis. 
- Internal differentiation may not be high as every household 
may be in a similar situation. 
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Officials’ and villagers’ dreams about the livelihood improvements that rubber can deliver 
are likely to come true where rubber production is high and the rubber market continues to 
boom. While the majority of the households will earn profits from selling rubber, not all 
households will profit to the same degree. Villagers who have large plantations will earn 
more. By contrast, poor villagers who do not have a plantation or who have sold out their 
plantation before their rubber has matured will be left behind. Thus, it is speculated, that 
internal differentiation will increase. The gap between emerging rural classes will be 
particularly high in the case of villagers in Baan Houay Luang Mai where there is a sharp 
distinction between those who voluntarily moved to the area when the village was first 
established and those late comers who have been recently and forcibly relocated and have 
thus encountered problems gaining access to agricultural land. The history of boom crops 
is, however, often a narrative of boom and bust (see, for example, Thanh Ha and Shively 
2008; Clough et al. 2009). Thus, in case that rubber cannot make its promise, people who 
are largely reliant on a single livelihood activity and unable to diversify their livelihoods are 
likely to be highly vulnerable (Ellis 2000a; 2000b). Thus there is ambiguity regarding the 
potential of rubber to become the major source of economic well-being for the upland 
populations. Replacement of traditional agricultural practice, which the state views as 
undesirable, by a mono-crop with no, or limited, availability of alternative livelihood 
activities may potentially impoverish uplanders instead of alleviating their poverty.  
The capability of villagers from each study village to cope with their risks varies among the 
study villages. Their vulnerability is associated with how far their livelihoods will depend on 
rubber and the historical settlement of the village which has implications for their ability to 
access agricultural land in each village. In Don Tha community where rubber will possibly be 
the only source of household income and well-being of people, villagers may desperately 
struggle against hunger. Kaem Khong’s villagers may be in a better situation than those 
villagers from Don Tha village if the rubber company continues hiring them for its 
plantations. However, as discussed earlier, their employment opportunities are highly 
uncertain. As resettlement villages, villagers from both cannot access paddy fields and have 
to rely on shifting cultivation to obtain rice. As discussed earlier, shifting cultivation is 
unable to provide sufficient rice to meet their subsistence needs. Rubber thus represents 
the means by which they can achieve rice security through its purchase using the cash 
generated by rubber. If rubber cannot meet this promise, however, villagers will face 
severe shortages of rice. They will struggle to continue farming but will also not find it easy 
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to move into other, alternative activities due to the limited availability of non-farm 
opportunities in the area. Villagers from Pha Lad and Houay Luang Mai villages who can 
access paddy fields, in general, will possibly have lower risks than villagers from Don Tha 
and Kaem Khong villages; they are likely to have rice to eat from their paddy fields. A 
considerable number of households from Houay Luang Mai, who have large areas of paddy, 
may be able to diversify their farming activities and earn some cash from producing other 
cash crops for the Chinese market. Though they may face some cheating and market 
fluctuation (see a similar situation in other areas in Chamberlain 2007: 36), being able to 
diversify farm activities beyond rubber may minimise their risks. By contrast to paddy 
owners, the future well-being of villagers who cannot access paddy and thus will have to 
make their living from a combination of declining shifting cultivation and uncertain rubber 
may be endangered. 
This section has traced how the livelihoods of the upland populations are being 
transformed in the age of the rubber boom. Fieldwork from four upland communities 
shows the erosion of upland traditional livelihoods. The arrival of rubber in the uplands has 
transformed the ways that forest and land were used into a new mode of production aimed 
at the market. Large areas of forest and swidden land are being transformed to a mono-
crop. This rapid change has affected the capacity of uplanders to continue the livelihood 
activities that they previously made their living from, namely, shifting cultivation, NTFP 
collecting, and livestock-raising. The fieldwork reveals a new livelihood activity - wage 
labour - emerging along with the arrival of rubber in some areas. The research records an 
expeditious increase in the role of wage income on the survival of upland households in 
some areas. Drawing on an immediate shrinkage of previous livelihood activities and the 
uncertainty of only a single emerging livelihood, this section has discussed the increasing 
vulnerability of the upland households. While there is a possibility that uplanders may have 
improved their well-being from rubber, this section has worriedly discussed the risks of 
replacement of an upland traditional agricultural system with a ‘modern’ mono-crop. 
Turning from shifting cultivation to rubber while there is limited availability of alternative 
livelihoods may unintentionally perpetuate poverty instead of increasing uplanders’ wealth.  
7.6 Summary 
This chapter has attempted to highlight how the uplands of the Lao PDR are being 
transformed in the context of spatial and economic integration wrought by the expansion 
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of rubber trees. The arrival of rubber trees has resulted in a domination of rubber over the 
upland landscape which, until recently, was a combination of forest and swidden. Though 
there is a similarity in the direction of land use changes, the degrees of change vary. This 
variation is associated with how rubber arrived in each community. This chapter has also 
discussed transformations of the land rights in the uplands. The arrival of rubber trees has 
successfully established privately-accessed land relations – the system that the state had 
attempted to establish but at which success was limited. The rubber tree, as the medium 
for the establishment of new land relations, has suddenly shrunk the area of communal 
property. Villagers have now claimed private rights over both land used for their 
plantations and fallow land. While transforming communal land rights to private land is a 
general trend in the transformations of land relations, different power geometries and the 
varied strategies of different actors in negotiating over land control in the uplands have 
resulted in complexities of land rights. 
This chapter has also discussed the emergence of new classes in rural Lao PDR. The arrival 
of rubber trees has provided opportunities for local traders and local state officials who 
could access financial capital through their social and political capital under the Lao socialist 
system to accumulate further wealth by making informal deals with poor uplanders who 
wished to be linked into the market but could not afford it by themselves. The rubber boom 
has also led to a process of semi-proletarianisation in the uplands when villagers are forced 
to leave their farms due to the increasing pressure they face from the rubber expansion. 
Semi-proletarianisation, moreover, has been engendered through the system of contract 
farming relations between Don Tha’s villagers and the Chinese rubber company. 
The chapter has illuminated how the livelihoods of the upland people have been affected 
by the boom in rubber. The rapid expansion of rubber has led to the decline of previously 
dominant livelihood activities, namely shifting cultivation, NTFP collecting, and livestock-
raising. The chapter has also discussed one new emerging livelihood activity that has 
accompanied the rubber boom: wage labour. While diversification can be an important 
contributor to building resilient livelihoods, it seems that the experience for many in the 
hills of northern Lao PDR is, rather, one of growing vulnerability in the context of 
increasingly fragile livelihoods. The next chapter will bring the empirical data back to key 
debate and concerns on agrarian studies. 
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Chapter Eight  
Rethinking Agrarian Transformations: 
Linking the Lao Experiences to the Literature 
8.1 Introduction 
This penultimate chapter aims to link the empirical evidence from the fieldwork back to the 
concerns regarding agrarian studies noted in Chapter 1 and then explored in more detail in 
Chapter 2. The main purpose of the chapter is to consider how the research offers insights 
that can build a better understanding of agrarian change. It is important to note that as 
discussed in Chapter 3, the research process encountered some limitations on the selection 
of the research sites themselves and, because of the presence of state officials during 
periods of fieldwork, the methods employed. These limitations have no doubt affected 
what the research could discover from the study communities. As a result, the findings 
presented in this thesis are best described as representing a ‘partial truth’ (Clifford 1986). 
This ‘partial truth’ not only applies to the study sites but extends to the question of 
whether we can read the processes of changes beyond the study sites. That said, the 
research can make the claim that similar processes and outcomes may be occurring in 
other areas in the Lao PDR. The inability to make generalisations does not imply that the 
research cannot contribute to the production of knowledge with wider resonances. 
However, the contribution is not made through generalisation of the findings observed 
from the four communities. It is rather made via the empirical evidence from the study sites 
that can have a dialogue with the existing literature and debates developed from previous 
studies. It is in this sense that the research contributes to the production of new 
knowledge.  
The chapter begins by linking the empirical evidence of agrarian changes observed in the 
study villages to literature on agrarian transitions in Southeast Asia focussing on a 
discussion of alternative paths of transition and the role of agriculture in rural livelihoods. 
The chapter then draws on the experience of transformations of land control to appraise 
the literature on global land grabs. Evidence from the research is also used to return to a 
wider discussion concerning the actors in agrarian processes. The chapter then links data 
from the fieldwork to debates on relations between small farmers and the market. In 
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particular, it seeks to ask whether the literature that sees smallholders as victims of market 
penetration still has explanatory purchase. The role of the Lao and Chinese states in rubber 
expansion in the uplands is used to reconsider state-market relations under conditions of 
economic globalisation. Finally, the chapter reconsiders how far current literatures and 
debates resonate or are challenged by this research conducted in the uplands of the Lao 
PDR. It is important to note that while the findings of my research may make some 
contribution to wider discussions on agrarian transformations, the particular contexts of 
the Lao uplands, and the specific political and economic conditions of the Lao PDR and the 
wider mainland Southeast Asian region demonstrate the ‘specificity’ of place. Thus both 
‘generalised’ and more ‘specific’ lessons will be considered in the following sections. 
8.2 Agrarian transformations in the Lao uplands 
One of the challenges faced by scholars who work in agrarian studies is the tension 
between generalising to sketch out common patterns and processes of transition, and 
emphasising the particularities of change bounded by specific contexts and conditions 
(Hirsch 2011: 186). This section draws on the agrarian changes under the rubber boom in 
the four upland communities. It is important to note that the empirical evidence of the 
transformations used to draw out the discussion in this section was observed at a particular 
point in the transformation process. Of particular note is that the rubber trees had not 
matured and were therefore not generating income. Notwithstanding this on-going 
process, such changes observed in the four research communities could be brought into 
contact with wider discussions of agrarian and rural transformations in Southeast Asia, 
seeking to identify both the specific nature of change in the Lao context and those 
similarities shared with other areas. 
8.2.1 The paths of agrarian transition in the Lao uplands 
The fieldwork, while recording different trajectories of change in each research site, also 
observed a common pattern, namely a transition from largely semi-subsistence to 
increasingly market-oriented production systems. Market integration, of which rubber is a 
major driver, highlights the influence of global market relations in re-shaping agrarian 
situations in the frontiers. The spread of rubber trees in the uplands resonates with the 
process of agricultural intensification and expansion proposed by De Koninck (2004). 
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Agricultural intensification takes place through an increase in agricultural productivity 
generated by changing land use from low productivity swidden agriculture to – it is 
surmised – high productivity rubber. The market also re-shapes agrarian situations in the 
frontiers through a process of agricultural expansion where rubber has also led to an 
opening of new agricultural land. While observing a significant role of transnational capital 
in agricultural expansion and intensification in the Lao uplands, the research also records 
the role of uplanders in converting land used from traditional agriculture to a commercial 
mono-crop.  
Previous studies on agrarian transition on the frontiers note the connection between 
agrarian expansion and territorial expansion and control (Uhlig 1988; De Koninck and Déry 
1997; White 1999). Scholars, such as Uhlig (1988) and White (1999), consider agrarian 
expansion as a political tool of the state designed to maintain national security; agricultural 
development in these sensitive areas not only helps the state to expand its power and 
authority over space and people but also prevents populations in these areas from taking 
sides with the ‘enemies’ of the state. Current agrarian expansion in the uplands of the Lao 
PDR, while it may be a political tool for the state to exercise its power over the frontiers, 
has little, if anything, to do with national security. While the fieldwork shows the coercion 
that lies behind the paths of agricultural and territorial expansion that have been outlined, 
especially when Chinese rubber companies have employed brutal means to take control 
over land from villagers, the research also observes the contribution that uplanders 
themselves have made to this process. Territorialisation taking place through agrarian 
expansion derives not only from the demands of the state but also “from the demand[s] of 
the population” (De Koninck et al. 2011: 36 and see below).  
Literature on agrarian expansion in the frontiers also records the links between agrarian 
expansion and the mobility of populations. Derek Hall (2011b: 508-509) writes: “Migration 
for boom-crop production is thus an enormously important part of the contemporary 
Southeast Asian agricultural landscape.” He summarises three different patterns of 
migration: i) smallholders’ spontaneous migration to set up plantations; ii) ‘transmigration’ 
– migration encouraged by the state or private companies to get people involved in the 
companies’ projects; and iii) people’s migration to secure work as waged labour in the 
plantations. Drawing on the experience of Vietnam, De Koninck (De Koninck 1996; De 
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Koninck and Déry 1997) argues that agricultural expansion is the state’s mechanism to 
minimise the pressure of population in core agricultural areas. 
The fieldwork from the four study communities, however, suggests that migration, at least 
at the time when the fieldwork was conducted, was not a significant process underpinning 
agrarian changes. Uplanders who are involved in rubber plantations, either through 
smallholder-owned investment or through contract farming, are in situ villagers who had 
settled down in the areas before the boom began. Fieldwork in Kaem Khong village 
observes the arrival of lowland investors who gain control over land in the uplands by 
making informal deals with villagers (see section 6.3 and section 7.3). However, these 
investors are not distant migrants; most live in the same district. Only in the Kaem Khong 
area where large-scale plantations were established by a Chinese rubber company was 
migration evident. Kaem Khong’s villagers mentioned that due to the low density of 
population in the area, the company needed to bring people from other areas such as 
Luang Prabang and Udomxay provinces to work on the company’s plantations. While the 
number of migrant labourers was not high81, it is possible that more migrant labourers, 
either Lao or Chinese, will be required when the rubber matures. Evidence from my 
research raises questions regarding Derek Hall’s argument that migration for boom crop 
production is a critical component propelling such agrarian transitions. No spontaneous 
migration of smallholders occurred. While the state may have encouraged uplanders to 
migrate from their distant villages to settle closer to ‘development’ through the 
resettlement programme, there was no migration sponsored by the state aiming at bringing 
(or attracting) people to take part in the rubber boom. One possible explanation for the low 
levels of migration in the study sites is that most of the plantations are under smallholder 
management, either their own investment, a contract farming system, or informal deals 
with local investors, but all of a size that can be managed using household labour inputs. 
Thus only large-scale plantations such as that of the Chinese company in the Kaem Khong 
area required non-local labourers.  
                                                          
81
 It was a challenge for this research to figure out the exact number of migrant labourers as I could 
not access the company’s manager. Some villager estimated that there were around 50-60 migrant 
workers (interviews, Mrs Koy - a 40s–year old villager, 28 February 2010) while another villager 
thought the number might be close to a hundred (interview, Mr Nu – a late 30s villager, 9 March 
2010). 
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Current agrarian changes in the Lao uplands also raise questions about the path(s) of 
agrarian transitions in Southeast Asia. Using Rigg’s typology (Rigg 2005b: 180) and applying 
it to the four study communities, the agrarian situations before the arrival of rubber in all 
villages fell into the semi-subsistence type. Livelihood sustainability relied heavily on 
agriculture produced mainly for subsistence; agricultural commercialisation was at a low 
degree with the exception of some sugarcane farmers from Houay Luang Mai village. While 
villagers engaged in non-farm activities, such as collecting NTFPs and wage labouring (but at 
a very low level – see section 5.3), all activities were highly village focused. Post-peasant 
agrarian characteristics were not evident in any of the study sites. De-agrarianisation had 
not made its way to the uplands (see section 8.2.2). 
The economy of the research communities is moving fast from a semi-subsistence to a 
market-oriented system stimulated mainly by the arrival of rubber. Swidden and forest 
areas have been converted to rubber plantations. A new commercial crop requires a high 
level of inputs, especially in comparison to the previous swidden system, and is closely tied 
to the global market. While there are plantations run by transnational investors, most of 
the villagers have attempted to get involved in rubber either through their own investment, 
contract farming relations, or informal deals with a local investor, with the expectation that 
rubber plantations will be their main sources for sustaining their livelihoods. There are signs 
of the emergence of rural entrepreneurs who have the means to transform their political 
capital into economic capital in the context of the rubber boom (see section 7.4). This 
process might be seen resonate with Rigg’s (2005b) professional agrarian type. The 
trajectories of agrarian changes in the study villages, however, are not likely to move 
toward a post-productive or neo-peasant type. The particular contexts of Lao economic 
development do not offer great opportunities for upland households to make a living from 
external farm activities. Current agrarian transformations cause villagers to become 
increasingly dependent on rubber production and the market. If there is a crisis in rubber 
production or in the market, livelihoods of upland households will be more vulnerable as 
they cannot return to their previous activities. This is likely to create more landless farmers 
as those who have become indebted will have no choice but to sell their rubber land. These 
displaced small farmers will have to rely on wage labouring in others plantations even, 
perhaps in their previous plantations, in combination with agriculture but on a small scale. 
By contrast, a relatively small number of villagers who can move to other occupations and 
do not rely only on rubber will be in a better position. Some of them will not only survive in 
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such a rubber crisis but will be able to accumulate further wealth by absorbing the land of 
unsuccessful rubber farmers. Agrarian changes in the study villages are thus transforming 
(some) villagers from semi-subsistence to professional farmers, skipping the post-peasant 
stage. There is the high possibility that the rapid transformations outlined in earlier 
chapters will create a class of Rigg’s remnant smallholders among upland households, 
without the stage of neo-peasant.  
The evidence from my research thus offers alternative paths of agrarian transition in a late-
comer country in the expansion of global capitalism. The paths of transition do not follow 
the sequence outlined to capture transformations that have occurred in the parts of the 
region which have been long engaged in the global market (such as the one proposed by 
Rigg) although some common characteristics can be observed. Agrarian changes in the Lao 
uplands raise concern over the necessity to consider the specific contexts and conditions of 
the transitions taking place in a particular place which may not follow a ‘general’ trend. The 
following section will consider another general trend of agrarian transitions in Southeast 
Asia, de-agrarianisation, looking at the role of agriculture in rural livelihoods in the Lao 
upland frontier. 
8.2.2 The role of agriculture in rural livelihoods 
The World Bank’s World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development 2008 
(World Bank 2007a: 26) records that in 2002, three out of four inhabitants in the global 
South lived in rural areas and their livelihoods depended either directly or indirectly on 
agriculture. The report observes a general trend in the growth of non-agricultural sectors, 
especially in Asia (World Bank 2007a: 26). While the report does not focus on Southeast 
Asia, it reflects a general trend of agriculture in the region through its typology of the 
“three worlds of agriculture for development”82. Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Vietnam fall into the category of transforming countries. Malaysia and the Philippines are 
classified as urbanised countries. Only the Lao PDR falls into the category of agriculture-
based countries (World Bank 2007a: 5, figure 2).  
                                                          
82
 Based on the role of agriculture in economic growth and poverty reduction, the report classifies 
the countries of the global South into three categories: agricultural-based, transforming, and 
urbanised countries.  
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The declining role of agriculture in the livelihoods of people in Southeast Asia has been 
well-recognised. An extensive literature on agrarian and rural studies reveals that 
agriculture has become only one component, even a small component, in generating the 
means of living for many rural residents (Kelly 2000; Rigg and Nattapoolwat 2001; 
Thompson 2004; McKay 2005; Thanh et al. 2005; Rigg et al. 2008; Limkriengkrai 2010; 
Gödecke and Waibel 2011). Rigg (Rigg 2001; 2006b; Rigg and Nattapoolwat 2001) 
conceptualises rural transformations in Southeast Asia as a process of ‘de-agrarianisation’, 
where the livelihoods of rural families are diversified beyond agriculture and rural space; 
for many rural households, non-farm activities have become the major source for 
sustaining their living.  
It is at this point that I would like to bring in data from my research in the upland 
communities in the northern region of the Lao PDR – a country classified by the World Bank 
(2007a: 5) as an agriculture-based country – to reflect on the discussion of the role of 
agriculture in rural livelihoods.  
Data from my research (see Table 8.1 and Figure 8.1) support the argument that rural 
livelihoods are now not attached only to agriculture. The research notes an impressive 
number of households who were involved in off-farm and non-farm activities in all the 
study communities. Agriculture is no longer a single activity providing a means of living for 
rural people, even those who live in this very remote corner of the world. While all 
households reported that they were involved in agriculture in 2009, agriculture did not 
make a great contribution to household income, with the exception of the households in 
Houay Luang Mai. This was associated with the current agricultural system of the study 
villages which was still dominated by semi-subsistence production (their rubber plantations 
were not producing rubber latex yet; the exception was villagers from Houay Luang Mai 
who had been intensely engaged in market-oriented production [sugarcane] for some 
time). At the time of the fieldwork for this research, agriculture was locally considered as 
fundamental to sustaining people’s livelihoods; it was important not because of the income 
it contributed to the households, but rather for the rice it provided. Rice cultivation, either 
dry-rice or wet-rice system, still played a crucial role in ensuring that villagers would have 
some rice to put in their pot.  
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Table 8.1 Percentage of surveyed households involved in each livelihood activity, 2009 
 Farm activities Off-farm activities Non-farm activities 
Don Tha (n =22) 100 45.5 81.81 
Houay Luang Mai (n=25) 100 56 96 
Kaem Khong (n=18) 100 100 94.45 
Pha Lad (n=31) 100 90.32 80.65 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009–2010 
Figure 8.1 Average income of surveyed households by livelihood activities, 2009 
  
Source: Fieldwork, 2009-2010 
Taking a close look at household income, there was only Kaem Khong village where 
household income generated from off-farm work was far greater than from farm activities. 
In Houay Luang Mai village, agriculture still made a great contribution to household income, 
far more than non-agricultural activities. Farm activities were also a major source of income 
for villagers from Pha Lad village where off-farm and non-farm activities also made an 
impressive contribution. It is worth noting that while the overall income generated from 
non-farm activities in Pha Lad was impressive, this figure was disproportionately linked to 
the income of one household which was a NTFP collector (accounting for around 50 per 
cent of the village’s overall income from non-farm activities). In Don Tha, farm activities 
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contributed to household income at a similar level to off-farm and non-farm activities, 
which was also significantly less than from the other communities.  
These findings seem to confirm a common trend in agrarian transformations in Southeast 
Asia: processes of de-agrarianisation which were obvious in the case of Kaem Khong village. 
De-agrarianisation found in my study communities was quite different from the processes 
taking place in some other Southeast Asian countries where de-agrarianisation is likely to 
be considered as an ‘opportunity’ for many rural households. For instance, a farmer from a 
village in northern Thailand in Rigg and Nattapoolwat’s study (2001: 956), who had been a 
farmer for all of his life and owned quite a large area of land, had invested in educating his 
children so that his children would be able to ‘escape’ from agriculture. Moving out of farm 
activities is about ‘choices’, for the better life of a farmer’s children.  
De-agrarianisation observed in my study sites was more about ‘distress’ processes; this was 
particularly apparent in the case of involvement in off-farm work among Kaem Khong’s 
villagers (see section 7.4.2 and section 7.5.2). The differences in the de-agrarianisation 
processes taking place in my study communities in the uplands of the Lao PDR and some 
other parts of rural Southeast Asia (see Rigg and Nattapoolwat 2001), are linked to the 
different contexts of rural development and the links between urban and rural spaces in 
the Lao PDR and other countries in Southeast Asia. For example, Thailand’s economic 
development, arguably, provides opportunities for rural-born populations to out-migrate 
from their village and work in urban areas. Moreover, for those people who do not leave 
the village, there are opportunities to access off-farm or non-farm work such as through 
rural employment, trading, and rural industries (Rigg and Nattapoolwat 2001; Limkriengkrai 
2010).  
Taking a look at my research, in 2009, the non-farm activities that villagers were involved in 
were small-scale trading, NTFP collection and handicrafts, while off-farm activity was wage 
labouring in, mainly, rubber plantations. However, there was variation in the degrees to 
which households from different villages could access off-farm and non-farm activities. 
Trading was available only in the areas which were close to the market or town. Even here, 
however, the scale of trading was limited by the purchasing power of buyers in a small 
market. This did not allow trading to generate much cash for households. Thus villagers 
from Houay Luang Mai who lived close to the Chinese market could generally gain more 
cash than Don Tha’s villagers who could only access the small market of Nalae district. Very 
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few households from Pha Lad village traded, and only one household from Kaem Khong 
village was involved in trading. 
A number of households from each of the study villages were involved in wage labouring. 
However, this did not make a great contribution to household income for villagers from 
Don Tha and Houay Luang Mai villages. In Pha Lad village, while a large proportion of 
household income was generated from wage labouring, agriculture still made the greatest 
contribution to household income. In Kaem Khong village, the contribution of wage 
labouring to household income was far more than other activities, including from 
agriculture. While there was demand for wage labour in the agricultural sector in the areas 
close to all the study communities, permanently heavy demand was available generally only 
in the areas near the Chinese rubber plantations. Only villagers from Kaem Khong and Pha 
Lad villages were able to access these opportunities. While de-agrarianisation is attractive 
for some rural residents, especially teenagers, in other regions of Southeast Asia (Mills 
1997; Kelly 2000; Rigg 2001; Rigg and Nattapoolwat 2001), de-agrarianisation is not yet an 
attractive proposition for villagers in my study villages.  
The limited availability of off-farm and non-farm work in the uplands means that agriculture 
remains attractive to uplanders. The view of one young Akha from Houay Luang Mai who 
was also one of the very few villagers who had had the chance to study at a secondary 
school illustrates why agriculture is still important for uplanders: 
“Here is different from Thailand. There is no factory. Selling things in the 
Chinese market is good but we do not have savings from it. We got 80 Chinese 
Yuan, we spent almost all we got, or even more, on buying things. It is only by 
selling rice and sugarcane that we earn large amounts of cash. My rubber will 
produce latex in the next few years.  We then could earn from rubber, and 
hope its price will not drop. It is these things [farm activities] that keep our 
lives going. If we do not have these things, we have nothing.” 
(Interview, Ar-Jo, a 21-year-old Akha man, Houay Luang Mai village,  
24 June 2010) 
His view reflects how far agriculture is still relevant for rural people’s lives. The arrival of 
rubber trees while the traditional production system is in decline and non-farm and off-
farm work has limited potential to bring well-being for people has led agrarian 
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transformations in another direction: agricultural intensification and expansion in the 
uplands. Over the past few years, villagers have sought to invest more in agriculture than 
they used to, especially through rubber trees.  
“Shifting cultivation is important. But there is uncertainty. We got plenty in 
some years but less in another year. Old forest [natural forest] or long-fallow 
forest has become rare. We are likely to get less and less rice from it. If we do 
not have things to sell, we will be badly off. I heard people saying that rubber is 
good. People in China could earn lots from rubber. Rubber is also a long-term 
investment. It is good for not only me but also my children. I am an old man 
and do not know when I will die. But my children will still be here. I have to 
leave something for them before I die. I set up the plantation not only for 
myself but for the future of my children. They will have rubber to sell and earn 
cash to buy rice and other things. They can raise their kids from the plantation 
I have set up.” 
(Interview, Mr Phu Thueng, a 52-year-old Kui, Kaem Khong village, 
10 March 2010) 
Mr Phu Thueng’s view that rubber trees will be the future of his children was shared by 
villagers in all the study villages. This hope reflects the fact that agriculture is still 
considered an important means for sustaining livelihoods not only for the adult generation 
but also for their children. 
The agrarian situation in my study villages also provides evidence countering Rigg’s (2006b) 
proposal on the de-linking of land and rural livelihoods. Rigg (2006b) observes an increasing 
de-linking between the sustainability of livelihoods of rural people and agriculture, thus 
also a de-linking of land from rural livelihoods. He argues that “not only are non-farm 
activities becoming central to rural livelihoods but also that an increasing number of rural 
households have no farm commitment to farming whatsoever” (Rigg 2006b: 181). Rigg 
rightly argues that landless people and the poor are not always the same; landless people 
are not necessarily poor. This raises the point that redistribution of land, together with 
other mechanisms for agricultural improvement, may not be able to resolve rural poverty 
as those people who benefit from the policies may not be the poor. Rigg’s (2006b) proposal 
is likely to be pertinent in contexts where agriculture is in decline and there is availability of 
non-farm work for rural residents. The situation found in my study communities is different 
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as non-farm work is very limited. Agriculture is still significant and therefore land is also still 
very relevant. In the areas where non-farm work is limited, any policies or rural 
development projects encouraging people, either directly or indirectly, to lose access to 
land would lead to an increase in the livelihood vulnerability of rural populations.  
The fieldwork in the four upland communities discussed here tells us about the non-linear 
direction of agrarian transformations. At the period of transition from semi-subsistence to 
market-oriented production systems in the uplands, the research observes the co-existence 
of both processes of distress de-agrarianisation (which takes place in different contexts in 
many parts of rural Southeast Asia) and agricultural intensification and expansion which has 
been stimulated by the arrival of a new boom crop. It is possible that only one process will 
exist in the future. For example, if rubber trees can provide sustainable upland livelihoods, 
people may move back to work only on their farms. By contrast, if rubber does not keep its 
promise while traditional agriculture is in decline, distress de-agrarianisation might lead 
uplanders to move on. Table 8.2 summarises the contribution of the research to debates 
over agrarian transformations in Southeast Asia. 
Table 8.2 A brief summary of the research’s contribution to debates on agrarian 
transformations in Southeast Asia 
Key debate The research’s contributions 
1. Paths of agrarian transitions: 
- Agricultural expansion and intensification in the 
context of market integration with close links to 
the state’s territorial expansion and control. 
 
- The link between agricultural expansion and 
migration for boom crop production. 
 
 
- A generalised typology of Southeast Asian 
agrarian transitions proposes a transformation 
from subsistence to semi-subsistence, post-
peasant, professional, neo-peasant, and 
remnant smallholders. 
 
- Market integration through rubber has led to 
rapid agricultural expansion and intensification. 
Territorialisation through agricultural expansion 
derives from both the desire of the state and 
people. 
- Migration is not a significant part of current 
rubber expansion. There is, however, a 
possibility of migration, either Lao or Chinese, to 
work as wage labourers in the Chinese rubber 
plantations in the Kaem Khong areas. 
- Agrarian situations in the study villages are fast 
moving from semi-subsistence to professional 
and are likely to move rapidly to remnant 
smallholders. The post-peasant type did not take 
place. The neo-peasant type is not likely to 
occur. 
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Table 8.2 A brief summary of the research’s contribution to debates on agrarian 
transformations in Southeast Asia (continued) 
Key debate The research’s contributions 
2. De-agrarianisation thesis:  
- A very high number of upland households have 
engaged in non-farm and off-farm work while its 
level of contribution to household income varies. 
- De-agrarianisation is about distress and 
‘necessity’ and it still has limited potential to 
provide sustainable livelihoods for uplanders. 
- There are double processes of upland 
transformations: the co-existence of de-
agrarianisation, and agricultural intensification 
and expansion. 
- Land is still relevant for uplanders; poverty 
levels are still associated with household levels 
of land access. 
- The role of agriculture as a primary source of 
rural households’ sustainability is in decline. 
 
-De-agrarianisation is considered as an 
‘opportunity’ and a ‘choice’ for many rural 
households. 
- De-agrarianisation is considered as a common 
trend of rural transformations in Southeast Asia. 
 
 
- Rural livelihoods are increasingly de-linked 
from land. 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009–2010 
8.3 Rethinking land grabs and land deals 
Literature on land grabs and small farmers’ loss of land control is largely based on the 
experiences of Africa – the region which has recently become a target for agricultural 
investment due to a prevalent perception of land abundance in the region (Cotula et al. 
2009: 59; Deininger et al. 2011: xxxiv table 2). As noted by Borras and Franco (2011), land 
grabs taking place in other regions may be distinct from the African experience. This section 
draws on experiences of recent rubber expansion in the Lao uplands to reflect on land 
grabbing and small farmers’ land loss in the Lao PDR. It considers how the experiences of 
the Lao PDR may contribute to our understanding and knowledge of land grabbing and land 
‘deals’. The section examines whether, and how, experience of the land rush taking place in 
other regions resonates with the experience in the Lao uplands and how the Lao experience 
may be distinctive from other regions. The actors and character of such processes are 
discussed (see Table 8.3 for a brief summary of the research’s contribution). 
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Table 8.3 A brief summary of the research’s contribution to the understandings of land 
grabs and land deals 
Key explanation/ debates The research’s contributions 
1. Forms of land grabs and land control 
- Literature on land grabs largely discusses direct 
control over land (concession, land lease, and 
purchasing), and indirect control (contract 
farming). 
 
- The research revealed some common forms of 
land grabs and deals (concessions and contract 
farming) but with some hidden complexities. 
- While officially there was no land lease in any 
of the study villages the research reveals land 
deals which were similar to land lease (under the 
1+4 contract farming system).  
- The research finds small farmers’ temporary 
loss of land control taking place under 
concession and two forms of contract farming 
system. However, the ‘temporary’ loss of land 
control lasts for a very long time (almost a 
generation). 
- The research found small farmers’ permanent 
loss of land. This occurred via informal deals 
between local investors and villagers. 
 
2. Actors in land grabs and land deals 
- Common perception that global land grabs and 
deals reflect wider North- South relations. 
- Literature on land grabs and land deals largely 
focuses on the role of powerful actors in the 
process of land acquisitions, namely 
transnational organisations, domestic investors 
and the national state. 
 
- Land grabs and deals in the uplands of the Lao 
PDR reflected emerging South-South relations. 
- The roles of powerful actors (investors and the 
domestic and transnational state) resonated in 
this research. 
- The research observed a significant role for 
smallholders in contributing to land grabs and 
deals. 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009-2010 
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8.3.1 Forms and strategies of land control and deals in upland Lao 
PDR 
Literature on land grabs addresses direct forms of land control which may be under a 
concession, long term land leasing, or land purchasing (Deininger et al. 2011; Cotula 2011a). 
Some common forms of land control were evident in my study villages. However, the 
fieldwork highlights the complex and diverse processes by which land deals are secured. 
The nature of rubber trees means that they need to be planted for at least five to seven 
years to be able to produce rubber latex which may then continue for 30-40 years. Rubber 
is thus a long-term investment. Securing long term control over land for plantations is 
therefore essential for investors. My research finds that investors employed different 
strategies to gain control over land which took the form of both direct and indirect control. 
8.3.1.1 Direct control 
Gaining direct control over land was preferable for land seekers. My research identified 
three different ways by which investors gained direct control over land. 
 Land concession 
Achieving direct control through concession was found in the Kaem Khong area where the 
Jundai Rubber Company was granted permission from the Lao army to use the military’s 
land to establish its rubber plantations. The company could gain control over land and 
forest previously used by villagers through the auspices of the military who claimed rights 
over the land and then took it from villagers before passing it on to the company (see 
section 6.2.2). Support from the military, which is still a privileged organisation in Lao 
society, permitted the company to take land from villagers without paying any 
compensation. The concession that the rubber company was awarded by the military 
highlights the role and power in economic activities of some state organisations, even when 
this may lie outside the organisation’s primary role and responsibilities. The role of the 
army in land grabbing is not unique to the Lao PDR. Woods (2011) notes the land 
concessions granted to Chinese investors in the ceasefire zone in the Burma-China 
borderlands. Concessions given to investors can be seen as a political tool for building a 
military state; they allow “the territorial expansion of the state agencies’ and military 
branches’ authority and power over land and people” (Woods 2011: 748). The role of the 
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army in land grabbing in Wood’s study as well as my own research raises a question about 
the authority of the state’s agencies in development. The privileged status of the army in 
Lao society, and the relative weakness of civil society makes land grabbing processes in 
which the army is involved distinctive from processes in countries where the military is less 
privileged or civil society is stronger; grabbing land through the medium of the military 
allows land seekers to gain control over land with a lower level of resistance. 
 Exchange of rubber seedlings for land 
Field research in Kaem Khong village reveals one form of land deal which is not well-
recognised by scholars: a permanent transfer of land control from villagers to local 
investors. This form of land deal occurred in the context of the rubber boom where villagers 
wanted to engage in the boom but were not in a position to set up the plantation 
themselves. Their demands for capital were met by local investors who had the capital, but 
lacked the land. An informal deal between them was established with the result that land 
was permanently transferred to outside investors (see section 6.3). While some officials 
and villagers themselves considered this form of land transaction as an informal contract 
system between villagers and an investor, I consider this deal to be another form of land 
loss but through villagers’ voluntary cooperation. This is a land deal which permanently 
transferred villagers’ land to outsiders with little recompense. While this form of land loss 
was not on the same scale as land being seized by the military to pass on to Chinese 
investors (see above), the majority of Kaem Khong’s households (16 out of 17 surveyed 
households) were involved in such informal land deals. Moreover, this form of land deal 
was not unique to Kaem Khong village; it could be found in every district in Luang Namtha 
as well as in other provinces. Different groups of people were involved in this form of land 
deal, including local traders, better-off smallholders, and local officials. The areas of land 
being transferred to land seekers were individually small but collectively they amounted to 
a considerable transfer of land control and ownership away from upland peoples.   
  ‘Land lease’ from the village 
Direct control over land in the form of land lease was found in Pha Lad village in Long 
district. This form of land acquisition was referred to by Long district’s officials and villagers 
as the 1+4 contract farming system, and it involved the Kunming Rubber Company and the 
village. Villagers were forced to provide 100 hectares of the village’s land for the company 
to set up a plantation (see also section 6.2.2). In return, the village would receive 30 
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hectares of plantation three years later. The village would then take responsibility for this 
share of land, and gain the benefits. While this form of land acquisition is officially called 
contract farming, I consider it to be a form of ‘land lease’ between the company and the 
village in which the company provided inputs (seedlings and labour) for the 30 per cent of 
the total land it obtained in the first three years as the rental. This system has resulted in 
long-term exclusion – over a period of 35 years – of villagers from 70 hectares of land. 
8.3.1.2 Indirect control over land: contract farming 
Indirect control over land was observed in Don Tha village, where villagers were involved in 
the 2+3 contract farming system with the Xiang Jiao Rubber Company. Contract farming is 
the preferred form of market-based agricultural development; it is usually considered as a 
‘better’ arrangement for smallholders in comparison to concessions as land is not taken 
from smallholders (GoL 2006: 93). However, the contract between villagers and the rubber 
company extends over 45 years and villagers have de facto lost control over their land 
during this period. The company, in contrast, secures (in)direct control over land for an 
extended period. Taking control over land through such a contract farming arrangement 
becomes an alternative strategy which guarantees investors’ security over land and yet 
prevents a wave of resistance from smallholders as it does not make people feel that their 
land is being seized by investors. In a context where villagers wished to participate in the 
boom crop but lacked the capital to invest, this form of land control was welcomed by the 
majority of Don Tha’s villagers, who believed that the deal would allow them to be linked to 
and gain from the boom. Under this form of agrarian relations, the rubber company could 
take control not only of the land used for the rubber plantations but also the labour 
demanded for the plantations. Should rubber prices decline, villagers cannot turn the land 
to other crops and they still have to contribute their labour inputs for the plantations as 
long as the contract continues. Thus the contract farming system secures both land and 
labour control for the investors.  
Literature on land grabs and small farmers’ land loss focuses on the control over land by 
investors through the purchase of land, the long-term leasing of land, concessions, and 
contract farming. The forms of land grabs observed in this research highlight the fact that 
land grabbers choose a variety of strategies to gain control over land. Some investors have 
taken full control over land through securing concessions (e.g. the Jundai Rubber Company 
in the Kaem Khong area), through a contract farming system which operates on the basis of 
  
245 
 
a long- term lease (the Kunming Rubber Company in Pha Lad), or by providing rubber 
seedlings to gain land from villagers (as in Kaem Khong village). Other land seekers have 
taken indirect control over land through contract farming relations, as occurred in Don Tha 
village. The research also highlights the issue of scale when it comes to land deals. The 
literature on land acquisitions largely discusses the rush for land as part of large-scale 
investment projects. For instance, the International Institute for Environment and 
Development’s (IIED’s) report prepared by Cotula and colleagues (Cotula et al. 2009) 
concerns itself only with projects covering an area of 1,000 hectares or more. The data 
from my research however points to the role of land deals on a much smaller scale. Most 
local investors who provide rubber seedlings in exchange for land from villagers do not 
have sufficient political and economic power to seek formal permission for large-scale 
investment. Instead they operate below the radar of the state, largely hidden from 
observation. Some of these land seekers could – in local terms – secure access to large 
areas of land. For instance, a Lue lady in Sing district obtained around 30 hectares of land 
while one state official secured around 40 hectares of land through such a land deal (see 
section 7.4.1 for details). Though the scale of villagers’ land loss was much smaller than the 
areas of land being seized by rubber companies, the fact is that it remains permanent land 
loss with major implications for villagers’ access to agricultural land in the long term, and 
therefore for the future of small farmers’ livelihoods. This form of land deal is common in 
Luang Namtha province and yet has been largely ignored in the literature to date. The risks 
connected with this form of land deal highlight the need for scholars to focus on land deals 
beyond the high profile, large-scale land grabs; there are low visibility land deals which also 
bring risks to small farmers. 
8.3.2 Actors in land grabs and land deals 
There is a general perception that the global land grabs and land deals occurring in the 
global South are spurred on by a rising demand for large-scale land for agricultural 
investments from the global North (McVeigh 2011). Research on land grabs, however, 
reveals that actors from non-northern countries are also increasingly involved in seeking 
farmland deals in the South (GRAIN 2008; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Hall 2011). 
Current literature largely discusses the search for the means to gain control over farmland 
abroad by investors seeking to secure food and energy supplies (Cotula et al. 2008; GRAIN 
2008; Borras and Franco 2010b; Borras and Franco 2012). Taking the rubber boom as a 
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reflection of such land grabs and deals, demand for farmland to produce an agricultural 
commodity for export was a key driver of the rush for land in the Lao PDR. However, 
neither food production nor biofuel production was the target of land grabs in the study 
communities, as well as in most of the northern uplands, rather it was rubber. However, 
the research finds that the North-South model of land deals is not applicable to the Lao 
PDR. Land acquisitions for investment in rubber in the four study communities were driven 
by China’s demand for rubber products. Chinese rubber companies were involved directly 
in rubber investment projects in three out of the four study communities. The plantations 
invested by villagers themselves were also a response to demand from the Chinese market. 
Taking a look at the broader picture of land deals in the Lao PDR through the lens of land 
acquisitions for rubber investment in other parts of the country (Laungaramsi et al. 2008; 
Hicks et al. 2009; Baird 2010) also suggests that the rush for farmland in the Lao PDR is 
driven by the country’s neighbours. The South-South character of land grabs and land deals 
taking place in the Lao PDR reflects the status of the county in the context of the GMS. The 
country is placed at the ‘bottom’ of a series of relations with its neighbours and the Lao 
PDR has become a provider of cheap resources for the economic development of its more 
powerful (economically and politically) neighbours, namely China, Thailand, and Vietnam 
(see also Barney 2008). The status of the Lao PDR as “a finance-poor, resource-rich country” 
opens doors for land grabs as this meets the desires of both government and investors; 
investors obtain cheap farmland while the government views large-scale investment in 
agriculture as an opportunity to support the country’s economic development.  
A common perception with respect to land grabs and deals is that transnational 
corporations and the domestic state are key actors in the process. These two key actors can 
also been seen operating in the study communities (see Chapter 6). The research also 
identifies, however, the importance of the transnational state (in the guide of the Chinese 
state), which indirectly facilitates the land deals in the Lao PDR through its opium 
replacement programme, which provides subsidies and tax benefits to Chinese investors 
who invest in rubber plantations in Myanmar and the northern region of the Lao PDR. The 
research also observes the role of domestic investors; their levels of investment were not 
always high, and usually relatively small by comparison with the transnational land 
grabbers (see section 6.3). The fieldwork highlights the significant role played by 
smallholders in contributing to the land deals and land loss in the uplands. The role of 
smallholders in land loss is frequently overlooked in the land grabs literature, which tends 
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to discuss the role of the more powerful actors, namely transnational and domestic 
investors and the states involved. The villagers from Baan Don Tha and, even more obvious, 
Baan Kaem Khong where villagers considered it was acceptable to permanently turn their 
land over and into the hands of outside investors, became surprising stories. Villagers 
therefore made a decision to get involved in land grabbing. However, it must be noted that 
their decisions, or agency, to be parts of this process with associated land loss, were far 
from being free actions. Rather, their agency was developed in the context of the 
opportunities that existed within the constrained situations they faced. These findings 
provide a deeper understanding of the modes and mechanisms by which land is transferred 
and lost in the uplands of the Lao PDR. 
8.4 Actors in the agrarian processes 
The question of agency is one of the key concerns in agrarian studies. Some literature, 
especially that taking the political economy approach, highlights the important role of 
powerful actors and processes at a macro level, namely the state, national or transnational 
capital, and global forces (Busch and Juska 1997; Whatmore and Thorne 1997). As 
discussed in Chapter 6, the fieldwork observed an important role played by powerful actors 
at the macro level in processes of agrarian changes in the uplands. The rubber boom is of 
course a response to global market forces which have stimulated the desire of both 
investors and smallholders to invest in plantations. Market actors at a transnational level 
(Chinese investors) and a domestic level (local investors) also played a crucial role in 
seeking and securing various forms of land control for rubber investment in the uplands. 
The research observes how crucial the state was for the spread of rubber trees in the 
frontiers. The fieldwork records the state’s good intention to improve the lives of uplanders 
through the introduction of rubber. But the research also highlights the violent aspects of 
rubber expansion in which the state and market actors were involved. The violence of 
market integration reflected through the lens of rubber expansion was apparent in the case 
of loss of villagers’ land rights and control, the most important means of earning a living as 
discussed earlier.  
Agrarian changes in the uplands are, however, not an absolute outcome of processes and 
actors operating at a macro level. Though one cannot ignore the forces of the global market 
and the role of the state and powerful market actors in shaping agrarian situations in the 
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Lao uplands, trajectories of rubber in the study communities also reflect the ‘constrained 
agency’ of uplanders in processes of agrarian transformations. The arrival of rubber in 
Houay Luang Mai and Pha Lad villages shows that it was not powerful actors like the state 
or market actors who initially brought about the changes into the uplands but less powerful 
actors like poor uplanders. The ways in which rubber arrived in these upland communities 
show that uplanders acted ahead of the state. The evidence is clear in the case of rubber 
expansion in Houay Luang Mai. The boom began in 2005 which was a year before the 
provincial governor encouraged Luang Namtha’s farmers to plant rubber through the ‘one 
family one hectare’ rubber tree policy. The policy had almost no influence on the decision 
of villagers to plant rubber: “Before we got the letter from the district governor 
encouraging us to plant rubber trees, we had already set up the plantation. We had done it 
before the government told us,” said Mr Jon (a 38-year-old Akha man, interview, 16 
December 2009). Many villagers did not even realise that they were being encouraged by 
the government to plant rubber. The fact that villagers from Pha Lad village asked the state 
and the EU development programme to take them to visit rubber farms in Xishuangbanna 
also shows villagers’ key role in initiate the process. In general, it was ordinary people who 
caught the boom before – and faster than – the state. Uncle Boonmee, a Lue farmer from 
Long district who planted 20,000 trees (approximately 45 hectares) mentioned that when 
he first set up his plantations, rubber was new for everyone including the state officials who 
often visited him to see what the rubber looked like (research diary based on interview with 
Uncle Boonmee who is in his early 60s, 10 February 2010). The rubber expansion in most of 
the study villages seems to be in accordance with the following statement said by a senior 
lecturer from the National University of Laos about rubber expansion in the Lao PDR: 
 “It was strange, not like other crops. It [rubber] has come on its own. It was 
not in the plan. The government promoted corn, cassava, sesame, peanut, 
chilli and many other crops but not rubber. It has arrived by Chinese and by 
villagers. The government’s awakening to rubber came after villagers who had 
already started. The government then promoted it but far behind on villagers.”  
(Interview, Faculty of Agriculture, National University of Laos, 8 September 2009) 
This evidence urges us to reconsider processes of agrarian transformations in the Lao PDR, 
which are not only shaped from ‘above’ but also significantly from ‘below’. Less powerful 
uplanders have made great contribution to agrarian changes in the Lao uplands not only 
by accelerating the connections of the uplands to markets but also by establishing new 
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land relations. The establishment of private rights over fallows and plantations was not 
much influenced by powerful actors like the state or the World Bank. Rather, it was less 
powerful uplanders who, under the new contexts of market integration, have established 
new land relations. The research also observes that, while land loss has become a crucial 
concern among villagers, villagers themselves have made a contribution to land loss. This 
was apparent in the case of Kaem Khong’s villagers who transferred land to local land 
grabbers in exchange for rubber seedlings (see section 6.3 and section 8.3.2).  
The trajectories of rubber and agrarian changes in the study villages warn against the 
assumption that agrarian changes are determined by powerful actors alone. The findings 
from my research resonate with similar issues of agency of smallholders in agrarian 
transitions taking place in the Central Highlands of Vietnam (Tan 2000), cocoa in Sulawesi 
(Li 2002a), rubber in China’s Xishuanbanna (Sturgeon 2010), and oil palm in Sumatra 
(McCarthy 2010). There was no doubt that the agency of the villagers was not developed 
free from the social and economic constraints they encountered, especially the Lao state’s 
policies of land enclosure through the implementation of the resettlement programme 
and stabilisation of shifting cultivation. It is unlikely that villagers’ decisions and actions in 
engaging with the expansion of rubber would lead to challenges or resistance to the 
existing power structure. However, the villagers were not sitting passively waiting for the 
state or the market to entirely determine their futures. Rather, their ‘constrained agency’ 
was being exercised through their active engagement in choosing particular ways to make 
a living from the opportunities available to them and in the context of the constrained 
conditions they encountered. The villagers themselves had different capacities to act or 
shape their own lives. That said, the villagers possessed various levels of agency potential. 
The sense of agency of the villagers observed from the research sites reminds us of the 
point stressed in the ‘everyday international political economy’ literature about the 
agency of people to “shape their own lives and others around them and beyond them 
whether or not they are resisting power”(Hobson and Seabrooke 2007: 15). It was true, of 
course, that villagers could not always shape their lives as they would have liked, but they 
were far from powerless in this regard. The role of smallholders in the rubber boom shows 
that “no agent is either entirely powerless or purely ‘confined’ within a structural 
straitjacket for there is always a space, however small, for the expression of agency” 
(Hobson and Seabrooke 2007: 14). My research highlights the necessity of not over-
estimating the actors and processes at a macro level as well as not overlooking the active 
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role of people at a local level in shaping and reshaping social processes. The active role of 
smallholders in bringing about or contributing to agrarian restructuring in the Lao uplands 
also raises another important point regarding relations between smallholders and the 
market which will be discussed in the following section. 
8.5 Rethinking the links between smallholders and the market  
Relations between smallholders and the market have long been discussed. Marx (1995), in 
his analysis of the development of capitalism in rural areas, speculated that peasants would 
be eliminated through a process of primitive accumulation. Peasants and smallholders are 
thus supposed to resist the market and capitalism. In his study of a rice-farming village in 
Malaysia, James Scott (1985) observes peasants’ resistance to the coming of capitalism as it 
destroyed traditional values of a peasant community and increased differentiation among 
villagers. This view which sees capitalism and the market as ‘threats’ to a peasant 
community is also found in studies of rural villages in Thailand (see, for example, Nartsupha 
2000). This position of market pessimism is, however, being increasingly challenged as it 
tells only a partial story of relations between the market and people (Rigg 2006a) or it fails 
to realise the potential of smallholders as agents of (or contributors to) the changes that 
they are seen to resist (Tan 2000; Hall et al. 2011; D. Hall 2011a). This section aims to 
explore how the market is viewed by small farmers in the Lao uplands, and to ask the 
question: what are the links between the market and social differentiation. 
8.5.1 Do smallholders always oppose the market? 
Data from my research (see section 6.3) raises a question about the perception that 
smallholders are supposed to ‘resist’ the market. My research shares similar findings with 
some previous studies (for instance, Tan 2000; Li 2002a; Walker 2004) that rather than 
opposing it, villagers welcome the arrival of the market. Villagers see the market as an 
opportunity. The villagers’ perception of the market as an opportunity is obviously seen 
through the lens of rubber expansion in the uplands. Rubber was welcomed by villagers in 
all of my study villages. In Don Tha village, while some villagers were hesitating to plant 
rubber trees for the Chinese company under the contract system of relations, the majority 
of villagers expressed their willingness to participate in the project. In 2007, the second 
year that the company had been promoting rubber trees, demand for rubber seedlings by 
villagers exceeded the company’s ability to supply the trees. Some villagers expressed their 
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great disappointment at the shortage of seedlings (interview, Pong, a 59-year-old man, 6 
December 2009).  
The desire to participate in the market by villagers in Kaem Khong was also strong. Poor 
villagers who were not able to set up their own plantation exchanged some parts of their 
land for seedlings with outsiders. They considered this as one way of preventing them from 
being left behind. It was the Pha Lad’s villagers who asked the local state and NGOs to 
organise a study tour to the rubber-farming communities in China. The agency of villagers 
from Houay Luang Mai and Pha Lad was also obvious. It was the villagers who initiated the 
bringing of rubber trees to the village. Villagers were quick to respond to the rubber boom 
in the area. Villagers set up their own plantation, which is relatively large, without any 
support or encouragement from the state or from investors. That said, it is important to 
note that there was some resistance to rubber expansion from some villagers in Kaem 
Khong and Pha Lad villages. A few villagers resisted the Chinese rubber companies taking 
land from them. Their resistance, however, was not resistance to the market per se, rather 
resistance to the ways in which the market operated.  
While villagers in all the study villages saw the market as an opportunity that would bring 
better lives, there were slight differences in villagers’ views of the role of the market. In 
general, the market was considered as a means for villagers’ further accumulation in Houay 
Luang Mai, especially less poor villagers. This is quite different from some of Pha Lad’s 
villagers and the majority of villagers from Don Tha and Kaem Khong villages who saw the 
market as an opportunity to survive, rather than to prosper. This is linked to differences in 
current livelihoods in each study village. While most villagers from Houay Luang Mai did not 
face rice shortages, some villagers from Pha Lad and most villagers from Don Tha and Kaem 
Khong villages struggled with a lack of rice. Unavailability of paddy and limited access to 
swidden fields caused uncertainty in the lives of villagers. In a context in which alternative 
livelihoods were still limited and could not provide for villagers’ well-being, rubber was 
seen as the new hope to lift them out of the hardship they were facing.  
8.5.2 Market and differentiation 
Data from my research supports Rigg’s (2006a) position that market relations in the 
countryside are not one-sided. There may be both ‘opportunities’ and ‘threats’ to rural 
communities. My research notices a sign of differentiation both between different study  
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             Picture 8.1 Houses of villagers of different economic status, 2009-2010 
Village Poorest household Poor household Less poor household 
Houay Luang Mai 
 
Pha Lad 
 
Don Tha 
 
Kaem Khong 
 
          Source: Fieldwork, 2009-2010 
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villages, and among households within the same village. Picture 8.1 shows the houses of 
villagers of different economic status. Houses owned by the poorest households were 
generally equivalent across the four settlements. There was no major difference between 
houses of the poor households in the four communities. By contrast, a crucial difference 
was evident among less-poor households. Some villagers from Houay Luang Mai and Pha 
Lad villages had strikingly better houses than the less-poor households from Kaem Khong 
and Don Tha villages. Taking rice shortage (see Figure 7.2), which is often recognised by 
villagers as an important indicator of poverty, into consideration, villagers from Kaem 
Khong and Don Tha villages were also poorer than those from Houay Luang Mai and Pha 
Lad village.  
Houay Luang Mai and Pha Lad are the communities with more intense levels of market 
integration compared Don Tha and Kaem Khong villages. This set of data implies that there 
is a correlation between levels of market integration and poverty and differentiation in the 
uplands. For market optimists who have faith in market integration as a motor for 
development, most notably the World Bank (see, for example, WB 1996; WB 2001; WB 
2007a), they would see this as evidence of the positive effect of the process of market 
integration. However, market pessimists would point out that internal differentiation was 
greater in the communities with intense market links (Houay Luang Mai and Pha Lad 
villages). They might thus conclude that the differentiation and poverty prevalent in the 
uplands are an outcome of market penetration. Things are not so simple, however. To get a 
true picture of relations between the market and differentiation in the research 
settlements, it is necessary to consider the historical contexts of the villages to gain a better 
understanding of how the current differentiation links to past conditions. 
Market integration has some significant implications for the levels of differentiation but we 
cannot hold it solely responsible. Differentiation in my research sites is rooted in the 
histories of village settlement and access to agricultural land, especially paddy fields. 
Among the study villages, only Houay Luang Mai village, which is the ‘richest’ village, has 
been settled in its current location for more than 20 years. It is also the only village that was 
first settled by villagers without force from the state. The other three study villages, in 
contrast, are new resettlement villages which were ‘convinced’ by the local state to 
relocate from their previous locations which, in the eyes of the state, were located ‘out of 
the reach of development’. While villagers from Don Tha, Kaem Khong, and the majority of 
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Pha Lad struggled to access paddy in their new settlements, the pioneers of Houay Luang 
Mai could access relatively large areas of flat land which could be developed for their paddy 
and later for sugarcane. Many households from Houay Luang Mai could gain sufficient rice 
from working only on their paddy fields, thus abandoning shifting cultivation. Paddy also 
provided a rice surplus for many of Houay Luang Mai’s households, permitting them to 
accumulate wealth. Some villagers from Pha Lad were able to gain access to paddy but over 
smaller areas than the villagers from Houay Luang Mai. Moreover, rice productivity was low 
due to the inadequate water supply. The majority of villagers thus combined wet-rice 
paddy with upland dry-rice cultivation. An abundance of forestland in the areas allowed 
them to be able to access land for cultivating upland rice, making their lives not too tough. 
Don Tha’s villagers, as a new settlement area that was not ‘empty’ prior to settlement, 
could not access paddy and had to rely heavily on shifting agriculture. For Kaem Khong’s 
villagers, while they were able to access flat land, a lack of water supply prevented them 
from using it for wet-rice cultivation. Only shifting cultivation could provide rice. However, 
shifting agriculture is a highly uncertain system. This uncertainty resulted from both the 
increasingly limited access to forestland arising from the state’s policies, and from natural 
disasters. Don Tha’s and Kaem Khong’s villagers rarely generated a rice surplus. Limited 
alternative livelihoods also made their lives more difficult. Considering the villagers’ 
definition of poverty which is linked to the ability to have sufficient rice to meet their 
needs, villagers from Don Tha and Kaem Khong villages were ‘poor’ before they were 
integrated into the market. In contrast, Houay Luang Mai villagers were ‘rich’. Pha Lad’s 
villagers were in between these ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ categories. This evidence warns against 
automatically jumping to a conclusion that differentiation among ‘the rich’ and ‘the poor’ 
was because of the penetration of the market. These particular conditions in the villages 
show that differentiation was rooted in the uplands through each village’s historical 
settlement and patterns of land access existing even before the uplands were deeply 
connected to the market and, certainly, before the arrival of rubber.  
This does not, however, imply that the market does not have any influence on the 
increasing gaps between the rich and the poor. We need to look carefully at how the 
market works in particular contexts at particular times in regard to the particular histories 
of villages and households. Taking a close look at the four study communities, while there 
was differentiation before market integration, it was the market that widened these gaps. 
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This is not because the market makes some people poorer; rather it is because the market 
cannot provide equal opportunities for everyone. Thus, while some people are well-
connected to and benefit from the market, others are left behind. 
Data from my research shows that Houay Luang Mai is the village which is intensively 
integrated into the market due to its geographical setting which is close to the main road, 
the district town, and the Lao-Chinese border. A new road between Xiengkok to the Pang 
Thong border checkpoint (the Lao-Chinese border) allowed Pha Lad to be connected to the 
market although the level of market involvement was far lower than in Houay Luang Mai 
village. Don Tha and Kaem Khon villages were almost left behind due to difficulties of 
market access. Only villagers from Houay Luang Mai and, but to a lesser degree, from Pha 
Lad could be connected to and benefit from producing commercial crops for the market. 
While villagers from Don Tha and Kaem Khong villages still struggled to gain access to rice 
to put in their pots, villagers from Houay Luang Mai and some from Pha Lad were able to 
accumulate wealth. 
Differentiation within villages which is prevalent in an era of market integration is also 
rooted in the historical settlement and ability to access agricultural land of each individual 
household. Taking a look at differentiation in Houay Luang Mai – the village which is 
‘richest’ among all the study villages but which also has wide gaps between the ‘rich’ and 
the ‘poor’ – the households which fell into the category of ‘less poor’ were the first group 
of villagers who moved into the area and managed to reserve large areas of flat land which 
were ‘abundant’ at the time they first moved. In contrast, villagers who came to the current 
location later, especially those who were recently ‘convinced’ by local officials to leave their 
old village, tended to fit the category of ‘poorest’. The newcomers could rarely access 
paddy and, for some, even swidden fields for growing upland rice. Lack of agricultural land, 
which is still a significant means of production not only to obtain rice to eat but also to be 
able to produce commercial crops, prevented newcomers from accumulating wealth. The 
pioneers, in contrast, have access to large areas of land, allowing accumulation under 
conditions of market integration (see Box 8.1). Data from my research thus warns against a 
conclusion that differentiation in rural areas automatically resulted from the market or 
from external forces without a careful consideration of the particular contexts of the 
community (Li 2002a). 
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     Box 8.1 The market and differentiation: stories from Baan Houay Luang Mai 
The story from a less poor household: Uncle Ponu 
Uncle Ponu is a 56 year-old Akha who is one of the well-off villagers, by villagers’ 
standards. He was one of the first settlers who moved to Houay Luang Mai around 20 
years ago. Uncle Ponu was able to reserve around three hectares of flat land which 
was later developed in to the family’s paddy. In the early years, the family grew both 
wet-rice and dry-rice in order to produce sufficient rice to meet the family’s needs. 
Three years later, Uncle Ponu stopped shifting agriculture as he was able to produce a 
rice surplus from his paddy land. In the mid-1990s, he began selling rice to a trader 
from a Lue village who then exported it across the border to China. In the late 1990s, 
commercial crops such as maize, sesame, and peanut were introduced to the village 
through a lowland middleman. He grew corn on an area of 0.2 hectares but he could 
not earn much cash from corn in comparison to selling his rice surplus. Due to the 
unimpressive return from corn, the family grew it for only one season. Around 2000, 
Uncle Ponu was introduced by a Chinese investor to sugarcane. He planted the crop on 
around 0.3 hectares of the family’s garden land. The return from sugarcane was much 
more impressive than from other crops. In 2003, with an introduction from another 
Chinese investor, Uncle Ponu turned around 1.5 hectares of his paddy land over to 
sugarcane plantation. Only one hectare of his paddy fields was left for rice cultivation 
which was just large enough to produce sufficient rice for the family’s consumption 
needs. While the family could still earn cash from selling surplus rice, sugarcane 
became the main source of household income. In 2009, he managed to earn almost 
£740 from selling around 50 tons of sugarcane. The cash generated from sugarcane 
was around five times more than he had earned from selling rice. Cash from sugarcane 
allowed him to accumulate wealth and make further agricultural investments. He now 
owns a two-wheel walking tractor, a rice threshing machine, and a motorbike. He has 
planted around 3,000 rubber trees on around 6.6 hectares, using his own financial 
resources. He intends to plant more rubber in the future. 
(Research diary based on an interview with Uncle Ponu, and Ar-Jo,  
a 21-year-old son of Uncle Ponu,24 June 2010) 
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Box 8.1 The market and differentiation: stories from Baan Houay Luang Mai 
(continued) 
     The story from one of the poorest households: Sha Pa 
Sha Pa, a 37-year-old female Akha, is the mother of five children aged between 7 and 
16 years. Sha Pa and her 38-year-old husband, Pu Cha, moved from Houay Laung Kao 
village to Houay Luang Mai in 2007. The family had access to around 0.2 hectares of  
flat land at Houay Luang Mai while they were still at their living old village. However, 
before 2007, they rarely grew wet-rice on the land due to risks of flooding from a 
nearby river. The family preferred to live in the old village as they could access fallow 
land for practicing shifting agriculture and most of their relatives were there. In the 
mid-2000s, Houay Luang Kao’s villagers were, however, forced by the Sing district 
authorities to move out from their village. Sha Pa and her family moved to Houay 
Luang Mai in 2007 to find that they could not find fallow land to grow rice on. The 
village’s communal land which was supposed to be allocated to new households had 
already been allocated to Houay Luang Mai’s villagers for establishing rubber 
plantations before Sha Pa’s arrival. The family and two other new households who 
moved from Houay Luang Kao together cleared forest land situated in-between the 
old and new villages. However, they were then fined by the Sing DAFO. In 2009, the 
family grew wet-rice on an area of 0.2 hectares which was supposed to give them 
around 1.6 tons of rice. Unfortunately, there was a flood before the rice harvest was 
complete. Some rice was damaged. Around 1.2 tons of rice was harvested, which 
could feed the family only for around 7-8 months. While sugarcane is a major source 
of income and wealth for the majority of Houay Luang Mai, Sha Pa’s family is an 
exception. The family do not have land for planting cash crops. Sha Pa said that:  
“We see everyone earning a lot from sugarcane. We want to earn as much as 
them too. But we have just arrived here and no land is left for us. The Chinese 
asked if we wanted to plant sugarcane. Of course, we do but we do not have 
any land. We came here too late. We do not even have land to grow rice on. 
Villagers who came earlier have plenty of land. When the Chinese came, only 
those who have plenty of [paddy] land could plant crops for the Chinese. The 
pioneers have a rice surplus. They have cash from sugarcane. They get richer 
while we have nothing. We do not rice to eat. We do not have cash.” (interview, 
Sha Pa, 23 December 2009) 
(Research diary based on an interview with Sha Pa, and Pu Cha, 23 December 2009) 
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Box 8.1 The market and differentiation: stories from Baan Houay Luang Mai    
(continued) 
These narratives reveal the historical origins of differentiation in Houay Luang Mai 
village today. The family histories of settlement in the current village are the 
important conditions for Uncle’s Ponu current wealth and Sha Pa’s poverty as they 
determine the potential of households to access paddy fields – the most important 
means of production. While Uncle Ponu was able to accumulate cash from his rice 
surplus and later sugarcane from his paddy, Sha Pa was struggling to find land for 
cultivating rice. Limited access to land prevents Sha Pa from connecting to and 
benefiting from market integration. In contrast, accessing a large area of paddy 
allows Uncle Ponu to be closely linked to and accumulate wealth from the market. 
In sum, data from my research contributes to debates on relations between the market and 
smallholders. My research findings raise doubts about the views that see smallholders as 
‘victims’ of the market. Differentiation and poverty which are found in all the rural 
communities are not an automatic outcome of market integration. My research suggests 
that the differentiation currently existing in upland communities has its roots in the history 
of each settlement and access to agricultural land by villagers. Differentiation and poverty 
did exist in the study villages even before the villages were intensively integrated into the 
market. What the market does is accentuate these gaps. My research also supports the 
views that smallholders do not always oppose the arrival of the market. Rather the market 
is welcomed by smallholders either as means of further accumulation or for survival. Table 
8.4 provides a brief summary of the research’s contribution to this set of literature. 
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Table 8.4 A brief summary of the research’s contribution to debates on the links between 
small farmers and the market 
Key debate The research’s contributions 
1. Smallholders and market integration: 
- Market pessimists assume that small farmers 
resist the market. 
 
 
 
2. Market integration and differentiation: 
- Market optimists see market integration as 
the way to improve small farmers’ well- being. 
- Market pessimists view market integration as 
a major cause of poverty and social 
differentiation. 
 
 
- Generally, uplanders expressed their 
willingness to be connected to and benefit 
from the market. 
- There is some resistance to the expansion of 
the market but it is resistance to the way that 
the market operates rather than opposing the 
market per se. 
 
- The research finds differentiation both 
among and within upland communities. 
Differentiation has widened in the context of 
increasing market connection. However, such 
differentiation is not an automatic outcome of 
integration; rather it is rooted in the particular 
households’ and villages’ histories and 
settlement. 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009-2010 
8.6 Rethinking the state and market in economic globalisation 
In 1996, the World Bank (World Bank 1996) published its annual World Development 
Report, with the subtitle ‘from plan to market’. The report called for a rolling back of the 
role of the state in economic activities to allow markets to work properly. The report 
echoed the ‘Washington Consensus’ in promoting market liberalisation and increasing 
global market integration. An increase in transnational forces of economic globalisation 
from the 1990s has aroused intense interest in the relationship between the state and non-
state actors in an era of globalisation. Kenichi Ohmae (1995) views the state as having lost 
its control of national economic activities. The state as the natural economic zone has been 
replaced by emerging regional economic zones. Susan Strange (1996; 1997) argues there 
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has been a decline of state power which has shifted to markets and transnational 
institutions. The collapse of communist states in Eastern Europe and the ‘reform’ of former 
socialist countries has led to general perceptions about the demise of the state. Exploring 
the role and the status of the state and its relationship to the market through the lens of 
rubber expansion in the Lao uplands, my research observes both decline and continuity of 
the post-socialist state in the context of economic globalisation. The research’s contribution 
to these debates is summarised in Table 8.5. 
Table 8.5 A brief summary of the research’s contribution to debates over state and 
market relations 
Key debate The research’s contributions 
State and market: competition and 
cooperation 
- Some literature considers that the ‘reform’ in 
former socialist countries and globalisation 
have led the rise of the market and the demise 
of the state. 
 
 
- The research findings highlight the 
continuing efficacy of the state; however, it 
performs differently from how did previously. 
- The research records both change and 
continuity of state power. 
- The research notes the decline of state 
power in determining and controlling 
transformations within its political boundary; 
the potential of the state, to some degree, has 
been challenged by market forces. 
- The research highlights the continuing 
persistent characteristics of the state as a 
controller of the market and as an agent of the 
market. This raises doubts about the state-
market division. 
- Globalisation and ‘reform’, while they may 
have weakened state power to some extent, 
have created new channels to enhance state 
power. 
- The research also notes to the heterogeneity 
of the state. 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009-2010 
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8.6.1 Decline of the state 
My fieldwork reveals that the power and authority of the Lao state in directing the 
country’s economic development has been challenged, even weakened. As discussed in 
section 8.4, rubber was not initially in the government’s plan. Rubber expansion in the Lao 
PDR, especially in the borderlands, began without the intention of the Lao state. Previous 
studies (Diana 2006; Shi 2008; Sturgeon 2010) record trans-border connections as the initial 
conditions spurring rubber expansion in the borderlands. Trans-border links were also 
evident in Houay Luang Mai village where all rubber plantations were under smallholder 
investment, without any support from the state (see section 6.3). Though the local state 
highlighted its encouragement of villagers in their efforts to plant rubber trees, many had 
already set up their plantations before they heard about the state’s policy. Without the 
state’s encouragement, villagers, who were convinced by the rising prices of rubber 
products, would still have planted rubber anyway. The relative weakness of the Lao state is 
shown through its inability to regulate where plantations should be established. Thus, many 
areas which are not supposed to be used for plantations have been turned over to rubber 
trees. Rubber expansion in Houay Luang Mai is a case reflecting the primacy of 
transnational market forces over the state in driving current agrarian transformations 
within Lao territory. It also reflects how weak the Lao state is in controlling changes within 
its political boundary. While these findings support some globalist views, such as the 
arguments made by Strange (1997) and Ohmae (1995), on the demise of the state power, 
the power of the Lao state has not been replaced by the rising power of global (regional) 
market. The Lao state has also been involved in the boom, even though its entry may have 
been quite late. 
8.6.2 Continuity of the state 
The research observes the existing role of the state in economic development. It is certainly 
the case that the role of the Lao state in the current era is different from that it performed 
previously before the ‘reforms’ introduced from 1986. The fieldwork reveals two different 
roles of the Lao state regarding the penetration of the market into the frontiers: as an 
agent and as a controller of the market.  
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8.6.2.1 The state as a controller of the market 
The Lao state was attempting to control the unpleasant manner of the operation of the 
market. Many projects were approved without consideration of the potential impacts of 
the investment on both environment and the lives of rural people. The impacts of large-
scale rubber plantations, especially under a concession form and rising criticisms of the 
effects of rapid expansion caused the government to reconsider the direction of rubber 
development in the country. Ex-Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh announced at a 
national land meeting on 8 May 2007 that the government “would stop approving land 
concessions for investors on an indefinite basis, or until a more comprehensive strategy 
could be devised” (Vientiane Times 2007 cited in Baird 2010: 30). The approval process has 
been amended. The state at a local level is allowed to approve projects, but only if they are 
on a small scale. 
The role of the state at the local level represents an attempt to control the market and to 
protect the people from the unintended and often unexpected impacts of the market. This 
is seen in the policy of Luang Namtha’s governor who declared that, as concessions are 
likely to lead to significant impacts on people’s livelihoods, the provincial government 
would not permit concession projects to go ahead. Thus only contract farming, either on 
the basis of the 2+3 system or the 1+4 system, would be allowed (see Chapter 5). The Luang 
Namtha provincial government not only attempted to minimise the negative impacts of the 
market on its people but also attempted to ensure that the population would benefit from 
the market. Rubber was integrated into the province’s poverty reduction programme. 
Farmers were encouraged to establish at least one hectare of rubber trees per household83. 
The role of the state in controlling the operation of the market to ensure that market 
integration provided benefits for ‘poor’ and ‘weak’ smallholders from hunger and poverty is 
most obvious in the case of villagers from Don Tha village in Nalae district (see section 6.2). 
With the hope that rubber could lift its population out of the poverty, the state at the 
provincial and district levels encouraged the Chinese rubber company to promote rubber 
plantations under a contract system to villagers. The local state negotiated with the rubber 
company over issues such as the villages to be targeted and the conditions of the contracts. 
The local state, in this way, acted as a protector for its ‘weak’ and ‘simple’ people. On the 
                                                          
83
 It is important to note, however, that many farmers had already set up their own plantation 
before this advice from the state was issued. 
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other hand, its policies and practices also facilitated the penetration of the market into 
these communities. Without the local state, the Chinese rubber company would find 
difficulty in convincing people to participate in its contract farming scheme. Thus, even in 
an attempt to control the operation of the market, the state has also acted as an agent of 
the market (this issue is discussed in the following section).  
8.6.2.2 The state as an agent of the market 
The role of the state was obviously limited in the case of smallholders’ plantations. The 
state, however, played a crucial role in facilitating the expansion of rubber trees to the 
uplands in the forms of concessions and contract farming relations. Fundamentally, the 
state was involved through the approval of investors’ rubber projects which was considered 
as an official passport for investors to access land. At the beginning of the boom, approval 
could be made at different levels of the state, from the district to provincial, to national 
levels; they could also be granted by a number of different state agencies such as the 
Agriculture and Forestry Office and the Planning and Investment Office. The research 
highlights the role of the military in economic activities. Not only did the army ‘grant’ 
permission to the Chinese rubber company, but some members of the army and the 
company worked side-by-side in taking land from villagers. The still privileged status of the 
army allowed market actors to establish themselves relatively smoothly in the frontiers (see 
section 6.2.2). In the case of the 1+4 contract farming system in the Pha Lad area, 
permission awarded by the state at the national level allowed the Chinese rubber company 
to gain access and control over land for its plantation. A letter from the district authority in 
combination with the presence of local state officials along with the company’s employees 
was considered by many villagers as meaning they had no choice but to give up land to the 
company. Without the facilitation provided by the state, the company could not have so 
easily established itself. The research also observes the role of the transnational state, the 
Chinese state, in facilitating rubber expansion in frontier areas of the Lao territory. In the 
context of globalisation, the Chinese state acted as a facilitator of the market not only 
within its political boundary but also in spaces beyond. 
My research suggests that global market forces may shake the status of some state 
agencies, such as the provincial and district authorities, even while it may reinforce the 
status of others. My research records that market integration and the ‘reforms’ did provide 
new opportunities (and resources) for some state agencies to maintain or expand their 
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power. The findings from my research support the argument, which is based on the 
experiences of reforming countries like Vietnam and China (Mora 2004; Gainsborough 
2010), on the persistence of the state in the economy. The status of the state in the context 
of ‘reform’ and globalisation is neither adequately described by the terms ‘rise’ or ‘end’. 
The evidence from the uplands of Luang Namtha suggests that marketisation does not 
automatically mean the fall of the state (and state personnel). The fieldwork also observes 
the increasing role of the state in the lives of uplanders which has been accentuated even 
as the Lao PDR has shifted from ‘high’ socialism to reform. The findings from this research 
thus support Weiss’s (1997; 1998) argument that the view of the powerless state in 
globalisation is a myth. 
The fieldwork highlights some similar points to those noted by Sturgeon (2004) about the 
heterogeneity of the state. Different state organisations have different aims and act 
differently. The conflicts between Kaem Khong’s villagers and the Chinese rubber company 
were a case in point. Long district authorities allocated the rights to access land to villagers. 
However, in the context of the rubber boom, the rights of villagers which had been 
previously recognised were not accepted by the army, another state organisation (see 
section 6.2). The privileged status of the army in Lao society prevented villagers from 
gaining protection from other state agencies. This is different from the case of villagers in 
China recorded by Sturgeon (2004) where people were able to negotiate and gain benefits 
from the inconsistencies in the state’s policies among different state organisations. By 
contrast, heterogeneity within the Lao state provided more channels for investors to gain 
access to resources (land) in the frontiers by dealing with different state agencies. It is 
worth noting that there is also a need to distinguish between the state as an organisation 
and state officials who sometimes do not act in the interests of the state. Local state 
officials took a significant part in the spread of rubber through various informal deals in the 
uplands. Without their status as member of a state organisation, some officials would not 
have easily accessed land in the uplands.  
8.7 Summary 
This chapter has used the data from the fieldwork to reflect back on the literature on 
agrarian transitions in Southeast Asia and global land grabs in order to explore how far 
current debates in the literature resonate with, extend, or are challenged by the research. 
By using the rubber boom as the lens to reflect on trajectories of agrarian change in the 
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region, the research notes processes of agricultural expansion and intensification 
accelerated by processes of market integration. Evidence drawn from the research shares 
some characteristics of the generalised typology of Southeast Asian agrarian paths 
described in section 2.2., that map out the transition from a semi-subsistence to a 
professional farming system and the possibility of remnant farmers and farming. However, 
the particular context of the Lao uplands and the country makes paths of transition 
distinctive. Empirical data were also used to consider how far the concept of de-
agrarianisation is applicable to the situation in the Lao uplands. The research highlights 
distress de-agrarianisation beginning in the uplands and argues that agriculture continues 
to play an important role, thus, land in the livelihood sustainability.  
The research also uses rubber expansion to reflect on debates on global land grabs. It 
observes the strategies of land control employed by land grabbers, including the control of 
land through concessions and contract farming arrangements. These forms of land control 
are similar to experiences of land grabs in other regions, namely in Africa. However, the 
research also finds some complexities in land control, for example the contract farming 
arrangements which are similar to a land lease system, or the provision of some capital 
(rubber seedlings) for villagers in exchange for gaining control over land. The research 
highlights the possibility that land grabs may be taking place at a small scale, which the land 
grab literature largely overlooks in the attention it pays to large-scale events. Looking 
through the lenses of agrarian transitions and land grabs, the research highlights another 
key contribution to our understanding: the role of less powerful smallholders in 
contributing to agrarian transitions. This leads to a reconsideration of relations between 
smallholders and the market. Finally, evolving relations between the state and markets in 
an era of economic regionalisation and globalisation are also brought to the discussion to 
investigate the paradoxical dual processes of the decline and continuity of the state in a 
transition context. This key literature is assessed using the data from the field which tells us 
how far current debates and literature are applicable to the Lao experience. 
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Chapter Nine  
        Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws together the findings presented in the previous chapters. The purpose 
of the chapter is to return to the original research questions outlined in section 1.2 and to 
summarise the key research findings in the light of those questions. The chapter then turns 
to a consideration of the implications of the findings for our understanding of current 
debates on agrarian transformations in Southeast Asia, global land grabs, and the roles of 
different actors – including the state – in agrarian processes in a globalisation context. 
Drawing on the research findings, the chapter also considers policy implications regarding 
agricultural development and poverty alleviation.  
9.2 Key research findings 
This section discusses the empirical findings of the research in the light of the research 
questions set out in Chapter 1. The section seeks to summarise two key related issues 
regarding rubber expansion in the Lao uplands: the respective roles of different actors in 
the rubber boom, and its impacts on people and settlements. 
9.2.1 Actors of the rubber expansion in the uplands of the Lao PDR 
Who and/or what are the key actors in the recent rapid expansion of rubber in the Lao 
uplands? 
The answer to this question is provided through fieldwork in four upland communities 
which are differentially involved in and engaged with the rubber boom. This encompasses 
various forms of investment, from smallholder to two systems of contract farming, informal 
deals between villagers and local investors, and concession arrangements. The research 
outlines how different actors emerging from and operating at different levels have been 
involved in the rubber expansion. Figure 9.1 summarises the key ‘actors’, namely market 
forces, market actors, the state, and uplanders. This summary will now turn to consider 
each in turn. 
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Figure 9.1 Key actors in rubber expansion in the Lao uplands 
                                                  
Source: Fieldwork, 2009-2010 
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 (1) The market 
Rubber expansion in the study communities, as well as throughout the northern region of 
the Lao PDR is a direct response to an increasing demand for rubber products in China. 
Based on the four study villages, we can see market forces playing a significant role in the 
rubber boom in two ways: 
 a. Stimulating the establishment of rubber plantations by uplanders: 
Market forces stimulated uplanders to get involved in rubber. Stories about the wealth of 
rubber farmers in China were a main driver for uplanders – as well as lowlanders – to 
participate in and, hopefully, earn profits from the boom. Villagers’ strong desire to have 
their own plantation was obvious in all the four study villages although their ability to 
establish their own plantation varied. In Houay Luang Mai village, the plantations were 
entirely set up by villagers, of their own volition and drawing on their own resources, with 
the stimulation from the market forces. The power of market forces also made uplanders 
actively participate in the 2+3 contract farming system (Don Tha village) and various 
informal deals with local investors (Kaem Khong village). 
 b. Stimulating investment in rubber plantations by other market actors: 
Market forces were a key driver for a growing number of market actors who sought to 
invest in rubber production in the Lao PDR. The research observes market actors at two 
levels: the domestic and the transnational levels. Domestic market actors are local investors 
who established informal deals with Kaem Khong’s villagers by providing rubber seedlings 
and receiving land in return (see section 6.3, and section 8.3.1). Market actors at a 
transnational level are Chinese investors establishing concession plantations in the Kaem 
Khong area, 2+3 contract farming plantations with Don Tha’s villagers, and 1+4 contract 
farming plantations in Pha Lad village. These transnational market actors were involved in 
enormous investments in rubber production in the study sites and in the northern uplands 
more widely. By contrast, domestic market actors invested on a much smaller scale. While 
market forces are essential, they are imprinted in quite particular ways in a particular place. 
 (2) The state 
While the research highlights the critical role of various market actors in the rapidly 
transforming upland landscape, market actors cannot work alone. The role of the state in 
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upland agrarian changes was also obvious. The research observes three levels of state 
involvement in the rubber boom: transnational, national, and local.  
 a. Transnational state 
The state at a transnational level can be seen reflected in the role of the Chinese state in 
shaping rubber expansion in the Lao PDR. In particular we can highlight the role of China’s 
opium replacement policy, which has provided subsidies and tax benefits to Chinese 
investors who invested in agriculture in Burma and the northern Lao PDR. The transnational 
Chinese state links the necessity to generate the resources needed for China’s industrial 
development with its new role as an aid provider for development in the region. However, 
the research warns against an overestimation of the influence of the Chinese state in the 
rubber expansion; the boom was not entirely directed by the Chinese state’s policies, and it 
is important to note the contingencies and limitations within which the Chinese 
transnational state operates. Transnational market actors (Chinese investors) who invested 
in rubber production in the Lao PDR were mainly stimulated by the rising demand for and, 
thus, rising prices of rubber products. Many Chinese investors would have still crossed the 
border to invest in the northern Lao PDR regardless of the support from the Chinese 
government’s opium replacement programme. The point, perhaps, is that the programme 
made their investments more attractive. 
 b. The state at national and local levels 
The essential role of the Lao state was not only a matter of approving investors’ rubber 
development projects but also facilitating investors’ rubber plantation plans. Among the 
four study communities, there was only one rubber initiative – in Houay Luang Mai village – 
that was occurring without the state’s direct intervention. Rubber could not have expanded 
rapidly in the other three study villages without the state’s involvement from a national to 
a local level. Large-scale concession plantations in the Kaem Khong area were a direct result 
of deals struck between the investor and the state at a national level (in the guise of the 
military in Vientiane) who granted permission to the Jundai Rubber Company to use 
military land along the Lao-Burmese border. The army at a provincial level played a crucial 
role in assisting the company to access not only military land but also land which was 
previously allocated to villagers, by claiming that it was also the ‘military’s land’. The 
company would not have been able to take land from villagers without the backing of the 
army (see section 6.2). 
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The establishment of the Kunming Rubber Company’s plantations in the Pha Lad area also 
reflects the state’s involvement. The company gained permission from the state at a 
national level (through the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry). Approved documents from 
the MAF became the means by which the company gained access to the state at a local 
level. The top-down character of the Lao bureaucratic system made it easy for the company 
to gain the cooperation of the state at the local level; local authorities rarely object to what 
has been approved by the state authorities at higher levels, reflecting the nature of the 
operation of the Lao state. The company was provided by the Long district authorities with 
an official document to be taken to the village asking for ‘cooperation’ in letting the 
company establish 1+4 contract farming plantations on the village’s land. The presence of 
local state officials along with the company’s staff and attempts by officials to convince 
villagers of the need to provide ‘cooperation’ to the company made it difficult for villagers 
to refuse (see section 6.2). Accessing the state meant the company was able to gain access 
to the upland village, and access the power of the local state and, thus, it had access to 
land. 
The establishment of the companies’ plantations in the Kaem Khong and Pha Lad areas 
reflected cooperation between the state and the market; the state facilitated investors to 
gain access and control over land in the uplands. The state clearly acted as an ‘agent’ of 
market actors as they sought to expand rubber into the uplands. The research shows that 
the state also acted, to some degree, in the interests of (some) uplanders. This was clearly 
the case in the encouragement of the 2+3 contract farming plantations in the Don Tha area 
by the state at provincial and district levels. The 2+3 contract plantations in Don Tha village 
reflected two concerns of the state regarding the rubber boom in the region. Firstly, the 
local state was worried about the impact of the boom on uplanders and especially villagers’ 
land loss under concession plantations. Secondly, the local state considered the potential of 
rubber to improve the standard of living of the upland populations in a region classified as 
one of the country’s poorest areas. Rubber was integrated into the state’s policy on poverty 
alleviation. The expansion of the 2+3 contract plantations arose from the ‘best’ of 
intentions of the local state in its efforts to promote upland development and poverty 
reduction (see section 6.2). What is not clear, however, is whether the state’s best 
intentions will be achieved in the long run. It is important to note that while intending to 
act for the benefits of the uplanders by linking people to rubber (and therefore to the 
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market), the state has become a mediator between uplanders and transnational market 
actors, allowing a Chinese rubber company to expand its plantation area. 
  (3) Uplanders 
The research, while noting the crucial role of the market and the state in the rubber boom, 
also notes a significant role played by uplanders themselves as key actors in the boom and 
current agrarian changes. Uplanders in all the research sites were actively involved in the 
boom. In Houay Luang Mai, villagers were stimulated by the lesson of the improving lives of 
rubber farmers in China to set up their own plantations without any involvement of the 
state or other market actors. Villagers have turned most of the forest and fallow land over 
to rubber; they were looking to use as much land as possible to grow more rubber trees. 
The history of rubber expansion in Pha Lad village also shows the important role of 
uplanders as initiators of the boom when villagers asked local state and development 
agencies to organise a study tour to the rubber plantations in Xishuanbanna, China. After 
the trip, although the state could not provide support to them, villagers began setting up 
their own plantations (see section 6.3). 
In the Don Tha area, though the state and transnational market actors played a critical role 
in the boom, villagers also made a significant contribution to the boom. Most villagers 
wanted to take part in the company’s rubber project, with the hope of earning profits from 
the boom. Some villagers were disappointed that they could not get rubber seedlings as 
they had expected. In the Kaem Khong area where the plantations are largely dominated by 
the company’s concession, villagers expressed their willingness to get involved in rubber. 
They thus welcomed informal deals with local investors even though they had to transfer 
some land to investors as a return for the rubber seedlings the investors provided to them.  
In sum, the research shows that the current rapid expansion in rubber in the upland 
communities resulted from the interaction between various actors, from powerful state 
and market actors to less powerful uplanders, operating at different levels. What is worth 
highlighting is the fact that while we may be tempted to characterise these actors as 
relatively strong (commercial actors and the state) or weak (uplanders), it is the way in 
which these actors coalesce in particular ways which is critical in understanding agrarian 
change in the uplands of the Lao PDR.  
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9.2.2 Impacts of the rubber boom 
This section summarises the impacts of the rubber expansion focusing on two key issues: 
the transformations of upland landscapes and the livelihoods of the uplanders. It is worth 
noting that the transformations discussed here were observed from the four study 
communities at the early stage of transformations under the rubber boom when income 
from rubber did not start to flow yet. When rubber begins to generate income to farmers, 
we may observe different stories and trajectories of transitions. Despite the fact that the 
process is continuing, such transformations have emerged. 
To what extent has rubber expansion shaped and re-shaped the upland landscape? 
Rubber expansion in the Lao uplands provides material evidence of how the landscape – 
natural and social - has been re-shaped by recent economic and spatial integration. This 
study is aware of the dangers of generalising transformations observed from four upland 
communities. Nonetheless, data from the fieldwork have some resonances which, it is 
claimed, will have purchase at a wider level. 
 (1) The upland economy and land use 
Data from the fieldwork show that until recently upland communities were mainly 
dominated by a semi-subsistence economy. Apart from some sugarcane farmers from 
Houay Luang Mai, most of the village households were involved in market relations only at 
a low level of intensity. Shifting agriculture was the main economic system, either in 
combination with paddy rice (in a small area) or as the only agricultural practice. Until the 
mid-2000s, sloping land in all the study villages was dominated largely by forest and shifting 
cultivation fields in combination with small home gardens. This landscape is now being 
transformed by rubber expansion. A significant area of upland rice fields and fallows has 
been converted to rubber trees. Forest cover in all the study villages has been rapidly 
reduced to be replaced by rubber, invested by smallholders or outside investors. The arrival 
of the rubber trees has affected not only how land is being used but also the economy of 
the upland communities, transforming it from a semi-subsistence to an increasingly market-
oriented system (see section 7.2). While shifting cultivation was still practiced in every 
study community at the time of the fieldwork, this traditional agricultural system is now in 
decline; limited land access, resulting from a combination of the state’s policy on land use 
along with the transformation of land use from forest and forestland to rubber plantations, 
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has led to a drop in upland rice production. Some upland households have begun to 
consider stopping the practice of shifting cultivation altogether. 
 (2) Land rights and control 
Before the arrival of rubber, villagers in all the study communities managed land use 
through collective rights. Both forest and fallow land in Kaem Khong, Pha Lad and Houay 
Luang Mai villages were accessed through communal management. In Don Tha village, 
while land was limited, private rights were not firmly established; land rights and access 
were managed under collective rights among relatives. The rubber expansion has brought 
significant changes to land rights and land control by initiating new forms of land relations 
in the uplands. There has been a sharp decline in the areas of land under collective 
management. By contrast, large areas of land have come under private land rights. In all the 
study communities, only forest, which covers a much smaller area than previously, is still 
under communal rights. Even fallow land is now under private rights.  
While transforming land rights from communal land to private land rights was a general 
trend found in all the study communities, there are complexities in the transformations, as 
shown in Figure 7.1, regarding the ways in which rubber entered each area and the 
particular ways in which relations between villagers, the market and the state evolved. The 
research observes some diversity within the single category ‘private land rights’. The 
fieldwork shows that by claiming private land rights through the establishment of a rubber 
plantation, villagers can gain land control only when they set up the plantation themselves. 
Villagers from Kaem Khong village, though they could hold private land rights over the 
newly-established plantations, had full de facto control over only a portion of that land as 
the local investors who provided rubber seedlings have claimed control over the remainder. 
Market relations, in this way, come at a price. In the Don Tha area, while villagers’ private 
land rights over the plantations are well-recognised, villagers have lost full de facto control 
over land to the rubber company for 45 years.  
The establishment of the Chinese rubber plantations in Pha Lad village has led to even more 
complicated transformations. Some recently privately-claimed land and some of the 
village’s communal land have been taken by the company to set up 1+4 contract farming 
plantations with the village. The plantations were part of the village’s communal land. 
However, as the village received 30 per cent of the plantation area back three years after 
the trees were planted and the village then allocated this returned land to the individual 
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households, rubber has become the mechanism by which land has been privatised. The 
company’s retained 70 per cent of the plantation area is still notionally under the village’s 
communal rights but with the full effective control held by the company for the long term.  
In sum, the expansion of rubber into the uplands has established a new system of land 
rights and land control. Collective (communal) land rights are in decline, with a general 
trend to private land rights on both newly established rubber plantations and fallows. There 
are once again, however, complexities in land rights and land control behind this general 
trend of land privatisation. 
To what extent, and how, has rubber expansion affected the lives and livelihoods of 
uplanders? 
 (1) Upland livelihoods  
The research records the transformations of the upland economy from semi-subsistence to 
market-oriented in which rubber will soon become the main, possibly the only, cash crop. 
Fieldwork reveals that while uplanders have been involved in various livelihood activities, 
agriculture is still the main source for them to earn a living. The significance of agriculture in 
the four communities relates to the limited availability of on-farm and off-farm work in 
rural areas of the Lao PDR and the limited mobility of uplanders in seeking alternative 
livelihoods. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the current rapid expansion of rubber has led to significant 
changes in the livelihoods of upland populations. The rapid and extensive conversion of 
forest and fallow land to rubber plantations, either by villagers themselves or by investors, 
has led to the erosion of former dominant livelihoods which were directly or indirectly 
reliant on the forest. Decreased fallow areas have resulted in shortening of fallow periods 
which are now too short to allow weed suppression and rebuild soil fertility. This has 
resulted in an increase in demand for labour input (especially for weeding) while upland 
rice productivity declines. Some villagers could not continue practicing shifting cultivation 
and, at the same time, did not have paddy fields to fall back on. This has led to increasing 
rice shortages and growing vulnerability, especially for those without paddy fields.  
While uplanders could not rely only on shifting cultivation, other former livelihood activities 
have also shrunk and can rarely provide a supplement to upland households. The research 
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observes a sharp drop in the availability of NTFPs due to a decline in forest area. Livestock-
raising is also no longer possible because of the loss of grass land and villagers’ wish to 
avoid being fined when their cattle destroy rubber trees. Upland livelihoods have, as a 
result, become squeezed by the rubber boom. While there is an increase in demand for 
wage labour to work on the rubber plantations, this new livelihood activity is available 
mainly in the Kaem Khong area, with high risks that their labour may not be needed in the 
long run. Uplanders encounter a situation where there has been an erosion of their former 
livelihoods with (almost) no new occupations available to fill the void. While some villagers 
take an optimistic view that hardship while their rubber is maturing will be followed by a 
period of plenty when their trees begin producing latex, it is questionable how promising 
rubber actually is. Uplanders’ lives will become worse if there is a crisis in rubber 
production or prices fall and the rubber boom, while it has brought a new hope, has also 
increased livelihood vulnerability among uplanders. 
 (2) Emergence of new classes  
Rural classes and differentiation in land access between villages and among members of the 
village are obvious. The research notes that rubber has, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, become a tool for people to gain control over land. Villagers in a position to 
establish large plantations are those who were able to turn their village’s communal land 
over to private control. The research finds that the potential of villagers to make claims 
over land correlates to the history of village settlement and land access, and levels of 
market integration before the boom began. In general, villagers from Houay Luang Mai, 
where villagers had access to large paddy fields and had intensively engaged in the market 
were able to gain rights over larger areas than villagers from other villages which had 
limited access to land and a lower level of market involvement (see Table 7.2). These 
findings suggest that differentiation in land access is not directly caused by rubber 
expansion; rather it is rooted in the historical contexts and conditions of the uplands. The 
boom in rubber, however, has widened the gaps and made differentiation more obvious.  
The research also highlights the emergence of new rural classes: a rural entrepreneurial 
class and a semi-proletariat. Rural entrepreneurs are generally those local officials and 
traders who have been able to access political and economic capital, and can in turn use 
this for further accumulation through investment in rubber plantations. By providing rubber 
seedlings to poor uplanders who were attracted by rubber but could not afford to establish 
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the plantations themselves, these new rural entrepreneurs have been able to gain control 
over plantations in the uplands which will become a new source for wealth creation in a 
context of market integration. At the same time, a semi-proletariat class has emerged in 
the context of the boom in two ways. Firstly, this was through the establishment of 
contract relations between Don Tha’s villagers and the rubber company resulting in a 
condition where villagers have become contract labourers on the plantations. This was 
forged under a situation where uplanders wanted to establish plantations but could not do 
so without the capital provided by investors. Another pattern of formation of a semi-
proletariat class occurred in Kaem Khong village when villagers encountered increasing 
pressure on agricultural land access caused by the loss of land to the Chinese rubber 
company. This, in combination with the availability of wage employment on Chinese-owned 
plantations, pushed villagers to enter wage labour work to survive.  
9.3 Contribution of the thesis 
Much less research has been undertaken in the Lao PDR compared to other Southeast 
Asian countries. Researching the rubber boom in the uplands of the Lao PDR has provided 
new empirical data that fill some missing pieces in the jigsaw that contributes to our 
understanding of agrarian change in a late-comer to global capitalism. It is important to 
stress, however, that the picture provided in this thesis can only – in its detail – represent 
the agrarian transformations occurring in the four selected upland communities in Luang 
Namtha. Generalisation beyond the study sites was not the purpose that the research 
sought to achieve. As indicated earlier in section 8.1, the thesis makes conceptual and 
policy contributions by providing empirical data that can be used to speak to relevant 
debates grounded on previous studies, not by generalising the findings beyond the study 
sites. These empirical findings in turn contribute to debates of a more conceptual nature as 
well as with regard to development policy. 
9.3.1 Conceptual implications 
This research has contributed to several areas of debate in agrarian studies, namely wider 
discussions of agrarian transformations in Southeast Asia, and more specific considerations 
of global land grabs, and actors in agrarian processes. 
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 9.3.1.1 Agrarian transformations in Southeast Asia 
My research has provided empirical evidence contributing to our understanding of the 
diversity of paths of agrarian transition in the region. An extensive literature on Southeast 
Asia’s rural transformations exists, often highlighting the increasing links between rural and 
non-rural spaces and the associated shifts in rural livelihoods (Kelly 2000; Rigg 2001; McKay 
2003; Thompson 2004; McKay and Brady 2005). This phenomenon has sometimes been 
conceptualised through a de-agrarianisation thesis (Rigg 2001; 2006b; Rigg and 
Nattapoolwat 2001). Certainly, my research has noted that upland households were 
involved in a range of activities from farm to non-farm and off-farm (see Table 8.1). Thus, 
livelihoods were not reliant only on agriculture. On this basis it might be assumed that de-
agrarianisation has already begun to occur in a very remote area where market relations 
are new and limited. The fieldwork, however, reveals that household income is still mainly 
derived from agriculture, with the exception of Kaem Khong’s households who were 
involved in wage labour on the Chinese rubber plantations (see Figure 8.1). While de-
agrarianisation may have been taking place in Kaem Khong village, the process differed 
from de-agrarianisation occurring in other Southeast Asian countries where it is considered 
in the context of ‘opportunities’ and ‘choices’ for rural households (Rigg and Nattapoolwat 
2001). De-agrarianisation observed in Kaem Khong village is rather a process of distress; 
villagers have moved to off-farm work not because out of choice but out of the necessity to 
survive when most of their agricultural land has been taken by the army and the rubber 
company.  
Fieldwork in the Lao uplands shows that a full process of de-agrarianisation has not 
occurred in any of the study villages; this is true even in the case of Kaem Khong village. 
Drawing on the experiences of current agrarian situations in the study communities where 
off-farm and non-farm work both within and outside upland spaces is highly limited, 
agriculture is still an important livelihood activity for villagers. Data from my fieldwork raise 
doubts that rural livelihoods and poverty are becoming de-linked from land (Rigg 2005b). 
These findings from the uplands of the Lao PDR highlight issues of both the progress and 
the state of de-agrarianisation in different places. 
While agrarian transformations in the study communities do have some characteristics of 
de-agrarianisation, the paths of change accord more closely with notions of agrarian 
expansion and intensification, than with de-agrarianisation. Agricultural expansion and 
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intensification in the study villages share similarities with transformations in many parts of 
Southeast Asia’s frontiers, especially those recently colonised by boom crops (Tan 2000; De 
Koninck et al. 2011; D. Hall 2011a; D. Hall 2011b). However, agrarian transformations in the 
Lao uplands also have some distinctive characteristics. In particular, there is dissociation 
between agricultural expansion and intensification and migration. While migration is 
recorded as a crucial part of current upland agrarian change in many of the region’s 
frontiers (D. Hall 2011b), this was not the case in the research sites, at least at the time 
when this research was conducted. The key implication is that there are complexities of 
agrarian transformations. While agrarian transformations in the upland Lao PDR may share 
some commonalities in the movement from semi-subsistence to professional farming and 
to remnant smallholders as proposed by Rigg (2005b), there are some distinctive 
characteristics which are more important (see section 8.2). The research finds that, while 
we may identify some common trends, transitions are never uniform in content or in 
direction. The fieldwork from the four upland communities confirms this point; while 
transforming from a semi-subsistence economy, which was dominated by shifting 
cultivation, to a market-oriented economy with rubber as a new (and only) crop, is common 
to all the study villages, the transformations taking place in each village are notably 
different regarding both the internal contexts of the villages and their relations to wider 
forces and architectures of power. This research argues that broader conceptualisations, 
though they are important in providing an overview of the situation, may harbour a danger 
of disregarding the diversity and complexities of changes occurring in rural space. There is a 
need to look at particular places, contexts and times to generate a deep understanding of 
agrarian transformations. 
 9.3.1.2 Global land grabs 
Fieldwork in these upland communities of the Lao PDR has also provided an empirical base 
to consider global land grabs. Using rubber expansion as a reflection of global land grabs, 
quickly shows that these upland communities do not accord with the general 
understanding that land grabs are reflective of North-South relations. Current land grabs in 
the study sites are solely determined by South-South relations in which the Lao PDR is 
situated at the bottom of the region’s unequal power hierarchy. The fieldwork observes 
both similarities and differences between land grabs in the upland Lao PDR and in other 
regions. A similarity is found through the direct forms of land control taking place under 
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land concession and land lease. The research also notes, however, that indirect control over 
land (and labour) is emerging through the establishment of contract farming relations 
between investors and villagers. This point is rarely recognised in the mainstream literature 
on land grabs, which focuses more on direct control. The fieldwork in Kaem Khong village 
also reveals another form of land deal: informal deals between investors and villagers. This 
form of land grabbing is usually on a smaller scale than global land grabs. Its relatively small 
scale makes it less visible although it has resulted in permanent land loss and insecurity of 
livelihoods among the uplanders affected. Evidence from the study highlights how land 
grabs can take place on a small scale, by small investors, and with limited visibility. This 
point is overlooked in the land grabs literature, which tends to focus on large-scale projects 
(Cotula et al. 2009). Using the rubber boom as a window to understand global land grabs, 
my research observes that powerful actors, namely the state and a range of market actors, 
were key in taking control over land in the uplands. The research, however, also highlights 
the critical role of uplanders in contributing to this process; this point is not widely 
recognised in the literature on global land grabs as the literature tends to discuss the role of 
the state and capital in grabbing land from villagers. The crucial role of smallholders in land 
grabs in my research requires us to look more widely at the actors in agrarian processes. 
 9.3.1.3 Actors in agrarian processes 
The findings from my research contribute to our understanding of actors in agrarian 
processes. Literature on agrarian studies, especially that developed under the political 
economy framework, highlights the crucial roles played by powerful actors such as the 
state, markets, and globalisation in agrarian processes. This view has been critiqued by 
those adopting an ethnographic approach (e.g. Tan 2000; Li 2002a), which shows that 
agrarian transformations at a local level are not solely determined by such powerful actors, 
but also by smallholders.  
My research findings support the contentions developed by Tan (2000) and Li. (2002). 
Evidence from my research, while affirming the significant role of powerful actors - both 
state and market at domestic and transnational levels - reveal the role of smallholders who 
in many cases have played a critical role in shaping the transformations that have occurred. 
These findings highlight the agency of less powerful smallholders in social transformations. 
The role of smallholders is frequently overlooked, presuming that the transformations 
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taking place at a local level are an outcome of policies and projects determined at macro 
level, either global or national.  
What it is important to note is that ascribing a critical role to smallholders does not mean 
that the actions of smallholders are fully free from what may have occurred at a macro 
level. The fieldwork reveals that the decisions and actions of smallholders are tightly linked 
to the macro level. It is necessary to look at agrarian transformations as the interactions 
between actors across levels and localities. This allows us to gain a better picture of how 
the policies, projects and structural changes actually work in specific places and at specific 
times; and how the policies at a macro level are shaped or re-shaped by less powerful 
actors at the micro level.  
 9.3.1.4 The state in globalisation 
My research also provides an empirical basis to contribute to debates on the role and status 
of the state in an era of globalisation. I argue, following Weiss (1997), against the notion of 
the powerless state in the globalisation era. The view that the rise of the market and the 
decline of the state in the context of globalisation depicts a situation of ‘competition’ 
between the state and the market, a zero sum game where the resurgence of one will 
inevitably cause the relative decline of the other. The adoption of the market economy by 
the government of Lao PDR has not led to the demise of the Lao state. Looking through the 
lens of the rubber boom, the agricultural structure of the Lao PDR has shifted from one 
where the national framework was controlled by the ‘socialist’ state to a global framework 
where market forces and actors have become key players (see McMichael 1992: 355-359; 
Kearney 1996: 127-130; Watts and Goodman 1997; Bernstein 2000:36-38). My research 
shows that while market integration and global forces have certainly affected the status 
and the role of the Lao state, this is not one where the state has been substituted or 
replaced by the market. As discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 8, both the Lao and Chinese 
states were significant actors in the expansion of the market. The fieldwork affirms the 
points made by McMichael (1992) that market expansion cannot be achieved without the 
state. The still existing role of the state in a transition country like the Lao PDR confirms 
Gainsborough’s (2010) warning, drawing on the experience of Vietnam, about the danger of 
disregarding the continuing influence of prevailing power structures. My fieldwork observes 
that the state’s involvement in the uplands has become increasingly intense since ‘reform’. 
The findings also suggest the necessity to consider the state as far from monolithic. ‘The 
  
281 
 
state’ is many-faceted and the state’s agencies operate at different levels with different 
aims and practices in their dealings with people and places.  
9.3.2 Policy implications 
The research raises some concerns regarding agricultural development and poverty 
alleviation in the uplands of the Lao PDR. 
 9.3.1.1 Risks of mono-crop development 
The research notes that bringing the market into the uplands is proposed as the way to 
resolve the poverty of the upland populations. While various cash crops introduced in the 
uplands have faced many obstacles, rubber is the first crop which has been welcomed by 
both the state and villagers thus bringing new hope that it might build better lives for the 
people. Thus, land which was previously used for semi-subsistence production has been 
converted to rubber plantations; only small areas of land are now left for traditional 
agriculture. Thus upland livelihoods will soon be reliant almost only on rubber production 
and a market system which is beyond their control. This raises the risk that upland 
livelihoods may have become narrowly based. The experiences of price shocks of boom 
crops such as coffee in Vietnam or cocoa in Indonesia suggest that a rubber price crisis is 
distinctly possible. A shortage of agricultural land will not allow villagers to return to their 
previous production system. The limits of non-farm and off-farm work will push uplanders 
into a situation where they may be even worse off than they were before engaging in 
rubber cultivation. The research suggests that, as non-farm is limited, agricultural 
diversification is needed to minimise the risks for people in a context of market uncertainty.  
 9.3.1.2 Large-scale agricultural investment and poverty 
Drawing on the empirical data from the upland communities, this research questions how 
far large-scale investment in agriculture will bring better lives to local people. The research 
reveals the loss of control over land and forest resources of uplanders who have limited 
power in negotiating with large-scale investors who have better access to political and 
economic power. The fieldwork reveals the insufficient capacity of the Lao state in setting 
and enforcing regulations in order to protect uplanders when they encounter powerful land 
seekers. While some optimistic scholars and policy makers, such as those from the World 
Bank (Deininger et al. 2011: 19-20) as well as some Lao officials, express the hope that 
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large-scale investment in farmland will generate employment opportunities for local 
people, my research suggests this is too optimistic. Rubber expansion may increase demand 
for wage labour but it does not necessarily mean that such opportunities will accrue to the 
Lao. Regarding the image of Lao people as ‘lazy’, both Chinese and Lao investors expressed 
their keenness to avoid hiring Lao labour to work in their plantations. Local officials who 
have invested in rubber plantations also prefer to hire Chinese labourers. This raises the 
spectre of ‘double’ dispossession; people are excluded both from their rights to use their 
land and are then also excluded from the opportunity to work on their former land.  
The research findings also raise concerns over the role of the contract farming systems 
which are being promoted by the GoL as a core strategy for the country’s agricultural 
development (GoL 2006). The research finds that the forms of contract farming relations 
between Chinese investors and uplanders have led, first, to villagers’ long-term loss of de 
facto land control and, second, to investors gaining long-term control over villagers’ labour. 
Taken together, these outcomes lead to greater vulnerability for uplanders in the face of 
declining rubber prices and low returns from rubber; villagers will not be able to turn land 
to other crops or to seek work outside the plantations. This highlights how the ‘good’ 
intentions of the state may lead to unexpected and negative consequences for the lives of 
the poor people the state is ostensibly attempting to help.  
9.4 Summary 
Based on fieldwork conducted in the uplands of the Lao PDR, this research has highlighted 
the processes, and their outcomes, of recent agrarian transformations in one of the 
frontiers of global capitalism. Through the lens of the rubber boom, the research has used 
evidence collected from four upland communities in Luang Namtha province to question 
and in some respects to challenge how scholars and practitioners have interpreted agrarian 
transformations in Southeast Asia.  
It is important, however, to consider the ‘representativeness’ of the field sites and 
therefore the degree to which the study can be ‘generalised’: can such a small number of 
upland communities represent a wider body of experience and therefore provide us with 
more general knowledge about the nature of agrarian transitions? The research has no 
intention to uncover phenomena from which general statements can be built. That said, 
the situations observed in the four upland communities can speak to wider debates. The 
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different trajectories of change between the four study sites suggest that we need to be 
sensitive to the particularity of context in shaping agrarian situations. Thus a key conclusion 
is that capital intrudes into rural space and contributes to the re-working of rural 
livelihoods in quite specific ways, cautioning against ‘models’ of change.  
The research also suggests a number of areas for further study. Firstly, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the research could only be conducted in the northern region where rubber 
expansion has been stimulated mainly by market forces emanating from China. Further 
studies of rubber expansion from other regions of the Lao PDR where different actors are 
involved (the Vietnamese, Thai, and local Lao states as well as Vietnamese, Thai, and local 
market actors) would provide empirical data permitting a comparison of different actors 
and their effects in terms of rural living and trajectories of rural transformation. Secondly, 
the study was undertaken between 2009 and 2010 at which time the rubber plantations 
were not yet producing latex. Thus, further studies carried out when the rubber is mature 
will shed light on how the rubber market shapes and re-shapes upland space and 
populations. Will rubber be able to resolve the hunger of uplanders? Will it re-shape new 
relations between the upland economy and people, and the wider Lao and regional 
economy space? Thirdly, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the thesis draws heavily on the 
economic, livelihood, and production aspects of transformation, while social and cultural 
elements of change are only lightly presented. This leaves room for the further 
investigation of the social and cultural dimensions of transformation, especially when the 
outcomes of rubber engagement become more obvious. Will rubber promote further social 
differentiation in the uplands? How will social cohesion be affected? Will social and cultural 
capital be affected? And will engagement with rubber lead to new identities in the uplands 
and the re-positioning of uplanders? All these questions are important and remain to be 
elucidated. 
. 
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Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages 
Villages Overview Advantages  Concerns 
Baan Thueng 
(A lowland Black Tai 
village, Namtha district) 
- The village is located about 10 kilometres from the 
provincial centre. 
- Paddy cultivation is the main activity for every 
household; some could have a rice surplus while others 
face a shortage of rice. 
- Some villagers are involved in other activities such as 
selling their garden produce in a morning market. 
- Rubber was first planted in 1994 by a few households (by 
their own investment) who were stimulated by the 
success of farmers in Xishuanbanna, China. However, 
most of the rubber trees died in 2000 as a result of bad 
weather. 
- Villagers began planting rubber again in 2002-2003 when 
they saw that villagers from Baan Hmong - the only village 
where their rubber could survive frost damage in 2000 – 
managed to make profits from selling rubber latex. 
- 38 out of 70 households have rubber their own 
investment) and hope that it will generate high profits for 
them when it matures.  
 
- Travelling to the village is easy. 
- The research can be carried out 
through the Lao and Thai 
languages. 
- The level of rubber engagement 
is not very high. Some households 
have a very small plantation. 
- There is an issue about feasibility 
as villagers seem to be extremely 
busy. 
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Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages (continued) 
Villages Overview Advantages Concerns 
 Baan Moon 
(A lowland Black Tai 
village, Namtha district) 
- The village is located about 10 kilometres from the 
provincial centre. 
- Paddy cultivation is the main economic activity and most 
of the villagers do not face a rice shortage. 
- Villagers began planting rubber in 2002, with assistance 
from the Luang Namtha PAFO in accessing loans from the 
Agricultural Promotion Bank). Every household planted 
rubber (the average is about 1 ha per household). 
- Some villagers have sold their plantations as they were 
not able to wait until their rubber trees produced rubber 
latex (this needs to around 6-7 years after the tree was 
planted). 
- Some outsiders (mostly e local state officials) have 
rubber plantations in the village. 
- A few households have started tapping rubber and sold 
latex to a Chinese trader. 
 
 
 
- The village is easy to access. 
 
- There is no need for an 
interpreter  
- The village may provide data 
about why the villagers do not 
need to be under the contract 
system with a rubber company. 
 
- The situation may show the role 
of the state in the agrarian 
processes. 
- Rubber seems to be an 
additional activity rather than the 
main activity for the village (even 
in the future when rubber 
matures).  
- Relatively large areas of 
plantations located in the village 
are owned by outsiders.  
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Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages (continued) 
Villages Overview Advantages Concerns 
Baan Hmong 
(An upland Hmong 
village, Namtha district) 
- The village is located only 2 kilometres from the 
provincial centre. 
- Villagers started planting rubber in 1994/1996 by 
learning from their relatives in China. They could access 
credit from the Agricultural Promotion Bank through the 
co-operative; now all of them have paid off their debts to 
the bank. 
- Every household has planted and started tapping rubber. 
Villagers have expanded their rubber areas after the first 
rubber tree was tapped in 2002 and rubber has become 
the main source of income. 
- Some households still have their upland rice fields but 
most of the upland fields have been converted to rubber. 
The village’s headman said that many villagers believe 
that rubber is better than rice. 
-This village is considered as a ‘model’ village for the 
success of poverty alleviation through rubber. The income 
they have made from rubber has stimulated the desire of 
people in other villages to establish rubber plantations.  
 
- The village can provide a picture 
of the rubber boom and people’s 
perspective on rubber (and other 
agricultural production) on upland 
livelihoods. 
 
- The village can provide the links 
between rubber, upland 
agricultural transformations, and 
poverty reduction. 
- It is easy to access the village. 
- Several pieces of research have 
been conducted in this village. 
- Two studies are being carried 
out. 
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Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages (continued) 
Villages Overview Advantages Concerns 
Baan Klang 
(A Lao Houay village, 
Namtha district)  
- Upland rice is the most significant livelihood activity of 
the village.  
- Villagers have lost about 214 ha of land to a Chinese 
rubber company that has obtained permission from the 
government to set up a demonstration plantation. The 
loss of their land has affected villagers’ traditional 
agricultural system. 
- Some villagers have their upland fields but some villagers 
do not have access to upland rice field. Most households 
face a rice shortage. 
- Villagers are involved in wage labouring in the plantation 
(but work availability is limited). 
- Villagers complain that they have lost land to the 
company without getting compensation. A DAFO official, 
however, said that villagers had already got rubber 
seedlings as compensation. Villagers do not consider the 
seedlings as compensation as, in their opinion, the 
seedlings the company provided them are under contract 
farming relations as villagers from other villages, who 
have not lost their land, are involved.  
- There are permanent Chinese workers working in the 
company’s plantations.  
- Some villagers are opium-addicted. 
 
- It is a very good case providing a 
picture of how the concession has 
affected the livelihoods of people 
(the concession is very rare in 
Luang Namtha province). 
- 
 
- It is not easy to travel to the 
village.  
- There is a need for an 
interpreter. 
- There is one Lao student 
conducting the research for his 
Master’s thesis in the village. 
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Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages (continued) 
Villages Overview Advantages Concerns 
Ban Dai 
(A lowland Tai village, 
Nalae district) 
- The village is located along the side of Tha River, 
opposite the district centre; it can be reached by a long-
tail boat. 
- The majority of the households have paddy fields while 
some rely on upland rice cultivation. Some villagers, 
especially those who do not have paddy access, face a rice 
shortage (from only a few months to as long as 6 months). 
- Two households started planting rubber in 2005 by their 
own investment but most of the villagers began planting 
rubber in 2006 under contract relations with the Chinese 
rubber company. Every household has a plantation, with a 
range of 1–3 ha per household. 
-Some villagers sold their plantation when they needed 
cash. 
- The villagers were encouraged to sell their livestock (e.g. 
buffalos, cows, and goats) when they started planting 
rubber to prevent their animals destroying rubber trees. 
 
 
 
- The village could provide a 
picture of rubber plantations 
under contract farming relations, 
which is the system that the 
government promotes as the new 
tool for the poverty alleviation.  
- The research team could get to 
the village within 30 minutes from 
the district centre. 
- There is no requirement for an 
interpreter. 
- Villagers are very friendly and 
they are likely to welcome the 
research team.  
- The village may not be a good 
representative ofr Nalae district as 
it is a lowland village but the 
majority of Nalae’s population are 
uplanders. 
- The village can be accessed only 
via a long-tail boat, raising an 
issue of safety.  
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Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages (continued) 
Villages Overview Advantages Concerns 
Ban Phu  
(An upland Khmu village, 
Nalae district) 
- The village is located about 25 kilometres from the 
district centre and can be reached through a laterite road. 
- It is one of the district’s poorest villages. 
- Shifting cultivation is the main activity; villagers do not 
have paddy fields.  
- 56 out of 82 households face a rice shortage. 
-Villagers began planting rubber in 2006 under the 
contract relation with the Chinese company; every 
household has a rubber plantation though their plantation 
is not large. 
- Villagers generally used their previous upland rice fields 
as a rubber plantation. Some villagers then cleared the 
forest to grow rice while some villagers use their fallows 
for shifting cultivation. 
- Villagers hope that rubber will become their new source 
of livelihoods. Some villagers consider that they may not 
need to cultivate rice in the future. 
- The level of market involvement in this village is very 
low. Villagers grew corn under a contract relation with the 
FUF, but only on a very small area. In 2009, the company 
could not operate in the area, thus villagers do not 
produce any cash crop.  
 
 
- The village can be a very good 
case providing a picture of the 
rubber expansion and upland 
transformations, the links 
between rubber and poverty. 
-As it is a village of Khmu, the 
majority of Nalae’s populations, 
this village is likely to be a better 
case than Baan Dai. 
- There is a concern over getting 
access to the village due to its 
setting. 
- There is a need for an 
interpreter.  
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Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages (continued) 
Villages Overview Advantages Concerns 
Baan Don Tha 
(An upland Khmu village, 
Nalae district) 
 
- It is a resettlement village located around 2 kilometres 
from the district centre.  
- Villagers cannot access paddy fields. Their livelihoods are 
heavily reliant on forest and shifting cultivation. 
- Villagers usually face a rice shortage and many 
households have experienced a longer period of rice 
insufficiency since they have set up the rubber 
plantations. 
- Villagers grew some cash crops (corn, peanuts, and 
sesame) under a contract relation with the FUF but, due 
to limited land, they could only produce a small amount. 
- Villagers said they were encouraged by local state 
officials to plant rubber as an alternative to their shifting 
cultivation which will not be allowed from 2010. Most of 
the villagers have a rubber plantation under the contract 
relations with the Chinese rubber company.  
- Villagers expressed both their hope and worries about 
their future which will be more reliant on rubber. 
- Some villagers work as a wage labourer in the rubber 
plantations of people from town (usually state officials). 
 
 
 
 
- The village could provide a good 
picture of agrarian changes 
brought about by rubber. 
- The village could be a case 
reflecting relations between 
rubber, upland agriculture and 
upland poverty.  
- The village’s experiences could 
reflect the links between the state 
and the market in upland 
transformations. 
- It is easy to get to the village. 
- Most of the villagers could 
communicate in Lao/Thai. So, 
there is no need for an 
interpreter. 
- The field research is not likely to 
be carried out before December 
as villagers are busy harvesting 
their upland rice. Most villagers 
stay overnight at their rice fields 
during the harvest season. 
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Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages (continued) 
Villages Overview Advantages Concerns 
Baan Na Mai 
(An upland Akha village, 
Sing district) 
- It is a 33-household resettlement village (first settled in 
its current setting in 1994).  
- Some villagers can access paddy fields but most villagers 
still rely on shifting cultivation. 
- The villagers are involved in cash crop production; they 
plant sugarcane under a contract relation with Chinese 
investors. Sugarcane is the main source for villagers’ cash. 
- The villagers started their own rubber plantations in 
2004 with the assistance of their relatives from China (the 
success of their relatives in China who have made profits 
from rubber trees was the significant inspiration for the 
villagers to set up their plantations). 
- Villagers have increased their planted areas every year 
using cashed generated from sugarcane. Every household 
has a rubber plantation. The headman estimates that the 
village’s total planted areas were around 2000 ha in 2009.  
- Some households faced a rice shortage when they 
turned their upland rice fields over to rubber as they do 
not have enough land left for shifting cultivation. 
However, the villagers hope that this problem will be 
resolved when their rubber matures and they can sell the 
produce.  
 
 
- It can be the case highlighting 
the links between trans-border 
connections and rubber expansion 
in the Lao PDR. 
-It can be a case reflecting 
people’s views on market 
integration. 
- There is a concern about 
travelling to the village. 
- There is a requirement for an 
interpreter. 
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Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages (continued) 
Villages Overview Advantages Concerns 
Baan Na Kao 
(An upland Akha village, 
Sing district) 
- This 62-household resettlement village moved from a 
village located near the Lao-Chinese border to the current 
area around 1993.  
- Paddy rice and upland dry rice are the main economic 
activities of the villagers. Villagers mention that they have 
faced a rice shortage for a longer period since the arrival 
of rubber. 
- Villagers also grow sugarcane for a Chinese company. 
-The success of their relatives in China was the inspiration 
for the villagers to set up their plantation. The villagers 
hope that they will make high profits from rubber like the 
Chinese farmers. 
- A few households set up the plantations in 2003 but 
most of the households started their rubber plantation in 
2004. In 2009, there were only a few households that did 
not have their own plantation.  
- Most households set up the plantation with their own 
investment but there is also a contract system (a 1+4 
system) between a Chinese company and the village. 
Some villagers are not happy to let the company 
establishing the plantation but they cannot oppose it. The 
village will get 40 per cent of the profits. Villagers are still 
not clear how the profits the village makes will be 
managed. 
 
- It may reflect the links between 
trans-border connections and 
rubber expansion. 
- It may reflect the role of 
transnational capital and the state 
in the boom in the village. 
 
- There is a concern about 
potential impacts on research 
subjects. 
- There is a concern about 
travelling to the village. 
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Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages (continued) 
Villages Overview Advantages Concerns 
Baan Yao 
(A Yao village, Sing 
district) 
-It is a 46-household Yao village located around 10 
kilometres from the district centre. 
- Most of the households have paddy fields and many can 
have a rice surplus. Villagers also plant sugarcane under a 
contract relation with Chinese investors.  
-One household first planted rubber in 1995, with the 
assistance of the Chinese and Yao people in China. This 
household has started tapping the rubber in the last 4 
years. The household members reported that rubber has 
brought better lives for them. 
- Other households set up their plantation in a few years 
later but the number of rubber planted areas increased 
rapidly in 2003 and 2004. In 2009, every household had a 
rubber plantation, an average of 9 ha per household. All 
plantations were under smallholder investment. 
- Villagers hope that they can earn high profits from 
rubber. However, they express their concerns over the 
price of rubber produce in the future. 
- Some villagers established informal deals with their 
relatives in other areas (such as Bokeo province) by 
providing rubber seedlings for their relatives and got 
some rubber plantations and land as a return. 
 
  
 
-It is easy to get to the village. 
- There is no need for an 
interpreter.  
-It provides a case reflecting the 
active role of small farmers in 
rubber expansion. 
- It provides a case reflecting the 
links between cross-border 
connections and rubber 
expansion. 
- It provides a case reflecting the 
potential of small farmers in an 
attempt to transform themselves 
to the status of rural 
entrepreneur.  
- Yao is not the main ethic group 
in Sing district.  
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Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages (continued) 
Villages Overview Advantages Concerns 
Baan Daen 
(An Akha village, Sing 
district) 
- It is a resettlement village located near the Lao-Chinese 
border (about 18 kilometres from the district’s centre). 
- The majority of households cannot access paddy. Thus 
shifting cultivation is still important for them.  
- Villagers have been involved in growing sugarcane under 
a contract relation with a Chinese trader since since the 
late 1990s. However, large areas of land which was 
previously used for sugarcane has now converted to 
rubber. 
- Villagers first planted rubber in 1997 with the inspiration 
from seeing the improvement of the lives of uplanders in 
China. However, most of the trees died in 2000 after 
heavy frost. The trees which have survived first gave 
rubber latex in 2003. Rubber produce is collected by 
Chinese traders. 
- From the early 2000s, rubber planted areas have 
significantly expanded. Some villagers can set their own 
plantation while others plant rubber under informal 
relations with Akha from China who provide the capital 
needed. 
- Around 200 ha of the village’s communal land were 
taken by the Homeland Security Office at a provincial level 
who then passed land on to a Chinese rubber company. 
Villagers cannot oppose land seizure. 
 
- It provides a case reflecting the 
links between cross-border 
connections, the state and rubber 
expansion. 
- It provides a case reflecting the 
role of the state in the 
penetration of the market in the 
frontiers. 
- It provides a case of the rubber 
expansion from different forms of 
investment (smallholder, informal 
deal between villagers and Akha 
from China, and a concession). 
- There is a concern about 
potential impacts on research 
subjects. 
- There is a concern about 
travelling to the village. 
- An interpreter is needed. 
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Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages (continued) 
Villages Overview Advantages Concerns 
Baan Houay Luang Mai 
(An Akha village, Sing 
district). 
- It is a resettlement village located close to the main road 
linking a town of Sing district and the Lao-Chinese border. 
- Some villagers, mostly those who moved to the current 
setting in the mid 1980s, can access paddy fields and 
some can have a rice surplus. Villagers who just relocated 
in the 2000s cannot have paddy fields and have to rely on 
shifting cultivation; many of them still face a rice shortage. 
- Villagers are intensively involved in the market. Many 
households have planted sugarcane under a contract 
relation with a Chinese investor. Villagers also often take 
NTFPs and their garden produce to sell in a market in 
China. 
- Villagers first set up rubber plantations in the early 2000s 
with their own investment. Most of the households have a 
rubber plantation. 
 
 
 
 
- It can provide insights 
contributing to the debates on 
actors in the agrarian processes.  
-An intense level of market 
integration in the village provides 
good sets of data for comparison 
to those villages with a lower 
degree of market integration. 
- The pattern of investment in the 
village may prevent any potential 
impacts on research subjects. 
- An interpreter may be needed to 
interview older villagers. 
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Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages (continued) 
Villages Overview Advantages Concerns 
Baan Pha Lad 
(An Akha village, Long 
district). 
- It is a resettlement village located near R17B which links 
Long district to Sing district and China. 
- While some villagers could access paddy fields, shifting 
cultivation is still important for the majority of the 
households. Around 30 out of 73 households face a rice 
shortage (about 3-4 months each year). 
- Villagers have begun involved in commercial crops but 
their produce is still very low. 
- NTFPs were the main sources of income for the villagers.  
- Villagers began planting rubber in the mid 2000s after 
they came back from a study tour to rubber plantations in 
Yunnan province (villagers asked the local state and NGOs 
to organise the study tour for them). 
- Some villagers set up a rubber nursery aiming to provide 
a supply of rubber seedlings. 
- There is a 100-hectare plantation of a Chinese rubber 
company established under the 1+4 contract relation. 
Some villagers said they had never agreed but they could 
not reject the company’s proposal. 
- Some villagers said they have faced more pressures on 
accessing agricultural land as land has been taken by the 
company. 
- Some villagers are involved in wage labouring in the 
company’s plantation.  
 
- It can provide a case contributing 
to the debates on actors and 
agency in the agrarian processes.  
- The 1+4 contract system in the 
village may provide evidence 
about different impacts of the 
rubber boom on people’s 
livelihoods compared to other 
forms of investment. 
- The village is easily accessible. 
- There may be a need for an 
interpreter to interview elder 
villagers. 
. 
  
298 
 
Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages (continued) 
Villages Overview Advantages Concerns 
Baan Tao  
(an Aka village, Long 
district) 
- It is a resettlement village located on the R17B. 
- Shifting cultivation is still the main agricultural system. A 
rice shortage is not uncommon. 
-Some villagers have set up sugarcane plantation under a 
contract relation with a Chinese investor but only on a 
relatively small area. 
- Other sources of income are NTFPs and wage labouring, 
mainly in the Chinese rubber plantations. 
- Villagers established their own plantations in 2006. 
- The village also allowed the Chinese company to set up a 
plantation under the 1+4 contract system.  
- Some villagers said that they did not want to give land to 
the company as they wanted to secure land for their 
upland rice cultivation or for their own investment. But 
they could not refuse the company’s project. 
- Some villagers said they allowed the company to set up 
the plantation because the company will provide a road to 
their agricultural fields. 
- It may provide data for 
understanding actors in the 
agrarian processes. 
 
- It may be a good example for a 
comparison between the 
investment under smallholders 
and the 2+3 contract systems. 
- An interpreter is needed to 
interview older people. 
 
- Gaining access to the village is 
more difficult than Baan Pha Lad. 
  
299 
 
Appendix 1 A summary of the surveyed villages (continued). 
Villages Overview Advantages Concerns 
Baan Kaem Khong 
(a Kui and Lahu village, 
Long district) 
- It is a resettlement village located along the Mekong 
River, difficult to access. 
- Villagers could not access paddy thus shifting cultivation 
is very important for their livelihoods. 
- Due to the geographical setting of the village, the 
village’s involvement in market is very low. 
- Villagers earn cash from selling NTFPs but this is in 
decline. 
- In 2009, villagers began working as wage labourers in the 
Chinese rubber plantations. This has become an important 
new source of income. 
- Villagers have set up rubber plantations under informal 
deals with a local investor.  
- Large areas of land in the areas have been given to a 
Chinese company’s rubber plantations by the Army. 
Villagers, though they had been allocated land use rights 
by the local state authorities, were forced to give up their 
land. 
- Many households face a rice shortage more than 6 
months per year. 
- Some households stopped practicing shifting cultivation 
due to the low fertility of available land.  
- It may provide good evidence 
about the role of the state (from 
different agencies) and its 
relations to the market and 
people in the agrarian 
transformations. 
- It may be an interesting case for 
a comparison of the impacts of 
rubber expansion between the 
concession system and other 
forms of investment. 
 
- Gaining access to the village is 
difficult. 
- An interpreter is needed. 
Source: Fieldwork, 2009-2010 
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Appendix 2 Summary of missing data 
Village 
N
o
 o
f 
H
H
s 
number of missing data 
N
o
 o
f 
m
em
b
er
s 
N
o
 o
f 
la
b
o
u
re
rs
 Livestock 
Rice Sufficiency 
pigs chicken ducks 
cows/buffaloes 
rice shortage 
(months) rice surplus (tons) 
BF 
rubber 
2009/2010 
BF 
rubber 
2009 
BF 
rubber 
2009 
Houay Luang Mai 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pha Lad 31 0 0 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 1 0 
Don Tha 22 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Kaem Khong 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 
             
villages 
N
o
 o
f 
H
H
s number of missing data 
agricultural land cash crop production 
paddy swidden rubber 
sugarcane corn passion fruit sesame 
areas produce areas produce areas produce areas produce 
Houay Luang Mai 25 0 0 0 0 0 25 25 0 0 0 0 
Pha Lad 31 1 1 0 0 0 31 31 0 0 0 0 
Don Tha 22 0 1 0 0 0 22 22 0 0 0 0 
Kaem Khong 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix 2 Summary of missing data (continued) 
villages 
N
o
 o
f 
H
H
s number of missing data 
   upland rice cultivation paddy 2009 
   BF rubber 2009 
areas      
areas 
Fallow 
periods 
produce areas 
Fallow 
periods 
produce 
       
   Houay Luang Mai 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   Pha Lad 31 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
   Don Tha 22 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
   Kaem Khong 18 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
   
             
villages 
N
o
 o
f 
H
H
s number of missing data 
income 
rice sugarcane corn sesame other crops livestock NTFPs trading wage handicraft 
Houay Luang Mai 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pha Lad 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Don Tha 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kaem Khong 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix 3 A list of the 'elite' interviewees and informal meetings 
Organisation Position/Role Date of interview 
State agencies at the national 
level: 
The National Agricultural and 
Forestry Extension Service 
(NAFES) 
 
 
Agricultural extension officer 
 
 
 
9/09/2009 
 
Department of Forestry, 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry  
Senior officer 
 
 
10/09/2009 
Department of Agriculture, 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry  
Senior officer 10/09/2009 
Agriculture and Forestry Policy 
Research Centre, National 
Agriculture and Forestry 
Research Institute (NAFRI) 
A policy researcher 
 
 
 
11/09/2009 
 
 
 
Research Division,  The National 
Land Management Authority 
(NLMA) 
Senior officer 15/07/2010 
State agencies at the provincial 
level: 
Luang Namtha PAFO 
 
 
 
Head of the PAFO (informal 
meetings) 
Deputy head of the PAFO 
Forestry officer 
 
 
26/10/2009; 29/01/2010 
24/09/2009; 3/12/2009 
24/09/2009 
State agencies at the district 
level: 
Long district: 
Long DAFO 
 
 
 
 
Deputy head of DAFO 
DAFO senior official 
 
 
 
1/02/2010 
1/02/2010; 11/02/2010 
Namtha district: 
Namtha DAFO 
 
 
Senior officer 
 
 
24/09/2009 
 
Nalae district: 
Nalae DAFO 
 
 
 
 
Nalae District Office 
 
Deputy head of DAFO 
Senior official 
Official 
Forestry official 
 
Senior official 
 
 
 
 
25/09/2009 
31/08/2010 
29/08/2010 
05/12/2009 
 
30/08/2010 
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Appendix 3 A list of the 'elite' interviewees and informal meetings 
(continued) 
Organisation Position/Role Date of interview 
State agencies at the district 
level: 
Sing district: 
Sing DAFO 
 
 
 
Sing District Office 
 
 
 
Sing Planning and Investment 
Office (PI) 
 
Sing Land Management 
Authority Office (LMA) 
 
 
 
DAFO senior officials 
Forestry official  
Agricultural extension official 
 
Deputy governor 
Sing ex-governor (informal 
meeting) 
 
Deputy head of Sing PI 
 
 
Deputy head of Sing LMA 
 
 
 
20/12/2009 
29/12/2009 
23/06/2010 
 
26/06/2010 
26/06/2010 
 
 
25/06/2010 
 
 
25/06/2010 
Business organisations: 
Luang Namtha Province: 
 
Friends of the Upland Farmers 
Company 
Long district: 
Rubber investment (local) 
 
 
 
 
 
A Chinese rubber company 
 
Agricultural investment under a 
contract system 
 
 
NTFP trade 
Nalae district: 
Rubber investment 
 
 
 
 
The company’s founder 
 
 
Local Investors who provided 
rubber seedlings for villagers in 
exchange for land 
- Lue investor 
- Tai Daeng (Red Tai) investor 
 
A member of the company’s 
management team 
Lue-Chinese investor who 
promoted villagers growing 
pumpkin under a contract system 
of relations) 
A NTFP trader 
 
Two local investors (ethnic Lao) 
who provided rubber seedlings for 
villagers in exchange for land 
 
 
 
 
 
12/08/2010 
 
 
 
 
 
10/02/2010 
11/02/2010 
 
11/02/2010 
 
11/02/2010 
 
 
 
10/03/2010 
 
28/10/2009; 6//12/2009 
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Appendix 3 A list of the 'elite' interviewees and informal meetings 
(continued) 
Organisation Position/Role Date of interview 
Business organisations: 
Sing district: 
Rubber investment (local) 
 
 
 
Rubber investment (joint 
investment between Lao-
Chinese partners) 
 
 
Rubber investment (non-local) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Chinese restaurant and 
guesthouse 
 
 
A Chinese nightclub 
 
 
Two investors (ethnic Lue) who 
provided rubber seedlings for 
villagers in exchange for land 
 
Lao partner who was responsible 
for documentary work and seeking 
land for the investment 
 
 
- Two Lue-Chinese investors who 
promoted villagers planting rubber 
under an informal contract system.  
- One Lue-Chinese investor who 
provided rubber seedlings for 
villagers under a formal contract 
system of relations 
 
- Owner of a Chinese restaurant 
and guesthouse where Chinese 
investors gathered for meals and 
business dealing. 
-Owner of a Chinese nightclub 
 
 
22/12/2009; 23/06/2010 
 
 
 
25/06/2010 
 
 
 
 
24/06/2010 
 
 
29/06/2010 
 
 
 
 
2/07/2010 
 
 
 
3/07/2010 
Others (NGOs and academic): 
Faculty of Agriculture, NUOL 
 
 
Associate Professor 
 
 
8/09/2009 
Faculty of Forestry, NUOL 
 
Associate Professor who has 
conducted research on forest and 
land management, land use policy 
11/09/2009 
The International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 
Lao office 
Business and Biodiversity Officer 14/09/2009 
The Norwegian Church Aid 
(NCA) 
A senior member of staff 
 
04/02/2010 
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Appendix 4 An overview of Long, Nalae, and Sing districts 
 Long district Nalae district Sing district 
Geography
84
  
- Mountainous areas account for 75 per 
cent of the district’s total area. Around 
1,500 ha of land can be used for paddy. 
 
- Mountainous areas account for around 98 
per cent of Nalae’s total area, leaving only 
two per cent of flat land along the river 
Namtha for wet-rice cultivation. 
 
- Mountainous areas account for around 85 
per cent of the district’s area. However, Sing 
is one of the two districts of the province 
(the other being Namtha district) which has 
large areas suitable for paddy (almost 5,000 
hectares are used for paddy. 
Population - In 2008, Long was home to 30,928 
inhabitants in 70 villages of which 30 per 
cent are located in mountainous areas. It 
has considerable ethnic, linguistic, and 
cultural diversity. The Akha are the major 
ethnic group accounting for 60 per cent of 
the total. Other major groups are Tai Lue, 
Tai Daeng, Kui, and Laen Taen. 
 
- In 2009, Nalae was home to 22,526 
inhabitants in 71 villages. The majority are 
Khmu, accounting for 85 per cent of the 
total population. The remainder belong to 
various lowland Tai ethnic groups. 
 
 
 
 
- In 2008, Sing was home to 31,543 
inhabitants in 94 villages. Two ethnic groups 
dominate the district’s population: i) Akha, 
who live mainly in the mountainous areas 
and account for 50 per cent of the total; and 
ii) Tai Lue who occupy land in Sing’s valley 
and make up around 30 per cent of the 
population. Sing is also home to Tai Dam, 
Tai Nue, Yao, Hmong, Phunoi, and Khmu 
ethnicities. 
 
                                                          
84
 There is probably some error on data over percentage of mountainous areas in Sing and Long districts as Long must have a higher percentage of mountainous 
areas than Sing district. I obtained these data from documents provided by DAFO officials from the two districts (Sing DAFO 2008; Long DAFO no date). It should 
also be noted that in the Lao PDR, there is concern over the accuracy of the data available. 
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Appendix 4 An overview of Long, Nalae, and Sing districts (continued) 
 Long district Nalae district Sing district 
Key state 
interventions  
- A resettlement programme was heavily 
implemented aiming to stop shifting 
cultivation and eradicate opium cultivation; 
villages in the mountainous areas were the 
target. 
- Massive resettlement occurred in the early 
2000s, resulting in a drop in the number of 
villages from 130 to 70 in 2009. These 
villagers have moved from the mountains to 
the lower slopes with easier access to the 
district centre (i.e. close to the main road or 
less than a day’s walk to Long town). While 
the government promised to provide 
infrastructure (road access, water supply, 
schools, and so on) and new means of living 
(paddy) for relocated villages, the 
government has rarely been able to deliver 
on these promises. This has resulted in 
difficulties for the relocated villagers when 
they moved to their new setting in the 
lowlands: losing upland agricultural land 
while not having access to paddy has led to 
rice shortages, and a high mortality rate in 
the early years of the relocation. 
- Nalae had a long history of resettlement, 
beginning just after the victory of the LPRP 
in 1975. Massive resettlement began from 
1997 when several of the government’s 
policies (opium eradication, stopping 
shifting cultivation, village consolidation) 
were launched. The number of villages 
dropped from 112 in 1997 to 71 villages in 
2010. While it was claimed that the 
resettlement programme had improved the 
quality of life of the uplanders by moving 
them to areas where ‘development’ (roads, 
water supply, education, state services, and 
market access) could be delivered, it was 
often a traumatic experience. While the 
government promised to provide new 
agricultural land for villagers, Nalae’s 
geography did not allow the government to 
keep its promises. Thus villagers in 
resettlement villages often have to go back 
to cultivate their original lands.  
 
- A resettlement programme was 
introduced in the mid 1990s and continued 
until the mid 2000s. The programme 
resulted in a decline in the number of 
villages from 110 in 1995 to 94 in 2005. The 
number of Akha villages dropped around 20 
per cent during this period. The decline was 
a result of a combination of the government 
induced resettlement programme and 
spontaneous resettlement of upland 
populations to lower slopes of the highlands 
or the periphery of Sing’s valley. Relocated 
villagers in Sing district also faced quite 
similar traumas to the relocated villagers in 
Long and Nalae districts. The government 
did not provide the ‘development’ they 
promised for relocated villages. Villagers 
became more vulnerable to disease; and 
had only limited opportunities for 
alternative income generation. Many 
relocated Akha became an impoverished 
labour force exploited by the dominant Tai 
lowlanders. 
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Appendix 4 An overview of Long, Nalae, and Sing districts (continued) 
 Long district Nalae district Sing district 
Key state 
interventions 
(continued). 
- Land Use Planning and Land Allocation 
Programme (LUP/LA) (see section 4.3.2.2 
for an overview of the programme), was 
introduced into upland communities 
throughout the district in the early 2000s.  
- The LUP/LA programme was carried out 
between the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 
some villages, the LUP/LA was introduced 
before the arrival of late comers, who were 
forced to relocate from their previous 
village under the resettlement programme, 
leading to discrepancies between 
households and allocated land and 
resources.  
- The LUP/LA programme was introduced in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. As in Nalae 
districts, late comers suffered. 
Economy and 
market integration 
- While Long district has some areas suitable 
for paddy, many resettlement villages have 
limited access to flat land and thus continue 
with their swidden agriculture. Upland 
households often experienced rice 
shortages but the situation has been 
generally better than for those in Nalae 
district. Collecting NTFPs is another 
significant contributor to people’s 
livelihoods  
- The majority of Nalae’s inhabitants 
practice shifting cultivation and collect 
forest products for both household 
consumption and to earn cash. The major 
NTFPs are sugar palm fruits, red mushroom, 
cardamom, bark, and rattan. Many upland 
households use the cash earned from selling 
NTFPs to buy rice in times of shortage. The 
amount of NTFPs they can collect has 
dramatically dropped due to the decrease in 
forest areas, partly because large areas of 
forest have become rubber plantations. 
 
- Shifting cultivation is the most important 
agricultural system practiced by uplanders, 
while paddy is practiced by lowlanders in 
Sing valley. In 2008, 73 per cent of the 
district’s total households were sufficient in 
rice and three per cent had a rice surplus. 
Generally, Sing has a rice surplus which is 
exported to China via the border checkpoint 
in Pang Thong, about 12 kilometres from 
Sing’s town. 
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Appendix 4 An overview of Long, Nalae, and Sing districts (continued) 
 Long district Nalae district Sing district 
Economy and 
market integration 
(continued). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Long was a district where road access was 
very limited. The district however is linked 
to Thailand, Myanmar, and China through 
the Mekong River which was illegally used 
by traders to transport goods between 
Chiang Saen district
85
 and Long, and Sing 
districts during the time that the border was 
closed. Since the reforms in 1986, a river 
port has been opened in Xiengkok and it has 
become a significant transhipment point for 
goods between Thailand and China. 
Opening the port was soon followed by the 
construction of road no. 17B connecting 
Xiengkok to China via the towns of Long and 
Sing (see Map 5.1).  
- The district has become an attractive area 
for Chinese investors since the mid 2000s, 
when they began to promote villager-based 
cassava and sugarcane plantations on the 
lower slopes under a contract system. 
- Commercial crops in Nalae are very limited 
due to its geography with limited arable 
land cash cropping. 
- The high cost of transportation also makes 
Nalae unattractive for traders. In the mid-
1990s, the FUF promoted cash crops in the 
villages along the main road. According to 
DAFO’s staff who accompanied the 
company to the target villages, only 50 
kilograms of maize seeds were provided for 
the whole district in the early days. In 2009, 
around 8 tons of maize seeds were grown, 
producing almost 2,000 tons of maize. 
Other cash crops produced in Nalae in 2009 
included 300 tons of sweet corn, 48 tons of 
sesame, and 10 tons of peanuts, far less 
than the cash crops produced in Long and 
Sing districts.  
- Sing’s geographical setting permits the 
district’s agriculture to be intensely 
integrated into the Chinese market. This 
began in the mid-1990s, when sugarcane 
was first planted under a contract system 
between villagers and a Chinese investor. In 
2003, sugarcane was planted both in the 
Sing valley and in the peripheral area of the 
valley in an area totalling 680 hectares. 
Though Sing DAFO was hesitant to 
encourage villagers to establish more 
plantations due to uncertainty over the 
buying policies of the Chinese sugar 
factories, the area of sugarcane has 
constantly increased; it was almost 2,000 
hectares in 2009.  
-The Sing valley has become a producing 
area for various kinds of vegetables (e.g. 
watermelon, pumpkin, chillies, beans, and 
garlic). These crops were first grown under 
a contract with the Chinese. Later, some 
localsbegan to grow crops using their own 
 
                                                          
85
 A border town of Thailand’s Chiang Rai province which is located on the right hand side of the Mekong River opposite Ton Phueng district of Bokeo province. 
This is the nearest Thai town on the Mekong River from China and Long district.  
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Appendix 4 An overview of Long, Nalae, and Sing districts (continued) 
 Long district Nalae district Sing district 
Economy and 
market integration 
(continued). 
 
Vegetable crops (such as pumpkin, chilli, 
bean and watermelon) were later promoted 
under a contract system on paddy fields 
after the rice harvest. Some villagers have 
followed investing their own capital to set 
up pumpkin or watermelon plantations. 
Some Chinese investors have rented land 
from villagers to set up crop plantations 
using both long-term and short-term rental 
arrangements for vegetable and fruit crops 
(such as banana, watermelon, pumpkin, 
chilli, and beans). 
- Long district is now an economic growth 
area. The Chinese have become new 
economic actors in the district. Two 
motorbike shops are run by Chinese 
entrepreneurs. One Chinese family runs a 
mobile-phone shop. In 2010, three out of six 
guesthouses in Long town were owned by 
Chinese; nearly 100 per cent of their 
customers were Chinese.  
 
 
 
 
 
- The level of spatial and economic 
integration in Nalae is less intense 
compared to Long and Sing districts. 
Electricity arrived in the district town at the 
end of 2009. However, many villagers still 
cannot afford the cost of getting power into 
their houses. There is a morning market in 
the district centre (see picture 2) where 
people come to buy groceries and bring 
goods to sell (such as vegetables from their 
gardens or rice fields, NTFPs, fish, and 
poultry). There are approximately 30 small 
grocery shops in Nalae mostly located 
around the market. One Chinese investor 
recently opened a shop selling grocery 
items and mobile phones. Apart from three 
small noodle shops, Nalae has two 
restaurants which open occasionally when 
there is a group of visitors (state officials or 
development workers from outside the 
district). 
capital. Some Chinese rent land from 
villagers and manage the plantation 
themselves; some hire villagers to work in 
their plantations and some use Chinese 
labourers. 
- Sing is the busiest town in Luang Namtha. 
It is a popular destination for foreign 
tourists who are attracted by its history and 
ethnic diversity. The number of tourists has 
dropped in recent years. In contrast, the 
number of investors, especially from China, 
has considerably increased. Some Chinese 
stop in Sing before going to other areas of 
the Lao PDR. Sing itself is also a destination 
for many Chinese who set up their own 
businesses ranging from various agricultural 
investments to running shops (groceries, 
cloth, mobile-phones, motorbikes, etc.). In 
2010, there were at least 6 Chinese 
guesthouses, four Chinese restaurants and a 
Chinese nightclub. 
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Appendix 4 An overview of Long, Nalae, and Sing districts (continued) 
 Long district Nalae district Sing district 
Rubber 
plantations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- From the mid-2000s, Long district, as well 
as other districts in Luang Namtha, became 
one of the most attractive areas for 
investment in rubber plantations. It is 
estimated that around 15,000 hectares of 
land are now covered by rubber which is 
invested in various forms: smallholder 
investment, informal deals between an 
investor and villagers, contract relations 
under either the 2+3 or 1+4 system, and 
concessions. While rubber brought hope to 
villagers of a better life, it has also created 
conflicts both between investors and 
villagers, and among villagers themselves 
over land issues. Generally, investors obtain 
permission to establish plantations from the 
state authorities at higher levels in 
government. These were often granted 
without consultation with the local 
authorities. State officials at the local level 
expressed a feeling of frustration when they 
were asked to find land for the investors. 
 
 
- In the mid-2000s, under the context of the 
rubber boom, the Luang Namtha provincial 
government considered rubber as a new 
route to resolving poverty in the province. 
Nalae government followed the policies 
originating from the provincial authorities in 
supporting villagers in setting up rubber 
plantations. Rubber shifted from the fifth 
priority to the first priority in Nalae DAFO’s 
strategic plan. In this context, the Xiang Jiao 
company was allowed to operate in Nalae. 
After discussion with the district authorities, 
the company promoted rubber trees in 25 
villages in 2006 before extending their 
operations to cover 29 villages in the 
following years. Though the main purpose 
of the promotion of rubber is to alleviate 
poverty, DAFO’s staff members themselves 
admit that some of the poorest villages are 
not included in the project due to 
difficulties with access. Thus, most villages 
which participate in the project are located  
-Rubber has become attractive for both 
lowland and upland populations in Sing. 
Sing DAFO first attempted to promote 
rubber in the 1990s after a study tour in 
Yunnan province by the district’s senior 
officials. However, very few villagers 
responded to this effort. Many rubber trees 
died in 1999 due to frost. Rubber became of 
interest to Sing villagers in the early 2000s 
due to the increasing price of latex and 
positive reports from rubber farmers in 
Xishuangbanna prefecture, Yunnan province 
and Hmong villagers in Luangnamtha. 
Villagers began setting up plantations and 
the planted area increased rapidly from less 
than 100 hectares in 2003 to around 1,200 
hectares two years later. The planted area 
had increased to 6,400 hectares by 2009. 
Most of the plantations in Sing district are 
based on farmers’ own initiative and 
investment. There are several cases where 
outsiders have provided seedlings for 
villagers in the uplands in exchange for land  
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Appendix 4 An overview of Long, Nalae, and Sing districts (continued) 
 Long district Nalae district Sing district 
Rubber 
plantations 
(continued). 
 close to the main road. The Nalae DAFO 
records that in 2009, forty villages were 
involved in contract farming relations 
with the Chinese company covering an 
area of 1,925.5 hectares. There are also 
252.5 hectares of trees planted under 
villagers’ own investment, while the 
company established a further 320 
hectares as a demonstration plantation. 
from villagers. Around 500 hectares of 
plantation are operated under a 2+3 
contract system with Chinese rubber 
companies. Three hundred hectares 
were granted to Chinese rubber 
companies to set up the plantations 
under a concession model. 
Sources: Fieldwork, 2009–2010; Cohen(2000); Fujita et al (2006); Daviau (2006); Manivong et al (2003); Romagny and Daviau(2003); RDMA (2007); (no date); Sing 
DAFO(2008) 
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